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ABSTRACT 
 
The Possibility of Mutual Benefit from Exchange between the Philosophy of Language and Second 




This dissertation has three parts. The first part is an ESL textbook that is based on a grammar which I call 
term and predicate grammar. This name reflects the view that all simple and complex sentences of 
English consist of one predicate and one or more terms, or are simple transforms of such sentences. 
There are four predicate types and seven term types, all of which can be specified precisely. The term 
and predicate grammar itself is based on the syntactic component of a semiotic system I developed, 
which standardly includes as well a semantic component and a pragmatic component. The second part 
of the dissertation establishes a connection between the philosophy of language and second language 
acquisition research and pedagogy by presenting two cases in which an analysis of a feature of English in 
the one discipline is juxtaposed with an analysis of the same feature in the other discipline. On the basis 
of these two cases, it is proposed that a merger of interests and lines of work between the two 
disciplines would be mutually beneficial, and that an ESL text book that is based in the philosophy of 
language should foster such a merger. The third and final part of the dissertation has a general aspect 
and a specific aspect. On its general aspect, it is a philosophical examination of the relationship between 
the implicit knowledge of language vs. explicit knowledge of language distinction in second language 
acquisition research and pedagogy and the knowing-how vs. knowing-that distinction in the philosophy 
of language. The two distinctions are found to align and it is claimed on this basis that the second 
language acquisition distinction has an antecedent in the earlier philosophical distinction. On its specific 
aspect, the third part of the dissertation is an analysis of what is called the interface issue in second 
language acquisition research. This issue addresses the question of how implicit knowledge and explicit 
knowledge contribute to the acquisition of a second language. Three positions have been taken on the 
issue, viz. the strong position, the no position and the weak position. On the strong position the explicit 
knowledge of language developed by instruction and practice plays a major role in acquisition, on the no 
position such knowledge plays no role in acquisition while on the weak position such knowledge plays a 
facilitating role in acquisition. But there is a consensus in the second language acquisition research 
community that the strong position should be rejected and yet it is this position that accords with the 
views of traditional language pedagogists, and with thoughtful common sense generally. This poses a 
dilemma that I claim can be resolved by making a philosophical interpretation of ideas and information 
that can be found in recent second language acquisition theory and research.      
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     There are many textbooks designed to help English as a second language or English as a foreign 
language students but this one is distinctive. All of the other textbooks that I am aware of present 
English as something like a collection of its parts and aspects:  verbs and prepositional phrases and 
dependent clauses, on the one hand, possession and mood and the count-mass distinction, on the 
other. The parts and aspects may well add up to the whole language but if there is any claim to this 
effect then it is decidedly implicit. The presentation of the parts and aspects follows a definite order but 
is not as order set by any constructive idea of the language, i.e. any idea of the language as a single 
construction of its many and various parts and aspects. Rather the order of presentation seems to be set 
by some idea of pedagogy, that the students are ready to learn this now and that later. I do not mean to 
suggest that there is anything wrong with this approach, and indeed there are excellent textbooks that 
implement it. I do not mean to criticize this approach but only to characterize it so that it can be 
contrasted with the approach taken here. The approach here is inspired by contemporary research in 
the philosophy of language and in linguistics, and especially in the burgeoning area that represents the 
intersection of the two disciplinary enterprises. It treats English as a single system. Certainly the 
language is characterized by its parts and aspects but all of these have to come together to form a 
coherent whole, no matter how large and complex. As will be seen, the central idea is that the grammar 
of English is a ‘term and predicate grammar’. That is to say, in the vast majority of cases, a simple 
sentence of English, as opposed to a complex or compound one, breaks down into one predicate, most 
typically a verb phrase, and one or more terms, each most typically either a name, a pronoun or a noun 
phrase. However, the full set of predicate types and the full set of term types, and the way in which they 
all fit together, will be specified precisely. The system of English that will emerge is one that is simple, 
orderly and intuitive, all of this being very much to the advantage of the ESL student. 
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     The student must be thought of as highly competent in natural language, as having a complete 
understanding of structure and meaning in their native language. Despite the enormous number of 
differences between the student’s native language and English, whether we speak in terms of a 
universal grammar, in the manner of Chomsky, or in some other terms, all natural languages are at some 
level, no matter how basic, more or less the same. Given this, if the student of English as a second or 
foreign language is presented with a systematic grammar of English that is also simple, orderly and 
intuitive then they should be able to encompass the new language within their general understanding of 
natural language. Over time, and with the great effort that is nonetheless required, they should come to 
recognize the correspondence between the L1, their native language, and the L2, English. By a rational, 
self-conscious process, they should be able to establish a system of analogical relationships of structure 
and meaning between features of the L1 and features of the L2. The meaning of ‘edificio’ in Spanish is 
the analogue of the meaning of ‘building’ in English. The structure ‘noun-adjective’ in French is the 
analogue of the structure ‘adjective-noun’ in English. These are of course the simplest of cases. Other 
cases are much more complex. If the L1 is article-less, like Russian and Mandarin, then what are the L1 
analogues of the L2 ‘a’, ‘an’ and ‘the’? The student must find something implicit in the L1 noun, or its 
context of use, to serve as the analogue of the L2 article. But, because the grammar of this text has the 
precise character that it does, because it is ‘open’ to the student in being systematic and in being simple, 
orderly and intuitive, even the most difficult task of the student will be brought within the realm the 
possible. Also, the style in which the text is written, and the large number of highly structured and real 
world-related exercises in includes, should engage the student in such a way that they will make 
progress towards proficiency much more easily and much more rapidly than they would by other 
instructional means.   
     The text will serve the student in at least two basic ways. The patterns of terms and predicates will be 
specified precisely and the student will be able to advance their proficiency in English by practicing the 
production of phrases that follow these patterns. There are for example eight noun phrase 
configurations and the student can be given a subject, sports, literature, fashion, international affairs, or 
whatever, and be asked to produce a phrase that conforms to each of these configurations while at the 
same time referring to the given subject. The same thing can be done at the sentence level where, given 
a restriction to just two object phrases, the number of configurations allowed by the pattern for simple 
sentences is large but manageably finite. In this way, the student will be helped greatly with their 
production in English. Over time, practice of the kind described here will naturally inform the student’s 
sub-conscious capacity to speak and write English according to its conventions. But the text will also 
serve the student by facilitating the evaluation of the English they produce naturally, out of the 
competence they bring to the study of the text. The teacher, a tutor, or even the student themselves, 
can show precisely how any sentence produced naturally by the student conforms to or fails to conform 
to the patterns established by the text. Since sentences produced by non-native users of English can 
vary away from proper usage in such a wide variety of ways, it is important that the text covers the 
micro-structure English in a manner that other texts do not, although there is no question that the 
teacher or a well-trained tutor will have to, first, determine the exact nature of the variation and, then, 
explain this variation patiently to the student. The text is designed mainly for what might be called the 
intermediate student but the advanced student can benefit in at least some ways from its systematic 
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and precise presentation of the language, and the beginning student can concentrate on the text’s 
comprehensive accounting of the word level grammar of the language, and the simpler of the sentence 

















     Because the grammar of English to be studied here has three distinct levels, the level of the word, the 
level of the phrase, and the level of the sentence, clauses being assimilated to sentences for the sake of 
simplicity, it was necessary to decide whether to present the grammar ‘bottom up’, i.e. from words to 
sentences, or to present it ‘top down’, i.e. from sentences to words, and because the text is designed to 
position the ESL student to compose the sentences that allow them to express their thoughts, it seemed 
more natural to go bottom up. But his means that the student will have to plod patiently through nouns 
and prepositions and verbs and determiners, and then through verb phrases and noun phrases before 
they are able to see the big picture of sentences and the way in which they are structured. So I ask the 
student to lend me their patience, assuring them that they will be rewarded for doing so. However, I will 
also provide a preview of the grammar as a whole so that the student will actually be able to see the big 
picture at the outset, albeit only in its most general outline. The preview runs as follows. 
     The focus is on simple, declarative sentences but there is a chapter in which questions, commands 
and exclamations, and complex and compound sentences are studied.  
     Now, the word level of the grammar takes the form of a 15 member set of categories of basic 
expressions, words for the most part. The 8 traditional parts of speech are included among the 15 
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categories, but so are more specialized categories like relative pronoun, copula and determiner. At the 
phrase level, there is a division into phrases that will be called terms, and phrases that will be called 
predicates. Phrases of the term type are essentially nominal. They include names, pronouns, noun 
phrases, infinitive phrases, gerund phrases and W/TH phrases. Phrases of the predicate type are 
essentially verbal. Each one of them consists of a ‘predicate base’ and one or more ‘term position 
blanks’. There are four types of predicate base, each type being distinguished by its key constituent. The 
four types, their respective key constituents and an example of each type of the simplest possible kind 
can be given compactly as follows:        
 
Type Key Constituent Example 
Action Verb runs 
Quality Adjective are wealthy 
Relation Preposition was in 
Identity Copula is 
 
We can add term position blanks to the predicate bases above to get the predicates 
 _____ runs 
 _____ runs _____ 
 _____ are wealthy 
 _____ is _____ 
Sentences are achieved by filling in the term position blanks with appropriate terms. Possibilities for the 
predicates above are: 
 Jane runs. 
 John runs marathons. 
 All Silicon Valley executives are wealthy. 
 Jane is the C.E.O.  
8 
 
     So this is the general outline of the grammar. The remainder of the text will work towards providing 














     This chapter presents the word level of the grammar. It is natural to handle the word level grammar 
of English by means of a set of categories of words, or more precisely, a set of categories of basic 
expressions since some of the truly primitive expressions of the language consist of more than one 
word: simple examples are the preposition ‘because of’ and the conjunction ‘if-then’. To accommodate 
this fact, we will take the term ‘word unit’ rather than the term ‘word’ to be the official designation of 
the truly primitive expressions of the language, although for naturalness in the exposition we will 
typically use the term ‘word’.  Now, it is possible to characterize the word level grammar of English by 
means of a 15 member set of categories. This set is based on the 8 traditional parts of speech but it also 
includes name, as a category separate from noun, and six highly specialized categories that give the 
grammar much more descriptive and explanatory power. The 15 categories divide into two broad types, 
the substantive type, words that can be seen as, in one way or another, referring to something in the 
world, and thus as having ‘substance’, on the one hand, and the functional type, words that facilitate the 
formation of more complex substantive expressions from simpler ones, starting at the level of the word, 
on the other hand. The 15 categories are as follows: 
1. Name (Na.)    6. Copula (Cop.)  11. Verb (V.) 
2. Relative Pronoun (R.P.)  7. Determiner (D.)  12. Adverb (Adv.) 
3. W/TH Word (W/TH W.)  8. Pronoun (Pro.)  13. Noun (No.) 
4. Particle (Pa.)    9. Conjunction (Con.)  14. Adjective (Adj.) 
5. Modal (M.)    10. Preposition (Pre.)  15. Interjection (I.) 
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The order of the categories can be explained as follows. Category 1., Name, is by far the largest 
category. It is speculated that there are approximately 1,000,000 words in English. Just think about how 
many more names, even in English, there are than that. But Name goes first because, in a sense, names 
are the most basic type of expressions in the language, and they are simple, fixed entities such that they 
pose no challenge to the student. And, category 15., Interjection, goes last because interjections are 
perhaps the least important expressions for true communicative purposes. They do not convey 
information, or even express opinion, so much as they ‘demonstrate’ emotion. And, like names, 
interjections are simple, fixed entities and thus are easy to learn.  Now, categories 2. through 10. contain 
relatively small, mostly exact numbers of words, and are presented in an order of size from the category 
W/TH Word, which has just 5 members, to the category Preposition, which as represented here has 
about 70 members . Finally, categories 11. through 14. follow an order of explanation, modified a bit for  
aesthetic purposes, as will be seen later. The next two chapters will be devoted to the presentation and 



















Putting aside their use in questions, which will be discussed later, relative pronouns serve as ‘stems’ or 
bases for the formation of relative clauses, and relative clauses serve as modifiers of nouns. Thus, for 
example, in the noun phrase 
 the student who loves Shakespeare 
the expression  
 who loves Shakespeare 
is a relative clause that modifies the noun 
 student 
and this relative clause has two parts, the relative pronoun 
 who 
and the incomplete sentence 
 loves Shakespeare 
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What makes the incomplete sentence incomplete is that it has a missing subject term or a missing 
object term. The missing subject term or object term is, in effect, the portion of the noun phrase that 
precedes the relative clause, and the incomplete sentence ‘says something about’ what that expression 
on its own refers to. Thus for example the incomplete sentence of the noun phrase under consideration 
 loves Shakespeare 
has a missing subject term. That subject term is the portion of the noun phrase that precedes the 
relative clause, namely 
 who lives Shakespeare 
which is of course 
 the student 
and if we supply the incomplete sentence with its missing subject term, we get the complete sentence 
 The student loves Shakespeare. 
Consider a somewhat more complex example, the noun phrase 
 the new student from China who is studying physics 
Here the relative clause is 
 who is studying physics 
which has two parts, the relative pronoun 
 who 
and the incomplete sentence 
 is studying physics 
What makes the incomplete sentence incomplete is a missing subject term. That subject term is the 
portion of the noun phrase that precedes the relative clause, namely 
 the new student from China 
and if we supply  the incomplete sentence with its missing subject term, we get the complete sentence 
 The new student from China is studying physics. 
Consider another example, one in which the incomplete sentence is incomplete because it has a missing 
object term: 
 the new student from China whom I taught last semester 
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Here the relative clause is 
 whom I taught last semester 
and it has two parts, the relative pronoun 
 whom 
and the incomplete sentence 
 I taught last semester 
Note that in another context this would be a complete sentence but here it is incomplete because it is 
missing the direct object term of its verb 
 taught 
and the missing object term is the portion of the noun phrase preceding the relative clause, namely 
 the new student from China 
and, again, if we supply the incomplete sentence with its missing object term, we get the complete 
sentence 
 I taught the new student from China last semester. 
       Now, the fact that the second component of a relative clause is (what might be thought of as) an 
incomplete sentence should not be seen as representing any kind of mistake. Rather, if we take the 
incomplete sentence to have a blank term position where the missing subject term or object term would 
go then we can say that there is a link between that blank position and the noun of the of the noun 
phrase, and that this link is the mechanism English has established to allow the relative clause to modify 
the noun. Thus for example the incomplete sentence in the noun phrase 
 the student who loves Shakespeare 
can be seen as having a blank subject term position as follows 
 the student who _____ loves Shakespeare 
and the link between that blank term  position and the noun of the noun phrase can be represented as 
follows 
              ___________ 
             ǀ                          ǀ        
             ˅                        ˅            
the [student] who _____ loves Shakespeare 
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This link is what allows the relative clause  
 who loves Shakespeare 
to modify the noun 
 student 
     It will be instructive to consider another case, one in which there is a missing object term. In the noun 
phrase 
 the new ambassador from China whom the university invited to lecture on geopolitics 
we might take there to be a blank object term position as follows 
 the new ambassador from China whom the university invited _____ to lecture on geopolitics 
and the link between that blank position and the noun of the noun phrase can be represented as 
follows: 
                             _______________________________________ 
                                         ǀ                                                                                             ǀ 
                            ˅                                                                                           ˅ 
 the new [ambassador] from China whom the university invited _____ to lecture on geopolitics 
 
This link is what allows the relative clause  
 whom the university  invited to lecture on geopolitics 
to modify the noun 
 ambassador 
     Further, in both cases, the incomplete sentence can be made complete if the portion of the noun 
phrase that precedes the relative clause is filled into the blank term position. Thus, with respect to the 
first case, if 
 the student  
is filled into the blank subject term position of  
 _____ loves Shakespeare 
then the result is the complete sentence 
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 The student loves Shakespeare. 
And, with respect to the second case, if 
 the new ambassador from China  
is filled into the blank object term position of  
 the university invited _____ to lecture on geopolitics 
then the result is the complete sentence 
 The university invited the new ambassador from China to lecture on geopolitics. 
Note that this procedure of filling in the blank term position can be used to test the structural 
correctness of a relative clause. 
     A very important feature of the use of relative pronouns is that there is a scheme of selectional 
restriction for them: ‘who’ and ‘whom’ are to be used only with nouns that refer to persons and ‘which’ 
and ‘that’ are to be used only with nouns that refer to things, but ‘whose’ can be used with nouns that 
refer to persons and with nouns that refer to things. Thus in the relative clauses of the noun phrases 
 the student who loves Shakespeare. 
 the new ambassador from China whom university invited to lecture on geopolitics 
the nouns ‘student’ and ‘ambassador’ refer to persons and the relative pronouns ‘who’ and ‘whom’ are 
used, respectively, and in the relative clauses of the noun phrases 
 a computer that has adequate memory capacity 
 an early edition of Milton which sold at auction for $100,000 
the nouns ‘computer’ and ‘edition’ refer to things and the relative pronouns ‘that’ and ‘which’ are used, 
respectively, but, in the relative clauses of the noun phrases 
 the artists whose work I admire 
 the paintings whose origins have not yet been determined 
the noun ‘artists’ refers to persons while the noun ‘paintings’ refers to things, but the relative pronoun 
‘whose’ is used in both cases.   
     Another very important feature of the use of relative pronouns is that all of them except ‘that’ can 
serve as the stem or bases of a relative clause which does not attach to the noun of a noun phrase but 
to a complete noun phrase occurring as a term in a sentence, or to a sentence itself. However, the 
content that the relative clause provides is considered to be auxiliary to, or in addition to, the content 
expressed by what might be called the ‘host’ sentence, i.e. the sentence containing the noun phrase 
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term that the relative clause attaches to or the sentence itself that the relative clause attaches to. And, 
the fact that the content that the relative clause provides is auxiliary to the content provided by the host 
sentence is indicated by setting the relative clause off by a comma or a pair of commas, depending on 
whether it occurs at the back of the host sentence or somewhere inside it. The following three examples 
reveal all of the possibilities: 
 She scrapped her old computer, whose processor was a bit slow. 
 She bought a new computer, which was a risky thing to do given her financial situation. 
 Her clients, who are all struggling with their own businesses, will appreciate her greater 
 productivity. 
In the first example, the ‘whose’ based relative clause attaches to the term ‘her old computer’ and takes 
one coma since it occurs at the back of the host sentence. In the second example, the ‘which’ based 
relative clause attaches to the whole host sentence ‘She bought a new computer.’ and also takes one 
comma since it occurs at the back of that host sentence. And, in the third example, the ‘who’ based 
relative clause attaches to the term ‘Her clients’ and takes two commas since it occurs inside the host 
sentence. Note that the fourth combinatorial possibility, a relative clause that attaches to the whole 
host sentence and occurs inside of it, thus taking two commas, is ruled out since a relative clause can 
attach to an expression, a noun, a term, a whole sentence, only if that expression, in its entirety, occurs 
at the left of the relative clause. In traditional English grammar, relative clauses that attach directly to 
the noun of a noun phrase are called ‘restricted ‘relative clauses while relative clauses that attach to the 
terms of sentences or to sentences themselves, and thus take commas, are called ‘unrestricted’ relative 
clauses.        
     One of the most troubling things related to relative pronouns is the question of whether to use ‘who’ 
or ‘whom’ in the composition of a relative clause when the noun to be modified refers to a person or 
some persons. Effectively, however, the question has already been answered. The two relative clauses 
 the student who _____ loves Shakespeare  
 the new ambassador from China whom the university invited _____ to lecture on geopolitics 
were discussed above. The first one was presented as having a missing subject term as we can see from 
 the student who _____ loves Shakespeare 
and it uses the relative pronoun ‘who’ while the second one was presented as having a missing object 
term as can be seen from 
 the new ambassador from China whom the university invited _____ to lecture on geopolitics 
and it uses the relative pronoun ‘whom’. So, ‘who’ is used where the noun being modified refers to a 
person or some persons and the incomplete sentence of the modifying relative clause has a missing 
subject term whereas ‘whom’ is used where the noun being modified refers to a person or some 
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persons and the incomplete sentence of the modifying relative clause has a missing object term. And, in 
fact, in traditional English grammar, ‘who’ is called the subjective relative pronoun while ‘whom’ is 
called the objective relative pronoun.  
     A final note here, however, is that there are many contemporary prescriptive grammarians of English, 
i.e. grammarians who make recommendations regarding English usage, who say that ‘whom’ should be 
eliminated from the language. They seem to think that it is anachronistic. Where a sentence has been 
composed in such a way that it contains a relative clause employing ‘whom’, they recommended that 
the sentence be restructured so that there is no longer a need for the ‘whom’. An opposing view is that 
mastery of the ‘who’/’whom’ distinction deepens one’s understanding of the grammatical structure of 
English, and that the correct use of ‘whom’ in particular is a mark of distinction both in writing and 
speech, but especially in speech.  
     The most interesting thing about relative pronouns, however, is that they do serve as the stems or 
bases of relative clauses, and yet relative clauses are by far the most powerful modifiers of nouns. The 
most basic modifiers of nouns are of course adjectives but, despite the fact that there are thousands 
and thousands of them in English, at any given moment there is a finite and definite number of them. 
Thus it is likely, and in fact quite true, that there are occasions on which a user of English will not find an 
adjective that expresses their ‘modification idea’, i.e. whatever it is that the user wants to attribute to 
the individual or individuals referred to by the noun. There will simply be no adjective that has the right 
meaning for the purpose. But given sufficient powers of articulation, the user of English can compose a 
sentence that expresses any idea whatsoever that occurs to them, including any modification idea. And 
in the case of a sentence expressing a modification idea, the user has only to alter the sentence they 
have composed in such a way that it becomes an incomplete sentence that can serve as the second 
component of a relative clause that will modify the noun. Presumably the sentence will contain a term 
referring the same thing that the noun to be modified refers to, and perhaps consists in or be based on 
that very noun, such that the alteration takes the form of the deletion of that term from the sentence 
followed by the prefixing of the appropriate relative pronoun. So it might be said in sum that relative 
pronouns serve as the stems or bases of relative clauses, and yet relative clauses provide unlimited 





    
1. Identify the noun phrases in the following sentences that have relative clauses and 
 (a) identify the relative pronoun and incomplete sentence parts of the relative clause involved 
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 (b) put a term position blank into the incomplete sentence to show how it is incomplete 
 (c) determine whether the term position blank is of the subject or the object type, and 
 (d) fill the portion of the noun phrase that precedes the relative clause into the term position   
       blank of the incomplete sentence in order to produce the relevant complete sentence. 
 
2. Use the relative pronouns and incomplete sentences provided to add relative clause modifiers to the 

















     Perhaps you can see now the logic of the term ‘W/TH word’. Each word in the list above begins with 
letter ‘w’ or the letter ‘t’ followed by the letter ‘h’, except for the word ‘how’, which at least has the 
letter ‘h’. Implicit in this explanation is the fact that the ‘/’ of the term means ‘or’. 
     Speaking very generally, with respect to the words in each of the several categories of functional 
expressions we will cover here, we will want to specify two things, namely the grammar of the words 
involved and their meanings. However it will sometimes be the case that, precisely because we are 
dealing with functional expressions, like ‘who’, ‘could’ and ‘be’, as opposed to substantive ones like 
‘mountain’, ‘student’ and ‘fork’, there will not really be separable grammar and meaning and instead 
there will be just ‘function’. Further, we will tend to speak less in terms of meaning and more in terms of 
‘conditions of application’, by which is meant whatever simple considerations can be presented to help 
the student to use the words involved. 
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     Now what we will offer by way of conditions of application for the W/TH words is an association of 









    
Unlike the other associations, the association of ‘that’ with situation needs some explanation but it will 
be much more convenient to provide this explanation after the grammar of W/TH words has been given. 
     We will say that W/TH words serve as the ‘stem’, or basis, for W/TH phrases, and that W/TH phrases 
serve as subjects and objects in sentences. Thus, for example, the W/TH word ‘who’ serves as the stem 
for the W/TH phrase 
 who love Shakespeare 
and the W/TH word ‘what’ serves as the stem for the W/TH phrase 
 what they want 
Now the earlier W/TH phrase serves as the subject of the sentence 
 Students who love Shakespeare tent to love language as well. 
and the later W/TH phrase serves as the object of the sentence 
 We have what they want. 
We need two more examples as follows: 
 1) I know that the U.S. is at war in Afghanistan. 
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Here the W/TH phrase 
 that the U.S. is at war in Afghanistan 
serves as the object of the sentence and its parts are the W/TH word ‘that’ and the sentence 
 The U.S. is at war in Afghanistan. 
and yet this sentences presents a situation. 
 2) I believe that the moon is made of green cheese. 
Here the W/TH phrase 
 that the moon is made of green cheese 
serves as the object of the sentence and its parts are the W/TH word ‘that’ and the sentence 
 The moon is made of green cheese. 
and yet this sentence presents a situation. Now the situation in the case of 1) is a sad fact while the 
situation in the case of 2) is perhaps a fantasy entertaining to children. Still we can see now the 
justification for associating the W/TH word ‘that’ with the concept word ‘situation’. In the second 






1) Identify all of the W/TH phrases that occur in the article ‘Literary Cubs’ appearing on page E1 of the 
Thursday Styles section of the December 1st, 2011 New York Times. 
2) Produce five W/TH phrases, having to do with style, sports, politics, art and business, respectively, 









     There are 12 modals. They are as follows: 
 
could  may  can  do 
should  might  shall  does 
would  must  will  did 
 
Grammatically modals are very simple. They are optional components of predicate bases and when a 
modal does appear in a predicate base it appears as the first, or leftmost, component of that predicate 
base, and it forces the first or only verbal element to its right, either a copula or verb, to take the 
infinitive form. Let us consider five cases: 
 
1. the modal ‘can’ is the first component  of the predicate base 
 can compete effectively 
which might appear in the sentence 
 The American team can compete effectively with the Russian team. 
and ‘can’ forces the verb ‘to compete’ to take the infinitive form. Compare the sentence 
 The American team competes effectively against the Russian team. 
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where there is no modal and the verb ‘to compete’ is free to take the present singular form ‘competes’. 
 
2. the modal ‘could’ is the first component  of the predicate base 
 could be competing effectively 
which might appear in the sentence 
 The American team could be competing effectively with the Russian team. 
and ‘could’ forces the copula ‘to be’ to take the infinitive form. Compare the sentence 
 The American team was competing effectively against the Russian team. 
where there is no modal and the copula ‘to be’ is free to take the past singular form ‘was’. 
3. the modal ‘may’ is the first component  of the predicate base 
 may truly be suitable 
which might appear in the sentence 
 This set of directives may truly be suitable as the protocol for the new division. 
and ‘may’ forces the copula ‘to be’ to take the infinitive form. Compare the sentence 
 This set of directives truly is suitable as the protocol for the new division. 
where there is no modal and the copula ‘to be’ is free to take the present singular form ‘is’. 
4. the modal ‘should’ is the first component  of the predicate base 
 should probably be in 
which might appear in the sentence 
 Jones should probably be in Dallas. 
and ‘should’ forces the copula ‘to be’ to take the infinitive form. Compare the sentence 
 Jones probably was in Dallas. 
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where there is no modal and the copula ‘to be’ is free to take the past singular form ‘was’. 
5. the modal ‘must’ is the first component  of the predicate base 
 must actually be 
which might appear in the sentence 
 This politician must actually be the representative from our district. 
and ‘must’ forces the copula ‘to be’ to take the infinitive form. Compare the sentence 
 This politician actually was the representative from our district. 
where there is no modal and the copula ‘to be’ is free to take the past singular form ‘was’. 
     But now, the meanings of modals are as complicated and their grammar is simple.  To capture their 
meanings effectively, I will enlist the help of a dictionary, where all of the senses of each modal are 
clearly specified. The dictionary I have chosen is the ESL dictionary Merriam-Webster’s Advanced 
Learner’s English Dictionary, which is excellent generally. However, what is offered here goes well 
beyond what the dictionary provides because 
A. all of the modals of English have been collected into a neat set of 12   
B. from among the senses specified by the dictionary, the main one for each modal will be selected 
C. a ‘condition of application’ will be provided for each modal as it is understood in relation to its main 
sense, and the condition of application will be simpler to understand and use than the sense of the 
modal it is related to  
D. the 12 modals will be divided into just five groups of two or three modals each, and each of these 








E. a simple relation will be established between/among the members of each group 
The effect of A. – E. will be a dramatic simplification of the modal part of English for the student. 
      Now I will present here the complete set of senses only for the modal ‘must’. For each of the other 
11 modals, I will present only the main sense. The student will use the indicated dictionary to access the 
others. The dictionary lists 5 senses for the modal ‘must’, but the first sense is broken down into two 
sub-senses so that effectively there are 6 senses. These senses are as follows:  
1. a. Used to say that something is required or necessary 
1. b. Used to say that something is required by rule or law 
2. Used to say that someone should do something 
3. Used to say that something is very likely 
4. Used in various phrases to emphasize a statement 
5. Used in questions that express annoyance or anger 
The main sense is, no surprise, 1.a. in relation to it, the dictionary provides 11 example sentences as 
follows: 
 You must stop. 
 I have told him what he must do. 
 One must eat to live. 
 You must follow the rules. 
 We must correct these problems soon or the project will fail. 
 I must remember to stop at the store. 
 Must you go? Yes, I’m afraid I really must. 
 Must you go? No I really don’t have to. 
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 If you must go, at least wait until the storm is over. 
 It must be noted, however, that the company was already in financial difficulties. 
 We must keep/bear in mind that she didn’t have any previous experience. 
Now, it is time to provide the condition of application for the modal ‘must’, the device so to speak that 
will make it possible for you to control its use, its main use.  I want to say that we use ‘must’ in relation 
to an interest, in relation to the possibility of gaining something that is of value to us, or of losing 
something that is of value to us. So if I say,  
 You must attach your transcript to the application for the scholarship. 
then I am specifying an action the taking of which will increase the chances of your gaining funding for 
your study. And if I say,  
 You must go to the dentist. 
then I am specifying an action the taking of which will decrease the chances of your losing a tooth. The 
effort here is to make things simple but with human language, things are never really simple and thus, in 
the case of the scholarship sentence above, it could be argued that the attachment of the transcript is 
an action the taking of which will decrease the chances of your losing the opportunity to be considered 
for the scholarship by having your application declared incomplete. I think that in many if not most cases 
of the use of ‘must’ there is this kind of ambiguity of interpretation, or perspective. A loss can often be 
seen as a failure to gain, and a gain can often be seen as the avoidance of a loss. It’s the same 
phenomenon we have in relation to the question, ‘Is the glass half empty, or is it half full?’. And this is 
fine. I still think that the condition of application provided here for the modal ‘must’, seeing it as a term 
to be used in a case of interest, a case in which there is something of value to be gained or something of 
value to be lost, will make it much easier for you to control the term, to understand sentences produced 
by others that contain it, and to produce sentences of your own that employ its power. 
     Let us consider next the modal ‘should’.  The dictionary lists 9 senses for it, although three of them 
are British, not American. I take the first one, 1.a., to be the main one. It is as follows: 
 Used to say or suggest that something is the proper, reasonable, or best thing to do 
Consider the first example sentence given, namely 
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 You should get some rest. 
I want to say that the condition of application for the modal ‘should’ is the same as that for the modal 
‘must’. That is to say, we use ‘should’ in relation to an interest, in relation to the possibility of gaining 
something that is of value to us, or of losing something that is of value to us. In the case of the example 
sentence the interest is feeling good or being healthy. The example sentence specifies an action the 
taking of which will increase our chances of gaining good feeling or health. But there is a difference 
between the case of ‘should’ and the case of ‘must’, and it is that the interest in the case of ‘must’ is a 
critical interest. So if we compare  
 You should go to the doctor. 
with 
 You must go to the doctor. 
Then you can see the difference. That is, we have interest in both cases but in the first case, there is the 
possibility of gaining a sense of well-being. The interest is not critical. But in the second case there is the 
possibility of losing one’s life. The interest is critical. We are now in a position to say that the modal 
‘should’ and the modal ‘must’ form one of our five sub-groups of modals, the sub-group characterized 
by the concept of interest. Let us now specify the other four sub-groups schematically as follows. 
     The modal ‘can’ has 9 senses. I take first one, 1., to be the main one. It is as follows: 
 To be able to do something 
and the leading example is 
 I don’t need any help. I can do it myself. 
The condition of application for ‘can’ can be given by saying that we use it in relation to the existence, or 
presence, of an ability. 
     The modal ‘could’ has 7 senses. I take second one, 2.a., to be the main one. It is as follows: 
 Used to say that something is possible 
and the example that is most convenient in relation to my scheme here is 
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 They could still succeed, although it’s not likely. 
The condition of application for ‘could’ can be given by saying that we use it in relation to the existence, 
or presence, of an ability, provided that a certain condition is met. In in relation to the example 
sentence, the condition might be getting a line of credit with a bank. If the condition of getting a line of 
credit with a bank were met then the ability to succeed would come into existence, would be present. 
     Now, we are in a position to say that the modal ‘can’ and the modal ‘could’ form one of our five sub-
groups of modals, the sub-group characterized by the concept of ability.  
     The modal ‘will’ has 9 senses. I take first one, 1., to be the main one. It is as follows: 
 Used to say that something is expected to happen in the future 
and the leading example is 
 We will leave tomorrow. 
The condition of application for ‘will’ can be given by saying that we use it in relation to a decision, to 
express the fact that a decision has been made. 
     The modal ‘would’ has 16 senses. I take second one, 2., to be the main one. It is as follows: 
 Used to talk about a possible situation that has not happened or that you are imagining 
and the example that is most convenient in relation to my scheme here is 
 If I could leave work early, I would. 
The condition of application for ‘would’ can be given by saying that we use it in relation to a decision 
that has a precondition. If the precondition is met then a decision will be made. In in relation to the 
example sentence, the pre-condition might be being on top of your work, of having the boss be out of 
the office. If the precondition is met then the individual will decide to leave work early. 
     We are in a position now to say that the modal ‘will’ and the modal ‘would’ form one of our five sub-
groups of modals, the sub-group characterized by the concept of decision. 
     The modal ‘may’ has 8 senses. I take first one, 1., to be the main one. It is as follows: 
 Used to indicate that something is possible or probable 
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and the leading example is 
 They may still succeed. 
The condition of application for ‘may’ can be given by saying that we use it in relation to possibility or 
probability. 
     The modal ‘might’ has 10 senses. I take the first one, 1., to be the main one. It is as follows: 
 Used to say that something is possible 
and the leading example is  
 We might go if they ask us, but then again we might not. 
The condition of application for ‘might’ can be given by saying that we use it in relation to possibility or 
probability. In in relation to the example sentence, decision is involved but what is being expressed is 
mere possibility, or low probability - it’s difficult to make a distinction between the two.   
     But now we have used the same condition of application for both ‘may’ and ‘might’, so clearly they 
form one of our five sub-groups of modals, the sub-group characterized by the concept of, we might say, 
possibility-probability.  
          The situation is a bit different with ‘do’, ‘does’ and ‘did’. They are really three forms of one word, 
which really has a single sense  
 Used to make a statement stronger 
in relation to which the most convenient example for my scheme is 
 Well, I did warn you that it would sting a little. 
So the three form the fifth and final sub-group, which is characterized by emphasis. 
     But now you should ask what happened to the modal ‘shall’? I have not saved it for last because it 
seems to be passing out of the language, becoming archaic. Rather I saved it for last because I see it as 
having the same condition of application as ‘will’ so that it joins the ‘will’, ‘would’ sub-group as a variant 









Modal Sub-Group Component 
 




‘should’ – non critical interest 
 




‘can’ - ability 
 




‘will’/‘shall’ - decision 
 




‘may’ - possibility 
 




‘does’ – singular, present 
‘do’ – plural, present 
 
 
‘did’ – singular, past 







1) Identify all of the modals in the article ‘Literary Cubs’ appearing on page E1 of the Thursday Styles 
section of the December 1st, 2011 New York Times and say in each case specifically what corresponds to 
the concept associated with the modal. 
2) For each of the 12 modals, produce a sentence that uses that modal and say what specifically 
corresponds to the concept associated with the modal. Let the subjects of the sentences vary over your 









     There are 17 copulas. They are as follows: 
 
 be  have  have been  am being 
 am  has  has been  is being 
 is  had  had been  are being 
 are       was being 
 was       were being 
 were 
 
The copulas in the first column are forms of the verb ‘to be’, the ones in the second column are forms of 
the verb ‘to have’, the ones in the third column will be called ‘mixed forms’ since each one combines a 
form of the verb ‘to be’ with ‘been’, which seems to be etymologically related to the verb ‘to be’, and 
the ones in the fourth and final column will be called ‘experimental’, or ‘provisional’, copulas because 
the expressions involved are not recognized as copulas and yet I will try to make the case that a 
functionally complete copula sub-system requires them. Now the case with respect to grammar and 
meaning as regards the copulas is just the opposite of that as regards the modals. We said that the 
grammar of modals is very simple but the meaning is very complicated. Well, to the extent that copulas 
have separable meaning and grammar, the meaning is very simple in that each copula indicates number, 
either singular or plural, of course, and tense, either past or present, while the grammar of  copulas is 
very complicated indeed. However, it might be better to say that copulas are true functional expressions 
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in that they do not in fact have separable meaning and grammar but instead serve functionally in the 
production of complex expressions that do have meaning, and of course, as complex,  have grammar as 
well.  
     Now what the copulas do is to work with the other elements that serve as components of predicate 
bases to produce the characteristics of predicate bases. And, we will see that while there are four 
columns of expressions that are morphologically related, i.e. related in the sense that, in the history of 
the language, one of the expressions appeared first and then the others developed from it, and possibly 
also all of the expressions are formed from more or less the same parts, the same syllables and/or 
letters, there are actually five groups, or sets, of copulas because ‘be’ has a unique, and highly 
specialized function, and thus constitutes the first group on its own. It helps predicate bases to produce 
modality because, wherever a predicate base with a copula takes on a modal, that copula must 
transform into ‘be’. So, for example, if the predicate bases of the sentences  
 They [are performing well]. 
 The boy [was very lonely] when he was away at boarding school.  
 The candidates [are from] the south. 
 She [is clearly] the leading authority. 
Take on modals, say, ‘could’, ‘must’, ‘should’ and ‘will, respectively, as follows  
 They [could be going soon]. 
 The boy [must be very lonely] when he is away at boarding school.  
 The candidates [should be from] the south. 
 She [will clearly be] the leading authority.  
then, as we see, their copulas all automatically transform into ‘be’. 
And, the copula ‘be’ has no other uses.  
     The copulas in the other four groups, however, function in a more complicated way. Thus the ones in 
the second group, the ones in the first column other than ‘be’, namely ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’ and ‘were’, have 
three distinct functions.  
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(1) Formation of Predicate Bases 
The copulas ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’ and ‘were’ help to form predicate bases of three of the four types of 
predicate base, namely the type having an adjective as its main component, the type having a 
preposition as its main component and the type a copula as its main component. The following 
sentences illustrate this: 
 The boy [was lonely] when he was away at boarding school.  
 The candidates [are from] the south. 
 She [is] the leading authority. 
The key components of the three predicate bases are the adjective ‘lonely’, the preposition ‘from’ and 
the copula ‘is’, respectively. All of the predicate bases are structurally simple in that they contain only 
the essential elements of their type, i.e., they contain no adverbs and or modals. The copulas ‘is’, ‘are’, 
‘was’, and ‘were’ then serve to indicate number, either singular or plural, and tense, either past or 






















(2) Characterization in Terms of Aspect 
The copulas ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’ and ‘were’ help predicate bases that have a verb as their main component, 
and do not have a modal component, to produce aspect. There are two characteristics of aspect, the 
indicative and the progressive. The following two sentences illustrate this distinction: 
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 Jane [plays] tennis. 
 Jane [is playing] tennis. 
The predicate base of the first sentence has the indicative aspect while the predicate base of the second 
sentence has the progressive aspect. In order to have the progressive aspect a predicate base must have 
a verb as its main component and that verb has to be of the present participle form, which is the form of 
the verb that has the ‘-ing’ ending. And when the verb of the predicate base is of the present participle 
form, the predicate base must have a copula component, either ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’, or ‘were’. Predicate 
bases that do not have the progressive aspect have the indicative aspect, so all predicate bases whose 
main component is an adjective, a preposition or a copula are indicative, and so are predicate bases 
whose main component is a verb that is not in the present participle form. When we say that the 
predicate base of a sentence has the indicative or the progressive aspect, we can also say that the 
sentence containing that predicate base has the indicative or the progressive aspect, respectively.  
Perhaps the nature of the progressive aspect can be brought out by considering the following three 
sentences in relation to a time line. 
 John hunts deer.  
 John shot a deer. 
 John is barbequing the deer now. 
The second sentence indicates an action at a point along the time line. The third sentence indicates 
activity through a span along the time line. The first sentence is something of a generalization and it 
indicates activity of a certain type through more or less regularly occurring spans along the time line. It 
has the progressive aspect. Perhaps it is fair to say that, when a sentence has the progressive aspect, it 
emphasizes the active in time. Compare the past tense sentences 
 John barbequed the deer. 
 John was barbequing the deer. 
The sentences don’t have the same meaning because John might have been barbequing the deer and 
yet failed to finish the job. But we can get rid of this difference by comparing 
 John played the guitar. 
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 John was playing the guitar. 
In both of these sentence pairs, the first sentence emphasizes the end, more or less, while the second 
sentence emphasizes the means: in both pairs, the first sentence emphasizes a result, more or less, 
while the second sentence emphasizes the action or activity that led to the result. Now, emphasis on the 
action or activity forces recognition of a span or period of time, and quite often the progressive aspect is 
employed where the speaker or writer wants to provide a temporal reference point, but can’t be precise 
and thus settles for a ‘reference span’, for an action or activity other than the one given by the verb in 
the present participle form. Thus consider 
 John was playing the guitar when the guests began to leave. 
Here it is the leaving of the guests that that is featured, that the speaker or writer is interested in, and 
John’s playing of the guitar has the subservient function of indicating, just approximately, when the 
guests began to leave. I believe that this function is the dominant function of the progressive aspect. But 
note in this connection that a predicate base that has the progressive aspect should not be confused 
with a gerund phrase serving as a subject or object term. Thus the sentence  
 Segovia [was playing] Spanish ballads.          
has the progressive aspect in view of the indicated predicate base, but the sentence 
 Playing Spanish ballads [was] Segovia’s passion.   
does not have the progressive aspect in view of the indicated predicate base: it has instead the gerund 
phrase subject term ‘playing Spanish ballads’, which is certainly therefore featured in the sentence. 
(3) Characterization in Terms of Voice 
The copulas ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’ and ‘were’ help predicate bases that have a verb as their main component 
to produce voice. There are two characteristics of voice, the active and the passive. The following two 
sentences illustrate this distinction: 
 Jane calls John. 
 John is called by Jane. 
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The first sentence is in the active voice because its subject ‘Jane’ performs the action given by the verb 
‘calls’, the action of calling, and the second sentence is in the passive voice because its subject, ‘John’, 
receives, so to speak, the action given by the verb ‘called’, again the action of calling. If for the sake of 
convenience, and nothing else, we say that the active voice sentence is basic then the passive voice 
sentence is arrived at by transforming the active voice sentence in four steps:  
(1) the subject term and the object term are transposed, i.e. the order of appearance of the subject 
term and the object term is reversed: thus the subject term ‘Jane’ becomes the object term  and the 
object term ‘John’ becomes the subject term 
(2) the verb of the active voice sentence is changed to the past form, if necessary: thus the verb ‘calls’ is 
changed to the past form ‘called’ 
The verb ‘to call’ is a regular verb and thus it has four forms, or parts 
 
‘to call’ Regular 
Present – plural call 
Present – singular calls 
Past called 
Present Participle calling 
  
Thus if the active voice sentence were 
 Jane called John.  
Then the corresponding passive voice sentence would be 
 John was called by Jane. 
so that a change of the verb to the past form would not be necessary.  
(3) the copula from among  ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’, and ‘were’ that agrees with the new subject of the emerging 




(4) the preposition ‘by’ is installed in the first connector position, which is the connector position just 
after the predicate base.  
Let us consider now a more complex case: 
 He [must willingly give] them all of the profits of the company. 
 They [must be willingly given] all of the profits of the company by him. 
There are several particular things to note here.  
- the predicate base has the modal component ‘must’ and the adverb component ‘willingly’, which are 
unaffected in the transformation 
- where the verb of the active voice sentence is irregular and has a past participle form it is changed to 
that form: thus the verb ‘give’ is changed to the past participle form ‘given’ 
The verb ‘to give’ is an irregular verb and has five forms, or parts 
 
‘to give’ Irregular 
Present - plural give 
Present - singular gives 
Past gave 
Present Participle giving 
Past Participle given 
 
- the subject term and the object term of the active voice sentence are pronouns and when they 
transpose they have to change case: thus when the subject term ‘he’ becomes an object term it changes 
into the objective pronoun ‘him’, and when the object term ‘them’ becomes the subject term it changes 
into the subjective pronoun ‘they’ 














- in the active voice sentence, the object term ‘them’ appears before the object term ‘all of the profits of 
the company’ but, in the passive voice sentence the object term which transposed with ‘them’, and thus 
replaces it, namely ‘him’, appears after the object term ‘all of the profits of the company’: the apparent 
reason for this is that the verb ‘to give’ wants to have either the term representing whom something 
was given to (‘them’/’they’) or the term representing what was given (‘all of the profits of the company’) 
as its direct object and thus who gave something, the giver, (‘he’/’him’) cannot appear directly after the 
verb in the passive voice sentence.  
     The copulas in the third group, ‘have’, ‘has’ and ‘had’, are used to form three of the six basic tenses of 
English, which are as follows: 
 Singular Plural 
Past He worked. They worked. 
Present He works. They work. 
Future He will work. They will work. 
Past Perfect She had worked. They had worked. 
Present Perfect She has worked. They have worked. 
Future Perfect She will have worked. They will have worked. 
  
So ‘had’ is used to form the past perfect tense, both in the singular and in the plural, ‘has’ is used to 
form the present perfect tense in the singular, ‘have’ is used to form the present perfect tense in the 
plural, and ‘have’ is also used, along with the modal ‘will’, to form the future perfect, both singular and 
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plural. The verb in each case must be in its past form, or where it has one, its past participle form. In the 
chart, each occurrence of the verb ‘to work’ in a perfect construction is in the past form ‘worked’. We 
will see a case involving a verb that has a past participle below. Regarding terminology, the past, the 
present and the future can all be called simple tenses, so that we can say that there are simple tenses 
and there are prefect tenses, and both break down into the past the present and the future. 
     Now you probably have a pretty good understanding of the simple tenses but the perfect tenses need 
some explanation. Let us say that we have three ‘time zones’ as follows: 
              the past zone                                    the present zone                                   the future zone 
   
  
We can let the left zone represent the past, the middle zone the present and the right zone the future, 
but the explanation of the perfect tenses will be based on a comparison of them with the simple tenses 
so we need a two tier time zone structure as follows: 
             the past zone                                    the present zone                                   the future zone 
   
   
 
We associate past, present and future with left, middle and right as above but devote the upper zone 
sequence to the simple tenses and the lower zone sequence to the perfect tenses. Take care to note the 
difference between the past, present and future time zones and the past, present and future tenses. We 
are using the zones to explain the tenses. To make the explanation as intuitive as possible, let’s use a 
little story that involves a husband and a wife. The wife is very secure in her job and is able to leave work 
at five every day but the husband is new in his job and in order to secure his position, he works late 
every day. The couple have a loving relationship but by personality she is very practical and no nonsense 
while he is romantic and very sentimental. He loves nothing more than to have dinner and a glass of 
wine with her, and if under low light the table is adorned with a long stemmed rose in a slim vase and a 
hand crafted candle, then he is in a state of bliss. The guys at his job however have come to understand 
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all of this and we will use three sentences they might utter in order to express their sympathy for him. In 
relation to the past zone, we have: 
 By the time he arrived, she had already eaten dinner. 
Here we clearly have a sentence whose main clause, ‘she [had already eaten] dinner’, is in the past 
perfect since its predicate base, indicated as usual by the bracketing, contains the copula ‘had’, and the 
verb ‘to eat’ has a past participle form, namely ‘eaten’, and thus, according to the rule above to the 
effect that the verb in a perfect construction must be in its past participle form, if it has one, and in its 
past form otherwise, the past participle form ‘eaten’ is what appears. The word ‘already’ is of course an 
adverb. The verb ‘to eat’ is quite irregular but it is perfect for our story here. Its parts are as follows:     
    




Present Participle eating 
Past Participle eaten 
 
Now to explain what is involved in the case of a past perfect sentence, let us represent the one above in 
tandem with the simple past tense sentence that corresponds to its main clause as follows: 
 She [ate] dinner. 
 By the time he arrived, she [had already eaten] dinner. 
Note that I would have liked to bring the two sentences closer together by producing 
 She already ate dinner. 
as the past tense sentence but it is at least slightly ungrammatical due to the meaning of the adverb 
‘already’. People use it in past tense sentences – ‘I already told you.’ – but this is not really acceptable 
usage. We see here how subtle English is, and of course the same is true no doubt for all natural 
languages. A tacit presupposition of the approach to English (natural language) language taken here is 
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that almost all, or at least most of this subtlety is due to the vocabulary of the language, what is called 
its lexical aspect, not its grammar, which is always clear, or becomes clear after reflection, even if it is a 
bit complicated in some cases. But let us get back to the explanation. If we use the upper zone sequence 
of the two tier time zone structure to represent the past tense sentence, we get: 
             the past zone                                    the present zone                                   the future zone 
a:(she eats)   
   
         
 where ‘a’ means action, and if we go on to represent the past perfect tense sentence, we get: 
             the past zone                                    the present zone                                   the future zone 
a:(she eats)   
a:(she eats)                    a:(he arrives)   
 
Thus, with the past tense, there is one action in the past zone but, with the past perfect tense, there are 
two actions in the past zone, one coming from the verb of the main clause of the sentence, the other 
coming from the verb of a stated or implied subordinate clause, and the action given by the main verb is 
presented with reference to the action given by the subordinate verb – the action given by the 
subordinate verb, being in the past zone, provides some specification as to the location of the action 
given by the main verb in that, quite vast, zone. So, in our example, the wife’s eating dinner is presented 
with reference to the husband’s arrival: his arrival’s coming, very sadly for him, after her eating dinner 
helps us to locate her eating dinner in the vastness of the past – although, to us as social beings, his 
arrival seems to be the big deal, her eating dinner being just a set up factor. We will see that the future 
perfect tense works in a perfectly analogous way, and that the present perfect tense works in a 
somewhat less analogous way when we come to the section on predicate bases per se. 
     The copulas in the third group, ‘have been’, ‘has been’, ‘had been’ ,  can be dispensed with  rather 
quickly as their function is to produce the perfect tenses in the progressive aspect, and we have already 
made a preliminary study of these linguistic phenomena. And notice, in this connection, how the three 
words that begin these copulas, ‘have’, ‘has’ and ‘had’, are the same as the three words that constitute 
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group 3, and the words in group three function to produce the perfect tenses, while the second word of 
the copulas here, ‘been’, seems to be etymologically related to ‘to be’, and yet its parts, ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’ 
‘were’, plus ‘am’, function to produce the progressive aspect. But to get to the point, predicate bases 
that are in both the perfect tense and the progressive aspect must contain one of the copulas here and a 
verb in the present participle form, and, given the word relations just established, it is not surprising that 
the specific association of the three copulas here, and the modal ‘will’, with the three perfect tenses in 
the progressive aspect is perfectly analogous to the association of the three copulas in group 3, and the 
modal ‘will’, with the same three perfect tenses in the indicative aspect. The following chart makes this 
clear: 
 Singular Plural 
Past Perfect Tense He had been working. They had been working 
Present Perfect Tense She has been working. They have been working. 
Future Perfect Tense He will have been working. They will have been working. 
     
 
     I call the copulas in group 5, ‘am being’, ‘is being’, ‘are being’, ‘was being’, ‘were being’, 
‘experimental’, although a better term might be ‘provisional’, since I use them as copulas and yet they 
have not to my knowledge been recognized as such, so that I have to make a case for them. Note 
however that the way in which they are related to the copulas in group 2 is perfectly analogous to the 
way in which the copulas in group 4 are related to the copulas in group 3. That is to say, 
 am being     is being    are being     was being     were being      [group 5] 
are to 
 am     is     are     was     were      [group 2] 
as 
 have been     has been     had been     [group 4] 
are to 
 have     has     had     [group 3] 
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In both cases, each two word copula = a one word copula + a variant of ‘be’. Thus for example 
 ‘is being’ = the one word copula ‘is’ + the variant of ‘be’ which is ‘being’ 
just as 
  ‘have been’ = the one word copula ‘have’ + the variant of ‘be’ which is ‘been’  
I do not know if this strikes you as elegant, as etymologically elegant, but if it does then it should all the 
more so in view of a very important fact about English that, somehow, has not yet come out, namely 
that ‘to be’ and ‘to have’ are the two basic verbs of English , on analogy to ‘etre’ and ‘avoir’ in French, 
and ‘ser’/’estar’ and ‘tener’ in Spanish. But this is not the argument I present to make the case for 
recognizing the group 5 expressions as copulas. The argument is fact as follows: 
If in the active voice, progressive aspect sentence 
 He [is torturing] them with grammar. 
‘is’ is a copula, then in the passive voice, progressive aspect sentence 
 They [are being tortured] with grammar by him. 
‘are being’ must be a copula too! 
To sum up, we have seen that copulas serve in the modification, formation and the characterization of 
predicate bases, and by extension the sentences these predicate bases are components of. The 
determiner in group 1 facilitates the modification of predicate bases that take on a modal. The 
determiners in group 2 facilitate the formation of predicate bases that have an adjective, a preposition 
or a copula as their main element. All characterization is in terms of the 3 P’s – Progressive, Passive and 
Perfect. And, the determiners in group 2 also facilitate the characterization of predicate bases that have 
a verb as their main component as progressive in aspect. The determiners in group 2 as well facilitate 
the characterization of predicate bases that have a verb as their main component as passive in voice. 
The copulas in group 3 facilitate the characterization of predicate bases as perfect in tense, either past, 
present or future. The copulas in group 4 facilitate the characterization of predicate bases that have an 
adjective, a preposition or a copula as their main component as perfect in tense. The copulas in group 4 
also facilitate the characterization of predicate bases that have a verb as their main component as 
progressive in aspect and perfect in tense, either past, present or future. And, the copulas in group 5 
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facilitate the characterization of predicate bases as progressive in aspect and passive in voice. But all of 
this will be much easier to take in if presented in chart form. Thus: 
 
Group Function 
1 – ‘be’ Modification of predicate bases that take on a 
modal 
2 – ‘am’, ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’, ‘were’ Formation of predicate bases that have an 
adjective, a preposition or a copula as their main 
element 
2 – ‘am’, ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’, ‘were’ Characterization of predicate bases that have a 
verb as their main component as progressive in 
aspect 
2 – ‘am’, ‘is’, ‘are’, ‘was’, ‘were’ Characterization of predicate bases that have a 
verb as their main component as passive in voice 
3 – ‘have’, ‘has’, ‘had’ Characterization of predicate bases that have a 
verb as their main component as perfect in tense  
4 – ‘have been’, ‘has been’, ‘had been’ Characterization of predicate bases that have an 
adjective, a preposition or a copula as their main 
component as perfect in tense   
4 – ‘have been’, ‘has been’, ‘had been’ Characterization of predicate bases that have a 
verb as their main component as perfect in tense 
and progressive in aspect   
5 – ‘am being’, ‘is being’, ‘are being’, ‘was being’, 
‘were being’ 
Characterization of predicate bases that have a 
verb as their main component as passive in voice 
and progressive in aspect 
 
 









     There are 25 copula tokens and 3 copula types. They are as follows: 
 
a  this  all  some  one/1  my  Jane’s 
an  that  every  few  two/2  your  Carter’s 
the  these  each  several  …  her  … 
   those  any  many    his  a boy’s 
    no  most    its  a man’s 
          our  … 
          your 
          their 
First, I need to explain what tokens and types are. Let us say simply that ‘dog’ is a type while Fido is a 
token, a token of that type. Here, ‘one/1’, ‘two/2’, …  represents  a type and all of the positive integers 
are its tokens, ‘Jane’s’, ‘Carter’s’, …  represents a type and all names with possessive endings are its 
tokens, and ‘a boy’s’, ‘a man’s’, …  represents a type and all noun phrases with possessive endings are its 
tokens. The entries above beyond the ones just mentioned are 25 in number, and they are all tokens. 
But now, this little bit of technical fastidiousness aside, we will from here forward speak simply of 
determiners. Determiners are true functional expressions in that they do not actually have separable 
meaning but, to the extent that they do have meaning, they are like the modals in that their grammar is 
extremely simple but their meanings are very complicated. However we will make things simple for 
ourselves here by, first, giving the simple grammar of determiners and then giving not their meanings 
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but rather a combination of the set of three concepts one or more of which all determiners reflect, and 
the specific conditions of application for each determiner. The set of three concepts will help you to 
understand what a determiner is, generally speaking, while the conditions of application for each 
determiner will help you to use it properly, and to understand the proper use of it made by others. We 
can give the simple grammar of determiners by saying that they all modify nouns from the left, and to 
make this perfectly concrete, we give the following scheme: 
_____ ….. _____ …..  
   (D)             (No) 
where, as the under labels indicate, the first slot is to be filled in by a determiner and the second slot is 
to be filled in by a noun. The dot sequence right after the (D) slot represents the possibility of an 
adjective modifier of the noun and the dot sequence after the (No) slot represents the possibility of a 
prepositional phrase modifier of the noun or a relative clause modifier of the noun or a sequence of a 
prepositional phrase modifier of the noun followed by a relative clause modifier of the noun. We will 
use the noun ‘car’ in the main illustration so let us bring out what is involved here by using it. If the noun 
is ‘car’ then the dot sequence after the (D) slot could be filled in by the adjective ‘red’ giving us  
 red car 
or the dot sequence after the (No) slot could be filled in by the prepositional phrase ‘from Italy’ giving us  
 car from Italy 
or that same dot sequence could be filled in by the relative clause ‘that costs over $1,000,000’ giving us 
 car that costs over $1,000,000 
or the same dot sequence could be filled in by the prepositional phrase and the relative clause in 
sequence giving us 
 car from Italy the costs over $1,000,000 
Finally here, the noun could carry all three modifiers giving us 
 red car from Italy that costs over $1,000,000 
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But let us put all of this aside and go back to the plain noun case. We can say exactly what the grammar 
of determiners is by filling ‘car’ into the (No) slot of the schema 
 _____ ….. _____ …..  
       (D)             (No) 
thus getting 
 _____ ….. __car__ …..  
       (D)              (No) 
or taking the plural form, and getting 
 _____ ….. __cars__ …..  
        (D)              (No) 
and then noting that every determiner in the whole sub-system of same will fill grammatically into the 
one (D) slot or the other, except for ‘an’. Thus we can have 
 a car     this car     every car     some car     one car     my car     Jane’s car 
and 
 the cars     these cars     all cars     several cars     two cars     their cars     a man’s cars 
and not to leave out ‘an’ we can have 
 an apple    
all of this variation is just a reflection of noun phrase structure, which we will study later. But now, ‘car’ 
is what is called a count noun. Another common count noun is ‘house’. These words are count nouns 
because, so to speak, they are nouns that allow you to count – one car, two cars … and one house, two 
houses … . Count nouns contrast with what are called mass nouns, or non-count nouns. Good examples 
of mass nouns are ‘air’ and ‘water’. We can’t say one air, two airs …  or one water, two waters … . Each 
count noun refers to a class of units whereas each mass noun refers to a mass, all air, all water. Now all 
determiners work with count nouns, as we have pretty much demonstrated, but there are a number of 
determiners that do not work with mass nouns. They are 
48 
 
 a, an, these, those, every, each, few, several, many, and all the determiners in the sequence 
 one, two …      
Thus we cannot say 
 a water, these air, etc. 
     Let us now consider the three concepts that will allow us to understand what determiners are in a 
general sense. These concepts are: 
 - existence 
 - quantity 
 - identification 
Each of these concepts has one or more associated concepts. The concept of possibility associates with 
the concept of existence. The concepts of number and proportion associate with the concept of 
quantity. And the concepts of uniqueness, particularity, definiteness and, as the opposite of this last 
concept, the concept of indefiniteness, all associate with the concept of identification. We will need to 
appeal to this larger set of concepts in order to bring out the general nature of the category of 
determiners and to develop the conditions of application for each of the various determiners. Now 
three pairs of sentences, each of which sets a contrast between two determiners, will show how 
determiners play upon the concepts in this set. 
     The first pair of sentences relates to a situation in which a subway train has stalled. The conductor of 
the train might say under these circumstances: 
 We are sorry for the inconvenience, 
However, a more linguistically sophisticated conductor under the same circumstances might say: 
 We are sorry for any inconvenience. 
The difference between the two sentences is of course that the first one uses the determiner ‘the’ while 
the second one uses the determiner ‘any’. The conditions of application for ‘the’ are such that the first 
sentence attributes the existence of inconvenience to all of the passengers on the train, and thus 
apologizes to all of them. The conditions of application for ‘any’ however are such that the second 
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sentence does not necessarily attribute the existence of inconvenience to all of the passengers on the 
train. It in effect brings in an ‘if’ clause to associate with the apology so that it really delivers the 
statement: 
 If you are inconvenienced by the stalling of the train then we are sorry for that. 
The second sentence thus fits both the case of the business group that will be late for a meeting 
because of the stall and the case of the young teenagers who are just joyriding the train out of their 
fascination with all aspects of the subway system. The first sentence can’t do this. So we see that 
determiners do play on the concept of existence. 
     The second pair of sentences relates to our perception of economic opportunity in American society. 
The two sentences are: 
 Few Americans are millionaires. 
 Many Americans are millionaires. 
The difference here is that the first sentence employs the determiner ‘few’ while the second sentence 
employs the determiner ‘many’. The interesting thing here is that even though the one sentence strikes 
a more positive note while the other strikes a more negative note, they do not have to be seen as dis- 
agreeing with each other. The conditions of application of ‘few’ are such that we might think of the 
sentence employing it as saying that a small proportion of Americans are millionaires while the 
conditions of application of ‘many’ are such that we might think of the sentence employing it as saying 
that a large number of Americans are millionaires. There are now 312 million Americans. If, say, 3 
million of them are millionaires then they represent a small proportion of the population but they are 
still large in number. So we see that determiners play on the concept of quantity, here obviously in the 
more specific terms of proportion and number. 
     Finally, we come to the third pair of sentences which have been fashioned to relate to exotic sports 
cars and the quality of honesty. A gorgeous, brand new red Ferrari passes a teacher waiting at a bus stop 
and he says 
 I want a red Ferrari. 
The driver of the car takes it to its destination, parks it and goes about his business. Standing across the 
street from where the car is parked, a shady character, wearing dark shades says 
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 I want that red Ferrari. 
The difference of determiner this time is of course ‘a’ versus ‘that’ and clearly the user of the sentence 
containing ‘a’, the teacher, does not have in mind any particular red Ferrari. Any gorgeous, brand new 
one will do. By contrast however the user of the sentence containing ‘that’, the shady character in the 
dark shades, does have in mind a particular red Ferrari – the one he is looking at with the intention of 
stealing it! Clearly then determiners play upon the concept of particularity. 
     Let us turn our attention now to the very difficult business of developing the conditions of application 
for the determiners in the set presented above. To the extent that it is possible, the conditions will be 
developed with respect to each other. The determiners will then form something of a system in which 
some determiners will have a primary role in that other determiners will be understood in relation to 
them. Theoretically at least this will reduce the number of determiners that the student has to learn by 
direct reference to terms or other meaningful entities in their native language. 
     The determiners are again like the modals in that a good dictionary will specify all of the senses that 
attach to each of them and here again we appeal to the Merriam-Webster Advanced Learner’s English 
Dictionary. The student should look each determiner up in the dictionary and become as familiar as 
possible with all of its senses, and of course try to identify the sense associated with each use of the 
determiner that they encounter. We will here follow the same strategy that was followed in the case of 
the modals, and that is to develop conditions of application related to the main sense of the term. Let us 





 any  
 no 
We will take ‘all’ to be primary, and characterize the other four determiners in the group in terms of it. 
And what about ‘all’ itself? The student should use their English-native language dictionary to establish 
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its meaning for themselves but we can help by noting that there are 100 members of the United States 
Senate, and if a reporter says 
 All senators were present for the critical vote. 
then 100 senators were present for the critical vote. Let us call ‘all’ the universal determiner, and advise 
the student to establish the meaning of this term too, although it is very convenient here given the 
international context that is set by the study of foreign languages. Now if ‘all’ is the universal determiner 
then ‘every’ is the grammatically singular universal determiner, ‘all’ being plural of course. And it is an 
important feature of our use of language that there are occasions on which only the singular will do. 
Thus we are quite comfortable saying  
 All men are equal. 
and find it difficult to express the same thought in the singular. Consider 
 Every man is equal. 
which simply won’t do, and 
 Every man is equal to every other man. 
which will do, but only very awkwardly. But if we want to contradict the famous line 
 No man is an island. 
we would naturally say 
 Every man is an island. 
recognizing the inadequacy of 
 All men are islands.          
But now if ‘every’ is the grammatically singular universal determiner then ‘each’ is the grammatically 
singular universal determiner with a focus on the individual case, the determiner that takes all of the 
relevant cases one by one. Consider the sentence 
 The assigned text was James Joyce’s difficult novel Ulysses, and the class tensed up as the 
 teacher called on each student one by one.   
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And consider how ‘each’ and ‘other’ work together to describe certain kinds of situations efficiently. 
Thus in relation to another classroom project, it might be said that  
 Each student passed their exam to another student, the one immediately to their right, or in the 
 case if the student at the end of the row, the one at the beginning of the next row. 
Contrast this sentence with the one just like it except that it has ‘every’ instead of ‘each’: 
 Every student passed their exam to another student, the one immediately to their right, or in 
 the case if the student at the end of the row, the one at the beginning of the next row. 
The second sentence  just does not do a very good job of making clear what the situation actually is. 
Now let us take ‘any’. It can be characterized as the conditional universal determiner. We saw above 
that ‘any’ in effect carries an ‘if’ with it. The sentence  
 We are sorry for any inconvenience, 
was deemed to be better by far than the sentence 
 We are sorry for the inconvenience. 
because the ‘any’ sentence really means 
 If inconvenience exists for any passenger then we apologize to them. 
Consider a simpler case, the famous sign wording 
 All trespassers will be prosecuted. 
This wording is not as accurate as is desirable. It should be changed to 
 Any trespassers will be prosecuted. 
The ‘all’ sentence almost presumes that there will be trespassers and immediately dictates prosecution 
for them while the ‘any’ sentence sets the condition 
 (if) there are trespassers 
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and waits to see whether the condition is met, whether one or more persons trespass on the property, 
before it concerns itself with prosecution. So the ‘if’ associated with ‘any’ brings in a condition, and thus 
‘any’ is the conditional universal determiner. 
     We can close out the total quantifier group of determiners by characterizing ‘no’ and the negative 
universal determiner. So while  
 All men are mortal. 
is positive in the sense that it includes all relevant individuals, 
 No men are immortal. 
is negative in the sense that it excludes all relevant individuals. If we say 
 All senators are well-paid. 
then we get 100 well-paid individuals but if we say 
 No senators are billionaires. 
then we get 0 billionaires. The determiner ‘all’ sweeps everything in: the determiner ‘no’ sweeps 
everything out.        






The determiner ‘some’ is basic here but we will not use it to set the conditions of application for the 
other determiners in the group on analogy to the determiner ‘all’ in the group above. The situation here 




1. ‘some’ can be used to establish existence, as it does in the sentence 
 Well, some lucky soul is free of money worries now! 
uttered after the results of a mega-lottery have been announced. There is no attempt here to refer to 
anyone. Rather the speaker marvels at the fact that such a person as the one described has come into 
being. This use of ‘some’ can be related to a rule in logic that allows us to reason 
 John is a three time Ironman triathlon champion. 
 Therefore: 
 Some individual is a three time Ironman triathlon champion. 
The rule is called existential generalization. The presumably factual assertion made by the first sentence 
provides the basis for the existential assertion made by the second sentence, which could be rewritten 
as 
 An individual who is a three time Ironman triathlon champion exists. 
2. ‘some’ can be used to refer to one or more individuals indefinitely, as the department secretary does 
when she says to one of the professors 
 Some student came by to see you this afternoon. 
It might be possible for the secretary to identify the student to the professor but that is not what is 
deemed relevant under the circumstances. What is deemed relevant is simply the fact that the professor 
was called upon by a student. 
3. ‘some’ can be used to indicate quantity. The point was made above that ‘some’ would not be used to 
develop the conditions of application for the other determiners in its group, and in fact the determiner 
‘most’, along with the determiner ‘all’, will be used to here develop the conditions of application for 
‘some’. If there are 100 members of the United States Senate then it is appropriate to say 
 Most senators have served for multiple terms. 
only if it is not the case that all senators have served for more than term but it is the case that more 
than half of the senators, more than 50, have served for multiple terms. Now it is appropriate to use 
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‘some’ to indicate quantity if the quantity intended is more than one but less than most. Thus we can 
say  
 Some senators are newly elected. 
if more than one is newly elected but fewer than 50 are newly elected. 
     Note that in developing the conditions of application for ‘some’, we have already developed the 
conditions of application for ‘most’. The determiner ‘most’ is to be used to indicate a quantity that is 
more than half but less than all. And we can deal quickly with ‘several’. It is the most specific determiner 
in its group, and native speakers tend to use it to indicate from 4 to 7, more or less. 
     The determiners ‘few’ and ‘many’ are much more difficult, but the notions related to the sentence 
pair presented above in the effort to show how the concept of quantity figures in the general 
characterization of determiners as a type of functional expression are helpful. We can use ‘few’ to 
indicate a small proportion and use ‘many’ to indicate a large number. Of course we depend here on the 
terms ‘small’ and ‘large’ but, while there is the possibility of developing some kinds of conditions of 
application by reference to things in the world – consider the presentation of color squares to develop 
the use of color terms in the Merriam-Webster Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary – we must for the 








the members of which are called ‘articles’, and ‘a’ and ‘an’ are really the two forms of the indefinite 
article while ‘the’ is the definite article. This is perhaps the most interesting group in that, on the one 
hand, the analysis of these expressions, especially ‘the’, has a long and controversial history among 
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those who study language formally and, on the other hand, the non-use and misuse of the articles is one 
of the main problems in second language acquisition.  
     Let us start with ‘the’. Its conditions of application are implicit in the following specification of three 
uses of it. 
1. ‘the’ serves as the determiner of a noun phrase whose noun with or without adjective, prepositional 
phrase and/or relative clause modifiers identifies an individual of some kind for the speaker, or writer, 
and their audience. So if one student talking to another student makes reference to a third student by 
means of the noun phrase 
 the new student from Costa Rica who is studying engineering 
then the noun ‘student’, its adjective modifier ‘new’, its prepositional phrase modifier ‘from Costa Rica’ 
and its relative clause modifier ‘who is studying engineering’, assembled as they are, identify a certain 
student for both the speaker student and the student spoken to. In a slightly different case, one diner 
might command a fellow diner by saying 
 Go get the small bottle of hot ketchup in the refrigerator. 
knowing that the information given by the noun and noun modifier assembly 
 small bottle of hot ketchup in the refrigerator 
will allow the commanded diner to find the desired condiment. 
2. ‘the’ serves as the determiner of a noun phrase that is used to refer to an individual of some kind that 
has been introduced into the discourse earlier on by a noun phrase that is the same, or similar, except 
that it has the determiner ‘a’ or ‘an’ rather than the determiner ‘the’. Thus someone says  
 I bought a bread knife and a cutting board: the knife costs $20, the board $15. 
Here ‘a bread knife’ and ‘a cutting board’ introduce individuals which will be referred to subsequently by 




3. ‘the’ serves as the determiner of a noun phrase that is used to indicate some individual that is a part 
of the context in which the discourse takes place. The simplest possible example here is the common 
English sentence 
 Pass the salt. 
where of course the noun phrase 
 the salt 
identifies a certain salt shaker because it is the only one on the dining table. 
As indicated above, the determiners ‘a’ and ‘an’ are effectively one determiner, which we can then call 
the indefinite determiner, to go with ‘the’ as the definite determiner. It appears that there are two uses 
of the indefinite determiner. 
1. Someone says 
 I want a new car. 
such that there is no particular car in the picture. 
2. Someone says 
 I bought a new car. I’ll pick it up from the dealership tomorrow. 
such that there is a particular car in the picture but there is no interest on the part of the speaker to 
identify the car for the person, or persons, spoken to, and it would be very difficult to do so anyway – 
the speaker could say 
 It’s a slate grey Chevy Malibu with a tan interior. 
but there could be thousands of cars that fit this description. There seems to be a strong association 
between identifiability and acquaintance. The person spoken to would need to see the new car before 
the speaker could identify it for the person spoken to. Once the person spoken to has seen the car, the 
speaker can say 
 I took the car back to the dealer for a checkup. There was a little rattle in the dashboard.  
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The student should note however that the number 2. case of the use of ‘the’ above is not an exception 
to the association cited here between identifiability and acquaintance. In the construction 
 I bought a bread knife and a cutting board: the knife costs $20, the board $15. 
There is no pretention that either the knife or the board has been identified for the person spoken to. 
The knife and the board have something like a hypothetical standing in the conversation. The person 
spoken to takes them on faith given their acceptance of the sincerity of the speaker. 
     The understanding of the use of ‘the’ here makes it possible to deal quickly with the two possessive 
groups, the possessive adjectives 












which will be called, for lack of a better term, ‘possessive ending constructions’, since each one is a 
construction whose parts are a name and a possessive ending. Now, we will treat  




 Jane’s husband 
as  
 the husband who belongs to her 
and 
 the husband who belongs to Jane 
respectively. In this way they become noun phrases whose determiner is ‘the’ such that they are 
covered by what has already been said.  And if the speaker says 
 Her husband is a lawyer. 
or  
 Jane’s husband is a lawyer. 
then either the person spoken to knows the gentleman involved such that the relevant noun phrase 
identifies him for the person spoken to or the relevant sentence has been preceded by a sentence like 
 Jane is married. 
such that the gentleman is introduced into the conversation hypothetically.    





They are called demonstrative adjectives because they demonstrate, although this term does not here 
have its usual meaning of protesting in public but instead it means to point. These determiners are very 
interesting. They are of course used in conjunction with nouns, and they may be compared profitably 
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with noun phrases whose determiner is ‘the’. In relation to use number 3. of such noun phrases, the 
sentence 
 Pass the salt. 
was presented. Well, in order to get the relation, the analogy really, between noun phrases with ‘the’ 
and noun phrases with ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘these’, and ‘those, let’s imagine a fancier dinner party at which 
someone says 
 Pass the sea salt. 
or a fancier dinner party still at which someone says 
 Pass the course ground sea salt from Morocco. 
In these last two sentences, noun modifiers, the adjective ‘sea’, in the one case, the complex adjective 
sequence ‘course ground sea’ and the prepositional  phrase ‘from Morocco’, in the other, are used to 
identify the thing given by the noun, namely some salt, by description. Now suppose that earlier in the 
proceedings, someone held up the dish with the coarse ground sea salt from Morocco and said 
 This salt is actually good for your health.   
Here the gesture of holding up the dish is used to identify the thing given by the noun, to wit, the very 
same salt, by demonstration. We can bring out the analogy more clearly by using the following two 
formulas: 
in the earlier case: 
 ‘the’ + an identifying modifier or modifier complex + noun 
in the present case: 
 ‘this’ + identifying gesture + noun 
So there is a strong relationship holding between noun phrases with the definite article and noun 
phrases with demonstrative adjectives. But, two further points need to be made. First, as is implicit in 
what is given above, the analogy does not hold if the noun phrase with ‘the’ has no modifiers, as is the 
case with respect to 
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 Pass the salt. 
And, what is more important, the phenomena that count as gestures in the sense intended here cover a 
very wide range indeed: everything from calling attention to something on a PowerPoint screen by use 
of a laser pointer to the merest redirection of the eyes in a more intimate setting. 




which I call ‘number expressions’, again for want of a better term. Each one of these determiners 
indicates the precise number of units of a type indicated by a noun that are involved in some situation. 
Thus compare: 
 The bill was rejected. Only 37 senators voted in favor of it. 









     The pronouns of English exhibit a great deal of order. And they can be seen as forming two grand 
systems, one very tight in formation, the other a bit looser. The logic of these systems is very interesting, 
and the systems themselves are quite beautiful. However, as we will see, there are two ways of 
regarding the logic, the traditional way and the way that will be recommended here.  The one system 
consists of the 32 so-called personal pronouns. It can be given schematically as follows: 
 
           
  
Number Person Gender Subjective Objective Reflexive Possessive 
singular first  I me myself mine 
      “ second  you you yourself yours 
      “ third masculine he him himself his 
      “    “ feminine she her herself hers 
      “    “ neuter it it itself its 
plural first  we us ourselves ours 
    “ second  you you yourselves yours 
    “ third  they them themselves theirs 
 
The one thing that is missing here, because it does not fit in conveniently graphically, is the indication 
that ‘subjective’, ‘objective’, ‘reflexive’ and ‘possessive’ come under the heading Case, just as ‘singular’ 
and plural come under the heading Number, ‘first’, ‘second’ and ‘third’ come under the heading Person 
and ‘masculine’, ‘feminine’ and ‘neuter’ come under the heading Gender. 
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     The distinction between singular and plural really needs no explanation. Singular pronouns refer to 
one while plural pronouns refer to two or more. 
     The distinction among the three ‘persons’ goes as follows: 
First person singular – the person speaking 
Second person singular – the person spoken to 
Third person singular – the person or thing spoken of (or about) 
First person plural – the persons speaking 
Second person plural – the persons spoken to 
Third person plural – the persons or/or things spoken of (or about) 
     The distinction between masculine and feminine also needs no explanation. The neuter is simply 
whatever there is that is neither masculine nor feminine. Only an animal can be masculine or feminine. 
So ‘boat’ is neuter. But things are different in the two other widely dispersed languages of the world, 
namely French and Spanish. In French and Spanish, everything is either masculine or feminine. In 
French, ‘boat’ is ‘bateau’ and it is … while, in Spanish, ‘boat’ is ‘barco’ and it is …  
     Case is also pretty straight forward. Subjective case pronouns serve as subjects of sentences while 
objective case pronouns serve as objects of sentences. Thus we can install ‘she’ and ‘him’ in the slots of 
the predicate 
_____ called _____ 
In the manner 
She called him. 
But we cannot install ‘her’ and ‘he’ not in the manner 
Her called he. 
Because the first slot of the predicate is the subject slot and thus it can take the subjective pronoun ‘she’ 
but not the objective pronoun ‘her’, and the second slot of the predicate is an object slot and thus it can 
take the objective pronoun ‘him’ but not the subjective pronoun ‘he’. 
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     The case of reflexive pronouns is a little bit interesting in that it requires a bit of explaining. A 
reflexive pronoun can appear only in an object slot of a predicate, particularly the first object slot, and 
they do so when what is to be referred to from that slot is the same thing that is referred to from the 
subject slot. Thus I can say, referring to my barber  
He cut me while shaving me. 
and the pronoun set up is correct because the subjective pronoun ‘he’ appears in the slot before the 
verb ‘cut’, i.e. the subject slot, and the objective pronoun ‘me’ appears in the slot right after the verb 
‘cut’, i.e. in the first object slot. But if I had decided to take the do-it-yourself route to save money and 
yet suffered the same misfortune, I could not say     
I cut me while shaving. 
even though the subjective pronoun ‘I’ which refers to me in the context, appears in the subject slot of 
the sentence and the objective pronoun ‘me’, which also refers to me in the context, appears in an 
object slot. What has to be said is 
I cut myself while shaving. 
because the rule, as indicated above, is that when the individual to be referred to from the object slot 
right after the verb is the same individual referred to from the subject slot, you can’t use an objective 
pronoun in that object slot: you have to use the appropriate reflexive pronoun, which in this case is the 
first person singular reflexive pronoun ‘myself’, as the chart above will verify.  
     Possession is well understood by everyone, and thus the possessive case as well:  
This is mine. Please keep your hands off of it! That’s yours over there. 
     The other grand system of pronouns has 8 sub-systems, 6 of which are in pretty tight formation while 





































We can see what the logic is here. Each sub-system employs the four quantifiers ‘some’, ‘every’, ‘any’ 
and ‘no’ and each of these quantifiers appears as the first of the two constituents of one of the 
pronouns involved, and then each sub-system has what might be called a base, either ‘thing’, ‘where’, 
‘place’, ‘time’, ‘one’ or ‘body’, which appears as the second of the two constituents of all of the 
pronouns involved. But not all of the possible combinations have developed in the language. The 





No effort will be made to account for any of these exclusions. The cost-benefit ratio is the justification 
for this. The student has simply to memorize the sub-systems. Their clear logic greatly facilitates this. 
     There is a special relationship that holds between the last two sub-systems. The pronouns in them 
mean the same thing but the pronouns in the sub-system with ‘one’ as base are more formal while the 
pronouns in the sub-system with ‘body’ as base are less formal. Thus it might be better to merge them 
as follows:   
 More Formal Less Formal 
some one body 
every one body 
any one body 
no one body 
 
At this point it is apt to note that, especially under the presentation here, the pronouns in these sub-
systems are like noun phrases. All of the quantifiers here are of course determiners and the bases are 
nouns, except for ‘where’ and ‘one’, and of course ‘one’ represents person and ‘where’ represents 
place. This will be important a bit later when we look at the big systems here from a new perspective.  
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     The next to last sub-system is even more systematic than the others here, although as indicated 
above it stands apart from them. It is the sub-system of the demonstrative pronouns, which is best given 
as follows: 
 Near Far 
Singular this that 
Plural these those 
   
     We just saw that the ‘quantifiers’ of the pronouns in the above 6 sub-systems are all determiners and 
her we see that the same 4 words, the ones in the grid above, are both determiners and pronouns. And 
clearly words in the two collective groups function perfectly analogously. Consider:  
 Everyone enjoyed the party. 
 Every guest enjoyed the party. 
 This guacamole is great! 
 This [with a gesture towards the guacamole] is great! 
The less obvious connection is with respect to the words ‘her’ and ‘his’, which are both both 
determiners and pronouns. Consider: 
 I saw her car. [‘her’ = determiner, specifically possessive adjective] 
 I saw her. [‘her’ = singular objective pronoun] 
 his is his car. [‘his’ = determiner, specifically possessive adjective] 
 This is his. [‘his’ = singular possessive pronoun] 
Note the structural difference. The  determiners ‘her’ and ‘his’ join with nouns to produce the terms ‘her 
car’ and ‘his car’ but the pronouns ‘her’ and ‘his’ are terms on their own. The point will be expanded 
upon shortly. Note also how the grammatical classifications are the same in the two determiner cases 
but different in the two pronoun cases – ‘her’ is objective case, ‘his’ possessive case. This is an 
interesting bit of morphology, or etymology, or both, that someone could no doubt explain. 
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     The final sub-system is as follows: 
Subjective Objective Reflexive Possessive 
one one oneself one’s 
  
Just above, we tagged ‘someone’, etc. as more formal and ‘somebody’, etc. as less formal. The 4, or 3, 
pronouns in this sub-system are all ways of referring formally to persons in general, in the singular 
mode. 
 One must protect oneself while traveling. 
 One must protect one’s valuables while traveling. 
The fact that all of these pronouns are singular but refer generally is analogous to the fact that the 
determiner ‘every’ is, in relation to ‘all’, the grammatically singular universal, and similarly for ‘each’. 
The final point here is that it’s a bit suspect that we have to use ‘one’ twice (but recall from the section 
on copulas that ‘had’ is both past singular and past plural) and that ‘one’s’ has a possessive ending – 
absolutely no other pronouns do. But the compensation for this is the elegance of having this group of 
pronouns fall precisely under the four part distinction with respect to case.    
     Now we can conclude the traditional account of pronouns by making three further points. 
a) Every pronoun in modern English consists in a single word. 
b) The distribution of pronouns among the various predicate term slots is clear – subjective case 
pronouns can appear only in subject slots, objective case pronouns can appear only in object slots, 
reflexive pronouns can appear only in the first object slot, under the conditions described above, and all 
other pronouns are free to appear in any slot, such that we can have all of 
 Everyone attended the party. 
 The party impressed everyone. 
 The host of the party received thank you notes from everyone. 
c) Some pronouns play an important ‘replacement’ role, allowing us to say not 
69 
 
 Mr. Obama is the president. Mr. Obama is a Democrat. They interviewed Mr. Obama on 
 television yesterday. 
but instead 
 Mr. Obama is the president. He is a Democrat. They interviewed him on television yesterday. 







although reflexive pronouns function in the same general way really. When the pronouns in the Pro. Kit 
play their replacement role, they must agree with the terms they replace in case, number and gender. 
Agreement with respect to number deserves special attention because it goes wrong so often. To 
understand this let us note that pronouns don’t replace the first occurrence of the term, only its 
repetitions and that first occurrence of the term is called the antecedent of the pronoun. Thus in     
 Mr. Obama is the president. He is a Democrat. 
The pronoun ‘he’ has ‘Mr. Obama’ as its antecedent. So, when the pronoun disagrees with the term it 
replaces in terms of number, it is said that there is a Pronoun/Antecedent Agreement Error, or a P/A for 
short. The most common case is that in which the antecedent is a noun phrase that contains a 
prepositional phrase modifying the ‘head’ noun and the pronoun is made to agree with a noun that is or 
is a part of the object of the preposition in the prepositional phrase instead of the head noun. Thus in 
the sentence 
 She designed the new line of items and will be responsible for promoting them. 
The antecedent noun phrase is ‘the new line of items’, which has the noun ‘line’ as its head and the 
noun ‘items’ as the object of the preposition ‘of’ in the prepositional phrase ‘of items’. The pronoun 
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involved is of course ‘them’ and unfortunately it agrees with ‘items’ instead of ‘line’, creating a 
pronoun/antecedent agreement error. The sentence should read 
She designed the new line of items and will be responsible for promoting it. 
     The final move here is to suggest a somewhat different perspective on the pronouns of English, and 
thus a different organizational scheme for them. The first division is that between pronouns that refer to 
discourse participants, i.e. the parties to the conversation, and those that refer to entities in the world. 
The pronouns in the former group are 
 I  me  mine  myself 
  you      you  yours  yourself 
 we  us  ours  ourselves 
 you  you  yours  yourselves 
The pronouns in the latter group are all of the remaining ones. They divide into those that demonstrate 
and those that describe. The pronouns in the former group are 
 this  that  these  those 
The pronouns in the latter group are all of the remaining ones. They divide into those that describe 
‘directly’ and those that describe ‘indirectly’. The pronouns in the former group are the ones that are 
like noun phrases and thus eminently qualified to describe directly, namely 
 something somewhere someplace sometime somebody someone 
 everything everywhere everyplace anytime everybody everyone 
 anything anywhere anyplace   anybody anyone 
 nothing    nowhere     nobody 
The pronouns in the latter group are the remaining ones. They divide into those that ‘describe’ 
specifically and variably via their antecedents and those that ‘describe’ generally and fixedly via their 




 he  him  his  himself 
 she  her  hers  herself 
 it  it  its  itself 
 they  them  theirs  themselves 
The pronouns in the latter group are 
  one  one  one’s  oneself 
where it must be understood that the single ‘antecedent’ of these pronouns is the noun ‘person’, or the 
noun ‘persons’ with the individuals in its reference taken one by one so to speak.  
     The student will have to decide whether this single scheme for the pronouns or the more traditional 
dual scheme presented above is more helpful. Perhaps the student will benefit from studying the 












     We will cast our net wide when it comes to the conjunctions, preferring to include something that 
might not belong to excluding something necessary, knowing that the set can be pruned going forward. 
A conjunction is an expression of one to a few words that is used to join two or more terms or 
sentences. The result is a compound term or a compound sentence. How many conjunctions are there in 
English? Well, like all categories of functional expressions, the tally we are dealing with here quite small 
in relation to the million or so words English is reputed to have currently. In the system here there are 
50 conjunctions that are divided into 8 sub-categories. 4 of the 50 conjunctions appear in 2 distinct 
categories. The presentation strategy here will be ultra simple, and thus perhaps a bit boring. The 8 
categories will be rolled out and the conditions of application for each member of each category will be 
implied by the use of that member in a single construction.    
Category 1: Conjunctions of Simple Compounding – ‘ and’, ‘also’, ‘further’, ‘furthermore’, ‘moreover’,   
‘plus’, ‘all in all’, ‘in  short’, ‘anyway’ [9] 
 Jane rides well and she has her own horse. 
 Jack and Mary are going to the movies and I’m going also. 
 The defendant has a criminal record. Further, he had a clear motive for committing the crime. 
 The operational model for the office has to be revised. Furthermore, we’re all going to have to 
 learn to be more cordial to each other. 
 This condominium has high ceilings, hardwood floors and a new Viking kitchen. Moreover, is has 
 a small terrace off the master bedroom.  




 The security was a little lax but the food was good, the various presentations were effective for 
 the most part and the attendees seemed to bond with each other. All in all, the conference was 
 a success. 
 He got good grades, he seems to like college life, he hasn’t complained about the cafeteria food 
 the way we used to, and he’s made some new friends. In short, things look pretty good now. 
 I just can’t seem to keep up. I’ve got to do the laundry, I haven’t filed my taxes and Grace keeps 
 calling me about the divorce proceedings. Anyway, you have a nice day! 
Category 2: Logical Connectives for Sentences – ‘either…or’, ’or’, ‘nor’, ‘if…then’,  ‘if’, ‘if and only if’, ‘only 
if’, ‘only’ [8] 
 Either you spend more time studying or you find a way to use the time you’re already spending 
 more efficiently. 
 I left my house keys in the car, or I left them at work. 
 She really doesn’t want to go to the party. Nor do I. 
 If you work hard and treat people in the right way then you will succeed in life. 
 I’ll sign up if you sign up 
 The economy will turn around if and only if confidence among both consumers and business 
 people  increases dramatically. 
 You can attain inner peace only if you’re willing to exercise a lot of mental discipline at the 
 outset. 
 Only well qualified buyers are eligible for this low rate. [= Well qualified buyers are eligible for 
 this low rate and no one else is eligible for this low rate.] 
Category 3: Logical Connectives for Terms – ‘and’, ‘both … and’, ‘either … or’, ‘or’, ‘neither … nor’, 
‘and/or’ [6 - 4]  
 Newspapers and magazines are experiencing different fortunes in the digital age. 
 Both the Obama and Romney will try to appear tough on terrorism.  
 Either the PC or the Mac will eventually emerge as the universal standard. 
 I’m going to get a Dell or a Sony. 
 Neither rain, nor sleet, nor snow nor gloom of night can stay these curriers from their appointed 
 rounds. 
 According to the prix fixe menu, we can have pie and/or ice cream for dessert – pie a la mode! 
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Category: 4 Qualification Conjunctions – ‘although’, ‘though’, ‘even though’ [3] 
 The article makes a number of good points although you have to dig them out of the language. 
 Though the economy is fragile, you can still barely move around in shopping areas. 
 They spent a couple of weeks in Hawaii even though they are deeply in debt. 
Category 5: Argumentative Conjunctions – ‘therefore’, ‘thus’, ‘hence’, ‘so’, ‘then’, ‘as’, ‘for’, ‘so that’, 
‘such that’ [9] 
 All men are mortal. Socrates is a man. Therefore, Socrates is mortal. 
 Only the butler had both motive and opportunity. Thus he must have murdered his master. 
 One of the most important discoveries of modern medical science is the correlation between 
 obesity and disease. Hence you must maintain a healthy weight if you want to be well. 
 I couldn’t find the doll she wants today so I’ll have to try some other stores tomorrow. 
 I hear you say you’re going to run the marathon. Then you have to get the proper gear. 
 They’ve put themselves a bit at risk as they haven’t yet decided what type of life insurance to 
 buy. 
 You can’t commit any act so wayward from your nature for to thine own self one must be true. 
 They sold the summer house so that they could feel confident about handling the kids’ college 
 expenses. 
 The doctor used a new micro-stitch technique such that the wound would actually heal in a 
 matter of hours. 
Category 6: Explanatory Conjunctions – ‘because’, ‘since’, ‘after all’, ‘in that’, ‘given that’ [5] 
 The student got the top grad because she understood the necessity of meeting the conditions of 
 the assignment, and she worked harder than any of the others at crafting the paper well. 
 Since he had too much time on his hands, he decided to do some volunteer work. 
 The sentence doesn’t work in that some of the things necessary for the reader to understand it 
 don’t show up until later in the paragraph.    
 Given that banks can borrow from the Fed at such low interest rates, many of them are finding it 
 easy to make record profits.  
Category 7: Contrast Conjunctions – ‘but’, ‘however’, ‘nevertheless’, ‘nonetheless’, ‘still’, ‘yet’, ‘rather’, 
‘instead’, ‘whereas’, ‘ anyway’[10 - 1] 
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 He proposed but she said no. 
 My new laptop is too heavy. However, I really like the way it looks and it’s really fast. 
 Life poses many challenges. We must persevere nevertheless. 
 Grammar is not the kind of thing that gets students excited. Nonetheless they can get into it if 
 it’s presented in the form of a computer game of the right type. 
 She wasn’t able to win his heart. Still she had sweet memories of their experiences together that 
 would last a lifetime. 
 My Fiat was really a toy car. Yet its responsiveness and handling made it a joy to drive. 
 He didn’t choose the smaller sapphire which was without flaws.  Rather, he chose the larger one 
 that, because of its size, looked so much more impressive. 
 She ordered a black coffee with two sugars. Instead, she got a light coffee with what seemed to 
 be a ton of sugar. 
 She loves foreign art films, especially the romantic ones, whereas he likes only Hollywood style 
 action flicks. 
 The thing was way overpriced. They bought it anyway, having become addicted to its charms 
 right there in the shop.   
Category 8: Amplification Conjunctions – ‘for example’, ‘for instance’, ‘in particular’, ‘in other words’, 
‘that is’ [5] 
 The more complicated an expression type, the more difficulty the student has mastering it. For 
 example, infinitive phrases and gerund phrases are complicated term types and the student 
 often uses preposition and a gerund phrase where they should use an infinitive phrase, or vice 
 versa. 
 When one must expend a good deal of effort putting together a general strategy for expressing 
 their thought, oftentimes one neglects the details involved. For instance, students often fail to 
 put plural endings on nouns they clear intend to have refer to more than one.  
 She had a hard time distinguishing words that look and/or sound alike. In particular she almost 
 always wrote ‘then’ where she should have written ‘than’. 
 Oftentimes, the ESL student will produce a sentence whose meaning is clear but whose 
 construction is odd. In other words, the student got the meaning out but by appeal to a 
 sentence model from their native language. 
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 Taking the right courses with the best teachers, and getting all of the materials required is good, 
 up to a point. That is, without a very high level of motivation, no real progress will be made, no 
 matter what resources are available. 
     We have taken the grand tour of conjunction types here, and perhaps the travel has been tedious. 
Further, the student can no doubt see from the example sentences how subtle the conditions of 
application of many of the conjunctions in fact are. But, the flip side of this is that having the types 
specified and classified as they are should help the student to develop their general understanding of 
the conjunctions of English as a part of speech, and each example sentence provides a model of the use 
of a particular conjunction that, no matter the subtlety involved, should help the student to make at 





















      
     On the accounting here, there are 69 prepositions in English. 53 of them are single word, 16 of them 
multi-word. 3 of them are probably archaic and 3 of them are complete or partial borrowings from other 
languages. They are as follows in alphabetical order: 
 about  beside  onto  without 
 above  between outside  along with 
 across  betwixt  over  as of 
 after  beyond  per  as per 
 against  by  sans  as though 
 along  cum  since  as to 
 alongside despite  than  because of 
 amid  during  through due to 
 amidst  except  thru  except for 
 amongst for  to  as a means to 
 among  from  under  as a result of 
 around  in  unlike  in consequence of 
 as  inside  unto  in lieu of 
 at  instead  upon  in spite of 
 before  like  via  instead of 
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 behind  of  with  in terms of 
 below  on  within  on the basis of 
 beneath 
     The system of English employed in this text allows us to say that, at the appropriate level of 
generality, there are exactly four functions of prepositions: 
1. prepositions serve as the main component of one of the four types of predicate base 
 She [is in] Texas attending a conference. 
2. prepositions serve as predicate extenders 
 I bought a necklace for my mother. 
3. prepositions serve as one of the two components of a prepositional phrase 
 I bought a necklace [with four rubies] for my mother. 
4. the preposition ‘to’ is a component of every infinitive phrase 
 I want [to learn Spanish]. 
However this is not of much help to the student because the big problem is figuring out which of the 69 
preposition to use on functions 1., 2. and 3., and especially 2. and 3. To help with this, we can winnow 
things down, in two phases. First, I will give a classification of a good number of the single word 
prepositions, although this classification will be quite crude as compared to the one above for 
conjunctions. And, second, I will give my ‘Prep Box’, which features the most important prepositions in 
English, the fabulous fourteen. Here is the classification: 
1. Space (relative position in space) – ‘above’, ‘across’, ‘against’, ‘along’, ‘alongside’, ‘among’, ‘around’, 
‘at’, ‘behind’, ‘below’, ‘beneath’, ‘beside’, ‘between’, ‘beyond’, ‘in’, ‘inside’, ‘on’, ‘onto’, ‘over’, ‘under’, 
‘upon’, ‘within’ 
2. Time - ‘after’, ‘before’, ‘during’, ‘since’ 
3. Motion (travel) – ‘from’, ‘through’, ‘to’, ‘via’ 
79 
 
4. Relation - ‘about’ [subject], ‘as’ [role], ‘despite’ [defeat of opposition], ‘except’ [not], ‘instead‘ 
[replacement], ‘like’ [resemblance], ‘unlike’ [lack of resemblance], ‘with’ [connection, attachment], 
‘without’ [disconnection, detachment] 
5. Miscellaneous – ‘by’ [means], ‘for’ [service], ‘of’ [possession], ‘than’ [comparison], ‘unto’ [service] 
And here is the prep Box: 
about among by for in on to 
after at during from of than with 
 
Let us now try to give conditions of application for the prepositions in the box. This is perhaps the best 
place to note that while the term ‘conditions of application’ suggests something complicated, what is 
intended by it in each case is the simplest thing possible, the simplest idea that will allow you to use the 
word involved with some degree of confidence. So here goes: 
1. ‘about’ [subject] 
Example: 
 This is a book about the middle ages. 
2. ‘after’ [time] 
Example: 
 There was a party after the concert. 
3. ‘among’ [in the mix] 
Example: 
 Among the crowd there was a seven year old boy who would twenty years later be the leader of 
 a much more powerful protest movement. 




 I’m at work now. 
5. ‘by’ [means: way: method: manner] 
 You prepare to buy a house by saving your money. 
6. during [time] 
Example: 
 She texted her friends all during the meal. 
7. ‘for’ [service] 
Examples: 
 I went to the store for my mother. 
 This is the cover plate for the light switch in the den. 
8. ‘from’ [motion: travel: being present as a result of motion or travel] 
Examples: 
 He is coming from Mali. 
 This is a nice leather bag from Morocco. 
9. ‘in’ [containment] 
Example: 
 There is a sandwich in the refrigerator. 
10. ‘of’ [possession] it is very important to note that unlike many other prepositions, ‘of’ has very limited 
use as the main component of a predicate base, witness 
 Mary [is of] foreign descent. 




 I went to the store for my mother. 
Examples: 
 The dean [of the medical school] will arrive this afternoon. 
 Life is just a bowl [of cherries]. 
Note that the dean ‘belongs to’ the medical school and the cherries ‘belong to’ the bowl. 
11. ‘on’ [there’s no way to say it!!!] 
Examples: 
 The book is on the desk. 
 I’m on the train. 
(figurative) 
 I’m on the phone. 
 I’m on a diet. 
12. ‘than’ [comparison] note that this one is easy because the way in which it can be used is very 
restricted and the example that follow pretty much tell the whole story 
Examples: 
 America is wealthier than China. 
 China is larger than America. 
 Romney is less conservative than Bachman. 
 Obama is more liberal than Clinton. 
13. ‘to’ [motion: travel] 
Examples: 
 They went to the movies. 
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 The quarter rolled on its edge all the way to the wall. 
14. ‘with’ [attachment: together] 
Examples: 
 She bought an SUV with all-wheel drive. 
 John rode with her through the countryside. 
     As we close this section on prepositions, and with it the chapter on the functional expressions, it 
should be noted that the Prep Box is not just a source of prepositions for which conditions of application 
are provided. Rather it represents the set of prepositions that are the most used and the most difficult 
to choose from among so that it indicates to the student what they should focus on and thus helps them 
to move towards proficiency more rapidly. This having been said however it must be acknowledged that 
the conditions of application provided for the fabulous fourteen prepositions in the Prep Box will 














     As we move from the functional expressions to the substantive expressions, i.e. the big 4 of nouns, 
verbs, adjectives and adverbs, we move from categories that contain 5 to 69 expressions to categories 
that contain thousands, even tens of thousands of expressions. And we move as well from a concern 
with how a type of expression works to a concern with identifying expressions as to their type. That is to 
say the ways in which nouns, verbs, adjectives and adverbs function are simple and well known, and the 
student’s task is to learn how to identify them, how to spot them, for the purpose of understanding the 
structures of sentences occurring in the writing of others, so that these sentences can serve as models 
of good writing, and for the purpose of determining the structures of the sentences occurring in their 
own writing in order to facilitate the critical process of editing. Students have to be able to spot the 
nouns in their writing, for example, so that they can make sure that they are accompanied by the right 
determiner where one is called for and make sure that they have the right ending where one is called 
for. And they have to be able to spot the verbs in their writing so that they can make sure that they have 
the right form given the characterization of the verb phrase in terms of number, tense, aspect, voice, 
mood and modality. We will see that our work on the substantive expressions will go quite quickly as 
compared to the work on the functional expressions. Let us begin with nouns.   
     A noun is a word that is used to refer to a person, an animal a place or a thing. The thing can be 
concrete, like an object, an action, an event or a state, or it can be abstract, like a quality, a relation, a 
type or a concept.  It is traditional to divide nouns into the common, like person, and the proper, like 
Jones, but in the system upon which this text is based, proper nouns are names and thus all nouns per se 
are common. There are several particular things that characterize nouns. They divide into what are 
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called count nouns and what are called either non-count or mass nouns. A count noun is one like ‘car’ or 
‘house’ that refers to a class of units such that it is possible to count with respect to it. Thus we can 
count ‘one, car, two cars, …’ and ‘one house, two houses, …’ . A mass noun is one like ‘air’ or ‘water’ that 
refers to a single mass such that it is not possible to count with respect to them. You cannot say for 
example that there are three ‘airs’ in the room, or that you had five ‘waters’ in your tub this morning. 
     Both count nouns and mass nouns can take possessive endings. Thus we can have all of 
 The car’s color is beautiful. 
 The houses’ kitchens are all Viking equipped. 
 The water’s temperature is what will pose the challenge. 
 The air’s movement in the container must be controlled. 
However, given the distinction between count and mass explained above, only count nouns can have 
plural endings. Thus we can have  
 The cars are expensive. 
but not 
 *The airs are cold. 
     Some plurals are irregular, i.e. not formed by simply adding an ‘s’, or an ‘es’, to the singular form. 
Thus the plural of ‘man’ is ‘men’ and the plural of ‘child’ is ‘children’. The latter sets up an interesting 
case with respect to possessive endings. All possessive endings require both an ‘s’ and an apostrophe 
but where the possessive ending is singular, an apostrophe is added first and then an ‘s’ is added. By 
contrast, where the possessive ending is plural, the ‘s’ is already there to make the noun plural and then 
an apostrophe is added after the ‘s’ to form the possessive. Compare: 
 my mother’s house 
 my parents’ house 




but this would make it appear that the ‘s’ is making the noun plural and yet this is certainly not the case 
because ‘children’ is already plural. So, to avoid the redundancy that this would produce, prescriptive 
grammarians must at some point have decided to give the possessive of ‘children’ as 
 children’s 
despite the fact that the possessive ending is then exactly what we have when the noun is singular.   
     But the main business here is the business of spotting nouns in your writing so that you can make 
sure that they are properly attended to, that they have determiners and plural endings and possessive 
endings where they are required. There are a number of spotting strategies: 
- nouns are often marked by special endings such  as ‘-tion’ in ‘attention’, ‘-sion’ as in ‘tension’, ‘-ment’ 
as in ‘judgment’, and many, many others 
- nouns are words that have or can take determiners, and note here that we have studied determiners 
- nouns are words that are or can be modified by adjectives, prepositional phrases and relative clauses 
- nouns are words that can be replaced by pronouns 
- and of course nouns are words that fit the definition of noun, words that can be used to refer to 
certain kinds of things in the world. 
     Perhaps the main reason for having a strategy for spotting nouns has to do with a basic rule of count 
nouns that I humorously call No Naked Nouns. Every count noun must have a determiner or a plural 
ending or both. This you cannot say 
 I like car.  
Instead, you must say  
 I like this car. 
in which case the noun is ‘dressed’ with the determiner ‘this’, or you must say 
 I like cars. 
in which case the noun is dressed with the plural ending ‘-s’, or you can say 
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 I like these cars.  
in which case the noun is all dressed up in having both the determiner ‘these’ and the plural ending ‘-s’. 
Now ESL students routinely violate the No Naked Nouns rule and as a result I have developed what I call 
a SMEP, a specific, mechanical editing procedure, which requires the student to go through their 
composition word by word using the above strategies to spot all of the nouns, each of which is then 
underlined with a red pen or marked with a highlighter. The count nouns are separated from the mass 
ones and each one of them is checked to make sure that it has either a determiner or a plural ending or 











     Adjectives are words that refer to qualities, or properties, or characteristics, of the kinds of things 
that nouns refer to, so that when they modify nouns they attribute those qualities to the things that the 
nouns refer to. The behavior of adjectives is tightly constrained. They modify nouns from the left or they 
appear as the main component of one of the four types of predicate base. Thus, grammatically, we get 
 The green apple tastes best. 
where of course the adjective ‘green’ modifies the noun ‘apple’ from the left, or 
 They [must be very happy] with his new computer. 
where the adjective ‘happy’ is the main component of the predicate base ‘must be very happy’ 
and that’s pretty much all there is to it. I have come across only two cases in which an adjective seems 
to modify a noun from the right. One of them is the case of ‘accounts payable’ where ‘payable’ seems to 
be an adjective modifying the noun ‘accounts’. The other case I can’t remember. When I came across it, 
it seemed so certain that I would remember it forever given how special it was, but alas it may be lost to 
me forever – and, by the way, it’s not ‘accounts receivable’! But even with this we don’t have to 
concede an exception. We just treat ‘accounts payable’ as a special term, whose etymology we might 
study.   
     Materially, however, things are much more interesting. Beyond the straight cases like ‘green’ 
modifying ‘apple’ above, we have at least four special cases as follows: 
1. it was said that the adjective refers to a quality that it attributes to the thing referred to by the noun it 
modifies. Well if this is the case then what do we do with  
 fake fur 
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It doesn’t make sense to say that ‘being fake’ is a quality of fur. 
2. On the same rule of adjectives, we have to recognize something of a problem with 
 alleged thief 
 an alleged thief may or may not be a thief. 
3. there is no size relationship between what is given by  
 big flea 
and what is given by  
 big elephant 
and yet there is just the one adjective for the two cases. 
4.   there are adjectives that are really verbs and what happens where they are used is that the action 
given by the verb is applied to the object given by the noun, and where that action is completed, the 
verb carries an ‘-ed’ ending and where that action is continuing, the verb carries an ‘-ing’ ending. Thus 
we can have 
 A buttered roll costs fifty cents. 
where the action, completed action, given by the verb ‘to butter’ is applied to the object given by the 
noun ‘roll’, and  
 The special toy for the Kiddie Meal is available at participating restaurants. 
where the action, continuing action, given by the verb ‘to participate’ is applied to the object given by 
the noun ‘restaurant’. 
5. When verbs modify nouns those verbs are subject to adverbial modification, and the adverbs that 
perform this modification are themselves subject to adverbial modification. Thus we can have 
 At the heart of the device is a controlled mechanism. 
where the noun ‘mechanism’ is modified by the verb ‘to control’, but we can also have 
 At the heart of the device is a tightly controlled mechanism. 
89 
 
where the verb cum adjective is itself modified by the adverb ‘tightly’, and finally we can have 
 At the heart of the device is a very tightly controlled mechanism. 
where the adverb ‘tightly’ is itself modified by the adverb ‘very’.  
 Cases 1. through 3. above pose problems for those who analyze natural language formally but none of 
the five cases poses a problem for us because we understand perfectly well in each case what is going 












     A verb is a word that indicates some type of occurrence, quite often an action, or, in a very small 
number of cases, the relationship of possession. Thus we can have 
 Jane scored the basket that won the game. 
 John accepted what the coach told him. 
 Jane now has four trophies.    
      Verbs are distinguished from all other parts of speech in that they have multiple parts. Nouns can be 
said to have two parts, the singular and the plural, but these are not full-bloodied parts of the kind that 
verbs have, and no other part of speech has even the pretension of having parts. Verbs range in the 
number of parts they have from 3 to 6, and interestingly enough, it is the two basic verbs of English, ‘to 
be’ and ‘to have’, on analogy to ‘etre’ and ‘avoir’ in French, and ‘ser’/’estar’ and ‘tener’ in Spanish, that 
account for the extremes in this range. The verbs ‘to be’ and ‘to have’ have 6 parts and 3 parts, 
respectively, as follows: 
be  have 
am  has 
is  had 
are 
was 
were   
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But as the student might recall, these words are not ‘verbs’ here. Rather, they are copulas and, putting 
them aside we can say that, although there might be an exception or two out there – the space of 
English is vast – all true verbs have either 4 parts or 5 parts. Thus for example the verbs ‘to work’ and ‘to 
give’ have 4 parts and 5 parts, respectively. These parts, with labels indicating their status can be given 
in chart form as follows:  
Present - Plural work 
Present - Singular works 
Past worked 
Present Participle working 
 
Present – Plural give 
Present – Singular gives 
Past gave 
Present Participle giving 
Past Participle given 
  
A very important distinction with respect to verbs is that between the regular and the irregular. Regular 
verbs are those that follow the pattern set by the verb ‘to work’ above. Their first part has no ending, 
their second part has the ending ‘-s’, their third part has the ending ‘-ed’ and their fourth part has the 
ending ‘-ing’. All regular verbs have 4 parts. If a verb varies from this pattern in any way then it is 
irregular. Thus note that the third part of the verb ‘to give’ does not have an ‘-ed’ ending, and it has 5 
parts rather than 4, so that it is irregular. 
If we consider the verb ‘to show’ and give its chart as follows: 
Present – Plural show 
Present – Singular shows 
Past showed 
Present Participle showing 




and note that it is irregular because it has 5 parts then we might be tempted to think that all irregular 
verbs have 5 parts but this generalization is contradicted by the verb ‘to run’ whose parts are as follows: 
 
Present - Plural run 
Present - Singular runs 
Past ran 
Present Participle running 
 
This verb is irregular because its past part ‘ran’ does not carry the ending ‘-ed’ but still the verb has only 
4 parts.  
     Now just as we needed a strategy for spotting nouns in order to control certain noun related error 
types, so we need a strategy for spotting verbs to control certain verb related error types. The first thing 
to consider is whether verb endings can be of help. Well the ending ‘-s’ cannot because nouns have it 
also, and ‘-ed’ can’t help either because irregular verbs don’t have it. However all verbs without 
exception have an ‘-ing’ form, or part, and this fact will serve as the anchor of our verb spotting strategy. 
If a word has an ‘-ing’ form then it is a candidate for classification as a verb. But we will need much more 
that this, as the following three sentences make clear: 
 I work at Pace University. 
 I love my work. 
 This is my work pen. 
Clearly the word ‘work’ has an ‘-ing’ form but this does not mean that it appears as a verb in all three of 
the sentences above. It does appear as a verb in the first sentence. But in the second sentence it 
appears as a noun, as is evident from its having the determiner ‘my’. And in the third sentence it 
appears as an adjective, as is evident for its modification of the noun ‘pen’. How then do we distinguish 
among the cases? We want  say that where a word that has an ‘-ing’ form appears as a verb you have to 
be able to manipulate it and its associated elements as though you were going to change the tense of 
the sentence, without producing a grammatical mess. Thus the first sentence is in the present tense but 
it is possible to change ‘work’ to ‘worked’ and have a grammatical sentence in the past tense 
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 I worked at Pace university. 
 and it is also possible to add the modal ‘will’ to ‘work’ and have a grammatical sentence in the future 
tense. But no such manipulation is possible with respect to either the second sentence or the third. It 
would produce a mess to change ‘work’ to ‘worked’ in the second sentence 
 I love my worked. 
And things would be even worse if the modal ‘will’ were added to ‘work’ in the third sentence 
 This is my will work pen. 
And note that in the search for verbs we will not be interested in the ‘frozen’ verbs of infinitive and 
gerund phrases, like the verb ‘to start’ in  
 Jane wants [to start a business]. 
or the verb ‘to go’ in 
 [Going on vacation] is fun. 
These verbs have to be handled properly too but they are so simple since in the one case the verb 
always takes the present plural, i.e. the infinitive form, and in the other case the present participle form 
such that the student does not often have trouble with them. Contrast this with the verb component of 
a predicate base 
 The company [will surely have chosen] its computer vendor by the end of the fiscal quarter. 
where the student has to choose from among ‘choose’, chooses’, ‘chose’, ‘choosing’ and ‘chosen’ and 
get all of its satellites right in order to properly reflect number, tense, aspect, mood and modality. But 
among these characteristics of predicate bases, it is number that provides the greatest motivation for 
the strategy of spotting verbs because when the sentence is in the present tense the ESL student has a 
great deal of difficulty getting the verb to agree with its subject in terms of number, i.e. in terms of 
singular and plural. To take a particularly troublesome case, what about 
 The schedule of topics on the agenda in the hands of the conferees [suggest/suggests] that 
 there is an excessive concern with the past. 
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After the student struggles to come up with a sentence expressing this idea, how are they to find the 
resources necessary to select the proper form of the verb? Thus there also has to be a SMEP for Subject-
Verb Agreement. The student must go through their text word by word, underlining in red or 
highlighting in their favorite color (or least favorite color, given the potential tediousness of all of this) all 
occurrences of verbs. Then the frozen ones have to be put aside, leaving only the ‘live’ ones that reside 
in predicate bases, and with respect of each of these live verbs, a determination of tense has to be 
made. Finally, where the determination is that the tense is present, the student must search in word by 
word mode again, but this time only among the words from the beginning of the sentence up to the 
point at which the verb occurs in order to find the key subject word, making sure that if it is singular and 
thus has no ‘s’(is plural and thus has an ‘s’) then the verb is also singular such that it has an ‘s’ (plural 
such that it does not have an ‘s’). In other words, the student has to spot the verb ‘suggest’ or ‘suggests’, 
whichever is present, identify ‘schedule’, not ‘topics’ or ‘agenda’ or ‘hands’, as the subject and, noting 
that it is singular, select the singular ‘suggests’! 
     We saw above a SMEP related to the use of nouns. When there is a problem of a determiner missing 
in relation to the noun, the error type is Word Omission and when there is a problem of a plural ending 
missing in relation to the noun, the error type is Word Ending. And we saw here the verb related SMEP 
for Subject-Verb Agreement. These are just three of the error types in the Big 10 system of the ten most 
commonly occurring error types, all of which have associated strategies of identification and correction 










    In the big 4, just as adjectives are the modifiers of nouns, so adverbs are the modifiers of verbs, and 
this is an elegant feature of English. However, adverbs have a wider range of application than adjectives 
in that they also modify adjectives and other adverbs. The adverb shows when, how or to what extent in 
relation to the term it modifies. Thus we have  
 They decided to leave early. 
where the adverb ‘early’ shows when in relation to the verb ‘leave’ and  
 She played the sonata beautifully.      
where the adverb ‘beautifully’ shows how in relation to the verb ‘played’ and  
 He is cautiously optimistic. 
where the adverb ‘cautiously’ shows how in relation to the adjective ‘optimistic’ and finally 
 She supported the measure very reluctantly. 
where the adverb ‘very’ shows to what extent in relation to the adverb ‘reluctantly’ -  and the adverb 
‘reluctantly’ shows how in relation to the verb ‘supported’. If adverbs have a wider range of application 
than adjectives they also have greater freedom to move about. Adjectives modify nouns from the left 
but adverbs modify verbs from the left and from the right, inside the predicate base, and from the right 
a term or more away from the predicate base. Thus we can have all of  
 Jane [completely disagreed] with the decision. 
 Jane [disagreed completely] with the decision. 
 Jane [disagreed] with the decision completely. 
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where ‘completely’ is the adverb, although this range of movement is not possible in all cases and where 
it is, as above, there is typically some difference among the positions in terms of aptness vs. 
awkwardness of fit. Adverbs can also appear at the very beginning of the sentence, as in  
 Reluctantly, john [left] the company. 
But there are two cases in this regard because, in the sentence above, the adverb ‘reluctantly’ modifies 
the verb ‘left’ and could appear inside the predicate base as in  
 John [reluctantly left] the company. 
and the adverb reflects the sentiment of John whereas in the sentence 
 Unfortunately, John left the company. 
the adverb ‘unfortunately’ seems to modify the whole sentence ‘John left the company.’ and could not 
appear inside the predicate base, as we see in 
 *John unfortunately left the company. 
which is unacceptable unless it appears as 
 John, unfortunately, left the company. 
which shows that the adverb cannot appear inside the predicate base, and that adverb reflects the 
sentiment not of John but of the speaker. So the two cases are quite different. 
     But there is a great deal of subtlety and complexity even in the case in which the adverb modifies the 
verb because as we saw above we can have 
 John reluctantly left the company. 
and  
 John left the company reluctantly. 
We cannot have 
 *John left reluctantly the company.         
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 Finally, note that adverbs are of course also components of predicate bases whose main component is 
not a verb but an adjective, a preposition or a copula, such that we can have all of 
 Jane [is clearly happy] about her promotion. 
 John [is probably in]Spain. 
 Jane [will eventually be] the chief officer in her division of the company. 
     It is easy to spot adverbs because, as we have seen, the ‘-ly’ ending is a clear marker, and the vast 
majority of adverbs have that marker. Unfortunately however not all adverbs do. But, the Merriam-
Webster’s Advanced Learner’s English Dictionary comes to our rescue here by providing the following list 
of the most common adverbs that do not in in ‘-ly’: 
 again  ever  never  soon  very 
 also  here  not  then  well 
 always  how  now  there  when 
 as  just  often  today  where 
 even    more  sometimes too  why 
This list is clearly a very nice gift because the combination of it and ‘-ly’ makes us super adverb spotters. 
And yet we must look a gift horse in the mouth because several of the items on the list cannot be seen 
as adverbs on the grammar of this text. On the grammar of this text, ‘also’ is a conjunction, ‘when’, 
‘where’ and ‘why’ are W/TH words, and most importantly, ‘here’, ‘there’ and ‘today’ are odd creatures 
but not modifiers of any kind because they always, or most often, appear effectively as terms taking 
slots in predicates to help in making sentences. Thus for example: 
 We are here. 
 You are there. 
 They will leave today. 
are effectively 
 We are at this place. 
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 You are at that place. 
 They will leave on this day. 
where ‘this place’, ‘that place’ and ‘this day’ are terms. The words of ‘here’, ‘there’ and ‘today’ are very 
similar to nouns in referring to places and times, and very like pronouns in having variable reference. 













     In this chapter, I will discuss what might be considered to be the simpler of the two groupings of term 
types, viz. the essentially nominal grouping that includes names, pronouns and noun phrases, as 
opposed to the essentially verbal, or sentential, grouping that includes infinitive phrases, gerund 
phrases and W/TH phrases, which will be considered in the next chapter.  
     Names are the most basic of the six term types. For the most part, the student has only to memorize 
them. While it is no doubt true that some very high percentage of names have etymologies that yield for 
them a distant association with meaning, names like ‘Carpenter’, ‘Plummer’ and ‘Smith’ being obvious 
cases in point, practically, as opposed to philosophically, most names can be viewed as arbitrarily 
chosen expressions that serve as tags of reference for persons places and things. It must be recognized, 
however, that this characterization fits names like ‘John Doe’ better than it does names like ‘The United 
States of America’ and ‘The Chamber of Commerce’. Names like these last two are really noun phrases 
that were turned into names at the point at which fixed reference became convenient, and thus these 
names have a closer association with meaning. The main concern is that the student has to be alerted to 
the need to use the definite article in the cases of this type, and to avoid using it in all cases of the other, 
more common type. Thus, for example, it is a mistake to fail to use the article and say or write, ‘United 
States of America’, but it is also a mistake to use it and say or write, ‘the America’.  
     Pronouns were studied extensively in the chapter on functional expressions and thus only a brief 
recap is needed here. They comprise four quite disparate groups. First, there are the 32 words that form 
the main system of pronouns. They are the subjective, the objective, the possessive and the reflexive 
pronouns. The 8 pronouns in each of these groups distinguish number and gender but mainly they 
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indicate person, that is to say, they indicate what might be called the three elements of the discourse 
situation, viz. the discourse participants consisting in the person or persons speaking (the first person), 
the discourse participants consisting the person or persons spoken to (the second person), and, 
adapting a term from logic, the universe of the discourse (the third person). Thus, for example, among 
the subjective pronouns ‘I’, ‘you’, ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’, ‘we’, ‘you’, ‘they’, ‘I’ and ‘we’ are first person and 
represent  the person and persons speaking, respectively, ‘you’ (singular) and ‘you’ (plural) are second 
person and represent the person and persons spoken to, respectively, and ‘he’, ‘she’, ‘it’ and ‘they’ are 
third person and represent the universe of the discourse, i.e. the persons, places and/or things that 
comprise the field of reference of the discourse. Second there are the pronouns that have a 
‘determiner-noun’ like structure, including ‘something’, ‘anytime’, ‘everyplace’ and ‘nobody’. Third, 
there are the demonstrative pronouns ‘this’, ‘that’, ‘these’ and ‘those’. And, fourth, there are the 
pronouns ‘one’, ‘one’s’ and ‘oneself’ of formal usage.  
     The structure for noun phrases in English is as follows: 
 (D.) + (Adj.) + No. + (Pre. + O.) + (R.P. + I.S.) 
where ‘D.’ = determiner, ‘Adj.’ = adjective, ‘No.’ = noun, ‘Pre.’ = preposition, ‘O.’ = object, ‘R.P.’ = relative 
pronoun, and ‘I.S.’ = incomplete sentence: the sub-structure ‘Pre. + O.’ constitutes a prepositional 
phrase (= P.P.) and the sub-structure ‘R.P. + I.S.’ constitutes a relative clause (= R.C.): parentheses 
indicate that an element is optional and of course a ‘+’ between two elements indicates that the one on 
the right follows the one on the left. Thus in the noun phrase 
 the huge pot of gold that she found 
‘the’ is a determiner, ‘huge’ is an adjective, ‘pot’ is the noun, ‘of’ is a preposition and ‘gold’ is its object 
such that ‘of gold’ is a prepositional phrase, ‘that’ is a relative pronoun and ‘she found’ is an incomplete 
sentence such that ‘that she found’ is a relative clause. The adjective, the prepositional phrase and the 
relative clause modify the noun and the determiner operates on the sub-structure consisting of the 
noun and these three modifiers. 
     Now the situation we find ourselves in here reflects the approach to the presentation of English taken 
in this text. We have already studied determiners, adjectives and nouns directly. The structure and role 
of prepositional phrases came out in our direct study of prepositions and the structure and role of 
relative clauses came out in our direct study of relative pronouns. So all we have to do here is appreciate 
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how everything goes together.  And yet we do need to see that, because of its optional elements, a 
noun phrase can take a number of particular forms. If we restrict out attention to the sub-structure on 
which the determiner operates, there are in fact 8 particular forms as follows: 
 
 students [No.] 
 good students [Adj. + No.] 
 students at Pace [No. + P.P.] 
 students who love literature [No. + R.C.] 
 good students at Pace [Adj. + No. + P.P.] 
 good students who love literature [Adj. + No. + R.C.] 
 students at Pace who love literature [No. + P.P. + R.C.]  
 good students at Pace who love literature [Adj. + No. + P.P. + R.C.] 
 
It is possible to have a series of modifiers all of whose members are of the same type, adjective, 
prepositional phrase or relative clause, but practically speaking this possibility is realized only in the case 
of adjectives. It is easy to have 
 large round green stone 
although as we saw in the section on adjectives, where the adjective is really a verb, it is possible for it 
to be complex, as is the adjective in  
 a [very skillfully crafted] ring 
     I think of noun phrases as the work horse of terms, but it would be interesting to conduct a study of 













     This second chapter on terms addresses the three term types infinitive phrase, gerund phrase and 
W/TH phrase. In contrast to the three essentially nominal term types name, pronoun and noun phrase 
discussed in the preceding chapter, the three term types here can be classified as essentially verbal in 
that both infinitive phrases like ‘to listen to music’ and gerund phrases like ‘listening to music’ begin 
with verbs, taking into account that an infinitive phrase begins with the infinitive form of the verb, which 
itself begins with the preposition ‘to’ , and W/TH phrases like ‘what they want’ consists of a W/TH  word, 
either ‘who’, ‘what’, ‘when’, ‘where’, ‘why’, ‘how’ or ‘that’, followed by an ‘incomplete sentence’, ‘they 
want’ in the case of the example here, and this incomplete sentence is always incomplete in virtue of 
missing a term, a subject term or an object term, such that it always includes a predicate base, and thus 
a verb, whether it is an ordinary verb like ‘live’ in ‘where they live’, or a copula like ‘is’ in ‘who John is’ or 
‘are’ in ‘what they are for’. Alternatively, however, the three term types here might be classified as 
sentential in that infinitive phrases and gerund phrases can be characterized loosely as sentences absent 
their subjects, and of course we have just seen that every W/TH phrase has an incomplete sentence as 
one of its two components. Given a certain notion of a sentence, it is not very difficult to specify the 
structure of an infinitive phrase or a gerund phrase, along the lines just suggested. The notion needed is 
that developed in the overview chapter of a sentence as a term and predicate construction. Working 
with this notion we can say that infinitive phrases and gerund phrases can be characterized as structures 
derived by deleting the subjects of term and predicate sentences, and then making certain modifications 
to their predicate bases. Thus from the sentence 
 Jane designed a control device for hot water heaters that can be produced inexpensively. 
which clearly has the term and predicate form, we can derive the infinitive phrase 
  to design a control device for hot water heaters that can be produced inexpensively 
and the gerund phrase 
 designing a control device for hot water heaters that can be produced inexpensively 
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The case of W/TH phrases is similar. W/TH phrases can be characterized as structures that have two 
parts, the first being a W/TH word and the second a sentence in which the subject term or an object 
term has been deleted. Thus using the sentence above can produce the W/TH phrases 
 what Jane designed  
and 
 who designed a control device for hot water heaters that can be produced inexpensively 
     It is very important to develop clear notions of what an infinitive phrase is and what a gerund phrase 
is because there is a type of mistake that appears quite regularly in ESL writing which seems to result 
from confusing the two phrase types in some way. The mistake consists specifically in producing an 
infinitive phrase where a preposition plus gerund phrase structure is called for, or vice versa. Thus the 
student might produce the sentence 
 I am anxious of starting my research paper. 
where they should have produced 
 I am anxious to start my research paper. 
So the preposition plus gerund phrase structure  
 of + starting my research paper 
is confused with the infinitive phrase 
 to start my research paper 
It is not clear whether the word by word similarity between preposition followed by the gerund phrase, 
on the one hand, and the infinitive phrase, on the other, is at least partly responsible for this mistake 
type, but it is obvious that the student must develop a precise sense what an infinitive phrase is and 
what a gerund phrase is if a teacher or a tutor is to be able to explain the mistake type to them in an 















     Every predicate has a predicate base and there are four types of these: 
The Action Type 
Predicate bases which conform to the following pattern, and thus have a verb as their main element: 
 (M.) + (Adv.) + (Cop.) + (Adv.) + V. + (Adv.) 
For example,  
 must be carefully crafting 
The Quality Type 
Predicate bases which conform to the following pattern, and thus have an adjective as their main 
element: 
 (M.) + (Adv.) + Cop. + (Adv.) + Adj. + (Adv.) 
For example,  
 might soon be wealthy 
The Relation Type 
Predicate bases which conform to the following pattern and, thus have a preposition as their main 
element: 
 (M.) + (Adv.) + Cop. + (Adv.) + Pre. 
For example,  
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 could actually be in 
The Identity Type 
Predicate bases which conform to the following pattern and, thus have a copula as their main element: 
 (M.) + (Adv.) + Cop. + (Adv.) 
For example,  
 should eventually be 
where:  
 - each word unit, M., Adv., etc. is called an element 
 - the plus sign ‘+’ indicates that the element at its left precedes the one at its right, alternatively, 
   that the element at is right follows the one at its left 
 - parentheses indicate that an element is optional 
  - an underline indicates that an element is required   
 - a sequence of elements connected by plus signs is called a pattern 
Note that logically it is not necessary to have both parentheses and underlines. If there are parentheses 
indicating that elements are optional then all elements not occurring in parentheses are required. And if 
there are underlines indicating that elements are required then all elements occurring without 
underlines are optional. Where a given meaning is indicated twice in one expression or system, that 
expression or system is said to be redundant to that extent, and redundancy is in general to be avoided. 
But in some areas, including advertising and education, redundancy is to be valued because it reinforces 
the reception of content.     
     Where the predicate base is of the action type, it is necessary to consider the number of terms 
required by that predicate base in view of the verb that is its main constituent. An action type predicate 
base whose verb is 
 to swim 
only requires one term, as the sentence 
 Bob swims.  
makes clear, but the an action type predicate base whose verb is 
 to authorize 
requires two terms, as the sentence 
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 Mary authorized the transfer. 
makes clear, and an action type predicate base whose verb is 
 to give 
requires three terms, as the sentences 
 Bob gave Mary a present. 
 Bob gave a present to Mary. 
make clear.   
     Predicate bases of the quality type and of the identity type do not have this variability with respect to 
the number of terms required.  Putting aside the case of comparison sentences, which will be 
considered  separately later, a predicate base of the quality type always requires just one term, as can 
be seen in the sentence  
 Jane is famous. 
and a predicate base of the equality type always requires exactly two terms, as can be seen in the 
sentence  
 Jack is the president. 
With predicate bases of the relation type, there is just a slight amount of variability. The vast majority of 
predicate bases of this type require exactly two terms, as the sentences 
 Mary is in Texas. 
 John is at work. 
show. But, relation type predicate bases which have the preposition  
 between       
as their main element require exactly three terms, as is shown by the sentence 
 New York is between Washington and Boston. 
     Now, a predicate consists of: 
(1)  a predicate base 




(3) in the case of some action and relation type predicate bases requiring three terms, a preposition or 
the conjunction ‘and’. 
One position blank precedes the predicate base, and is called the subject phrase position blank. Any 
other position blanks follow the predicate base, serially where there is more than one, that is to say, 
where there are two. Each such position blank is called an object phrase position blank. There is a 
preposition only in the case where there are two object phrase position blanks, and then the preposition 
is positioned between them. The conjunction ‘and’ occurs in the same way where the predicate base is 
one of the relation type whose key constituent is the preposition 
 between 
Thus all of the following are predicates: 
 _____ sings. 
 _____ authorized _____ . 
 _____ gave ______ to _____ . 
 _____ bought _____     _____ . 
 _____ is tall. 
 _____ is in _____ . 
 _____ is between _____ and _____ .    
 _____ is _____ . 
All of the predicates here have bases that are ‘bare’, i.e. have only the required elements, but of course 
all of the optional predicate base elements come into play also. Thus  
 _____ may have reluctantly authorized _____ . 
is a predicate as well.  
     The final point to be made about predicate structure is that a predicate can be ‘extended’ to take on 
an additional object phrase position blank through the action of a preposition. Thus the predicate  
 _____ is in _____ . 
can be extended to take on another object phrase position blank through the action of the preposition 
‘for’ as follows: 
 _____ is in _____ for _____ . 
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and this predicate can, in turn,  be extended to take on still another object phrase position blank 
through the action of the preposition ‘according to’ as follows: 
 _____ is in _____ for _____ according to _____ . 
An example of a sentence employing this predicate is: 
 Jane is in Texas for a conference according to her secretary. 





    
1. Identify the predicates in the following sentences. 
 
2. Use the following scrambled terms and predicates to form three sentences about sports. 
 
3. Diagram the following predicate bases using the four predicate base patterns.   
 
4. Making use of the five prepositions and the five terms provided, extend each of the following five 













     The structures of predicates have already been considered. The purpose of this chapter is to show 
what predicates indicate, i.e. what they contribute to the characterization of the state of affairs denoted 
by the sentence that they are a part of. Now, what a predicate indicates in the main is a function of the 
nature of its predicate base:  
If the base of the predicate is of the action type then the predicate indicates that what the terms of the 
sentence refer to, respectively, participate in some action -  
 Ex: Jane plays tennis. 
If the base of the predicate is of the quality type then the predicate indicates that what the subject term 
refers to has a certain quality –  
 Ex: John is intelligent. 
If the base of the predicate is of the relation type then the predicate indicates that what the terms of 
the sentence refer to, respectively, stand in a certain relation - 
 Ex: Jane is on the executive board.  
And, if the base of the predicate is of the identity type then the predicate indicates that what its subject 
term refers to and what its first, or only, object term refers to are identical - 
 Ex: John is the office manager.           
Beyond this main indication, however, all predicates have certain ‘characteristics’, in virtue of which 
they indicate several more abstract things. The characteristics of predicates are: number, tense, voice, 
aspect, mood and modality. These characteristics will be described in turn, and then the structure of 
relations that holds among them will be specified. It will be convenient to refer more to predicate bases 




     This is the simplest of the six characteristics. Every predicate base has a number, i.e. it is either 
singular or plural, depending on whether its subject term is singular or plural. The subject term and the 
predicate base of the sentence must agree in number. Both must be singular or both must be plural. 
Thus consider: 
 The student is going on vacation. 
 The students are going on vacation. 
However, where the predicate base has a modal as one of its elements, the number of the predicate 
base is not actually marked. 
 The student must apply for a visa. 
 The students must apply for a visa.   
Tense 
     Students complain about the complexity of tense in English but this is unfortunate because it 
represents nothing more than their having been taught improperly. The tense system of English is much 
simpler than for example that of either French or Spanish. There are six basic tenses of English, and what 
is involved with them can be brought out by considering just the third person singular and the third 
person plural, and employing absolutely minimal sentences, as follows:   
 The Past 
 He worked. / They worked. 
 The Present 
 He works. / They work. 
 The Future 
 He will work. / They will work. 
 The Past Perfect 
 She had worked. / They had worked. 
 The Present Perfect 
 She has worked. / They have worked. 
 The Future Perfect 
 She will have worked. / They will have worked. 
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A key tool in instructing students about tense and other characteristics of predicates will be that of a 
‘marker’. Now there are seven simple markers that indicate all of the features of tense represented 
above. The easiest way to show this is to repeat the scheme above with the markers underlined, noting 
that all of the markers appear more than once.     
 The Past 
 He worked. / They worked. 
 The Present 
 He works. / They work _. 
 The Future 
 He will work. / They will work. 
 The Past Perfect 
 She had worked. / They had worked. 
 The Present Perfect 
 She has worked. / They have worked. 
 The Future Perfect 
 She will have worked. / They will have worked. 
There is a bit more complexity in that context must be taken account of. For example, ‘-ed’ indicates the 
past only in the absence of ‘had’, ‘has’ and ‘have’, and ‘will’ indicates the future perfect only in the 
presence of ‘have’. And, while no additional markers come into play, the scheme does expand when the 
first and second persons are included. Thus consider the full representation of just the Past, the Present, 
and the Future: 
 The Past   The Present   The Future 
 I worked   I work.    I will work. 
 You worked.   You work.   You will work. 
 He, She, It worked.  He, She, It works.  He, She, It will work. 
 We worked.   We work.   We will work. 
 You worked.   You work.   You will work. 
 They worked.   They work.   They will work. 
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Now, the markers mainly help students to determine the tenses of sentences they receive. They must 
learn the whole scheme if they themselves are to be able to produce sentences in all of the tenses 
proficiently. All of this having said, however, students can learn the tense system of English easily if the 
teacher presents it in the manner indicated here.    
Voice 
     There are two voices, the active and the passive. A sentence is in the active voice if the referent of its 
subject term ‘performs’ the action indicated by its predicate base while it is in the passive voice if the 
referent of its subject term ‘receives’ the action indicated by its predicate base. The predicate base must 
thus be of the action type. Consider the sentences: 
 Jane teaches John Latin. 
 John is taught Latin by Jane. 
The first sentence is in the active voice because Jane is the referent of the subject term and she 
performs the action of teaching while the second sentence is in the passive voice because John is the 
referent of the subject term and he receives the action of teaching. Conversion from the active to the 
passive requires (1) the inversion of the subject term and the first object term, (2) a change in the form 
of the main verb, (3) the introduction of a copula and (4) the introduction of the preposition ‘by’. 
Aspect 
     There are also two aspects of predicate bases, the discrete, which can be represented by a point on a 
time line, and the progressive, which can be represented by a span along a time line. Consider the 
sentences:  
 Jane runs. 
 Jane is running. 
The first has the discrete aspect while the second has the progressive aspect. Clearly then, the verb must 
be of the ‘-ing’, or present participle, form and must be accompanied by a copula if the aspect is to be 
progressive while the verb must not be of the ‘-ing’, or the present participle, form and must not be 
accompanied by a copula if the aspect is to be discrete. Thus the predicate base must be of the action 
type for either aspect.    
Mood 
     There are two moods of predicate bases as well, the indicative and the subjunctive. The difference is 
that, in the indicative mood, an interest in deception aside, the speaker or writer tries simply to say 
what is the case while, in the subjunctive mood, the speaker or the writer entertains what they know 
not to be the case in order to try to say something that is the case. The following two sentences show 
how this distinction is really an easy one to understand. John says, first: 
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 I am 5 feet, 8 inches tall. 
and, then: 
 If I were 7 feet tall, I would play in the NBA.       
The first sentence is in the indicative mood. John merely tries to say what is the case, and presumably 
succeeds. But, the second case is in the subjunctive mood. John entertains what he knows not to be the 
case, viz. that he is 7 feet tall, in order to try to say, pretty much by implication, that he would like to 
play in the NBA. The typical sentence in the subjunctive mood shares with the subjunctive mood 
sentence here both conditional form and the use of ‘were’ where ‘was’ would otherwise be appropriate. 
Modality 
     Each of the following 12 modals 
 could  may  can  do 
 should  might  shall  does 
 would  must  will  did 
has, as we saw in the sections on modals above, a simple practical characterization, and the simple 
effect of the inclusion of a modal element in a predicate base was specified there. Thus the modal ‘can’ 
is associated with ability while the modal ‘could’ is associated with ability on condition, again as was 
seen above, and when a modal is included in a predicate base, the verbal element of that predicate 
base, or the one of the two verbal elements of that predicate base which is leftmost, either a copula or a 
verb, must take the infinitive form. Thus in all of: 
can win   could be winning  can be loyal  could be in  can be   
the verbal element or the leftmost verbal element is in the infinitive form, despite the full variety of 
predicate base types represented.  
     Now, all of the six characteristics of predicate bases have been studied thoroughly so it is time to 
consider the structure of relations holding among them. There are many possible ways to do this, but 
the ideal way is to devise and employ a scheme that is simple, orderly and intuitive. I recommend a 
scheme that incorporates just the three characteristics number, tense and aspect, but also shows how 
the sentences in the scheme, which will be active, indicative, and [ - ] modal, can be converted to 
sentences that are passive, subjunctive and [ + ] modal, respectively.  A scheme incorporating all six of 






 The Discrete The Progressive 
The Past He worked. 
They worked. 
He was working./ 
They were working. 
The Present He works./ 
They work. 
He is working./ 
They are working. 
The Future He will work./ 
They will work. 
He will be working./ 
They will be working. 
The Past Perfect She had worked./ 
They had worked. 
She had been working./ 
They had been working. 
The Present Perfect She has worked./ 
They have worked. 
She has been working./ 
They have been working. 
The Future Perfect She will have worked./ 
They will have worked. 
She will have been working./ 
They will have been working. 
 
Examples of conversion to the passive voice, the subjunctive mood and [ + ] modal are 
  (passive) 
 He works the trainees hard. 
 The trainees are worked hard by him. 
 She is working the trainees hard. 
 The trainees are being worked hard by her. 
 (subjunctive) 
 He works the trainees hard. 
 If he were to work the trainees hard, they would be fit. 
 She is working the trainees hard. 
 If she were working the trainees hard, they would be fit. 
 ( [ + ] ) 
 He works the trainees hard. 
 He must work the trainees hard. 
 She is working the trainees hard. 
 She must be working the trainees hard. 
In all of these cases, of course, we have expanded the primitive sentence from the scheme above in 
order to show what the conversion involves. But note that it is by no means true that all combinations 
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are possible. In the cases above, we start from the present but if, for example, we start from the past 
perfect 
 She had been working the trainees hard. 
and try to convert the sentence  from the active to the passive, we get something like  
 The trainees had been being worked hard by her. 
which is dubious at best. And if we start from the future 
 He will work the trainees hard. 
and try to convert it from [ - ] modal to [ + ] modal, we get something like  
 He must will work the trainees hard. 
which of course is not even dubious grammatically, although it might be understood as ‘It is necessary 
that he will work the trainees hard.’. To determine which of the very large number of possible 
combinations is actual is something that might be attempted as a very interesting project auxiliary to the 
production of this text. The thing would be to provide a good explanation of each case in which the 
possible combination is not actual, and eventually to set out the general principles governing all of the 
cases. But, this aside, the simple descriptions of the characteristics of predicate bases provided here, in 
conjunction with the consideration of cases which are realistic because they are drawn from published 
sources, will greatly assist the ESL student in mastering this part of English, and might even convince 












     We find ourselves in a position here that is perfectly analogous to the one we found ourselves in with 
respect to noun phrases. There we said that because of the studies of determiners, adjectives, nouns, 
prepositions and relative pronouns, all the elements of the noun phrase form 
 (D) + (Adj) + No (Pre + O) + (RP + IS) 
and the ways in which they relate to each other were already well understood, and the only things left  
to do were to appreciate all of this, and to break out the various specific configurations that the form 
and the element types license. Well here we already understand the 6 + 4 = 10 of  
 Name 
 Pronoun 
 Noun Phrase 
 Infinitive Phrase 
 Gerund Phrase 
 W/TH Phrase 
 + 
 Action Type Predicate Base 
 Quality Type Predicate Base 
 Relation Type Predicate Base 
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 Identity Type Predicate Base 
 + 
 the form, which has perhaps been merely implicit, although instantiated many times, which is as 
 follows: 
 [subject term]+[predicate base]+[(pre.)]+[object term 1]+[(pre.)]+[object term 2] … 
where the parentheses indicate that the preposition connectors (pre.) are optional, and the only things 
left to do are to appreciate all of this, and to break out the various specific configurations that the form 
and the term and predicate base types license. This is a combinatorial affair at the first instance. Thus 
since there are 6 term types and 4 predicate base types, there are 6 x 4 = 24 possible combinations vis-à-
vis the first two components of a term and predicate sentence. The next component is the preposition 
connector and here we either have the optional connector or we don’t, so we get 2 x 24 = 48. The next 
component is object phrase # 1, which has the same 6 options as the predicate, so we get (break out the 
calculator!) 48 x 6 = 288. The next component is an optional connector, which again we have or don’t 
have, so we get 2 x 288 = 576. The next component is object phrase #2, which repeats the 6 term 
options, so we get 576 x 6 = 3,456. The next component is an optional connector, which gives us 2 x 
3,456 = 6,912. And the next component is object phrase # 3, which has the 6 options, so we get 6,912 x 
6 = 41, 472 as the number of possible sentence patterns going out to 3 object positions, which is enough 
to cover the vast majority of sentences in English. It would be a big undertaking but all of these patterns 
could be specified and the thing would then be for a team of native speakers, linguists and philosophers 
of language and editors, ideally, to try to produce a grammatical sentence of English for each pattern. 
Just one would do. Where a grammatical sentence would be produced, it would be known that the 
pattern is ‘valid’ and where a grammatical sentence would not have been produced, either the pattern 
would be declared invalid or the ‘jury’ would declare itself still to be out. But beyond this very 
mechanical affair the effort would be to uncover the principles that explain why some patterns are valid 
while others are invalid, that is the effort would be to provide a definition of grammatical validity in 
term and predicate grammar.             
     In this chapter, we also want to show how all of the parts and aspects of the grammar that we have 
studied come together to form a coherent whole, in practical, rather than combinatorial, terms. What 
will be employed to achieve this objective is a technique of sentence diagramming that is based on the 
system developed here. The technique is applied to four member sentence sets which are configured in 
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such a way that they cover all of the truly basic structural aspects of declarative sentences in English. In 
particular, each four member sentence set covers: 
 - all four types of predicate base 
 - all six types of term 
 - the first four sentence lengths: subject term only, one object term, two object  terms and three 
   object terms 
 - all three of the noun phrase modifier types 
 - the four modal-adverb configurations possible with respect to predicate bases 
 -  the extension of the sentence beyond the predicate base to an object term or the extension of 
    the sentence from one object term to another object term,  both with the use of a preposition   
    and without the use of a preposition. 
     The diagramming can be done on paper or on the computer. In either case, each of the four 
sentences has a page, and a segmented line goes across the top of the page. The segments of the line 
are labeled in turn from left to right, ‘S.T.’, ‘P.B.’, ‘(C.)’, ‘O.T.1’, ‘(C.)’, ‘O.T.2’, ‘(C.)’ and ‘O.T.3’ for ‘Subject 
Term’, ‘Predicate Base’, ‘Connector’, ‘Object Term1’, ‘Connector’, ‘Object Term2’, ‘Connector’ and 
‘Object Term3’. All connectors are prepositions, and the parentheses that enclose them indicate that 
they are optional. The sentence is written across the page some space below the sentence line. On a 
separate guide sheet page, the options for each segment are listed. Thus for the S.T. segment the 
options ‘Na.’, ‘Pro.’ “IP’, ‘GP’, ‘W/TH P.’ and ‘N.P. = (D.) + (Adj.) + No. + (Pre. + O.) + (R.P. + I.S.’) are 
listed. In order to diagram the sentence, the student must follow the general algorithm: 
 - Pick 
 - Write In 
 - Match 
which means that, at each segment of the sentence line, the student must pick from the appropriate list. 
Thus, at the very beginning of the diagramming, the student must pick one of the six options listed for 
S.T.. Then, the student must write in the element or pattern picked just under the segment of the 
sentence line labeled S.T.. And then the student must match wording from the sentence to that element 
or pattern. The student then moves on to the next segment of the sentence line and executes there the 
same three steps of the algorithm. However, it is probably necessary to illustrate what is involved here 
in order for it to be clear (see the attached document entitled ‘Sentence Diagramming’). Nonetheless, 
drawing sentences from newspapers, magazines, and books,  from the radio, the television and the 
Internet, and even from ordinary speech, and  trying  to determine what can be diagrammed and how 
versus what cannot be diagrammed and why, taking into account that in this latter case either the 
reason why is that the sentence is of one of the special types of sentence in the ‘Larger Context’ chapter 
119 
 
that appears next, or there exist an opportunity to discover and explain something new about English, 













     The grammar we have studied so far is the grammar of simple, declarative sentences in standard 
form. We must now consider three sub-classifications of sentences in English that will allow the 
grammar to be much more comprehensive, even though we will have to consider these sub-
classifications ever so briefly.   
Basic Sentence Functions: Declarative, Interrogative, Imperative, Exclamatory 
     All of the sentences considered thus far are declarative. In the simplest possible terms, they state that 
a certain situation exists. Thus we say 
 John is washing the dishes. 
But sentences may also be interrogative, imperative or exclamatory. An interrogative sentence does not 
state that a certain situation exists. Rather, it asks whether a certain situation exists. Thus we say 
 Is John washing the dishes? 
An imperative sentence neither states that a certain situation exists nor asks whether a certain situation 
exists. Rather it commands that certain situation come into existence. Thus we say 
 Wash the dishes. 
therby commanding, i.e. ordering, someone, let us say John, to wash the dishes. The speaker wants the 
situation in which John is washing the dishes to come into existence. Finally, an exclamatory sentence is 
like a declarative sentence in that it states that a certain situation exists, but it goes beyond this in 
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expressing the speaker’s emotional reaction, strong emotional reaction, to the existence of the 
situation. Thus we say 
 John washed the dishes! 
where it was by no means expected that John would do so. What makes the sentence exclamatory is 
that the speaker expresses their shock at the fact that John washed the dishes.    
     The structural characterization of the four basic sentence functions is very much a mixed bag. All of 
the rest of this text is a structural characterization of the declarative function. And given the relationship 
between the declarative and the exclamatory just cited, the structural characterization of the former 
serves perfectly as the structural characterization of the latter. Further we will be able to dispense ever 
so quickly with the imperative because of its relationship of strong similarity to infinitive phrases. But, 
the structural characterization of the interrogative is very challenging indeed. Let us turn to it now.     
     Interrogative sentences are the ones we use to ask questions. A question arises when someone needs 
information. The questions we ask in English seem to be of two basic types. First there is the type of 
question that arises when someone has a complete hypothesis about a certain situation and tries to 
confirm that the hypothesis is correct, meaning that the hypothesized situation exists, or that the 
hypothesis is incorrect, meaning that the hypothesized situation does not exists. So someone asks  
 Is Jane in the office today? 
Here the questioner hypothesizes that Jane is in the office on the day indicated contextually by the word 
‘today’ which means that they think that it is possible, or at least slightly probable, that she is in the 
office on that day. Questions like this have a definite and rather simple grammar. To see this grammar 
we need to call up the sentence that expresses the hypothesis, i.e. the sentence that would be true if 
the hypothesis were correct. This sentence is strongly implied by the question sentence. The relevant 
sentence in the present case is 
 Jane is in the office today. 
Notice that the question is formed by pulling out the copula ‘is’ and then moving it to the front of the 
sentence, and of course changing the period to a question mark. Consider now the question  
 Should Jane take out whole life insurance? 
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The associated hypothesis sentence is 
 Jane should take out whole life insurance. 
And the question is formed by pulling out the modal ‘should’ and moving it to the front of the sentence. 
But now if the hypothesis sentence has both a copula and a modal then it is the modal that is pulled and 
repositioned. Thus the question sentence 
 Should Johnny be in school?  
is formed from the hypothesis sentence 
 Johnny should be in school.   
If however, the hypothesis sentence has an action type predicate base which contains neither a copula 
nor a modal then one of the modals 
 do     does     did 
will be placed at the beginning of the hypothesis sentence, and thus the hypothesis sentence 
 Janie ran today. 
provides the basis for the question sentence 
 Did Jane run today? 
The modal must agree with the predicate base of the sentence in number and tense and since the 
predicate base of the hypothesis sentence is ‘ran’ and thus in the past tense, the past tense modal ‘did’ 
was used. To confirm this arrangement we consider 
 Jane runs every day.  
as the basis for 
 Does Jane run every day? 
and 
 Jane and John run every day. 
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as the basis for  
 Do John and Jane run every day?   
     The second type of question in English is one that arises when someone has a partial hypothesis 
about a certain situation and tries to confirm that the hypothesis is correct, meaning that the 
hypothesized situation exists, or that the hypothesis is incorrect, meaning that the hypothesized 
situation does not exists. The hypothesis is partial because the questioner knows all off the components 
of the situation to be in place, that is to exist, except for one. Now here too the notion of a hypothesis 
sentence is useful and it can be said that the component not known to exist is, with respect to that 
hypothesis sentence, either (1) the referent of one of the terms, or (2) the quantity of the referent of 
one of the terms, or (3) the duration or frequency of the referent of one of the terms or the referent of 
the predicate. Further, questions of this second type are formed with the help of the relative pronouns, 











 how – long, often, many, much 
and of course the missing component will fall under the concept associated with the relative pronoun or 
the W/TH word. To try to make all of this clear, let us use several examples. Thus if the question is 
124 
 
 Who ate the pizza? 
then the hypothesis sentence is effectively  
 Someone ate the pizza. 
and the missing component is the referent of the subject term. And if the question is  
 Whom did the committee pick? 
then the hypothesis sentence is 
 The committee picked someone. 
and the missing component is the referent of the object term. And if the question is  
 Whose car is parked in the driveway? 
then the hypothesis sentence is 
 Someone’s car is parked in the driveway.  
and the missing component is not actually the referent of the subject term ‘someone’s car’ but, 
appropriately enough given ‘whose’, the owner of the referent of the subject tem. And if the question is  
 Where is the treasure hidden? 
then the hypothesis sentence is 
 The treasure is hidden somewhere. 
And the missing component is the referent of the object term. 
     The cases of questions formed with ‘which’, ‘why’ and ‘how’ are quite different from those of the 
relative pronouns and W/TH words covered above. The hypothesis sentence for a ‘which’ question must 
contain a noun phrase term which has an indefinite determiner, either ‘a’ or ‘an’, and thus refers to a set 
of things, and the ‘which’ must be followed by that term minus its determiner. The copulas and the 




 Which flower did she pick? 
 She picked a flower. 
  
 Which boy earned the top grade? 
 A boy earned the top grade. 
     A question based on ‘why’ seeks also seeks a component of the situation referred to by the 
hypothesis sentence, but now the category of components must be expanded to include entities that 
are not referred to by components of hypothesis sentences. Specifically reasons for what are asserted 
by the hypothesis sentences must be regarded as components. Thus 
 Why did Johnny cut class?         
seeks the reason for the situation given by the hypothesis sentence 
 Johnny cut class. 
     I think that ‘how’ questions have the most interesting machinery, although, as we have seen, the 
machinery of ‘which’ questions is pretty cool too. We will consider here just four ‘associate’ words for 
‘how’, namely ‘many’, ‘much’, ‘long’ and ‘often’. This is plenty in relation to the purpose of showing how 
‘how’ works. The first two associate terms are used in cases where it is not the referent of a term in the 
hypothesis sentence but the number or quantity of the referent of a term that is missing from the 
situation vis-à-vis the knowledge of the questioner (in this respect ’how’ is analogous to ‘whose’). The 
associate word ‘many’ is used where the relevant term is a noun phrase based on a count noun and the 
associate word ‘much’ is used where the relevant term is a noun phrase based on a mass noun. The 
‘how’ is followed first by the associate word and then the noun phrase minus its determiner (in this 
respect ‘how’ is analogous to ‘which’). The copulas and the modals ‘do’, ‘does’, ‘did’ and ‘will’ operate as 
above. Thus we have the pairs 
  
 How many students attended the lecture? 
 [20 students attended the lecture.] 
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 How many pairs of shoes did she buy? 
 [She bought seven pairs of shoes.]       
 How much flour did the distributor deliver to the bakery? 
 [The distributor delivered 600 pounds of flour to the bakery.]  
Note that, in this last case, ‘600 pounds of’ has to be taken as the (complex) determiner whereas on a 
straight analysis, ‘600’ would be the determiner, ‘pounds’ would be the noun and ‘of flour would be a 
prepositional phrase modifying the noun). 
     The associate terms ‘long’ and ‘often’ are used in cases where it is not the referent of a term in the 
hypothesis sentence but the duration or frequency, respectively, of the referent of the action type 
predicate base that is missing from the situation vis-à-vis the knowledge of the questioner. Thus we 
have the pairs 
 How long has Jane lived in New York? 
 [Jane has lived in New York for two years.] 
 How often does Jane swim in the university pool? 
 [Jane swims in the university pool every day.] 
But note that we can also have 
 How long has Jane lived in New York? 
 [Jane lives in New York.]   
in which case the machinery of the present perfect has to be imported – and similarly for the ‘how 
often’ pair above. And note further the lack of analogy among the three pairs 
 How long did Jane live in New York? 
 [Jane lived in New York.] 
 How long has Jane lived in New York? 
 [Jane lives in New York.] 
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 How long will Jane live in New York? 
 [Jane will live in New York.] 
In the question related to the past tense hypothesis sentence, we have to import the modal ‘did’, in the 
question related to the present tense hypothesis sentence, we have to import the present perfect 
copula ‘has’, as we just saw, and in the question related to the future tense hypothesis sentence, the 
modal ‘will’ is already present and just has to be copied. But the problem here, if there is one, has 
nothing to do with the interrogative aspect of English. Rather it has to do with the tense aspect (no pun 
intended but pun accepted) of English. Two points will make the point. First, the present tense of English 
has always seemed a bit odd to me. If we want to have John eat lunch in the present, we can’t say 
 John eats lunch. 
There is virtually no use for this sentence in English (there is the marginal use related to the fact that, 
given the pressure of the work schedule and the need to maintain a healthy weight, everyone has to 
choose to eat lunch or not). What we have to say is either 
 John is eating lunch. 
or 
 John has eaten lunch. 
And, second, the future tense of English is different from the past and the present in that it is carried not 
by an inflection of the verb but by a separate word, the word ‘will’ of course. So let us say that, with 
respect to the three pairs above, the past tense pair fits the interrogative model developed here 
perfectly, and the present is off related to the point just made about it, and the future is off related to 
the point just made about it.  
     This concludes our discussion of questions in English. It is not comprehensive. There are questions 
that are simpler than the ones addressed here. For example, we can take a declarative sentence and 
make it into a question by means of inflection: 
  Jane is in town? 
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And there are questions that are more complicated than the ones addressed here. For example there 
are what are called ‘tag questions’, as when both John and Jane have lost their jobs, and little Janie has 
to ask 
 There won’t be any presents this year, will there? 
where the ‘will there’ part is the tag. Interestingly enough, from the perspective established above, the 
hypothesis sentence here is actually a part of the question. But, despite this lack of comprehensiveness, 
what has been said provides a conceptual basis for all types of questions in English, and as well the 
mechanics associated with the most important types.  
     By the way, you may question my judgment in using the last example above but, after it just came to 
me, given the economy I suppose, I could not resist it because it touches my heart – and just you try 
now to forget, ever, what a tag question is! 
    Well, as was indicated a good while ago, imperative sentences can be dispensed with quickly. If you 
take an infinitive phrase whose verb refers to an action that can be performed by an agent, a person or 
a dog typically, and drop the ‘to’, change the first letter of the new first word from lower case to upper 
case and affix a period at the end then you have an imperative sentence. Thus the infinitive phrase 
 to sit down and be quiet 
becomes the imperative sentence 
 Sit down and be quiet.  
 
Basic Sentence Scopes: Simple, Complex, Compound 
     All of the sentences considered thus far are simple. What makes a sentence simple is that it has just 
one predicate and term set assembly. Thus for example, the sentence 
 Jane called everyone about the party. 
is the assembly of the predicate 
 _____ called _____ about _____ 
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and the term set 
 Jane     everyone     the party 
Now in order of scope, the lead variable here, complex sentences follow simple ones immediately (we’ll 
do a little math on this a bit later) but for convenience of exposition, I will deal next with compound 
sentences. The characterization of compound sentences will be built up in stages, for reasons that 
should become apparent, and here we will say that a compound sentence is made up of two simple 
sentences and a sentence conjunction. Thus for example  
 Jane plays tennis and John plays golf. 
is a compound sentence consisting of the two simple sentences 
 Jane plays tennis. 
 John plays golf. 
and the sentence conjunction ‘and’. And in having two simple sentences as components, a compound 
sentence has two predicate and term set assemblies. We will characterize compound sentences two 
more times as we go forward. The idea is that not only simple sentences but also complex and 
compound sentences can serve as sentence components of compound sentences and yet we are in the 
process of characterizing these two sentence types right now. So again we find ourselves caught in the 
middle of what might be called the linguistic circle, the need to depend on one part of the language that 
hasn’t necessarily ben developed itself in order to develop another part of the language. 
     Now a complex sentence stands between a simple one and a compound one. Like a compound 
sentence it has two predicate and term set assemblies but like a simple sentence it has only one 
complete predicate and term set assembly. We will consider here two distinct types of complex 
sentence. First there is the type that adds a structure very like a gerund phrase to a complete sentence 
(for now we will intend by ‘complete sentence’ just a simple sentence – we’re in the linguistic circle 
again!) thereby establishing a cause and effect relationship. Thus for example we say  
 Having finished her homework, Janie jumped on her Play Station 3 to play Call of Duty: MW III. 
Here we have the complete, simple sentence    
 Janie jumped on her Play Station 3 to play Call of Duty: MW III. 
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and the gerund phrase like structure 
 having finished her homework  
The complete sentence has the predicate 
 _____ jumped on _____     _____ 
the subject term 
 Jamie 
and the two object terms 
 her Play Station 3  
 to play Call of Duty: MW III 
while  the gerund phrase like structure has the predicate 
 _____ having finished _____ 
and the object term 
 her homework 
it does not have a stated subject term but its implied subject term is the subject term of the complete 
sentence, i.e. the subject term 
 Jamie 
What thus happens is that the gerund phrase like structure ‘piggy backs’ on the complete sentence by 
sharing its subject, so effectively it is a complete sentence itself. Now the relationship between the two 
complete sentences we actually wind up with is that what one of them states is the cause of what the 
other one states, making what this other one states an effect. Specifically, Janie’s having finished her 
homework is the cause of her playing Call of Duty: MW III, although the concept of cause and effect has 
to be taken loosely here and in many if not most instances of constructions of the kind under 
consideration here. Finally when two sentences relate to each other in cause and effect manner, they 
can be seen as connected by a conjunction, perhaps most typically the conjunction ‘so’. Thus the original 
complex sentence    
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 Having finished her homework, Janie jumped on her Play Station 3 to play Call of Duty: MW III. 
has become, with a couple of touch ups, 
           Janie had finished her homework, so she jumped on her Play Station 3 to play Call of Duty: MW III. 
which is a compound sentence. 
     The other type of complex sentence we will consider here also draws on a grammatical structure we 
have already developed. Just above the structure was the gerund phrase. Here it is the relative clause. 
As we developed the notion earlier, a relative clause is a component of a noun phrase that modifies the 
noun of that noun phrase. The noun phrase itself appears as term in a sentence. Here the relative clause 
will apply to a whole term of a sentence in order to provide extra information about the person, place or 
thing that term refers to, or it will apply to a whole sentence in order to provide more information about 
the situation that the sentence refers to. But in neither case will the relative clause be a part of the 
structure of the sentence per se. Rather it will appear after the term it applies to or after the whole 
sentence it applies to, and be set off by a pair of commas or a single comma to show its independent 
status, i.e. its not actually being a part of the structure of the sentence. Thus if we have  
 John gave Jane a beautiful ring, which costs $5,000, for her birthday. 
the relative clause 
 which costs $5,000 
applies to the term 
 a beautiful ring 
in order to provide more information about what it refers to, namely the ring, but that relative clause is 
not really a part of the structure of the sentence and thus it is set off by a pair of commas. But if we have 
 John gave Jane a beautiful ring for her birthday, which pleased her very much. 
the relative clause 
 which pleased her very much 
applies to the whole sentence 
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 John gave Jane a beautiful ring for her birthday. 
in order to provide more information about the situation that sentence refers to, but that relative clause 
is not really a part of the structure of the sentence and thus it is set off by a comma. Now, the complex 
sentence above converted to a compound sentence, and the complex sentences here could too but it is 
much more natural to convert them to 2-sentence sequences. The first one becomes  
 John gave Jane a beautiful ring for her birthday. It costs $5,000. 
and the second one becomes 
 John gave Jane a beautiful ring for her birthday. This pleased her very much. 
Note that, as is implied by all that has been said here, the ‘It’ of the first 2-sentence sequence refers 
back to the term 
 a beautiful ring 
while the ‘This’ of the second 2-sentence sequence refers back to the whole preceding sentence 
 John gave Jane a beautiful ring for her birthday. 
     These examples provide the opportunity to point out a very common mistake in writing among not 
only ESL students but among native speakers of English as well. The error consists in using ‘It’ instead of 
‘This’ in a construction like the second one above, i.e. attempting to refer back to what is expressed by a 
whole sentence using ‘It’ despite the fact that only ‘This’ can serve that purpose. 
     Now we are in a position to complete our characterization of compound sentences. We are perhaps 
about as much now outside the linguistic circle as is possible. So a compound sentence consists of two 
sentences joined by a sentence conjunction, and each of the two sentences can be either a simple 
sentence, a complex sentence or itself a compound sentence. Finally, if the sentence conjunction is ‘and’ 
then there is no restriction to two component sentences for the compound sentence. We can have 
I bought an apple, I bought grapes and I bought bananas. 
I bought an apple, I bought grapes, I bought bananas and I bought plums. 




Basic Sentence Forms: Standard, Nonstandard 
     All of the sentences that we have dealt with thus far are in standard form and all that we have said 
about them will serve to motivate the use of this term. Many sentences however are in non-standard 
form which is to say that they are not in standard form. But we will be more forthcoming than this 
because we will specify four particular sentence forms that are non-standard and this will serve to 
motivate the use of this term. Thus all of the preceding plus what will be offered here should be enough 
to make the standard/non-standard distinction reasonably clear. 
     The first of the four non-standard forms it the existential sentence, a sentence whose first or only 
three components are the word ‘There’, an identity type predicate base and a noun phrase, i.e. a 
sentence whose form is given at least partially by 
 ‘There’ + an identity type predicate base + a noun phrase 
The classic example is  
 There is a god. 
Views differ as to how such sentences are to be interpreted but perhaps the best way to help the 
student to understand them is to say that they convert to standard form in three steps: 
 1) drop the ‘There’ 
 2) drop the identity type predicate base 
 3) place an action type predicate base whose verb it ‘to exist’ and whose characteristics, 
 especially number, tense and modality, are the same as those of the dropped identity type 
 predicate base immediately after the noun phrase.  
But all of this boils down to something very simple.  The sentence above can be understood to mean the 
same thing as the sentence  
 A god exists. 
Similarly, the sentence 
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 There must be some fruit in the refrigerator. 
can be understood to mean the same thing as the sentence 
 Some fruit must exist in the refrigerator. 
No claim is being made here that a sentence like this accords with English usage, just that it is equivalent 
to the existential sentence, and in standard form. 
     The second of the four non-standard forms is what might be called a proportion sentence. A good 
example is  
The harder you study, the higher your grade. 
An attempt to analyze this sentence in the term and predicate manner established above wouldn’t even 
get off the ground. It brings quantity into English and as we will see again when we come to comparison, 
this warps standard form. Now the standard form equivalent of this sentence is something like 
 The level of your study effort is proportional to the level of the grade you earn. 
Again there is no claim here that this sentence would pass unnoticed in actual speech but understanding 
what proportionality is and teasing out the meaning of the sentence will definitely help the student to 
understand proportion sentences, 
     Next we come to comparison sentences. Comparison in English is a very complicate business and it 
should not be thought that what will be offered here is a comprehensive account. But first we must say 
that there is qualitative comparison and there is quantitative comparison. The preeminent device for 
qualitative comparison is the sentence conjunction ‘whereas’. Thus we can have the comparison  
 New York is a northern state whereas Georgia is a southern state. 
The set up here is very simple. The complexity comes in when we turn to quantitative comparison. But 
even here we can impose some order. The critical elements are two distinctions and one preposition, 
the ‘comparison preposition ‘than’. The one distinction is that between a comparative adjective, on the 
one hand, and a regular adjective used with ‘more’ or ‘less’, on the other. The former is illustrated by  
 John is older than Jane. 
while the latter is illustrated by 
135 
 
 Jane is more cautious than John. 
Note that given the reference to adjectives, regular and comparative, these sentences have quality type 
predicate bases, and those bases, and the sentences of which they are a part are in standard form. But 
things change when the predicate base is of the action type and we have comparison. Consider 
 Janie weighs more than Johnnie. 
This is short for  
 Janie weighs more than Johnnie does. 
Here we go non-standard big time. 
The word ‘does’ here is not the emphasis modal we have in Janie’s defense of John 
 He does clean his room! 
Nor is it the main component of an action type predicate base as in 
 Janie does a good job of keeping her school work in order. 
or in the maid shocker 
 I do windows!  
Rather, the ‘does’ of the comparison sentence above is something like a ‘verbal pronoun’, or ‘pronoun 
of action’, in that it reflects the main verb ‘weighs’ such that the sentence really reads 
Janie weighs more than John weighs. 
This double verb set-up is what rocks standard form, clearly taking us over to the non-standard. But the 
set-up is also very revealing and brings us to the main point here, viz. that there is a certain logic in 
comparison, a logic that sets a three part structure. We can see what is involved here clearly by 
converting the sentence above to 
 1) Janie weighs X. 
 2) Johnny weighs Y. 
 3) X is greater than Y. 
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In a comparison sentence one part of the sentence indicates an indefinite quantity, another part 
indicates another indefinite quantity, and still another part makes one of the quantities larger than the 
other. Note however that it is not possible to set a one to one relationship between mutually exclusive 
and jointly exhaustive subsets of the words constituting the comparison sentence and the three ‘parts’ 
called for here. The three parts have to be seen as implied, although it is possible that some deeper 
analysis of the comparison sentence might allow for something like the correspondence described. And 
of course it does not go without notice that the 1 – 2 – 3 schematic above contains a comparison 
sentence, namely the sentence 
 X is greater than Y. 
But the idea is that this one, very basic and in fact essential comparison sentence serves, along with its 
two associated sentences to reduce all quantitative comparison sentences of the type that we have seen 
thus far. But there is one more type to be considered. With respect to all of the types above, the 
comparison element, the ‘more/less’ or the ‘-er’ of the comparative adjective, applied to the predicate 
base, and thus to the predicate itself, but in the types to follow the comparison element applies to a 
term. Thus we have 
 More young students registered for my class than for yours. 
Here the predicate base is simply the action type  
 registered 
and it does not contain the comparative element. Rather the expression 
 more young students       
which is at least superficially a term  contains the comparative element ‘more’. Despite this important 
syntactic difference however the same type of three part analysis can be made. Under such analysis the 
sentence becomes 
 1) X number of young students registered for my class. 
 2) Y number of young students registered for your class. 
 3) X is greater than Y. 
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Now of course the point is that all of the sentences in the 3-part analysis are in standard form, but what 
is really important is the fact that the three distinctions made in the discussion of comparison, viz. 
 1 - qualitative vs. quantitative 
 2 - ‘more’ – ‘less’ + regular adjective vs. comparative adjective (‘-er’) 
 3 - comparison element applies to the predicate vs. comparison element applies to a term 
along with the 3-part analysis should help the student to master the complex feature of English which is 
comparison. 
     The fourth and final non-standard sentence form is one that is really compound rather than simple so 
that we will see some variety in scope in the non-standard genre. The form is set by the expression 
 … not only … but also … 
which is effectively a complex conjunction. Just two examples will show what is involved here: 
 In this industry, you need not only training but also experience.  
and 
 They not only won the race but also set a new world record. 
or  
 Not only did they win the race but also they set a new world record.   
 In the first sentence the conjoined expressions are the terms 
 training     experience 
and the standard form compound that the sentence converts to is 
 You need training in this industry and you need experience in this industry. 
The ungainliness of this sentence helps us to see how in each case in this section the non-standard form 
is efficient and stylish, and no doubt the desire for efficiency and stylishness in the language plays a role 
in the etymology of all of the non-standard forms here, and perhaps of such forms in general. 
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     In the alternatives for the second sentence, the conjoined expressions are effectively sentences. In 
the first alternative these sentences are 
 they win the race     they set a new world record 
which, with the past tense of the word ‘did’ applied to the first sentence, become 
 they won the race     they set a new world record    
and the standard form sentence that the larger sentence converts to is simply 
 They won the race and they set a new world record. 
     The four non-standard forms studied here constitute only a sample of those that exist in the language 
but they are definitely among the most important ones and the student is well advised to work towards 
mastering them. And of course four cases are plenty for the purpose of illustrating the standard vs. non-
standard distinction.  
     A final note here is that the exercises for this chapter include a very important one whose directive is 
to take a long article in the New York Times and try to diagram each sentence there using the 
diagrammatic technique developed in chapter 10. This will provide a very exciting opportunity for the 
student since for each sentence they encounter that is  
 - not declarative (i.e. is interrogative, imperative or exclamatory) or 
 - not simple (i.e. is complex or compound) or 
 - not standard (i.e. is non-standard) 
they will have to use the resources here or generate their own resources in order to convert that 
sentence to one or more sentences each of which is declarative, simple and standard such that it can be 
diagrammed by means of the indicated technique. I can think of no better way than this for the student 
to learn the structure of English.   
    
 













     Congratulations on completing your course in English, and this textbook. I sincerely hope that you will 
continue to study the language. Think of yourself as having just started a great voyage of exploration, 
the exploration of a universe that is as fascinating as any physical universe that scientists might turn 
their attention to, because it is the deep, complex universe of human experience, a socio-linguistic 
universe of impressive order and great beauty. Of course, you must consider taking more advanced 
courses. This is perhaps the best single way of going forward, better perhaps even better than living long 
term in an English speaking country because it is too easy to let your effort trail off once you have 
reached a functional level of proficiency that allows you to negotiate the mass of practical affairs that, 
no matter how it is particularized by the local culture, is still the common burden of the members of 
societies across the globe. 
     But whether you take further courses or not, you must make permanent in your life certain activities 
that you can have control over. You must indeed take the standard/common advice and follow the high 
quality print and electronic media – non-fiction books, news magazines and newspapers in English; 
radio, television and the Internet in English. In the analytical spirit of the course, pursuing the print 
media is more important than pursuing the electronic media. And newspapers are the best of the print 
media. Books are static, and the good newspapers have broader coverage and exhibit a wider variety of 
writing styles that the compact and rather formulaic news magazines. If you are in America then read 
The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Los Angeles Times, The Chicago Tribune or The Atlanta 
Journal and Constitution, whichever one is most conveniently available. Of course, if you live in one of 
the great associated cities then your situation is ideal. But you must read the newspaper you choose in 
the analytical mode established in the course. You should first read an article for interest, but then you 
must go back through as much of it as you can, paragraph by paragraph, sentence by sentence, 
searching for words that are new to you or whose meaning you are still not quite sure of, and sentences 
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whose grammatical structures don’t parse for you right away. Look up those words in your best 
dictionary, and break out this textbook and try to make the sentences with the seemingly unwieldy 
structures fit one or another of the patterns catalogued here. And when you have finished these tasks, 
take the final step and formulate, for each English sentence you have singled out, the sentence in your 
native language that comes closest to expressing the same meaning as it does so that you can identify 
the system of analogies that encompasses the two sentences: which terms or other features of the 
native sentence match which terms of the English sentence, what is the predicate or other feature of 
the native sentence that matches the predicate of the English sentence, and which features of the 
native language sentence match the characteristics of the predicate of the English sentence, its tense, its 
voice, its mood, etc.? Determining what the analogies are in this way not only deepens your knowledge 
of English by connecting it to your native language in a systematic way but also caters to your 
intellectual interest in language, an interest that, ideally, was served by the course you have just 
finished, but was by no means created by it.     
     But beyond all of this you need to have feedback on your production of English if you are truly to 
advance. If you are not going to take another course then you should consider hiring a tutor, even if the  
individual chosen is just a bright high school student who will be happy being paid what they would 
otherwise make by babysitting. Failing even this, identify English speaking friends, neighbors or 
colleagues who will be willing not just to talk to you, and perhaps read something that you have written, 
but also to tell you where your sentences are mistaken. In either case, you should have a small voice 
recorder with you so that you can try to record your production and the feedback you receive. Studying 
the recordings should help you a great deal. And if things develop for the best then you will develop 
what might be called ‘linguistic self-consciousness’, i.e. the disposition to monitor ‘in your head’ the 
composition of the sentences that you produce, as well as those that you receive. With this mechanism 
in place, continued progress should be automatic. 
     Finally, however, you must have fun with English. Just socializing with your English speaking 
acquaintances and your fellow students of the language is such a pleasure, in part, the pleasure of 
exercising and displaying your mastery. And when you go back home, try to make the same kind of 
social arrangement, and look to see if there are any societies of language and culture devoted to English 
that you might join. Having mastery of a second language, and especially a very important one like 
English, is a very exciting thing. And, yes, you have to work hard to achieve this mastery, but there is the 
appearance nonetheless that it’s somehow ‘free’, because the language is there for the taking, if you’re 






To The Student 
 
     This text is designed for students at all three levels of study, beginning, intermediate and advanced. 
How can this be? Well, the idea is to offer something for the students at each level, and to make sure 
that what is offered at the one level will not interfere with the study of the students at the other level. 
Now the text is of benefit to the beginning level student because it is specific. The text basically outlines 
English in terms of word lists and grammatical forms. The beginning level students should concentrate 
on these, taking care to learn them well. The other material will also be help beginning level student 
because while some of it is written in challenging language, not all of it is. And of course you will have 
the teacher to help you. Finally the exercises represent a great opportunity to learn for all students. And 
yet the text is also of benefit to the intermediate level student because it is systematic. Most texts are 
really bits and pieces of English which do perhaps add up to something unitary, something whole but if 
so then only by implication. The student is left to put the pieces together for themselves to a very large 
extent. An intermediate level student, as such, knows a great deal about English but this text will allow 
them to put their knowledge in order, and thus to be able to look more deeply into the structure of 
English, and thus move much closer to the advanced level. Finally the text is of benefit to the advanced 
student because it is serious. What I mean by this is that the text reflects the thinking of those who 
analyze English, and natural language generally in a formal way. Its aim is not merely to make the 
student functional in the use of English but to help them to have a principled understanding of the 
language. The advanced student is interested in English not just as a means of communication but also 





To The Teacher 
 
     This text was written with you clearly in mind. I have taught myself for many years and I understand 
very well that the main thing that motivates you to teach is the pleasure and the satisfaction you get 
from doing so. I can’t imagine any form of work that can be as enjoyable an is teaching, for the right kind 
of person, namely someone who loves ideas and language, and the process of analysis, and who o 
course engages very positively with other people and is committed to helping them to grow and 
develop, to come as close as possible to realizing their full potential. So as I wrote the text I thought 
about what might prove entertaining to a person of the type I have described, who is a teacher. I knew 
first that the material of the text would have to reflect serious thinking about the nature of English. I 
knew further that the language would have to have a certain richness and complexity, a certain texture 
if you will. And I knew that there would have to be some humor and even a bit of silliness here and 
there, in order to set the relaxed mood that I think most of us most enjoy working in. But now if I have 
written the text to you to a large extent, which says something about its ‘level’, then what about the 
student? Won’t they be left out, at least the ones below the advanced level? Well, this brings us to 
another key feature of the text. I wrote at a certain level to create a situation in which, to a large extent, 
you have to be the interface between the student and the text. You have to be able to explain what 
morphology is to them. You have to break down for them some of the more complex sentences, and 
explain some of the more sophisticated ideas. And you have to explain to them what ‘looking a gift 
horse in the mouth’ means. I know that I would relish every chance to help them to understand this or 
that, to have them dependent upon you in a way that empowers you to delight them by relieving their 






I bought a bread knife and a cutting board, the knife costs $20, the board $15. 
[sometimes/oftentimes you have to go to/for the deeper logic of the situation] 
The whole thing about non-standard sentences is that out of some set of circumstances they became 
established in the language as the way to say what they say and thus any other way of saying same will 




















THE CATEGORIES OF BASIC EXPRESIONS IN ENGLISH 
 
1. Na. = Name 
2. R.P. = Relative Pronoun 
3. W/TH W. = W/TH Word 
4. M. = Modal 
5. Cop. = Copula 
7. Pro. = Pronoun 
8. Con. = Conjunction 
9. Pre. = Preposition 
10. V. = Verb 
11. Adv. = Adverb 
12. No. = Noun 
13. Adj. = Adjective 
14. I. = Interjection 






1. R.P.   3. W/TH W.  4. M.   5. Cop. 
who   who   could   be 
whom   what   should   am 
whose   when   would   is 
which   where   may   are 
that   why   might   was 
   how   must   were 
   that   can   have 
      shall   has 
      will   had 
      do   have been 
      does   has been 
      did   had been 
         am being 
         is being 
         are being 
         was being 
         were being 
          




6.  D.      7. Pro.    
a   my    I   mine 
an   your    you   yours 
the   her    he   his 
this  his    she   hers 
that  its    it   its 
these  our    we   ours 
those  your    you   yours 
all   their    they   theirs 
each  Carter’s    me   myself 
every  the old president’s  you   yourself 
any      him   himself 
no       her   herself 
some      it   itself 
few      us   ourselves 
several      you   yourselves 








7. Pro. Cont’d  8. Con.    
this   also    or   in that 
that   although   plus   only if 
these   and    rather   that is 
those   anyway   since   so that 
something   as    so   such that 
anything   because   still   both … and 
everything   but    then   either … or 
nothing   for    therefore  if … then 
somewhere  further    though   neither … nor 
nowhere   furthermore   thus 
someplace   given    whereas 
anyplace   hence    yet 
everyplace   however   after all 
sometime   if    all in all 
anytime   instead   and/or 
anyone   moreover   even though 
somebody   nevertheless   for example 
anyone   nonetheless   if and only if 
anybody   nor    in other words 







about   beyond  since  as a result of 
above   by   than  in consequence of 
across   cum   through in lieu of 
after   despite  thru  in spite of 
against   during   to  instead of 
along   except   under  in terms of 
alongside   for   unlike  on the basis of 
amid   from   unto 
amidst   in   upon 
amongst   inside   via 
among   instead  with 
around   like   within 
as    of   without 
at    on   along with 
before   onto   as of 
behind   outside  as per 
below   over   as though 
beneath   per   as to 
beside   sans   because of 
between      due to 
betwixt      except for 





A verb is a word that indicates action or possession and has the parts ‘present’, ‘past’ and 
‘present participle’ 
 
Action   Possession 
work   have 
think   own 








An adverb is a word that indicates when or how in relation to verbs. 
 
Adverb Verb  Adverb 
play  skillfully 





















An adjective is a word that indicates what type (or kind) or which one(s) in relation to a noun. 
 
Adjective Noun 
sweet  wine 
California franchise 
 

























General Algorithm   Predicate Base Pick Algorithm 
 
Pick    V. = A.T.   Cop. + V. = A.T.       Cop. + Adv. + V. = A.T.         I.T.     
Write In         Cop. + Adj. = Q.T.    Cop. + Adv. + Adj. = Q.T. 
Match*         Cop. + Pre. = R.T.    Cop. + Adv. + Pre. = R.T. 















S.T./O.T.         P.B. 
Na.         A.T. = (M) + (Adv) + (Cop) + (Adv) + V + 
(Adv)   
Pro.                     could really be going 
I.P.* (to run for Congress)     Q.T. = (M) + (Adv) + Cop + (Adv) + Adj + 
(Adv)   
G.P.* (running for Congress)     will soon be wealthy 
W/TH P.* (what they want)      R.T. = (M) + (Adv) + Cop + (Adv) + Pre 
N.P. = (D.) + (Adv.) + No. + (Pre. + O.) + (R.P. + I.S.)  might actually be in    
               the huge pot of gold that she found    I.T. = (M) + (Adv) + (Cop) + (Adv) 















The Philosophy of Language 
and 
















     The study of language has advanced dramatically since the fusion of interests among logicians, 
philosophers of language and linguists that happened in the 60s and the 70s [f-note]. And, the 
development now taking place in formal semantics is both broadly based and fast paced. Analysts take 
on features of natural language and, drawn in by their complexity, they produce theories that illuminate 
the phenomena involved but at the same time reveal more that needs explanation, and invite the 
formulation of alternative views as well. The analyses of some features a given natural language or of 
some feature types with respect to natural language in general become accepted, if not in the whole 
field then at least in one or more of its subfields, but the achievement of anything approaching a 
comprehensive and final theory, or set of more specialized theories, still seems to be a distant goal. This, 
however, is in no way discouraging. What we are in the midst of is very exciting, and there is 
opportunity for those who love language, and are willing to put in the hard work that is necessary to 
participate in the rich and evolving discourse. 
     The linguistics referred to above is theoretical linguistics, of the kind spawned by Noam Chomsky’s 
seminal 1957 monograph, Syntactic Structures. From the very beginning, the effort was to ferret out 
complex syntactic structures of English, and natural language generally of course, and to chart the 
patterns across these structures in order to form a single elegant theory. But, before Chomsky trained 
the focus of the discipline on the very abstract and the highly theoretical, it encompassed areas of work 
of a decidedly practical nature too, including bilingualism, computer-mediated communication, stylistics, 
forensic linguistics and second language acquisition. The professionals working in these areas wanted to 
maintain their focus on the practical, while those of a more theoretical bent became reluctant to be 
associated with anything explicitly practical. Thus, the field of applied linguistics came into being. Now I 
believe that, in a kind of genealogy of language study, a fusion of the kind that occurred between 
philosophy and theoretical linguistics, leading to the development of formal semantics, can occur 
between formal semantics and applied linguistics, especially as regards its sub-field of second language 
acquisition, which is in fact strongly theoretical, although the theory involved is informal. 
     The fusion would be mutually beneficial, I believe, in a multitude of ways that cannot presently be 
foreseen. But, I am even now able to see the possibility of a direct, singular exchange of values. In the 
one direction, SLA research can be of value to formal semantics because the nature and the source of 
the sentences that appear in an SLA research are such that they can be regarded as ‘real’ in that they are 




whereas the sentences that appear in an article in formal semantics are in effect contrived for the 
purpose of illustrating the syntactic and/or semantic aspect of language that the theory presented in the 
article addresses. So, to the extent that formal semanticists become consumers of the data generated in 
SLA studies, and the associated informal theory as well, they have both more opportunity and more 
responsibility with respect to the advancement of the theories they propose. But now, precisely because 
the theory of SLA studies is informal in nature, formal semanticists could be of service to SLA 
researchers in that they may be able to provide a certain amount of formalization of the phenomena 
discovered in SLA studies, and this should allow the SLA researchers to develop deeper insight into the 
essential nature of those very phenomena. However, I think that we should be more ambitious and 
broaden the benefit by stipulating, or at least recommending, that the formal theory be constructed in 
as simple and intuitive a way as possible, and that the articles presenting the theory be written in such a 
way that they are maximally perspicuous. If these conditions are met then the audience for the fusion 
work can include SLA pedagogists, i.e. SLA teachers and SLA teacher-researches, and serious university 
level SLA students as well.  The same unit of theoretical work can thus have double or triple the benefit.    
     But all of this is quite general . What is needed is something specific, a view, an approach or a project, 
that bridges the gap between formal semantics and SLA research. I propose a project in the form of an 
English textbook which draws its inspiration from the philosophy of language but is designed for ESL, i.e. 
English as a second language, students. Such a textbook is the second, and main, part of this 
dissertation. It is distinctive among textbooks of its general type in that it presents English not as a 
collection of parts and aspects, selected and arranged according to some pedagogy, or some set of 
pedagogical ideas, but as a single system whose basic structure is both simple and intuitive. As we will 
see, this comes down to the view that a simple sentence of English consists of one predicate and one or 
more terms, and that there are four precisely specifiable predicate types and six precisely specifiable 
term types. On this view, English may then be said to have a ‘term and predicate’ grammar [f-note]. 
Further, the text was written to be maximally perspicuous, and thus it strives to accord with the 
stipulation set above for work falling in the intersection of formal semantics and SLA research. Since the 
text was developed as a part of a dissertation in the philosophy of language, field testing it by convincing 
some number of ESL teachers to use it in their courses and then provide feedback in the form of 
evaluations of effectiveness as produced both by themselves and by their students was not an option, 
but I am confident that the merit of the text as a primary tool of instruction in ESL will be apparent to all 
who peruse it. 
     This introductory chapter ranges broadly but its aim is to cover all that is necessary to provide a 
rationale for presenting an ESL textbook as the major part of a dissertation in the philosophy of 
language. It begins with a brief accounting of the development of formal semantics as a fusion between 
the interests of the philosophy of language and logic, on the one hand, and theoretical linguistics, on the 
other. The accounting focuses on three figures who played critical roles in this development, viz. Noam 
Chomsky, Richard Montague and Donald Davidson. But then, the chapter turns to the emergence of 
applied linguistics as an enterprise that is decidedly distinct from that of theoretical linguistics. This 
provides a basis for the main move of the chapter, which is the presentation of a proposal to effect a 




acquisition, or SLA. The fact that the two disciplines have a common object of study but differ in at least 
three basic ways is used to set up the claim that the analysts in either discipline can benefit from the 
study of work in the other discipline. The underlying idea is that a merger of formal semantics and SLA 
research would be analogous to the merger of philosophy and linguistics that led to the creation of 
formal semantics. Given all of this, it becomes important to introduce SLA research to the philosophy of 
language community, and this is accomplished by considering two of its basic issues and five of its 
central theories. It is hoped that the accounting of the development of formal semantics presented 
earlier will serve at least to some extent to introduce that field to the community of SLA researchers. 
However, the largest part of the chapter consists in two cases in which a particular feature of English is 
considered both by a formal semanticist and by an SLA researcher. In the one case, the feature is that of 
determiners and two articles that study this feature, one in formal semantics by Edward Keenan and one 
in SLA research by Monika Ekiert, are summarized and then analyzed. In the other case, the feature is 
that of the modals of English, and articles in formal semantics and SLA research which address this 
feature, by Murvet Enc and Andrea Tyler, respectively, are also summarized and analyzed. As a part of 
the analysis in both cases, I present ideas as to how the features involved might be treated. But, the 
purpose of this is not to establish theory in either field, or in the proposed fusion of the two, but rather 
to ‘model’ the simple and intuitive kind of theory that I believe would have to be produced if the two 
fields are to engage in the common dialogue that would make possible the realization of the mutual 
benefits projected above. After this, the chapter takes a turn towards the practical. A characterization of 
the SLA learner is provided, and this characterization provides a platform for the claim that an ESL 
textbook that draws its inspiration from the philosophy of language but is at the same time a highly 
effective device for instruction in English would serve to foster the formal semantics-SLA research cross-
fertilization proposed, and thereby help to engender its projected benefits. Following this, there is a 
section of the chapter in which the view of English on which the textbook is based is discussed. The view 
is described in some detail, and both the way in which it developed and the use I have been able to put 
it to are recounted. The final section of the chapter is a very important one in that it specifies the seven 
conditions that must be met if instruction in English is to be effective in the production of proficiency for 
students who are first speakers of other languages.         
§ 2 The Historical Background: Chomsky, Montague and Davidson in the Emergence of Formal Semantics      
When he published Syntactic Structures in 1957, Chomsky effected a revolution in the discipline of 
linguistics. The new goal of the discipline was to become (1) the construction of a theory of linguistic 
structure that is both general and formal, and (2) the investigation of the foundations of that theory. 
Given this, the then current theories were found to be inadequate. Chomsky cites two such theories, or 
models – the communication theoretic model and the immediate constituent model. Although I think 
that it has to regarded as just one example of the inadequacy of these theories, he says that neither of 
them can explain the active-passive relation. The new model which will be able to explain the relation is 
the ‘transformational’ model. Speaking generally again, Chomsky says that the objective of the linguist is 
to construct grammars, where the grammar of a particular language is a device that generates the 
grammatical sequences of the expressions of that language. For the determination of which sequences 




is grammatical if the native speaker judges it to be so. But, for any given language, there are many 
grammars that will generate the grammatical sequences of its basic expressions and so a criterion of 
adequacy is needed. And the criterion is that the grammar deemed adequate for any one language be 
constructed by the same method as the grammar deemed adequate for any other language.      
 We then have a very strong test of adequacy for a linguistic theory that attempts to give a 
 general explanation for the notion “grammatical sentence” in terms of “observed sentence,” 
 and for the set of grammars constructed in accordance with such a theory. It is furthermore 
 a reasonable requirement, since we are interested not only in particular languages, but also in 
 the general nature of Language. (14) 
Bialystok and Hakuta contrast Chomsky’s approach with that of what they call the ‘inductivists’ and sum 
up the matter nicely as follows: 
 Whereas the old-guard structural linguists were content with accounting for observed 
 utterances, and patterns of speech (a purely inductive and cumulative operation) and scanning 
 for differences and similarities between languages, Chomsky argued that linguistics should be 
 concerned with deeper, abstract, universal properties of language. This meant that linguists 
 needed to discover the underlying grammar that would account for the infinite set of potentially 
 grammatical sentences in the repertoire of native speakers of a language. (26) 
     In 1970, Richard Montague published an article entitled ‘English as a Formal Language’. Its first 
paragraph is important for its historical significance as well as for its theoretical content. It is as follows: 
 I reject the contention that an important theoretical difference exists between formal and 
 natural languages. On the other hand, I do not regard as successful the formal treatments of 
 natural languages attempted by certain contemporary linguists. Like Donald Davidson I regard 
 the construction of a theory of truth – or rather, of the more general notion of truth under an 
 arbitrary interpretation – as the basic goal of serious syntax and semantics; and the 
 developments emanating from the Massachusetts Institute of technology offer little promise 
 towards that end. (188) 
I think it fair to say that there are four figures in the history of the study of language who appear in one 
way or another in this brief passage. In the background, there is Alfred Tarski, to whom the notion that 
the basic goal of a serious syntax and semantics is the construction of a theory of truth must be 
attributed. There is the explicitly given figure Donald Davidson, a philosopher who, like Montague, was 
deeply invested in the study of natural language, and whom we will see in the next paragraph. There is 
of course the author, Montague himself. But, the fourth figure is Chomsky. He is the central figure 
among ‘certain contemporary linguists’, and the developments emanating from the Massachusetts 
Institute of Technology are ones he either produced or inspired. Now the content of the passage is a 
criticism by Montague of the approach to the formal study of natural language taken by Chomsky. 
Montague’s point is that Chomsky’s attempt to develop a syntactic theory of English without 
consideration of the semantic aspect of language, of the relation between language and the world that 




response to it on the part of the community of linguists, had very important implications for the history 
of the formal study of natural language. But, while Montague’s criticism is valid, there are at least two 
parts of Chomsky’s work of the time that have to be taken into account before the criticism is accorded 
final acceptance. Thus in Syntactic Structures, at the very end of the introduction, Chomsky refers to the 
implication of his theory for ‘semantic studies’. In 1966, he published ‘Topics in the Theory of Generative 
Grammar’ and, in 1971, ‘Deep Structure, Surface Structure, and Semantic Interpretation’, both of which 
affirm the necessity and importance of semantics in the formal study of natural language. And, reacting 
to the former article, Davidson positions philosophers and linguists as ‘co-workers’ in the formal study of 
natural language. But all of this may fail to address Montague’s point because to acknowledge the 
necessity and the importance of semantics is not the same thing as acknowledging that semantic 
considerations must be made in the formulation of syntax, and in fact chapter 2. of Syntactic Structures 
is entitled ‘The Independence of Grammar’, and Chomsky (1975) defends ‘the autonomy of syntax’. Be 
all of this as it may, Montague’s trilogy of essays, ‘English as a Formal Language’, quoted from above, 
‘Universal Grammar’ and, most especially, ‘The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary 
Language’, fostered a revolution of their own. According to Shalom Lappin, “Montague’s work 
established the foundations for research in semantics for the next two decades.” (1), and Barbara Hall 
Partee, the leading authority on what came to be called ‘Montague Grammar’, says  
 Formal semantics has roots in several disciplines, most importantly logic, philosophy, and 
 linguistics. The most important figure in its history was Richard Montague, a logician and 
 philosopher whose seminal works in this area date from the late 1960s and the beginning of the 
 1970s; its subsequent development has been a story of fruitful interdisciplinary collaboration 
 among linguists, philosophers, logicians, and others, and by now formal semantics can be 
 pursued entirely within linguistics as well as in various interdisciplinary settings. (11) 
     Davidson is also a seminal figure in the development of formal semantics. We can relate him to 
Montague in that he saw that a formal theory could be provided for a natural language, and that the 
central feature of that theory would have to be the provision of a definition of truth for the language. 
But we can also relate him to Chomsky because, very early on, he saw that when philosophers took on 
this task, they would enter a collaborative relationship with linguists. We might take as his manifesto the 
first part of the second paragraph of his ‘Semantics for Natural Languages’: 
 I suggest that a theory of truth for a language does, in a minimal but important respect, do what 
 we want, that is, give the meanings of all independently meaningful expressions on the basis of 
 an analysis of their structure. And on the other hand, a semantic theory of natural language 
 cannot be considered adequate unless it provides an account of the concept of truth for that 
 language along the lines proposed by Tarski for formalized languages. (55) 
We see here a commitment to the principle of compositionality, and a commitment to the Tarskian 
procedure of fielding a theory of a language that accords with Convention T in that has as consequences 
all sentences of the form 




where ‘s’ is to be replaced by a standardized description of a sentence of the language and ‘p’ is to be 
replaced by the sentence itself. So we get 
  ”Snow is white” is true if and only if snow is white. 
And Davidson goes on to say that, since the words ‘is true if and only if’ are invariant, we can replace 
them, if we please, with ‘means that’ so that we get 
  ”Snow is white” means that snow is white. 
It is important to note, however, that it is not the biconditional itself but rather the proof of it that “… 
must demonstrate, step by step, how the truth value of a sentence depends upon a recursively given 
structure (61).” It is also important to note that Davidson acknowledges that what he is providing in all 
of this is not a particular theory but rather a criterion of theories, and he did not go much further in 
terms of specific semantics except for isolated cases of philosophical int4rest, like action sentences and 
events. 
     But now, taking himself to have shown that a formal theory of natural language is possible, Davidson 
goes on to ask why such a thing is desirable. His answer is that providing a satisfactory theory of truth 
for natural language will position philosophers and linguists to work together on a variety of problems, 
such that there will be a convergence of the respective methods and interests of the two disciplines. 
There is a question, however, as to whether a kind of foundational realignment of the two disciplines 
would be a prerequisite of such convergence. In this connection, Davidson raises the question of the 
extent to which the philosophical concept of logical form can be identified with the linguistic concept of 
deep structure but, setting this aside, he goes on to enumerate the problems that might be taken on 
collaboratively. They include ambiguity, reference, modality, propositional attitudes, mass terms, 
adverbial modification, attributive adjectives, imperatives and interrogatives. He also brings up the case 
of providing a theory for a foreign language, and invokes Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of radical 
translation. This problem might be related at least distantly to Slobin’s linguistic relativity thesis, which is 
discussed briefly below. 
     We have seen how Chomsky, Montague and Davidson made critical individual contributions to the 
development of formal semantics, but we must also consider the broader historical context. Linguistics, 
on the one hand, and the philosophy of language and logic, on the other, were quite distinct enterprises 
through the 1950s. This can be understood in specific historical terms (see Partee for a brief but 
excellent account of this) but is can also be understood in general terms having to do with intellectual 
interest. Philosophers were primarily interested in truth. Now in the proper sense of the term, the only 
thing that can be true is a sentence, and of course a sentence is an item of language, but if it is truth that 
is your focus then the range of linguistic phenomena that you deal with can be quite narrow, even if 
you’re working with natural language. Consider all of the discussion generated by, and about, Russell 
and Strawson in relation to the sentence ‘The king of France is bald.’. And think about the sentences 
analyzed in logic textbooks to display their logical meaning. Even the most challenging ones in predicate 
logic, like ‘All that glitters is not gold.’ are relatively simple linguistically. We might even go back to 




representative. Where the primary interest is in truth, and other related semantic phenomena like 
entailment, the sentences entertained are just props for the semantic theories produced. What the 
theorist wants is the simplest possible structure so that the semantic trait they are highlighting can be 
represented with minimal interference from the linguistic vehicle that delivers it. But things are 
completely different if your interest is language, especially of course natural language. Then you are 
virtually overwhelmed with complexity and thus the theories you produce strain to capture this 
complexity. It does not matter whether you are a structuralist like Saussure who is involved in what is 
essentially a classificatory project, or a transformationalist like Chomsky who is concerned with relations 
between, and among, linguistic structures such that deeper, more general and more abstract structures 
have to be sought. You embrace the complexity because it is that complexity that makes the thing you 
are interested in, language itself, what it in fact is. But, things changed dramatically when in the 1960s 
philosophers decided that they could apply their formal apparatus to natural language, not bits of it as 
in logic textbooks and philosophical treatises, but big fragments of it, and eventually, it would be hoped, 
all of it. Then the linguists had to take notice. And, as linguists began to accept the necessity of treating 
the semantic aspect of natural language, philosophers and logicians became more aware of its 
complexity and subtlety, and a process of cross-fertilization developed: the two disciplinary lines of 
research converged forming the common enterprise of formal semantics, which has proven to be highly 
productive. 
§ 3 The Other Side of the Ledger: the Emergence of Applied linguistics as a Discipline in its Own Right 
          We have considered the roles of logic, philosophy of language and linguistics proper in the 
development of formal semantics, but the story to be told here requires that we bring in applied 
linguistics as well. In this account I rely on Berns and Matsuda (2006) – see the bibliographic references 
there. The discipline of applied linguistics emerged as linguists who wanted to continue to work on 
practical problems related to language reacted to the theoretical turn the discipline took under 
Chomsky’s influence. In the early part of the 20th century, applied linguistics was closely associated with 
structuralism, which was simultaneously attempting to disassociate itself from philology, whose 
humanistic approach to the study of language, literature and culture put it out of accord with the new 
ideal of scientific linguistics. But, in the 1940s, what became distinctive about applied linguistics was its 
relation to language teaching, teaching English in schools, teaching foreign languages beyond English 
and teaching ESL, i.e. English as a second language. In American schools, English was taught 
prescriptively on a model related to British literary English, and Latin grammar. Fred Newton Scott, 
founding president of the National Council of Teachers, and two of his students in the Department of 
Rhetoric at the University of Michigan, Sterling Andrus Leonard and, more notably, Charles C. Fries tried 
to institute reform towards actual usage but there was too much resistance from rank and file English 
teachers. Regarding foreign language instruction, Leonard Bloomfield developed a method of teaching 
anthropologists in preparation for their fieldwork. The method was picked up by the Army Specialized 
Training Program. Bloomfield was influenced by ‘the Reformists’, Henry Sweet, Paul Passy and, most 
notably, Otto Jespersen, who distinguished theoretical and practical language, the former focusing on 




     At a 1939 conference cosponsored by the U.S. State department and the Rockefeller Foundation, 
Charles Fries and I.A. Richards offered competing methods of teaching English to Latin American 
students. Fries’s method, like Bloomfield’s, drew its inspiration from the Reformists but Richard’s 
method was based on Basic (British American Scientific International Commercial) English, which 
employed a limited vocabulary. Fries’s method was chosen. An outgrowth of the discussion involved was 
the establishment of the first English Language Institute (ELI) at the University of Michigan. Its influence 
in the U.S. and around the world has been considerable. In 1948, the first journal whose title contains 
the term ‘applied linguistics’, Language and Learning: A Quarterly Journal of Applied Linguistics, was 
established. At about that time, applied linguistics began to dissociate itself from linguistics proper as 
the latter became less and less willing to be associated with problems of a practical nature. Applied 
linguistics then became effectively a separate discourse community. But, the concern with the practical 
continued to grow and, in the 1950s, Modern Language Journal regularly explored the relationship 
between applied linguistics and language teaching. In 1957, the Ford Foundation sponsored the 
Conference on Linguistics and the Teaching of English as a Foreign Language. This led in 1959 to the 
establishment of the Center for Applied Linguistics (CAL), which has served as a vehicle for the spread of 
applied linguistics throughout the world. And, just a few years later, in 1964, the International 
Association of Applied Linguistics (AILA) was founded and, by 1969, it had 18 affiliate organizations in 
Europe and North America.  
     As applied linguistics began to make its way independently of linguistics proper, it looked to other 
disciplines, like anthropology and psychology, for technique and theory and, in 1967, Language Learning 
was established as an applied linguistics based interdisciplinary journal. There was also expansion within 
the field as it went beyond language teaching to add to its areas of interest first language acquisition, 
bilingualism, translation, sociolinguistics, psycholinguistics, writing systems and language policy. In 1966, 
Teachers of English to Speakers of Other Languages, or TESOL, was founded, and that same year saw the 
beginning of the publication of TESOL Quarterly. The field has continued to grow internationally as well 
as in breath of focus. Since 1975, associations have formed in Ireland, Korea, Greece, Hong Kong, Japan 
and Brazil.  
     In the European Union, there is a need to have a lingua franca for all of the member states while at 
the same time avoiding the devaluation of the ‘smaller’ languages. The problem is made more complex 
as there is labor migration from points both within and without the union. Canadians and Americans 
who are members of the North American affiliate of AILA are mainly interested in second language 
acquisition, second/foreign language pedagogy and discourse analysis while the members of the Russian 
affiliate are mainly interested in contrastive linguistics, error analysis, lexicography and lexicology. In 
China, applied linguists have been engaged in standardizing, teaching and computerizing the Chinese 
language, and the description and teaching of minority languages, but teaching foreign languages, and 
especially English, is paid a good deal of attention and is supported by the government. Further, the 
Chinese Ministry of Education has been instituting change in language teaching practice from a focus on 
intensive reading and the study of grammar rules to the communicative use of language in speech and 
in writing. In Malaysia, applied linguists study the consequences of the challenge to Malay posed by the 




levels is studied as motivated by parents’ recognition of the connection between proficiency in English 
and the prospects for employment and financial security. “These differences in emphasis reveal as much 
about linguistic traditions as they do about the language problems that are identified as meriting 
consideration by applied linguistics.” 
§ 4 A Second Merger?: The Possibility of a Mutually Beneficial Exchange between the Philosophy of 
Language and SLA Research 
       It would seem that a convergence of the lines of interest of the philosophy of language and SLA 
research creating a set of circumstances in which each discipline can benefit from the work of the other 
is a distinct possibility, especially given the analogous development involving theoretical linguistics that 
has already taken place. Again we have a case in which two different disciplines have the same object of 
study, provided that we construe that object, natural language, in sufficiently broad terms. The dynamic 
of the mutual benefit would be set by the ways in which the two disciplines differ along dimensions that 
are common to the two of them. Thus, the philosophy of language is theoretical while SLA research is 
practical, although this characterization of SLA research has to be qualified sharply by the point made in 
Ellis (1997) to the effect that the individuals who work in this area are now almost exclusively members 
of university departments whose main interest is in publishing peer reviewed articles in scholarly 
journals, the concern with the learning of second languages by real people in real situations of need 
having been dropped like some non-functional appendage in the evolutionary process a long time ago. 
But now, the point is that when the theoretical and the practical rub us against each other, some new 
understanding is bound to be in the offing. A second difference can be set up by saying that, with 
respect to natural language, the concern of the philosophy of language is ‘how it works’ whereas the 
concern of SLA research is ‘how we get it’. Finally, to the extent that the philosophy of language involved 
is cognitive in its orientation, i.e. to the extent that it takes the form of cognitive semantics, a critical 
distinction made by Jackendoff comes into play: 
 The study of “externalized language” or E-language treats language as an external artifact used 
 by human beings, and seeks to characterize its properties as part of the external world with 
 which humans interact. By contrast, the study of “internalized language” or I-language treats 
 language as a body of knowledge within the minds/brains of speakers, and seeks to characterize 
 its properties within the context of a more general theory of psychology. (539) 
Both the philosophy of language and the discipline of SLA address both E-language and I-language such 
that the E/I distinction is orthogonal to the distinction between the two of them. But, since philosophers 
of language attempt to confirm their theories through a process of introspection in which hypothetical 
uses of sentences are judged to be acceptable or unacceptable on the basis of grammatical intuition 
while SLA researchers attempt to confirm their theories by conducting studies in which real, if staged, 
uses of sentences are judged to be acceptable or unacceptable on the basis of the standard grammar of 
the language involved, there is an important difference between the two disciplines in that E-language 
thus plays a very large role in the methodology of SLA while it plays a very small role in the methodology 




Clearly, I-language is the object of study of the philosophy of language cum cognitive semantics  and any 
review of SLA studies will motivate the claim that it has E-language as its object of study. Such studies 
make reference to mind/brain processes and indeed to psychology itself but there is no indication that 
the aim of SLA scholarship is to make a contribution to the general theory of psychology.   
    The fact that the two disciplines differ in all of these ways, and yet are similar in being efforts to 
characterize human beings as language using animals, suggests that the extent of the mutual benefit 
projected above could be considerable. 
§ 5 The Emergence of Second Language Acquisition (SLA) as an Important Sub-Field of Applied 
Linguistics 
     Applied linguistics is allied with several disciplines. It also has a broad array of sub-fields but we will 
be concerned here only with the sub-field of second language acquisition, or SLA. It emerged when the 
applied linguists who were interested in second language acquisition shifted from conducting global 
studies of the effectiveness of methods of instruction to particular studies of the ways in which students 
learn. In the 1960s there were mainly two methods of teaching second languages. The one method is 
the grammar-translation method. The students are presented with a text and, under the guidance of the 
teacher, they identify and study the vocabulary and the grammar of that text, as a means of learning the 
language of the text. The objective is to enable the students to read the language, not to speak it. The 
other method is the audio-lingual method. In the simplest possible terms, the teacher speaks a sentence 
and the students repeat it, with or without variation. Now the two methods were compared for 
effectiveness in two studies, Scherer and Wertheimer (1964) and Smith (1970). However, the results of 
the two studies were inconclusive. Somewhat later, a new approach was taken. The object of study was 
no longer the methods but rather the learners. Duskova (1969) studied the errors learners made and 
Ravem (1968) studied individuals learning a second language not in the classroom but in the world so to 
speak. Teachers took to this type of study more than they did to the other type because, in being 
focused on errors and individuals, the studies of the new type operated in a conceptual space that the 
teachers were familiar with. Further, studies of the new type were conclusive, and what they showed is 
that not only do students of a second language learn the language, but also they learn it in a systematic 
way. Out of this success, SLA came into existence and since has become a major scholarly and practical 
enterprise.      
     A good way to characterize SLA is to consider some of the main issues that it addresses, and some of 
the leading theories that researchers in the area have produced. I believe that, without doubt, the two 
most important issues in the field are the issue related to the question of what the relationship between 
explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge is in second language acquisition, and the issue related to the 
question of whether there is a fixed order of acquisition of the features of a second language. Let us 
consider these issues in turn. 
     The issue of the relationship between explicit knowledge and implicit knowledge is an important one 
because it is widely accepted that implicit knowledge is the true basis of our general use of language and 




knowledge, by contrast, is developed typically by instruction, or independent study, and as such resides 
in the domain of the conscious. Thus, the position one takes on the interface hypothesis, i.e. on the 
question of the relationship between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge, determines whether 
one thinks of formal language instruction in grammar, and perhaps other aspects of language, as 
effective or ineffective, and if effective then to what extent. Instruction produces explicit knowledge and 
thus only if explicit knowledge, by one means or another, becomes implicit knowledge can instruction be 
seen to have value. But before we try to say what the relationship between the two forms of knowledge 
in fact is, it seems appropriate to say something about what the two forms actually are, what their 
natures are. I don’t find the literature to be particularly clear on this question. Ellis (1997) builds an 
impressive case for formal second language instruction which depends heavily on the distinction 
between the explicit and the implicit but, when it comes to defining these terms, he appeals to Bialystok 
(1981), according to whom explicit knowledge is: 
 - ‘analyzed’: because it does not have to be used in order to exist 
 - ‘abstract’: because it represents a generalization about the way in which we use language 
 - ‘explanatory’: because its logical basis is independent of its use 
     But, our intuitive notion of the nature of explicit knowledge is clearer than what these motivated 
terms convey. And nothing is offered in Ellis in the way of a definition of implicit knowledge. However, 
we do have intuitive notions of both implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge, and they will probably 
serve well enough in the present context. Now the claim about the relationship between the two forms 
of knowledge has varied over time. In the 60s and the 70s the prevailing methods of second language 
instruction, like the audio-lingual method, presupposed that explicit knowledge would become implicit 
knowledge, i.e., that formal instruction would be effective. But, Krashen (1982) argued that the fact that 
a formally instructed student can know more about the target language than native speakers of that 
language and yet be virtually unable to speak it revealed the disconnection between the implicit and the 
explicit. Under this inspiration, SLA pedagogy turned to ‘natural’ and ‘communicative’ approaches that 
basically sought to expose the student to the target language with the idea that acquisition would result 
just from this. Studies of the implementation of these approaches, however, revealed definite problems. 
Students trained according to these approaches failed to achieve either acceptable levels of accuracy or 
acceptable end states. In the meantime, other studies showed that, where features of the target 
language were attended to properly in instruction, those features were mastered. But, this did not mean 
that the field went from Krashen’s no-interface position to a strong-interface position because formal 
instruction in the grammar of the target language was set in a naturalistic, communicative environment. 
And this compromise thus represented the adoption of a weak-interface position, which is still the 
dominant position today. Further, research, in SLA and even in neuroscience, confirms the position. 
Subconscious processes are perfectly capable of handling language tasks that are routine for the 
language user but, when the user is presented with something that is truly novel, like a second language, 
then the resources of conscious processes must be called upon. The implication that we can play an 
active role in the development of proficiency in a second language, that we can help ourselves directly 




development that we must realize in order to pursue so many of our goals, has to be regarded as very 
welcome. 
     Another issue of great importance in SLA research and pedagogy is that having to do with the 
question of whether there is a fixed order of acquisition of the features of a natural language. There is 
the claim, for example, that the (partial) order for English is as follows:   
 - progressive –ing 
 - plural –s 
 - third person –s 
 - past tense –ed 
 - articles a, an, the 
And, there is a proposed (partial) order for sentence word order in German as follows: 
  
 - adverb preposing 
 - movement of finite auxiliaries and verb particles to the end of the sentence 
 - inversion 
 - movement of the finite verb to the end of a subordinate clause 
     The native language of the learner makes no difference. The order of acquisition of the target 
language, English or German here, is the same for the first speaker of Polish as it is for the first speaker 
of Cantonese. Further, the profile of the learner does not matter either. The strong, highly motivated 
student must follow the sequence as surely as the weak, unmotivated one. 
     Now, the idea essentially associated with these sequences is that no instruction is required for the 
learner to acquire the features involved. Only exposure to the language is required. This does not mean, 
however, that instruction is of no value. Both Krashen and Ellis suggest what this value might be as they 
address what might be seen as a conflict between the claim here that instruction is not necessary for 
acquisition and the positive findings of some SLA research regarding the influence of instruction. 
The Input Hypothesis [which we will examine shortly] helps to settle … [an] apparent contradiction 
in the research literature. Some studies indicate that formal instruction helps second-language 
acquisition, while others seem to indicate that informal environments are superior or just as good. I 
reviewed this research in Krashen 1982a, and concluded that it is consistent with the hypothesis 
that language classes help when they are the primary source of comprehensible input. This is 





The theory helps to explain … [a puzzle] in L2 acquisition studies. The … [puzzle] is the paradox of 
formal instruction; formal instruction results in faster and more successful language learning … and 
yet learners often fail to learn what they have been taught. This can be explained by positing that 
formal instruction contributes primarily to explicit knowledge. In other words, it will often have a 
delayed rather than an immediate effect. (Ellis 1997: 131) 
Thus instruction is of value in that it provides comprehensible input for some learners and enhances the 
acquisition process for all learners. Further, there is also broad agreement in the SLA literature that 
some features of natural language do not appear in the order of acquisition and they can be acquired 
effectively through instruction at any time. Pienemann supplies some helpful terminology in this 
connection. He calls features that appear in the natural order ‘developmental’ and features that do not 
‘variational’ (1984: ???). 
     The order of acquisition issue is perhaps a lopsided one since everyone in the field seems to accept 
the notion that such an order exist, although Ellis does at one point appear to express some reservation: 
“Learners do not acquire the L2 grammar as a set of ‘accumulated entities’ … but rather work on a 
number of features simultaneously, gradually sorting out the form-meaning relationships which they 
encode and on the way constructing a series of interim grammars (61).” But, despite this general 
acceptance, no one claims to know what the actual orders of acquisition are, the examples above 
notwithstanding. And, this poses a big problem for implementation. An associated implementation 
problem is the determination of each learner’s place in the order at the time of instruction. Presumably 
the instruction should begin at the proper point for each learner, but how is this to be achieved in a 
class, a typical class, in which the students are at different levels of proficiency? (Pienemann and his 
associates have developed software, sophisticated software, that may be able to determine the 
student’s level of proficiency but Ellis thinks that its use is likely impractical.) 
     But, if we do accept that there is a fixed order of acquisition then the question is, why is this so? It 
seems very strange. One possibility is that the order might be related to Universal Grammar as due to 
Chomsky, in its current principles and parameters manifestation.  Perhaps the parameters can be seen 
as types that the features of the various languages are tokens of in such a way that each feature in a 
given language is of the same type as some feature of every other language, and it is really the types 
that are the elements in the fixed order. But this is just a speculative reaction, although, as it turns out, 
Zobl and Liceras present a very similar idea using the terms ‘generative grammar’ and ‘category’ as 
opposed to the terms ‘Universal Grammar’ and ‘type’ used here. Pienemann and his associates (1988), 
however, have worked out a theory of their own, which they call the Teachability Hypothesis. The 
central concept is that of a processing operation. The learner first masters non-linguistic operations, 
then operations that require the identification of the beginnings and ends of strings, then operations 
that require shifting the components of strings around within them, and finally operations that address 
multiple strings. Now, since these operation types are hierarchically arranged, the learner cannot 
perform the operations at a given level until they have mastered the operations at the preceding level. 
Thus all we need to do to have an explanation of the order of acquisition is to correlate features with 




     The final point to be made here is that, while the order of acquisition applies to implicit knowledge, 
which provides the basis for all spontaneous use of language, both written and spoken, Ellis suggests 
that it may not apply to explicit knowledge, and I am very much in sympathy with this point because, as 
regards writing as opposed to speech, given (1) the clarity of the nature of most features of English, (2) 
the power of teachers to explain, and (3) the ability of most ESL students in American universities, it is 
difficult for me to imagine a case in which the student has been trained in a specific, mechanical editing 
procedure (what I call a SMEP) designed to control a certain feature of English, and yet that student is 
somehow unable to control that feature. And does there not have to be, at some point, transfer from 
writing to speech?   
     We turn our attention now from issues to theories. There are at least five important theories, or 
hypotheses as they are called, in SLA research that play upon the two issues just discussed in various 
ways. If we operate with an ‘input-processing-output’ model, where input is listening to speech or 
reading a text, processing is thinking of some kind and output is speaking or writing then, looking at 
second language acquisition naively, we are likely to believe that advances in proficiency come mainly 
from processing. The learner is presented with a grammatical structure of the L2, a grammatical rule 
perhaps, and they ingest that structure, or rule, by means of the various learning mechanisms and 
strategies available to them, and then they can both understand language which has the relevant 
structure (input) and produce language which has the relevant structure (output). But, as we will see, 
only one of the five hypotheses focuses on mental processing directly. The other four focus on what is 
superficially at least peripheral to processing. The five hypotheses are: the input hypothesis, the 
interaction hypothesis, the pushed output hypothesis, the delayed-effect hypothesis, and the thinking-
for-speaking hypothesis. 
Let us now consider these hypotheses in turn. The names of the hypotheses, and the sequence in which 
I have put these names, suggest more order among the hypotheses themselves than there actually is. 
While we will see that, overall, a good deal of reference is made to the two issues presented above, 
each hypothesis represents primarily the thinking of one figure regarding the vast and highly complex 
phenomenon of second language acquisition, from one basic perspective or another, and reflecting a 
unique set of particular interests. Further, it was not possible for me to try to homogenize the contents 
of the hypotheses and thus each hypothesis has to be understood on its own terms. However, I think 
that the presentations of the hypotheses to be offered are relatively straightforward and clear, and that, 
in conjunction, with the presentations above of the two basic issues, they provide for someone outside 
the field a pretty good sense of what it is about.       
The Input Hypothesis 
   Krashen has what he calls a theory of second language acquisition but there is some awkwardness 
involved in presenting it since (1) as indicated above, the five main SLA theories are all called hypotheses 
in the literature, (2) Krashen’s theory has five main components each of which is called an hypothesis, 
and (3) one of the five hypotheses, the input hypothesis, was elected as the most important hypothesis, 




terminological infelicity in all of this, but once the clarification has been made, the presentation of 
Krashen’s theory proceeds straightforwardly. The five hypotheses are as follows.    
The Acquisition-Learning Hypothesis – there are two ways in which we learn a second language and 
these are (1) acquisition, which is a sub-conscious process that is very much like the subconscious 
process related to first language acquisition, and  (2) learning, which is a conscious process that yields 
only ‘knowing about’ the second language. 
The Natural Order Hypothesis – we acquire the features a second language in a fixed order which cannot 
be affected by instruction: the order is not determined by the simplicity or complexity of the features. 
The Monitor Hypothesis – this hypothesis depends upon the acquisition-learning one: it says that our 
production in the second language is based primarily upon the sub-conscious knowledge that comes 
through acquisition but the conscious knowledge that comes through learning allows us to monitor, or 
edit, our production: however, two conditions must be met if monitoring is to be effective: first, the 
learner must be consciously concerned about the correctness of their production and, second, the 
leaner must know the rules that that allow them to recognize and then correct their errors: Krashen says 
that these two conditions are difficult to meet. 
The Input Hypothesis – this hypothesis depends on the natural order one: we acquire a second language 
only by receiving ‘comprehensible input’ but a given feature is acquired only when the learner is at the 
point in the natural order of acquisition at which the feature is located: when we are at point i in the 
natural order, we advance by receiving comprehensible input that contains the feature at point i + 1: 
“We are able to understand language containing unacquired grammar [the feature at i + 1] with the help 
of context, which includes extra-linguistic information, our knowledge of the world, and previously 
acquired linguistic competence (2).” There seem to be two corollaries of this hypothesis, neither of 
which accords very well with the common sense view of the matters involved. The first corollary is that 
instruction is not needed for acquisition to occur. As we just saw, when the learner is at point i, some 
combination of previously acquired competence, consideration of context, and general knowledge of 
the world helps them to figure out some input language, i.e. something they have heard or read, which 
is at point i + 1, thus making that language comprehensible, and Krashen’s overall main point is that 
comprehensible input is both necessary and sufficient for acquisition to occur. Thus there is no role for 
instruction to play. But most of us, as students and/or teachers, believe that instruction can play a role 
in acquisition, and in most cases does in fact play a role. The second corollary is that all individuals 
acquire the second language in the same way, viz. by means of input. But if we operate with the input-
processing-output model of language use presented in the preceding paragraph then we might expect 
that individuals vary in terms of the extent to which their acquisition is due to the various phases of the 
model, input, processing and output, taken separately. So some might learn more from input, i.e. from 
listening and reading, but others might learn more from output, i.e. from speaking and writing, while 
still others might learn more from processing, i.e. from thinking about the second language, about how 
its parts work and how they are related to each other. We believe in individual variation with respect to 
modes of learning among forms of study in general, and would not expect the case of second language 




The Affective Filter Hypothesis – comprehensible input is a necessary but not a sufficient condition of 
acquisition: it is also necessary that the learner’s ‘affective filter’ be ‘down’: the affective filter is “… a 
mental block that prevents acquirers from fully utilizing the comprehensible input they receive for 
language acquisition (3).” When the filter is ‘up’, because the learner is unmotivated, lacks self-
confidence, or is anxious or defensive, the reception of comprehensible input will not result in 
acquisition: the filter is at its lowest point when the learner finds the input so engaging that they lose 
their awareness of operating in the second language. 
Krashen presents ten categories of evidence for the input hypothesis. I will discuss ever so briefly here 
just parts of two of the categories that relate to instruction, since ESL instruction is my main interest. In 
the discussion of the category The Effect of Instruction, Krashen says  
 Language classes are less helpful when (1) the students are already advanced enough to 
 understand some input from the outside world, and (2) this input is available to them. This 
 explanation predicts, for example, why advanced ESL courses for international students in North 
 American universities are not effective. … The students are competent enough in English to get 
 their comprehensible input elsewhere, i.e. certain subject matter classes and in social situations. 
 (13, 14) 
And in the discussion of the category The Reading Hypothesis, Krashen says earlier on 
 A number of studies show a relationship between reading and writing. Good writers, it has been 
 found, have done more reading for their own interest and pleasure than poor writers, and 
 programs that get students ‘hooked on books’ help develop writing skills. … I have hypothesized 
 … that writing competence comes only from large amounts of self-motivated reading for 
 pleasure and/or interest. It is reading that gives the writer the ‘feel’ for the look and texture of 
 good writing. (18,19) 
and then later 
 The complexity of the written language, as well as the fact that so little of it has been described, 
 makes it unlikely that it can be taught deliberately. We are only now beginning to discover the 
 often subtle grammatical and discourse differences between speaking and writing, and between 
 good writing and poor writing. Instruction can give the student only the most obvious aspects of 
 written language. This is confirmed by the failure of several studies to show any clear 
 relationship between the study of grammar and the ability to write … (19) 
Now ESL instruction in writing at the university level is a big part of my teaching, and of course part two 
of this dissertation is an ESL textbook so, needless to say, I have a radically different view of these 
matters than Krashen does. I will respond separately to each of his three points. (1) I teach English at 
Pace University and The English Language Institute, which is adjunct to the university, offers a full range 
of ESL courses. The students in the institute are assessed as to their level of proficiency in English when 
they are accepted, and they have to move through a series of proficiency levels before they graduate. I 




students in their courses to meet the applicable standard before they move on. Further, the institute is a 
feeder school for the university and, while I have no statistics to offer, I know that institute students 
routinely enter the university and go on earn degrees from it. Given all of this it has to be said that the 
ESL courses offered by the institute are successful. (2) Reading good literature in the target language is 
certainly helpful to the second language learner with respect to writing, but students cannot develop 
grammatical proficiency by this means. The books, magazines and newspapers they read present them 
with rhetorical forms and sentence patterns that can serve as effective models of writing but, when the 
students attempt to express their ideas in an essay, they have to have command of the mechanics of the 
second language if what they say is to be relatively error free, and yet the transfer of mechanics from 
what is read to what is written is weak at best. The models provided by reading are ‘macro’ whereas the 
mechanics required by writing are ‘micro’. (3) The theoretical explanation of natural language is of 
course far from complete. The challenge there is to discover principles, as simple and intuitive as 
possible, that apply across the whole of the language, thus becoming general constraints. Good 
examples are the Ross Constraints. But, explaining a feature or an error in an ESL student’s essay is a 
very different matter. Students do not just throw words together. Even the weakest, laziest student 
writes with sense, no matter how little in evidence this may be. Given this, the range of phenomena 
associated with a student’s sentence is very narrow indeed as compared to the range of phenomena 
associated with a language as a whole – the theoretical linguist has to ‘cook the whole language from 
scratch’ whereas the ESL tutor has only to ‘throw together some prepared sentence components’. 
Further, the linguist’s explanation has to apply generally whereas the tutor’s explanation has to apply 
only specifically. Finally, the linguist’s explanation has to meet a standard of theoretical adequacy 
whereas the tutor’s explanation has to meet only a standard of practical adequacy in serving as a guide 
for the student’s future writing. So, I am not able to square Krashen’s three points with my now long 
term experience with ESL students.            
The Interaction Hypothesis  
     Ellis says that, on The Interaction Hypothesis, grammatical features are acquired when they become 
salient in the discourse at points where communication breaks down such that the discourse 
participants have to negotiate for meaning via ‘interactional modifications’ in the form of requests for 
clarification and confirmation. (49) Ellis attributes the hypothesis to Long, and in Long (1983) we learn 
what is really involved here. It is very interesting that Long couches his hypothesis in the Input 
Hypothesis of Krashen and indeed he does not even seem to take his hypothesis as an entity separate 
from Krashen’s. In fact, Long goes so far as to begin his article with a presentation of the evidence for 
the input hypothesis. He starts with the five kinds of evidence Krashen himself gives in Krashen (1985). I 
did not review these kinds in the discussion of the article above because they are more relevant here. 
They are as follows:      
1. Caretaker Speech – those who care for young children modify their speech in order to ensure 
communication but at best they only approximate the child’s actual level of proficiency so that they 
produce language below, at, and, most relevantly of course, above the child’s level: the above level 




speech focuses on the ‘here and now’, the child is able to understand the structure and thus acquisition 
takes place. 
2. Speech by Native Speaker/Foreigner Talk – the case here is really the same as that of caretaker 
speech: the native speaker has to try to ensure that they communicate with the non-native speaker. 
3. The Silent Period – some children remain silent for a period of time as they learn what they need to be 
able to speak by listening: Long does not really indicate whether there is any tendency to remain silent 
in adults, but he notes that adults are often pushed to produce speech from the very beginning in 
courses they take and this can cause them to resort to transfer from the L1. 
4. Research on Teaching Effectiveness – research shows that teaching models that do not include 
sufficient comprehensible input are invariably ineffective whereas models that do include such input are 
effective. 
5. Immersion Programs – programs that emphasize comprehension over production, and content over 
formal accuracy outperform foreign, second and modern language programs to such an extent that the 
comparison groups for immersion students are typically monolingual native speakers. 
Long adds two units of evidence himself, namely that immersion students do not gain from exposure to 
L2 outside of school and that studies show that, where there is no comprehensible input, there is no 
acquisition. He then concludes that there is a prima facie case for the importance of the role of 
comprehensible input in language acquisition generally, and in second language acquisition in particular. 
Long’s own contribution is the analysis of the mechanism of comprehensible input. Ellis’s formulation of 
the interaction hypothesis given above is taken from Long and so to avoid repetition here I will say that 
Long sees the mechanism of comprehensible input as stemming from the relationship of mutual 
responsibility that the native speaker and the non-native speaker enter as they in effect agree to 
converse. Both of them are responsible for making communication happen so that, when one of them 
does not understand the other, the other must make moves of some kind, on their own initiative or at 
the request of the one, and yet the non-native speaker is able to learn from the moves that the native 
speaker makes in order to make themselves clear to the non-native speaker. The moves the native 
speaker makes in effect explain the expression or structure they have used that the non-native speaker 
does not know, this lack of knowledge being the cause of the failure to understand. And, the explanation 
of the expression or structure by the native speaker allows the non-native speaker to acquire it.   
At a certain point, Long turns his attention to education. Of course he recommends that the SLA course 
provide the student with comprehensible input, and he recommends that the provision be high in 
frequency. Perhaps the most important particular he mentions is that the best way to set up the 
mechanism for comprehensible input is to use two way arrangements, exchanges between two parties 
that require the one party to depend on the other party for information in the completion of a task.  




     The Pushed Output Hypothesis, naturally enough, emphasizes the importance of output in second 
language acquisition. According to this theory, “… when learners are required to produce pushed output 
(i.e. sustained output that pushes at the limits of the learner’s current state of development) they are 
forced into revising interlanguage hypotheses and also have to attend to the syntactical properties of 
the L2 (Ellis 49).” And Swain has argued that “…although comprehensible input … may be essential to 
the acquisition of a second language, it is not enough to insure that the outcome will be nativelike 
performance (236).” He goes on to say that 
 … while comprehensible input and the concomitant emphasis on interaction in which meaning is 
 negotiated … is essential, its impact on grammatical development has been overstated. The role 
 of interactional exchanges in second language acquisition may have as much to do with 
 ‘comprehensible output’ as it has to do with comprehensible input. (236) 
Swain and colleagues conducted a study of children whose first language is English and who were 
studying French in an immersion program. The children heard little French outside of their school and 
thus had only the French spoken by their native-speaker teachers, the French spoken by their fellow 
students and the French materials with which they were taught as input. The conclusion of the study 
was that comprehensible output 
 … extends the linguistic repertoire of the learner as he or she attempts to create precisely and 
 appropriately the meaning desired. Comprehensible output … is a necessary mechanism of 
 acquisition independent of the role of comprehensible input. Its role is, at minimum, to provide 
 opportunities for contextualized, meaningful use, to test out hypotheses about the target 
 language, and to move the learner from a purely semantic analysis of the language to a syntactic 
 analysis of it. (252) 
This is an extremely interesting view. I would like to understand better the specific way in which the L2 
learner generates hypotheses about the L2 and then tests them. The operations involved in this must be 
very complex, and there is the very important question of whether the learner conducts them 
consciously or sub-consciously.   
The Delayed-Effect Hypothesis 
     Ellis characterizes the Delayed-Effect Hypothesis as one according to which the natural acquisition 
order hypothesis is accepted, but the claim is made that a linguistic feature can be taught profitably to a 
learner before they reach the point in the order at which that feature appears because the 
understanding of the feature which the instruction develops will help them to acquire the feature when 
they do in fact encounter it in the natural acquisition order. Lightbrown is a leading proponent of the 
delayed-effect hypothesis but in Lightbrown (1985), her consideration of it is only a part of a complex 
assessment of the role of instruction in second language acquisition. In the article, Lightbrown reacts to 
the views of Pienemann, especially as presented in Pienemann (1985). The natural order of acquisition 
idea has, as one might expect, had a powerful impact on the views of SLA researchers and teachers 
regarding the value of instruction. Two extreme reactions can be distinguished. One is that all 




language per se should be replaced by content instruction, i.e. instruction in regular subject matter areas 
like history, science and mathematics, thus allowing language development to take place on its own. 
Pienmann recommends that we reject these extreme proposals and go instead right down the middle. 
He argues that there are actually two types of linguistic features, one of which is ‘universal’ in that it can 
be learned only when the student reaches the point in the natural order at which that feature is located, 
the other of which is ‘variable’ in that it can be learned at any time. It should be noted that literature on 
the natural order I have read provides only a few examples of universal features - see page ___ above - 
and the one example of a variable feature I have seen is the copula. A proper curriculum will then 
accommodate both types of features, and of course incorporate the standard pedagogical principles of 
careful introduction, practice and review. Lightbrown endorses this approach but issues a caveat to the 
effect that a curriculum like Pienemann’s should not be represented as something that all practitioners 
should adopt wholesale, lest they be disappointed yet again at the failure of a ‘scientific breakthrough’ 
in SLA pedagogy. Lightbrown goes on to make a number of critical points about the natural order of 
acquisition hypothesis, but then she introduces, ever so subtly, the delayed-effect hypothesis as follows: 
 … formal, controlled practice makes it possible for learners later to recognize (and thus 
 understand) these elements [features of language] in the L2 they encounter. That is, even if we 
 accept that developmental sequences of acquisition generally override the sequences imposed 
 by formal instruction in terms of what the learner actually incorporates and in what sequence, 
 formal instruction may provide “hooks”, points of access for the learner. That is, a certain 
 amount of information about the language together with contextual cues – may make it 
 possible for the learner to understand the L2 samples he is exposed to, making the input 
 comprehensible, thus available for language acquisition processing. (108) 
The operative term here is ‘later’. Students can be taught the formal grammar of a feature as a 
contribution to their explicit knowledge of it, their knowledge about it, before they reach the point in 
the natural acquisition order at which it appears as a way of facilitating their actual acquisition of it, i.e. 
the development of their implicit knowledge of it, when they reach the point in the natural acquisition 
order at which it appears. There are two ideas that can be closely associated with the delayed-effect 
hypothesis. One is the idea of a ‘spiral syllabus’ as discussed by Ellis (1997), with reference to Howatt 
(1974). On this kind of syllabus, the instruction cycles through the features of language to be taught so 
that the learner sees each feature more than once. Ellis is critical. He says 
 The key question … is whether it is possible to guide the process by which explicit knowledge 
 becomes implicit knowledge by means of a cyclical re-presentation of grammatical items. 
 According to the theory of L2 acquisition discussed in Chapter 4 … [ ] this is only possible if the 
 presentation of an item coincides with the learner’s readiness to acquire it. A spiral syllabus may 
 increase the likelihood of this occurring, but is still a hit-or-miss affair. (139) 
But, this seems to me to be just a question of logistics having to do with the duration of the state of 
readiness and the speed at which the cycle of instruction moves, i.e. how quickly each feature comes 
round again. And does readiness come up and then go back down, or does it come up and stay up? My 




pedagogical motto is ‘repetition is the key to learning’, and the feature could be taught in relation to 
new, and interesting, content material each time it comes around. The second idea that can be closely 
associated with the delayed-effect hypothesis is one that Lightbrown presents just after the passage 
quoted above. She says that “… formal instruction may be useful by alerting learners to the regularities 
of patterning in the language … (108)” as a means of developing their ‘metalinguistic awareness’. This is 
rather vague but I take it to refer to the instruction of more advanced students in the more complex 
structures of the language – the subjunctive mood, the formation of appositives, the future perfect 
tense with irregular verbs, sentence compounding via present participles. I find it difficult to imagine 
students acquiring features like these without instruction. Further, the best ESL students, invariably, 
have an intellectual interest in English, and the result of the satisfaction of this interest is what might be 
called metalinguistic awareness. Lightbrown’s final main point is a citation of what she takes to be the 
basic difference between Pienemann’s view and her own:  
 While I see the application of our current knowledge principally in terms of being able to tell 
 teachers, testers, and programme planners what to expect learners to do in certain situations, 
 Pienemann is ready to make some more explicit recommendations about what practitioners 
 should do. For all the reasons discussed above, I fear that this could lead to frustration and then 
 to a too-early rejection of the valuable contribution language acquisition research can make to 
 L2 teaching. (109)      
It is important to note here the distinction between (1) standard SLA research studies, in which a feature 
of language is isolated in one way or another such that what is learned about its acquisition or use is 
fairly specific and definite and (2) classroom research studies, in which a large system of variables is 
tolerable because the objective is for the most part just to have the instruction be more effective and 
thus it is not so important to be able to tie the increase in effectiveness to any one variable or one small 
set of variables. Clearly the discussion above is more related to classroom research studies.      
The Thinking-for-Speaking Hypothesis 
     The theory of linguistic relativity is generally associated with Whorf. His view can be traced back to 
Sapir and Boas but its form was very radical and it thus had consequences that were difficult to accept. 
Further, the view “… fell into disfavor in the 1960s with the predominant view in linguistics of language 
as separate from cognition, and the emphasis in cognitive psychology on the universality of human 
conceptual structures … (Cadierno 1).” But, Dan Slobin, professor emeritus in psychology and linguistics 
at the University of California at Berkeley, has produced what is called the ‘thinking-for speaking 
hypothesis’, according to which L2 learners are forced as they speak, as they struggle to express in the 
L2 the meaning they intend in the little time that conversational exchange allows, to think in terms of 
the model of reality that is built into that L2. As Slobin says, this involves “…picking those characteristics 
of objects and events that (a) fit some conceptualization of the event, and (b) are readily encodable in 
the language … (76).” The ramifications of this cover a very broad range. Let us consider two cases 
reported in the literature that involve English and Spanish. When Flight 1549 went down over the 




in English and Spanish revealed that the two languages have basically different forms of representation. 
A report in The New York Times (January 16) included the wording 
 it floated, twisting and drifting south in strong currents 
while a report in El Pais (January 15) described the action of the plane quite differently with the wording 
 remained floating on the water 
and the Times described the action of the passengers with the wording 
 terrified passengers began swarming out the emergency exits and into the brutally cold air and 
 onto the submerged wings of the bobbing jetliner 
whereas El Pais described their action with the wording  
 several people with life jackets on the wings of the plane, waiting to be rescued by boats that 
 have surrounded the plane 
The use of verbs is very different in the two reports, and the English report is much more in the active 
mode, the Spanish one much more in the static mode. (Han and Cadierno xi,xii) Formal studies 
demonstrate this phenomenon with precision. In a study of the expression of motion in the L1, Cadierno 
distinguishes ‘S-languages’, which include all Indo-European languages other than the Romance 
languages and Chinese, and ‘V-languages’, which include the Romance, Semitic and Polynesian 
languages. And, she distinguishes as well the concepts of Motion, Manner and Path, on the one hand, 
and the linguistic structures root verb and satellite, on the other. Drawing from the work of Talmy, she 
presents two sentences, one in English, the other in Spanish as follows: 
 The bottle floated into the cave. 
 La botella entro a la cueva flotando. (The bottle entered the cave floating.) 
Here, in the S-language, English, Motion and Manner are coded in the root verb ‘floated’ while Path is 
coded in the satellite prepositional phrase ‘into the cave’. In sharp contrast, in the V-language, Spanish, 
Motion and Path are coded in the root verb ‘entro’ (‘enter’) while Manner is coded in the gerund 
satellite ‘flotando’(‘floating’). Reflecting Slobin, Han and Cadierno make the very important general 
point: 
 … different languages predispose their speakers to view and talk about events differently. An 
 obvious question, then, for us and indeed, for the entire second language acquisition (SLA) field, 
 has been this double-barreled question: to what extent does a prior language (L1) affect the 
 acquisition and use of a second language, and more profoundly, to what extent does the 
 conceptual system that comes with the L1 affect the development of another compatible with 




I think that it goes without saying that the question of the relation between language and the world 
raised by the thinking-for-speaking hypothesis is one that not only philosophers of language but 
philosophers generally would have to find very interesting, and SLA researchers might benefit from 
study of the philosophical theory that bears on the question. 
     Having reviewed some of the main issues and theories in SLA, we will now consider the possibility of a 
relationship between SLA and the philosophy of language by attempting to demonstrate that each of 
the two disciplines can benefit from studying the work produced in the other. This attempt could take 
the form of an argument based on some correlation between the main characteristics of the two 
disciplines but the result might prove to be too abstract to be of real value. I think that it will be much 
better to do something more concrete. So, two features of natural language, determiners and modals, 
will be addressed by analyzing work on these features in both disciplines. Specifically, we will analyze 
work on determiners in SLA by Monica Ekiert and in the philosophy of language by Edward Keenan first, 
and then analyze work on modals in SLA by Andrea Tyler and in the philosophy of language by Murvet 
Enc. The strategy will be to analyze in detail a single article by each of the four authors. I found each of 
the articles to be inherently interesting and I think that anyone who has bent for the theoretical with 
respect to natural language will have the same experience. More substantially, however, it is beneficial 
to see how the two disciplines, as reflected in the respective articles, differ in terms of purpose, 
approach and results. I said above that I did not want to present an argument but perhaps I should have 
said that I did not want to present a formal argument because I do have what amounts to a thesis that I 
hope the material of the articles will support, viz. the thesis that those in the discipline of SLA will 
benefit from studying the formal theory  produced by philosophers of language, and that those in the 
philosophy of language will benefit from reviewing the data on real world language use contained in the 
studies that are produced by SLA researchers. The schedule of articles is as follows.     
Determiners: 
‘The Semantics of Determiners’ by Edward Keenan from 
The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory (1996) edited by Shalom Lappin 
and       
‘Linguistic Effects on Thinking for Writing: The Case of Articles in L2 English’ by Monika Ekiert from 
Linguistic Relativity in SLA/Thinking for Speaking (2010) edited by ZhaoHong Han and Teresa Cadierno 
Modals: 
‘Tense and Modality’ by Murvet Enc from  
The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory (1996) edited by Shalom Lappin 




Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics and Second Language Acquisition (2008) edited by Peter Robinson and 
Nick C. Ellis 
The criteria for the selection of the articles are fairly straightforward. First, despite the technical material 
it may contain, each article is freestanding in that it does not make critical reference to any other work, 
and is not a link in a chain of articles which cannot be understood unless the other articles have been 
read. And, second, since the audience for this essay includes those who work in both SLA and the 
philosophy of language as well as students who find the study of natural language interesting but have 
not committed to a discipline, as can be seen, all of the articles come from anthologies. This is of some 
importance because it means that the neophyte with respect to either discipline has not only the article 
itself but also the context provided by the other articles in the anthology and the editor’s introduction. I 
know that I benefited greatly from reading broadly in the two SLA anthologies – the Robinson and Ellis 
volume is actually in cognitive linguistics, not SLA, but the two disciplines are closely allied. The dates of 
the articles were not so important because advancing the discussion of the phenomena addressed is not 
a main goal of this essay.       
§ 6 Two Analyses of Determiners: One in the Philosophy of Language, One in Second Language 
Acquisition Research 
     Keenan’s article on determiners focuses on what are called ‘generalized quantifiers’, the concept of 
which originated in the work of Montague but became an important topic of investigation with the 
publication in 1981 of Barwise and Cooper’s ‘Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language’. A 
generalized quantifier, in the simplest possible terms, consists of a determiner and a noun so that 
 every student 
consisting of the determiner ‘every’ and the noun ‘student,’ is a generalized quantifier, or ‘GQ’. When a 
sentence is formed whose subject phrase is the GQ ‘every student’ and whose predicate phrase is ‘is a 
vegetarian’, i.e. the sentence 
 Every student is a vegetarian. 
where the noun ‘student’ of the GQ ‘every student’ refers to the set of individuals who are students and 
the noun ‘vegetarian’ refers to the set of individuals who are vegetarians, the GQ ‘every student’ is a 
function whose argument is the set of individuals who are vegetarians and whose value is either T = true 
or F = false, depending on the way in which the determiner ‘every’ is defined (alternatively the example 
sentence ‘Every student is a vegetarian.’ can be seen as a function operating on the pair of classes that 
are the extensions of the predicates ‘students’ and ‘vegetarians’, respectively). The definition of ‘every’ 
is given by the general formula: 
 For all properties A, B every (A)(B) = T if and only if A C B 
where ‘C’ means ‘equal to or included in’. Applying the formula to the example sentence here, we get A 




sentence is true just in case the set of students is equal to or included in the set of vegetarians. The 
definitions for the determiners ‘no’ and ‘most’ are as follows: 
 No (A)(B) = T if and only if A ∩ B = Ø 
where ‘∩’ means ‘the intersection of’ such that ‘A ∩B’ means the intersection of the sets A and B, i.e., 
the set of individuals who are both A and B, and ‘Ø’ is the empty set. So if the sentence is  
 No students are billionaires. 
then it is true just in case the intersection of the set of students and the set of billionaires is empty, i.e. 
just in case there are no individuals who are both students and billionaires.  
 Most (A)(B) = T if and only if I A ∩ B I > I A – B I 
where I A ∩ B I is what is called the cardinality of A ∩ B, i.e. the number of the individuals who are in the 
intersection of A and B, i.e., the number of individuals who are both A and B, I A – B I is the cardinality of 
A – B, which is the set of individuals who are A’s but not B’s, and ‘>’ means ‘is greater than’. So if the 
sentence is 
 Most students are hard workers. 
then it is true just in case the number of individuals who are both students and hard workers is greater 
than the number of individuals who are students but not hard workers.  
     Keenan goes on to discuss a vast range of determiners, from simple ones like ‘every’, ‘no’ and ‘most’ 
above, which occur frequently in English, to complex-compound ones like ‘just two of the ten’ and ‘more 
than twice as many … as …’, which occur much less. The main content of the article, however, has to do 
with establishing classes of determiners and making generalizations about the nature and use of 
determiners with reference to those classes. Two of the most important classes established are those of 
monotone increasing determiners and monotone decreasing determiners. The definitions are expressed 
in terms of DNPs, or Determined NPs, i.e. noun phrases that are built up from a certain number of nouns 
and a determiner. But, Keenan makes it clear that it is the determiners of the DNPs, not the nouns, that 
play the dominant role in the definitions. Thus we get: 
 A function F from properties to truth values is increasing if and only if for all properties A, B if 
 F(A) = T and A C B then F(B) = T. And the test for increasing is  
If all A’s are B’s and X is an A then X is a B.’ 
Thus, for example, where F = ‘every citizen’ and A = persons and B = mortals then ‘every citizen’ is 
increasing because if all persons are mortals and ‘every citizen’ (persons) = T, i.e. every citizen is a 
person, then ‘every citizen’ (mortals) = T, i.e. every citizen is a mortal.   




 A function F from properties to truth values is decreasing if and only if for all properties A, B if 
 F(B) = T and A C B then F(A) = T. And the test for decreasing is  
 If all A’s are B’s and X is a B then X is an A.’ 
Thus for example where F = ‘no deity’ and A = persons and B = mortals then ‘no deity’ is decreasing 
because if all persons are mortals and ‘no deity’ (mortals) = T, i.e. no deity is a mortal, then ‘no deity’ 
(persons) = T, i.e. no deity is a person. 
     Now based on all of this, Keenan states that decreasing determiners do and increasing determiners 
do not work with‘negative polarity’ items, which include the adverb ‘ever’ modifying the main verb of a 
sentence and the determiner ‘any’ modifying the noun of the first object position noun phrase of a 
sentence. Thus: 
 No author has ever travelled to Moscow. 
 No author refused any book deal. 
 *Every author ever travelled to Moscow. 
 *Every author refused any book deal. 
So the decreasing ‘no author’ licenses the negative polarity items ‘ever’ and ‘any’ but the increasing 
‘every author’ does not. This generalization is valuable because it helps us to understand what might 
otherwise be a very puzzling part of English. Keenan proposes many rules of this nature which I need not 
go into at this point. 
     We turn now to Ekiert’s article. She opens with a brief but very interesting allusion to the history of 
her field: 
 Much of the current understanding of second language (L2) learning is driven by the assumption 
 that adult L2 acquisition is a cognitive process of establishing form-meaning connections … . This 
 comes after years of the field’s preoccupation with providing evidence for the emergence of 
 specific linguistic forms (e.g. grammatical morphemes or syntactic constructions) independent 
 of the meanings they express (125).      
This does not belong to the subject of determiners per se but one cannot help but wonder about the 
relationship between this occurrence in SLA research and the question vis-à-vis generative grammar of 
whether syntax can be developed independently of semantics.  
     On the view set by the basic division between vocabulary and grammar, we think of vocabulary as the 
exclusive carrier of meaning, but Ekiert points out that, on the view of cognitive linguistics, grammatical 
constructions themselves have meaning. In a given language, certain grammatical distinctions are 
obligatory and they thus become gramaticized. Consider just the cases of nouns and verbs. Examples of 
gramaticized distinctions with respect nouns are ‘number’, ‘gender’, ‘animacy’ and ‘definiteness’. And, 




of discourse participants’, ‘direction of movement type’ and ‘type of moving figure’. Now these 
gramaticized distinctions influence the language user in the production of a sentence that expresses 
their thought by forcing them to ‘segment’ the reality correspondent to the thought in ways that accord 
with the gramatized distinctions as they are reflected in the words and forms used to compose the 
sentence. Note that this is essentially Slobin’s thinking for speaking hypothesis, which is the inspiration 
not only for Ekiert’s article but for all of the articles in the Han and Cadierno anthology from which her 
article comes, as the anthology’s under title indicates. 
     A study of language development in Finnish children provides a general illustration of thinking for 
speaking. Finnish is an article-less language. Up to about the age of about five, children ground 
reference in the ‘extralinguistic’ context but, after that, they have access to ‘intralinguistic’ resources. 
The study found that once the Finnish children in the study had made this transition, they performed 
less well in studying English than children of their age whose first language has articles in tasks that 
required definite reference to particular members of a set of objects. The researchers concluded that, 
while there are lexical items in Finnish that allow identification, the absence of an obligation to refer 
definitely to particulars within collections of items left the children “… insensitive to certain aspects of 
experience (128).” This study confirms Slobin’s view that each language trains its first users to pay 
attention to certain aspects of reality, and the effect of this training is so great that individuals may find 
it exceedingly difficult to develop the intentional focus required by any L2 they take on as adults. He says 
 For the child, the construction of the grammar and the construction of the semantic/pragmatic 
 concepts go hand-in-hand. For the adult, construction of the grammar often requires a revision 
 of semantic/pragmatic concepts, along with what may well be a more difficult task of perceptual 
 identification of the relevant morphological elements. (242) 
I am one of the faculty tutors in the Writing Center at Pace University, and I am always puzzled by the 
way in which articles are used in the essays of the ESL students I work with there. At the places in the 
essay where article use is required, typically, there are to be found a number of cases of the correct use 
of an article, a number of cases of the absence of an article and a few cases of the incorrect use of an 
article. There are also a few cases of the use of an article where none is required, and thus of course 
none is allowed (the most common case being the use of the definite article ‘the’ before a name, e.g. 
‘the Manhattan’). The student has been taught the use of articles in the schools they studied in in their 
native country. What then explains the variation? There are several possible factors involved. First, the 
student is under pressure to express their ideas, and to do so within the format the teacher has 
specified for the essay. Second, the student’s native language may not have articles and, since the 
student is operating by means of their interlanguage, i.e. the system of language between their native 
language and English that they have developed as a result of their study of English and their experience 
using it, their employment of their knowledge of English article use is inconsistent. Third, there is the 
immense complexity and subtlety of the rule set governing the use of articles. A student is not expected 
to get either all right answers or all wrong answers on their math test so why should they be expected to 
make either all correct uses or all incorrect uses of articles? The math test was challenging so the 
student failed to understand some problems and the use of articles in English is challenging so the 




is that the ESL student is operating to some extent, perhaps to a large extent, on the basis of explicit 
knowledge and yet it is only implicit knowledge that provides the basis for the automatic use of features 
that insures perfect performance. Finally, the student may not be conscientious enough, or hard 
working enough, or they may simply be pressed for time.  
     I might note, however, that I think that I have a remedy for the problem of article use that takes the 
form of what I call a SMEP, i.e. a specific, mechanical editing procedure. This SMEP is complex but the 
main part of it requires the student to go through their essay word by word and underline all of the 
count nouns in red and then go back through the essay and make sure that each of these nouns has 
either a plural ending or a determiner or both. The typical ESL student’s explicit knowledge of English 
grammar makes this perfectly feasible. A plural ending is used where more than one is intended. A 
determiner is used where consideration of the lists of the seven classes of (basic - f-note on ‘some of 
the’) determiners indicates which if any of the determiners listed is needed. The most commonly 
needed determiners are the articles, and the most challenging determiner is the definite article ‘the’. 
But, it must be admitted that, since students, both native speaker and ESL, use writing centers 
episodically for the most part, I seldom have the opportunity to train any of the ESL students in the use 
of the SMEP. However, writing center ‘contracts’, agreements between the English teacher and the 
student that the student will go to the writing center a certain number of times during the course of the 
semester, could solve this problem, although a true solution can be achieved only where the student is 
conscientious enough to use the SMEP regularly. 
      It was mentioned above that Finnish has resources for expressing definiteness, even though it does 
not have articles. A very important general concern has to do with determining which feature or set of 
features, or whatever else, in an article-less language corresponds to the articles of a language like 
English that has them. Ekiert reports that 
The accepted view on [- ART] languages [i.e. languages without articles] … is that they possess 
certain grammatical and discoursal elements that may have the function of expressing 
definiteness. Polish, unlike English, has no articles and thus has no equivalent way of expressing 
definiteness. Instead, deictic categories such as demonstratives, possessives, word order, verbal 
aspects, and case marking have been said to signal definiteness and indefiniteness in certain 
contexts. (131) 
However, there are several studies that challenge this view. 
 … Trenkic (2002), using a corpus analysis of Internet newspaper resources in Serbian (a Slavic 
 language with an NP structure similar to Polish) and English, offered an empirical verification 
 that demonstratives, possessives, or quantifiers are no more frequent in Serbian than in English. 
 Similarly. Smocznska (1885) writes that in Polish, possessive pronouns are used less frequently 
 than in English. Terms such as body parts or kinship terms are usually used without possessive 
 pronouns, unless the possessor happens not to be identical with the agent. It appears then that 
 demonstratives, possessives and quantifiers in [-ART] languages can be translation equivalents 




Trenkic goes on to suggest that we give up on the idea of finding a feature or feature set in Serbian or 
Polish that corresponds to the article structure of English and instead assume that semantic definiteness  
“… is conversationally implicated through relevant context and the speakers’ general knowledge of the 
world (132).”  
     All of this constitutes a very interesting issue. It appears that in order to establish equivalent means of 
definite reference vis-à-vis two languages, one [+ ART], the other [- ART], we must have someone who is 
native level proficient in both languages. This individual must then have two semantic systems, or 
better, two semantic sub-systems that are analogically related in their mind, i.e. each part of the one 
sub-system must correspond to one part or one set of parts of the other sub-system, and vice versa. The 
discussion here, and self-reflection, suggest that the monolingual speaker is not aware of the relevant 
obligatory distinctions of their language, i.e. they are not aware of their semantic sub-system for 
definiteness, so the bilingual individual under consideration must be aware of their two sub-systems as a 
result of having developed proficiency in the two languages during their childhood, or as a result of 
having developed proficiency in one of the two languages as an adult. The latter scenario seems to 
encounter the problem cited by Slobin of the exceedingly difficult development of the intentional focus 
required by the L2 that applies to at least some learners, and the former scenario seems to encounter 
the problem posed by the claim that, when an individual acquires two or more languages 
simultaneously as a child, one of the languages will nonetheless be dominant. And, both scenarios seem 
to be in need of precise psycholinguistic characterization. Note, finally, that the studies and views that 
Ekiert cites in her article are not all in agreement regarding the [+ART] language / [- ART] language 
interface vis-à-vis definiteness of reference.     
     In her study Ekiert seems to have taken a more determinant approach, relying on a combination of 
what was referred to above as the accepted view of [- ART] languages, and Trenkic’s  conversational 
implicature view of such languages. The study was motivated by the fact that only a few empirical 
studies had explored the relationship between the semantic system of an L1 and the use of articles in L2 
English. The L1 selected for the study was Polish, and the specific purpose of the study was to answer 
two questions: 
 1) How did L1 Polish learners apply articles in L2 English? 
 2) What kinds of meanings influenced L1 Polish learner’s application of articles in           
       L2 English?  
     The study participants were three adults who were studying English in a program in New York City. 
The study set three tasks for the participants: (1) a narrative task that required the participants to retell 
in writing in English a story presented in a brief video clip, (2) a missing article task that required the 
participants to attempt to fill in articles that were missing from an Aesop’s fable with no indication of 
where the articles were missing, and (3) a recall task that required the participants to try to explain their 




     Ekiert worked with a certain model of article use. Article use in English is classified into the following 
kinds: 
[ + / - SR] presence (+) or absence (-) of specific reference 
[ + / - HK] presence (+) or absence (-) of assumed hearer’s knowledge    
Of the four combinatorial possibilities this allows for, three are realized in use: 
1. [+ SR, + HK] – speaker specific, hearer knowledge 
 Examples: ‘Where should we put the table?’, ‘The engine began to make a funny noise.’ 
2. [+ SR, - HK] – speaker specific, hearer non-knowledge 
 Examples: ‘A dog bit me.’, ‘There’s a table over there.’ 
3. [- SR, - HK] – speaker non-specific, hearer non-knowledge  
 Examples: ‘Draw a horse.’, ‘I don’t have a car.’  
     This is the first part of the model. Ekiert characterizes the second part as a ‘finer-grained’ 
classification. It is as follows: 
1. Textual uses, also known as anaphoric, refer to situations where the is used with a noun that has been 
previously referred to or is related to a previously mentioned noun (e.g. Jane bought a ring and a 
necklace for her mother’s birthday. Her mother loved the ring but hated the necklace.). 
2. Structural uses are those where the is used with a first-mention noun that has a modifier (e.g. The 
horse I bet on is still in front.)  
3. Situational uses of the involve visible situations when the person makes use of information readily 
available within one’s sensory reach (e.g. Pass me the salt.), immediate situations when the person 
makes use of information readily available, but not available within one’s sensory reach (e.g. Don’t go 
there. The dog will bite you.), or larger situation uses relying on specific knowledge available to the local 
community (e.g. people from the same neighborhood talking about the church, the post office, the pub). 
(130-1) 
     The presentation and discussion of the results of the study are extensive, complex and very 
interesting. Here, for example, are two items out of the many written by one of the study participants. 
The first part shows how the participant’s use of articles in English is affected by the manner in which 
definiteness and indefiniteness are accommodated in his native Polish while the second part shows how 
it is affected by the way in which the concept of specificity is manifested in Polish. Unlike English, Polish 
can, in effect, indicate definiteness and indefiniteness with respect to a term by means of the position 
that the term takes in the sentence. Thus a ‘sentence-final’ position suggests new information whereas 





 Do Sklepu wszedf mezczyzna. 
 to store     entered man 
 A man        entered the store. 
 
 Mezczyzna wszedf       do  sklepu. 
 man              entered    to   store 
 The man entered the store. 
In the first match-up, ‘man’ takes the indefinite article ‘a’ because the term ‘mezczyzna’ (man) appears 
in sentence-final position, which suggests new information, and some linguists associate this with 
indefiniteness. In the second match-up, by contrast, ‘man’ takes the definite article ‘the’ because the 
term ‘mezczyzna’ (man) appears in sentence-initial position, which suggests given information, and  
some linguists associate this with definiteness. 
     The first of the two items, which consist of English rendering by the participant of parts of the story 
runs as follows: 
 Mr. X waiting for someone, probably his girlfriend. He doesn’t feel comfortable because he 
 knows his pants need ironing. He set up ironing set. During this time, his dog still watching what 
 is going on. When iron is ready, he starts ironing his pants. Suddenly, he sees thread. He tries to 
 remove it. Unfortunately, this method doesn’t work.          
The term ‘ironing set’ and the term ‘thread’ both need the indefinite article ‘a’ (or ‘an’) since they are 
being introduced, but they appear in sentence-final, new information providing position and thus, in the 
mind of the participant, they are perhaps already marked as indefinite. And, the term ‘iron’ needs the 
definite article ‘the’ since it has already been introduced, but it appears in sentence-initial, given 
information providing position and thus, in the mind of the participant, it is perhaps already marked as 
definite. 
     So we might say that here L1 Polish grammar influences the L2 English use of articles.   
     The second of the two items, which is much briefer, is: 
 The man, his donkey and a dog were travelling. 
Here, the definite article ‘the’ is applied inappropriately to the term ‘man’ because this is its 
introductory appearance. However, the indefinite article ‘a’ is applied appropriately to the term ‘dog’ 
since this is also its introductory appearance. What then makes for the difference between appropriate 
article use in the one case and inappropriate article use in the other? During the stimulated recall 
session, the participant author was asked to explain his application of the articles and Ekiert reports that 




content (i.e. … [the participant] explained that man in this story was made specific by the fact that the 
character was travelling with his donkey, whereas dog was not specified at all) (150).” Ekiert interprets 
this case as one determined by the L1 conceptual system.  
The definite article ‘the’ requires  [+ SR, + HK] but, while Polish has means of encoding SR, in the form of 
demonstratives and possessive pronouns, it does not have means of encoding HK. Thus, taking the fact 
that the man was traveling with his donkey to provide a basis for SR, the L1 Polish participant found it 
appropriate to use ‘the’. 
     There is, however, one other possible interpretation based on the model Ekiert uses, namely that the 
fact that the man is travelling with his donkey might have been transmuted, in the mind of the 
participant author, into a modifier of the noun ‘man’, specifically either as a prepositional phrase, 
yielding 
 man with a donkey 
or as a relative clause, yielding 
man who is travelling with a donkey 
and, of course, with the application of the definite article ‘the’ we would get 
 the man with a donkey 
or 
 the man who is traveling with a donkey 
As such, the case would go into the second class of Ekiert’s three part classification above to become a 
structural use, although still an inappropriate use since the introductory status of ‘man’ calls for the 
indefinite article ‘a’.  
     On Ekiert’s interpretation , we might say that we have here a prima facie case in which the L1 Polish 
conceptual system influences the  L2 English use of articles. 
     I would like to end the discussion Ekiert’s article by quoting its concluding (summary) paragraph in its 
entirety. It will be seen that the two examples I presented above, which I associated with grammar and 
conceptual system, accord well with the findings of Ekiert’s study. 
 In conclusion, findings from the study described in this chapter revealed some thinking-for-
 writing effects … at the level of referent identifiability conceptualization.  As Han (2008) notes, 
 the acquisition of distributional restrictions of a new form by an adult L2 learner presents a 
 challenge ‘for it requires the restructuring of a primarily L1-based conceptual system’ (2008: 74). 
 The overall premise of this study, namely that article errors should not be exclusively attributed 
 to inadequate acquisition of the forms of the TL [Target Language], was shown to be correct. L2 




 grammatical encodings of characteristics of objects and events, but also by the lack of an 
 equivalent conceptual system (i.e. meanings). As pointed out by Jarvis and Pavlenko (2008), 
 learning a new language involves learning how to make new attributions to familiar objects and 
 events. (150)   
     We have taken a long journey with Keenan and Ekiert, and now it is time to try to justify that journey 
by using what we have learned to make the case for a merger of interests and lines of work vis-à-vis the 
community of formal semanticists and the community of SLA researchers. First, however, I should note 
that there is just a bit of convergence in the two articles themselves. Ekiert refers to the field of 
theoretical linguistics and one of her sources is an article by Fodor ad Sag that appears in the journal 
Linguistics and Philosophy. And Keenan considers the implication of generalized quantifier theory for 
learning theory when he poses the question of whether “… there are constraints on which functions 
from properties to generalized quantifiers can be denoted by natural language … [determiners]…” and 
then responds to the question by saying that a positive answer to it “…limits the task faced by the 
language learner and thus helps account for how the semantic system is learned with limited exposure 
to imperfect data”. (45) 
     But now, we must come to the point. There would be a great deal to be gained as far as our 
understanding of natural language is concerned if the respective interests and lines of work of the 
community of SLA researchers and the community of formal semanticists merged such that a process of 
cross fertilization occurred between the two. For the SLA researcher, the benefit would be a deeper 
understanding of the linguistic phenomena they study and, for the formal semanticist, the benefit would 
be a richer, fuller apprehension of the linguistic phenomena they theorize about, an apprehension of 
those phenomena as they are grounded in the communicative practices engaged in by the members of 
society in the conduct their affairs. 
     Let us consider two points that may help to support the claim that the philosophy of language can be 
a resource for SLA theorists while SLA research can be a resource for philosophers of language. First, 
note that, in Ekiert’s article, neither the word ‘truth’ nor the word ‘true’ appears even once whereas 
Keenan’s article is ultimately all about the specification of truth conditions for sentences that employ 
determiners. This reflects a general difference of approach between the two disciplines and suggests 
that SLA research on the use of a feature of natural language by second language learners might be 
informed by consideration of the semantic theory of that feature. And, second, the sentences that 
appear in Ekiert’s article might be called ‘corpus sentences’ in that they come from the narratives of the 
three participant authors and, thus, they are sentences that were actually used for purposes of 
communication whereas the sentences in Keenan’s article might be called ‘model sentences’ in that 
they were concocted by him, or others, to model the various aspects of the theory of determiners he 
presents. This too reflects a general difference of approach between the two disciplines and suggests 
that the formation of semantic theories of a feature of natural language might be informed by what is 
revealed by SLA studies of the use of that feature by second language learners under the conditions set 




     A further consideration here is set up by a Ekiert’s reference to ‘cognitive semantics’ and ‘cognitively 
oriented SLA researchers. With respect to the latter, she cites in particular Peter Robinson and Nick C. 
Ellis, whose anthology Handbook of Cognitive Linguistics and Second Language Acquisition is the source 
of the article we will use in the next SLA research-formal semantics pairing, viz. Andrea Tyler’s ‘Cognitive 
Linguistics and Second Language Instruction’. It is convenient to present here two passages from this 
article that might be taken to show how the set of language-related parts and aspects of the world that 
formal semantics must be responsible for covering must be expanded by much more than what was 
indicated in the previous paragraph. In contrasting the view that has served as the basis for most English 
Language Teaching (ELT) over the years with the view of cognitive linguistics, Tyler says: 
 A cognitive linguistic account of language differs radically from traditional perspectives by 
 emphasizing that language is a reflection of general cognitive processes, not a separate, isolated 
 system with its own system of rules. Language is understood as being grounded in lived human 
 experience with the real world and as crucially reflecting the human perceptual system and 
 human understanding of the spatial-physical-social world we inhabit. (459) 
And in arguing that the cognitive linguistics approach is one that is useful for L2 learners, she says: 
 By viewing language as a function of general interaction with other cognitive abilities and our 
 interaction with the world, Cognitive Linguistics offers explanations that draw on learners’ 
 everyday real world experience by tapping into an intuitive reservoir of knowledge that 
 facilitates an understanding of the systematic relationships among the units of language. This is 
 the same reservoir of experiential knowledge of the world which underpins the human 
 conceptual system and hence, language itself. (462) 
Being very much what Tyler would no doubt call a traditionalist, I do not cite these passages as an 
endorsement of the cognitive linguistic approach to the semantics of natural language. My point 
precisely is that, when we look at any part of SLA research under any approach, we see possibilities for 
fruitful use of formal semantic tools. In the first passage above, we have reference to our general 
cognitive processes, with perception highlighted via the citation of the human perceptual system, 
reference to the physical world and reference to the social world. It may well be the case that the 
complete, or even a reasonably complete, analysis of the production and/or reception of any sentence 
that is actually used for purposes of communication must include variables, or even systems of 
variables, that track aspects of our cognition and the physical and social worlds in which we live. Of 
course, we have this to some extent in formal pragmatics, and the article covering this branch of 
semiotic theory in the anthology in which Keenan’s article appears, viz. ‘Semantics, Pragmatics and 
Natural-Language Interpretation’ by Ruth Kempson, claims that pragmatics and semantics are discrete 
enterprises and that the former is founded in the study of cognitive psychology. However, what Tyler 
has in mind seems to go well beyond consideration of the way in which the context of utterance of a 
sentence factors into its interpretation, as difficult as that consideration is. Now, if the first of the two 
quotes above brings in our cognition in relation to the socio-physical world, the second one brings in our 
knowledge of the socio-physical world, and not just narrowly, as in the case presented by Kempson in 




 Peter:  Is George a good cook? 
 Mary: He’s a Frenchman. 
seems to require the generalization ’Frenchmen tend to be good cooks.’ for its proper interpretation. 
Rather, it seems that in principle, the whole’ of our language is involved in use of language, though only 
parts of this knowledge are involved in particular cases. So, again, the association of formal semantics 
with SLA would provide it with a much broader field of application and thus more opportunity. 
     Now before going on to consider the specifics of the relationship between the Ekiert and the Keenan 
articles, let me make one further broad point, one that is based on my experience in working with ESL 
students. When a native speaker makes a grammar mistake, that mistake typically respects the general 
structure of English. So, English has nouns that take plural and possessive endings, and the native author 
omits an ending, uses the wrong ending or uses an ending where none is called for. But, these mistakes 
all respect the  
 noun + ending 
structure, and might thus be called ‘conservative’. Now, while the ESL author makes plenty of mistakes 
of this type too, they also make mistakes that are ‘radical’ in that they go against the structure of the 
English language. This is of course not so good for the ESL student, and perhaps not so good for the ESL 
teacher, but it is great for the ESL teacher or tutor cum linguist because, unlike a conservative mistake, a 
radical mistake, once thought through and understood, has the power to reveal  the structure of English 
that lies below the consciousness of the native user, precisely because it is the form-invariant part of 
English, the girder assembly to which the exterior, of whatever style, executed in whatever material, is 
applied in order to complete the edifice of the language. And, the revealing of this structure provides a 
great learning opportunity for the linguist-instructor. Clearly then, SLA studies, like Ekiert’s above, are a 
steady source of organized corpora of second language mistakes, and thus provide a great opportunity 
for the formal semanticist by expanding the range of linguistic phenomena that they can choose from 
among to try to include within their theories. 
     We come now to the main part of this discussion. We want to look here at the specifics in Ekiert and 
Keenan to see what kind of positive interchange can take place. We can break out the relevant parts of 
what Ekiert presents as follows: 
1)  
the idea that languages differ in terms of the conceptual structures in which they are based so that the 
L1 conceptual structure of the L2 learner can hinder that learner in their effort to master the L2, which 
means ultimately learning to negotiate the L2 conceptual structure, no doubt by mapping it effectively 
onto their L1 conceptual structure 
2)  




 [ + / - SR ] and [ + / - HK ] 
the realized combinations being 
 [ + SR, + HK ] – ‘Where should we put the table?’, ‘The engine began to make a funny noise.’ 
 [ + SR, - HK ] – ‘A dog bit me.’, ‘There’s a table over there.’ 
 [ - SR, - HK ] – ‘Draw a horse.’, ‘I don’t have a car.’ 
3)  
a finer grained analysis of the use of the definite article ‘the’ fields three cases: 
 - textual use: ‘Jane bought a ring and a necklace for her mother’s birthday. Her mother loved     
   the ring but hated the necklace.’ 
 - structural use: ‘The horse I bet on is still in front.’ 
 - situational use: ‘Pass me the salt.’   
These are results from SLA research and informal theorizing, and I think that the effort to provide a 
formal theory of these items, as made by a formal semanticist, an SLA researcher, a formal semanticist 
and an SLA researcher working together, or even by a third party specifically interested in the 
relationship between the two kinds of linguistic enterprise, is a very exciting project. Successful 
completion of the project would yield, for the SLA researcher, a much deeper understanding of the 
phenomena they have discovered and organized, and for the formal semanticist, the application of their 
theory to new phenomena which may be more authentic and/or more complex.   
         Regarding 1) above, we might begin by expressing a note of caution with respect to the idea that 
different languages are associated with different conceptual structures. This suggests the possibility of a 
strong linguistic relativism, which is sometimes referred to as ‘Whorfism’, according to which the world 
in which one lives, or the reality that one faces is to some meaningful extent determined by the 
language one uses primarily, effectively one’s native language, and yet, while views on the relationship 
between language and the world vary among theorists in the philosophy of language, there is a strong 
tradition in the discipline of taking there to be one world in which we all live, one reality that we all face, 
a world which is given antecedently of our formation of language, and indeed of our coming into 
existence. Through our interaction with this world or this reality, we have formed concepts. Perhaps in 
order to try to be clear, we can speak simply and say that these concepts are represented by, or 
reflected in, the general terms of our language, certain nouns and adjectives preeminently and since 
there are relations among these concepts, we might say that there is a conceptual structure, but there is 
just one which is common to all intelligent agents. Given this, we might want to think of what is unique 
to a particular language not as a conceptual structure but as a representational apparatus in relation to 
the common conceptual structure. Each such apparatus would be taken to consist in a complex 




represent the various parts and aspects of the common conceptual structure. The L2 user observes or 
investigates the facts, and accesses the relevant concepts by means of the representational apparatus, 
using logic all along, in order to either (a) recognize an existing state of affairs and then formulate a 
sentence which in effect codes that state of affairs, with the intention that the sentence will inform a 
conversational partner or reader or (b) determine the state of affairs coded by a sentence formulated by 
a conversational partner or author, whose intention was that the sentence would inform them.      
     Had we continued with the idea that the L1 conceptual structure of the L2 learner can hinder that 
learner in their effort to master the L2, thereby forcing them to develop the ability to negotiate the L2 
conceptual structure, no doubt by mapping it effectively onto their L1 conceptual structure then we 
might have felt the need to move from (a) an intuitive model of L2 learning on which there is one 
semantic sub-system but there are two syntactic sub-systems and these syntactic sub-systems stand in 
an analogical relationship established on the basis of the common semantic sub-system to (b) a model 
on which there are two semantic sub-systems as well as  two syntactic sub-systems, the two semantic 
sub-systems stand in an analogical relationship established somehow, perhaps as a result of the dual 
linguistic experience of the L2 learner, and the two syntactic sub-systems also stand in an analogical 
relationship, which is determined directly or indirectly by the analogical relationship in which the two 
semantic sub-systems stand. But by taking the position that there is only one conceptual structure, we 
can stick with the intuitive model, taking the semantics it provides to be sufficiently rich to 
accommodate both of the apparatuses involved, that of the L1 and that of the L2, respectively. It should 
be noted here, however, that is seems perfectly plausible to expect that, while there is a single 
conceptual structure accessed by and represented in all particular languages, this structure is not so 
rigid that its configuration is the same from the perspective of every natural language. But, given the 
great variety among the cultures and languages of the societies of the world, past 0and present, it is 
perhaps only natural that at least a weak form of linguistic relativity would hold.             
     It might be possible to get started on the problem related to the three uses of the definite article ‘the’ 
by thinking in terms of the speaker’s ‘delivering’ an entity to the hearer in three distinct ways. First, on 
the structural use, the speaker delivers the entity by description by using a noun and possibly one or 
more of the noun modifiers, adjective, prepositional phrase and relative clause, to construct a noun 
phrase that refers only to the entity, which the hearer is familiar with. Thus, in the example above:  
 The horse I bet on is still in front. 
the noun ‘horse’ and the relative clause ‘that I bet on’, which has undergone ellipsis to become simply ‘I 
bet on’, refers for the hearer to only one entity, one horse, which they are familiar with, perhaps by 
having viewed all of the horses in the race in the paddock before the race. It should be noted however 
that the use of the sentence above described here is not the only one. Instead of constructing the noun 
phrase ‘the horse [that] I bet on’ for the purpose of identifying an entity for their hearer, a speaker can 
construct the same noun phrase for the purpose of characterizing an entity for their hearer. We can 
cash out the difference by considering the states of affairs denoted by the propositions the speaker 
wants the hearer to entertain in the two cases, respectively. In the identification case, the state of 




state of affairs incorporates a horse that the hearer is not acquainted with – at least not as far as the 
speaker knows. Second, on the situational use, the speaker delivers an entity to the hearer by 
demonstration by gesturing in a pointing way. Thus in the example above: 
 Pass the salt. 
the speaker looks at the salt shaker on the table and nods at it, although this could also qualify as a case 
of structural use if we take the noun ‘salt’, meaning ‘salt shaker’, to refer to only one entity for the 
hearer. And, third, on the textual use, the speaker delivers an entity to the hearer by hypothesis in the 
sense that the speaker does not actually deliver an entity to the hearer but rather ask the hearer to, in 
effect, accept the existence of an entity under the description provided, on faith, and the hearer does so 
based on the presumed sincerity of the speaker. Thus, in the example above 
 Jane bought a ring and a necklace for her mother’s birthday. Her mother loved the ring but 
 hated the necklace. 
the speaker neither describes the ring or the necklace nor of course demonstrates either by pointing to 
it. Rather, they ask the reader to accept without the usual introduction that a certain ring and a certain 
necklace exist, and the hearer does so because of their interpretation of the intention of the speaker.    
          Turning our attention to the indefinite article, we will consider the two examples above: 
 A dog bit me. 
 Draw a horse. 
One possible, perhaps odd seeming, way of handling the first example is to use the part of the 
definite/indefinite article distribution model Ekiert provides for such indefinite cases, viz. 
 [ + SR, - HK ] 
as the basis for a structural definite interpretation that applies to the speaker only. Recall that a 
structural use consists in a noun that is modified and capped with ‘the’ – ‘the horse [that] I bet on’ 
above. So, the speaker is able to generate, say 
 the brown terrier that belongs to my next door neighbor 
as the basis for 
 The brown terrier that belongs to my next door neighbor bit me. 
for himself, the speaker, but not for the hearer, because the hearer does not know the dog involved. 
Thus, we might imagine the speaker saying to himself 
 The brown terrier that belongs to my next door neighbor bit me. What do I do now? 




 [ + SR, - HK ] 
It appears then that, in straight terms, we might say that the use of the indefinite article in 
 A dog bit me. 
is appropriate just in case there is a (possible)noun phrase without a determiner that identifies an entity 
for the speaker but does identify it for the hearer, 
 brown terrier that belongs to my next door neighbor 
in the present case. It might be necessary to go further and say that there is no such expression that 
identifies the entity for the hearer, or a bit more modestly, that there is no such expression that can be 
generated with the resources of the speaker that identifies the entity for the hearer. It must be noted 
here, however, that in assigning, or selecting [ - HK] we are not suggesting that the hearer does not 
understand the speaker’s sentence. The hearer will understand the sentence 
The brown terrier that belongs to my next door neighbor bit me. 
perfectly well. It is simply the case that, as we just saw, 
brown terrier that belongs to my next door neighbor 
does not identify for the hearer the dog that bit the speaker.  
     It is interesting now to compare 
The brown terrier that belongs to my next door neighbor bit me. 
as interpreted here, with 
The horse [that] I bet on is still in front. 
as interpreted above. With regard to the latter, we distinguished the identification case, on which 
 the horse [that] I bet on 
identifies a horse for both the speaker and the hearer , from the characterization case, on which 
this noun phrase does not identify a horse for the hearer, but does, presumably,  do so for the speaker. 
If we bring back in now 
A dog bit me. 
we get a simple scheme of classification: 
1. The identification use of ‘the’, exemplified by    




where the noun phrase ‘the horse [that] I bet on’ identifies a horse for both the speaker and the hearer 
2. The characterization use of ‘the’, exemplified by both 
The horse [that] I bet on is still in front. 
The brown terrier that belongs to my next door neighbor bit me. 
where the noun phrases ‘the horse [that] I bet on’ and ‘the brown terrier that belongs to my next door 
neighbor’ identify an entity for the speaker but not the hearer in the two respective cases, and 
3. The use of ‘a’ or ‘an’, exemplified by 
A dog bit me. 
where the noun phrase ‘a dog’ does not identify an entity for either the speaker or the hearer. What 
then motivates the choice of noun phrase in the third case? Consider the following progression of 
sentences: 
A dog bit me. 
An animal bit me. 
Something bit me. 
Something injured me. 
Here the speaker gives the hearer less and less – via the noun phrases ‘a dog’, and ‘an animal’, the 
pronoun ‘something’ and finally the verb ‘injured’. Now consider the following progression of sentences: 
A dog bit me. 
A rabid dog bit me. 
A rabid dog that is still on the loose bit me. 
Here the speaker gives the hearer more and more – via the noun phrases ‘a dog’, ‘a rabid dog’ and ‘a 
rabid dog that is still on the loose’. 
The point I want to make is that the speaker gives the hearer as much, or as little, as necessary for her or 
his, i.e. the speaker’s, communicative purpose to be achieved. Needless to say, coming up with some 
formalism that would spit out this purpose in an arbitrary case of the use of the indefinite article would 
be no mean feat.  We cannot of course settle the case of the English articles here but the line of thinking 
presented was stimulated by Ekiert’s discussion, and I think that it deserves further consideration. 
         The second example is more complicated. It needs to be investigated so that an acceptable account 
of it can be developed. Here, however, I will have to settle for a brief exploration. The sentence is of the 




commands they have the modal force of ‘must’ and as recommendations they have the modal force of 
‘should’. And the individual to whom the command or recommendation is addressed can be known only 
where there is access to the sentence’s context of use. Let us imagine then that the imperative is a 
recommendation and that this recommendation is addressed to John. We then get the sentence 
John should draw a horse. 
The first thing to see about this sentence is that, despite the occurrence in it of the term ‘a horse’, it is 
not about horses. Rather it is about figures of horses. Formalizing this deduction would be an interesting 
project on its own but probably the resources for it can be found in lexical semantics. It is likely that the 
deduction depends on the interpretation of the transitive verb ‘to draw’. But all of this is just setting up. 
All that I can offer of a more substantial nature is an attempt to get at the intuition involved by appeal to 
a distinction I make in my ESL tutoring related to the understanding of the use of the definite article 
‘the’. The distinction is that between an ‘open class’ and a ‘closed class’. Thus in relation to the sentence 
Students lead a hard life. 
the class of students is open in the sense that individuals pass in and out of it freely because what is of 
relevance is the idea, or the concept, associated with the class, not its membership. But in relation to 
the sentence 
The students are waiting for you. 
addressed to a teacher who is late for class, the class of students is closed because you could make a list 
of the members of the of the class. Now the class of figures of horses related to the featured sentence is 
open in the sense that individuals pass in and out of it freely because what is of relevance is the concept 
associated with the class. And, for the recommendation conveyed by the feature sentence to be 
complied with, John must produce something that falls under that concept.  It must be noted that the 
notion of individuals passing in and out of the class of figures of horses is not as natural as that of 
individuals passing in and out of the class of students, and what I am doing here overall is just pressing 
into new service what is regularly used as a teaching aid.     
        Before we move on from Ekiert and Keenan, I would like to make one further point. What has been 
said so far can be seen as a call to develop resources in Keenan’s system, or formal semantics generally, 
for the purpose of formalizing models employed in Ekiert’s study. But, there is one part of Ekiert’s study, 
a detailed but important part, in relation to which there already exist a resource in Keenan’s system. The 
study tracks the environments in which the definite and the indefinite articles were used by the study 
participants in the production of their narratives: 
 Following Han (2008), assessment of article accuracy was not confined to morpheme accuracy; 
 ‘rather, it [was] carried out within a larger linguistic and discourse context, including 
 constructions that might not specifically involve the morphemes’ (2008:72). For example, the 
 narrative task elicited a large number of situational uses of the in prepositional phrases. In order 




 of articles by L2 learners, situational uses of the in prepositional phrases (P + the + N) were 
 isolated into a subcategory of situational uses. (135-6) 
Therefore, a formal determination of which determiners can front noun phrases that appear as objects 
of prepositions in prepositional phrases would have to be of great interest to Ekiert and to SLA 
researchers generally and, yet, Keenan provides such a determination with respect to what are called 
partitive, or partitive genitive, constructions, i.e. prepositional phrases whose preposition component is 
specifically the preposition ‘of’. Thus 
 We are concerned to define the set of NPs which occur grammatically following the of phrase in 
 partitives such as more than ten of John’s cats, each of those students, and all but two of his ten 
 children. Linguists usually consider that such NPs have the form [Det1 of NP]… 
Now it turns out that the acceptability of an NP in position after of in partitives is significantly 
determined by its choice of Det … . Observe: 
 (51)   a. [at least two of Det cats] is acceptable when Det = the, the six, the six or more, John’s       
           (six (or more)), those (six (or more)), John’s doctor’s (six (or more)) 
                       b. [at least two of Det cats] is not acceptable when Det = each, no, most, at       
           least/exactly/less than nine, no children’s (six) 
Keenan calls the determiners in the a. class definite. Now, the formal basis for this characterization is 
rather complex but, perhaps we can say here that a determiner is definite if, when it appears in the 
context 
 (Det) (A) (B) 
the sentence is true if and only if A C B and A ≠ Ø. Thus, for example, the determiner ‘the’ is definite 
because the sentence 
 The authors are billionaires. 
is true if and only if all authors [in the relevant reference set for ‘the’, or ‘the authors’, i.e. the relevant 
situation-determined sub-set of authors] are billionaires and there are (some) authors but the 
determiner ‘no’ is not definite because the sentence 
 No authors are billionaires. 
is quite obviously not true if and only if all authors are billionaires and there are (some) authors. And, 
consequently, we can have 
 at least two of the authors 
but not 




I said above that this result should be of value to SLA researchers and teachers, but the value has to be 
scored as limited because, while the use of the context ‘at least two of Det. ____ cats’, or ‘at least two of 
Det. ___[noun – plural]’ generally, in the formulation above allows Keenan to determine which Det.s are 
definite and which Det.s are not, when we map the expressions that the formulation sanctions onto the 
form Keenan attributes to linguists, again   
 [Det.1 of NP] 
we get, effectively 
 ‘at least two’ +’ of’ + [NP = Det. + Noun] 
and yet clearly linguists and philosophers of language alike are going to be more interested in the more 
general form 
Det. +’ of’ + [NP = Det. + Noun] 
where Det. ranges over all determiners, including the determiners that Keenan classifies as lexical, and 
thus simple, viz.  
 every  no  both  ten 
 each  several  this  a few 
 all  neither  my  a dozen 
 some  most  these  many 
 a   the  John’s  few 
such that we can generate:  
 all of the cats 
 several of my students 
 both of John’s parents 
 many of these questions 
for example. But, notice how restrictive even this is because the preposition ‘of’ is being used effectively 
to put simple determiners together in order to make complex ones, viz. 
 all of the 
 several of my 




 many of these 
while the more significant use of the [proposition/preposition] has it serve as the basis of a prepositional 
phrase that modifies a noun. Consider now 
 all bands [of gold] 
 several tons [of reinforced concrete] 
 both types [of nominalized phrase with direct object] 
 many issues [of great concern to the community that still have to be addressed] 
We would also like to know which principles determine the distribution of determiners in structures of 
these two classes, as well as in the class of structures Keenan presents, and perhaps his concept of the 
definite will play a role in this. But, of course, all of this is just in relation to the preposition ‘of’. The 
general interest is in the full play of determiners across the whole of the language. 
§ 7 Two Analyses of Modals: One in Second Language Acquisition Research, One in the Philosophy of 
Language 
          We have just explored the relationship between a work in formal semantics and a work in SLA 
research, both addressing the articles of English. Let us now do the same thing with respect to the 
modals of English. As was indicated earlier, the articles on modals I selected are: 
‘Tense and Modality’ by Murvet Enc from The Handbook of Contemporary Semantic Theory 
‘Cognitive Linguistics and Second Language Instruction’ by Andrea Tyler from Handbook of Cognitive 
Linguistics and Second Language Acquisition 
     Let us take Tyler first. She begins by sketching a broad contrast between what she calls the traditional 
view of language  and the cognitive linguistic view she is a proponent of. On the traditional view, a 
natural language is an independent system, largely unrelated to our other cognitive capacities, and to 
the conceptual structure that undergirds these capacities. It is a system of rules but, ultimately, the rules 
are arbitrary such that when you look deeply into the system, you encounter a mystery. The system 
achieves economy by having a relatively small set of basic sentence forms but achieves variety and 
complexity because sentences that fit the basic forms are subject to various transformations. Thus, for 
example, the active form of the system is a basic form while the passive form is generated by applying a 
transformation to the active form. Lexical items are ‘plug ins’ with respect to the basic expression slots 
created by the grammar rules. Where lexical items carry more than one meaning, it is declared that 
there are homophones and no effort is made to show how the meanings involved are related. This of 
course contributes to the impression of arbitrariness. But, the structure of the language extends only so 
far and thus the system becomes laden with exceptions. In the end, the language learner’s task is 
reduced largely to memorization: memorize the lexical items, memorize the rules, and then memorize 




acknowledges the historical development that has taken place within the traditional view by pointing to 
its recent concern with reflecting the pragmatic aspect of language. Thus, there are now ‘formulas’ for 
making requests, and making apologies, and the like. For example, one formula for making a request has 
the individual in need say ‘Could I ask you a favor?’ rather than the more accurate ‘Can I ask you a 
favor?’. But, Tyler is critical here too in that she sees the consideration of the pragmatic as an ‘add-on’ 
to the original system, not something that has been elegantly integrated into it. 
     By contrast, on the cognitive linguistics view, our language facility is a reflection of our general 
cognitive facility. Language is grounded in the experience we have living in the worlds that we do, first 
the physical world but also the social world. Now, this is very general and programmatic, but it is clear 
how the cognitive linguists wish to set themselves off from the ‘traditional’ linguists and philosophers of 
language who, from the late fifties onwards, have studied natural language formally. The cognitive 
linguists take a holistic view. The physical world, the social world and the suite of cognitive capacities of 
the individual, along with the conceptual structure all of these capacities are based in, form a well- 
integrated whole. And, while it may be true that, in the short run, it can be effective to study a sub-
system of the general system of the mind-world on its own, in isolation, clearly in the long run we can 
have a true understanding of that sub-system only in its relation to the system as a whole. It must be 
admitted however that this line of thinking is speculative in nature. [+ f-note: is this really new given 
Chomsky’s revolution?] 
     It seems perfectly legitimate to ask here to what extent this perspective of cognitive linguistics is 
distinctive, or new. After all, at least as early as Chomsky (1965) we have the idea of the integration of 
our language capacity with other systems of mind. Referencing the biological constraints on language 
acquisition, Chomsky says: 
… we do not … imply that the functions of language acquisition are carried out by entirely separate 
components of the abstract mind or the physical brain, just as when one studies analyzing 
mechanisms in perception …, it is not implied that these are distinct and separate components of 
the full perceptual system. In fact, it is an important problem for psychology to determine to what 
extent other aspects of cognition share properties of language acquisition and language use, and to 
attempt, in this way, to develop a richer and more comprehensive theory of mind. (207) 
And at least as recently as recently as Hulstijn (2002) we have consideration of the need to “… address 
other dimensions of cognition, such as emotion, personality and motivation … (215)” in the theory of L2 
learning. [f-note on Hulstijn’s reference to the social] 
     However, by including both the physical world and the social world along with our suite of cognitive 
faculties, the cognitive psychologists expand considerably the environment within which the theory of 
language acquisition and use must be developed. Also important is their claim that the rules and basic 
expressions of language are not arbitrary. One helpful tool of the ESL teacher is the ESL dictionary 
Longman Handy Learner’s Dictionary of American English. It uses brackets with plus signs in its 
definitions of nouns and verbs to help the ESL student pick the right preposition. Thus for example the 




used with in most instances. But the student must either memorize the association or go into the 
dictionary every time they want to use the verb. The situation would be much better if the association 
were explained in terms of meaning.        
     Things get much more specific, however, when Tyler turns her attention to the modals. She again 
makes a fundamental distinction between the traditional view and the cognitive linguistics view, but 
now with specific reference to theories of modals. She chooses a grammar book designed for high 
intermediate to low advanced level students, Mosaics 2: A Content Based Grammar (1996) by Werner and 
Nelson, as representative of the traditional approach to modals. It classifies the modals according to the 
various speech acts they are used to perform as follows: 
 - ‘may’, ‘might’, ‘can’, ‘could’ – used to express ability and possibility 
 - ‘may’, ‘can’ – used to grant permission 
 - ‘may’, ‘could’, ‘can’ – used to ask for permission 
 - ‘would’, ‘could’, ‘will’, ‘can’ – used to ask for assistance 
Other speech acts with which subsets of the total set of modals are associated are: 
 - giving advice 
 - making a suggestion  
 - prohibiting action 
 - expressing a preference 
 - expressing a lack of necessity 
Several modals are associated with several speech acts, and Tyler criticizes Werner and Nelson for failing 
to provide an explanation of the resulting pattern of distribution. And, she goes on to make the 
following general statement: 
A consequence of this approach, in which a range of shifting interpretations represented by 
modals are presented in relation to isolated speech acts, is that there is no attempt to relate the 
various contextualized interpretations. … Hence, any systematic patterns of usage remain 
unexplored. This results in a fragmented picture of the lexical class in question, leaving the 
learner with the impression that the various uses are arbitrary. (464)  
Thus, we see how the same criticism of the general traditional approach to language we saw Tyler make 
above is registered here in relation to the particular case of the traditional approach to the modals.     
     Having rejected the traditional approach to modals, the speech acts approach, Tyler goes on to 




foundational. Going beyond the most general terms that characterize the cognitive linguistics 
perspective on language, again the grounding of language in the external dimensions of the physical and 
the social, and in the internal dimension of the cognitive, these theorists developed an analysis of 
modals based on force dynamics. “Specifically, they argue that the root meanings of modals have to do 
with physical forces, barriers and paths.” (467) Tyler chooses to follow Sweetser’s analysis on the way to 
formulating her own, and she chooses further to concentrate on Sweetser’s treatment of just four of the 
twelve or so modals – ‘must’, ‘need to’, ‘may’ and ‘can’. Tyler is very succinct, or perhaps better, 
formulaic. The modal ‘must’ reflects an external force which compels the individual to act: 
 You must get your paper in by the deadline or you will not be allowed to graduate with your 
 class. 
The modal ‘need to’ reflects an internal force which compels the individual to act: 
 I need to get a haircut. 
And, the modal ‘can’ reflects the ability of an individual to move along a path, while the modal ‘may’ 
reflects an authority that takes away, or keeps away, a barrier to the movement of an individual along a 
path.   
 As Sweetser explains, can is the equivalent of a full gas tank in a car and may is the equivalent of 
 an open garage door. ‘These two factors will exert certain similar influences on the situation: 
 neither factor forces the car (or driver) to travel a given path, and yet if either factor were 
 reversed, then travel would be correspondingly restricted. (469) 
This explanatory classification of the modals ‘must’, ‘need to’, ‘can’ and ‘may’ perhaps reflects the 
preponderant uses of these terms but it is difficult to maintain the mutual exclusivity of the classes 
involved. Consider, for example, the sentence 
I must paint because this is the only way I can have any meaning in my life. 
It uses the modal ‘must’ but the force involved seems to be internal. 
      Be this as it may, there is a fundamental modal distinction that is recognized by all or most analysts 
even though it has not come up here, viz. the distinction between the root and the epistemic senses of 
the modals and, yet, Sweetser’s approach allows for an elegant relationship between the two while 
other approaches, like the traditional one, simply do not. Thus, for example, if we contrast 
 John may go. 
with  




we have the root sense in the earlier sentence such that ‘may’ signifies permission but we have the 
epistemic sense in the later sentence such that ‘may’ signifies belief. How does Sweetser’s approach 
establish a relationship between the two senses? 
 May is an absent potential barrier in the socio-physical world, and the epistemic may is a force-
 dynamically parallel case in the world of reasoning. The meaning of epistemic may would thus 
 be that there is no barrier to the speaker’s process of reasoning from the available premises to 
 the conclusion expressed in the sentence qualified by may …” (59) 
And, the epistemic senses of the other modals, ‘might’, ‘could’, ‘will’, ‘would’, ‘must’, ‘shall’, ‘should’, 
and the others “… represent parallel extensions of the particular forces and barriers indicated by the 
modal in the socio-physical world to the domain of reasoning and logical prediction.” (Tyler 470) 
     At this point in the discussion Tyler begins to present her own ideas about the modals, and posits 
beyond the force-dynamics metaphor the metaphor of the NOW IS HERE – THEN IS THERE. The latter 
part of this metaphor serves as a basis for forms of language the speaker appeals to in order to be 
polite. Thus, for example, the speaker says 
 Hi, are you busy? I was hoping you were free for lunch.         
when quite obviously they are hoping that the addressee is free for lunch. The point is that if THEN IS 
THERE then the use of the two past tense verbs puts the speaker into the THEN which, given the action 
of the metaphor, puts the speaker THERE, i.e. away from the addressee, and if the speaker is away from 
the addressee then the speaker cannot control the addressee and, thus, the invitation is not an 
imposition on the addressee, which is just what the speaker wants, given their desire to be polite. 
     And, in the other part of the metaphor, the NOW IS HERE part, we have a device for highlighting 
surety, realis, and force. According to Tyler, at least some of the modals come in present-past pairs: 
‘will’/’would’, ‘can’/’could’, ‘shall’/’should, and “… we find the past tense forms consistently indicating 
less surety on the part of the speaker or less social and/or physical force. For example, in legal discourse 
shall indicates a legally binding circumstance while should indicates a preferred, but non-binding 
circumstance.” (471)  
     Tyler might not be very happy about the way I have presented her essay thus far. I have skewed 
things in order to emphasize its strictly theoretical aspect in order to set up a nice interface between it 
and the essay by Enc. In addition to its theory of modals, taken mainly from Sweetser as we have seen, 
Tyler’s essay contains an argument to the effect that we must develop ESL texts and other materials that 
reflect the structure of English accurately and, yet, are fully comprehensible to the student, and taking 
this advice itself, the essay contains as well some simple diagrammatic material designed to teach the 
English modal system in accord with Sweetser. I will give the argument a prominent place in the section 
still to come in which I try to motivate the approach of the ESL textbook that is part II of this 
dissertation, but I will present here a sample of the diagrammatic material, both to show what Tyler has 
in mind pedagogically and to set up a critical similarity between Sweetser’s understanding of the modals 




     In Tyler’s diagrammatic presentation of the modals, each modal is represented by a pictograph that 
takes the form of a square in which there appears a figure moving forward to the right. The specific form 
of each pictograph is determined by the values it takes for four (partially nested) variables, which are as 
follows: 
 - the pictograph features a path (no graphic representation) or a barrier (a door)    
 - in the path case, the force responsible for the movement is internal (lines in the figure’s head) 
 or external (a second figure applying force to the first from the rear) 
 - in the external case, the authority of the force is recognized by the first figure (a double 
 headed arrow connects the heads of the two figures) or is not recognized by the first figure (no 
 graphic representation) 
 - the modal is in the present tense (the line creating the box is solid) or in the past tense (the 
 line creating the box is dotted) 
     Let us consider the pictographs for ‘will’, ‘should’, ‘may’ and ‘can’. This will be pretty much sufficient 
to show how the pictographs work, and the range of configurations of the values of the variables. In 
association with each pictograph, Tyler gives ‘a metaphoric translation of the root use into the epistemic 
use’ and examples of epistemic uses with explanatory paraphrases. The full set of pictographs is given as 
Appendix A. 
     To motivate the diagrammatic approach, Tyler says, because “… a cognitive linguistic analysis is based 
on experience in the physical world, it is possible to represent the meaning of each modal 
diagrammatically, or in terms of scenes, rather than only in terms of linguistic propositions or dictionary 
definitions (472).” Readers who are teachers may have had the experience of thinking up or discovering 
some device that they excitedly thought would make a certain concept perfectly clear to their students, 
only to find that, when the device is presented on the board, a lot of its magic disappears: its 
pedagogical power is shown to be significantly less than what was imagined. I teach a test prep 
workshop for Touro College that involves arithmetic. The other day I thought up a little technique for 
making the simplification of fractions easier and, after I showed it to the students, I realized that it is 
effective but it is also still another thing that has to be patiently explained. Well, I think that Tyler’s 
pictographs show that, in explanation, there is a continuum that runs from perfect concreteness at the 
one end to perfect explicitness at the other such that an inverse proportion holds between the two 
qualities and, while I find the pictographs helpful, I think that they should go along with rather than 
replace linguistic propositions and dictionary definitions. And, indeed, this is what happens in essence 
because, as we have seen, each pictograph is accompanied by an explanatory note. However, Tyler does 
not leave the effectiveness of her diagrammatic presentation of the modals to speculation. Instead, she 
cites two classroom-based studies that tested the presentation against advanced learners, both of which 
showed that it allowed the learners involved to “…move from a stable but defective understanding of 




      Let us now turn to Enc’s treatment of the modals. His main objective is to prove that the word ‘will’ is 
not a tense element but rather a modal, which, with some consideration of the (putative) present tense, 
positions him to claim in turn that English has only one tense, the past tense. His strategy is 
straightforward in that he attempts to show that ‘will’ does not behave in a manner analogous to the 
past tense ‘-ed’ but that it does behave like a modal. He focuses on complex sentences whose matrix 
verb is ‘to say’ or ‘to claim’ such that they take a ‘that’ clause as complement.  Critical to the analysis is 
the distinction among (1) the time at which the sentence is uttered, often called the speech time, (2) the 
time of the saying or claiming indicated by its matrix verb, and (3) the time of evaluation, i.e., the time at 
which the sentence, or more precisely, the complement of the sentence, is to be determined to be true 
or false. We are invited to compare the sentences 
 Mary said that she was tired 
 Mary will say that she will be tired. 
where the former features, in effect, the past tense element ‘-ed’ in its matrix and its complement 
clauses while the latter features ‘will’ in its matrix and its complement clauses. Now, there is a 
fundamental difference between the two cases because the former sentence allows two readings, on 
one of which the time of Mary’s being tired is the same as the time of saying, on the other of which the 
time of her being tired is earlier than the time of saying. But, the latter sentence allows only one 
reading, on which the time of Mary’s being tired is after the time of saying, i.e. there is no reading on 
which the time of her being tired is the same as the time of saying. Thus, the past tense and ‘will’ 
behave differently. 
     We are also invited to compare the sentences 
 John said that Mary is upset. 
 John will say that Mary is upset. 
where, as above, in the matrix clause, the one sentence has ‘-ed’ while the other has ‘will’. But, here, 
both of the complement sentences are in the present tense. Again, however, there is a clear difference 
according to Enc with respect to the number of available readings.  The former sentence will be true 
only if the time of Mary’s being upset is the same as the time of utterance such that the utterance time 
is the time of evaluation for the complement sentence. But, the latter sentence will be true if the time of 
Mary’s being upset is the same as the time of utterance, or, if the time of her being upset is the same as 
the time of saying, i.e. after the time of utterance, such that the times of evaluation for the two 
complement sentences differ. What we see further in these two cases is that, ordinarily, the time of 
evaluation of a present tense complement is the time of utterance but, in the presence of ‘will’ the time 
of evaluation of the present tense complement can shift to the future.  
     Consider finally the sentences 




 Mary may say that she is in charge. 
 John should talk to whoever is guarding the entrance.      
All of these sentences have a modal in their matrix clause, and a present tense extension, ‘that’ clauses, 
as above, in the first two cases, an infinitive phrase in the third case. And, in each case, the modal has 
the effect of shifting the time of evaluation of the present tense extension from the time of utterance to 
some future time with respect to it. Enc in effect concludes his main argument by saying that the 
present tense extensions here 
 … when embedded under a future-shifting modal, can be anchored to the future time 
 introduced by the modal and need not be anchored to the speech time. That is to say, they 
 behave like will. It is not the case that will just patterns differently from the past tense. It also 
 patterns exactly like future-shifting modals. Thus when we account for the temporal 
 properties of these modals, we will automatically be accounting for the temporal properties of 
 will if we take will to be a modal rather than a tense. (353) 
     We come now the relationship between Tyler’s article in SLA research and pedagogy in the 
theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics and Enc’s article in formal semantics, both of which 
address the modals of English. Now there is a bit of intersection already in place in that Tyler, in 
introducing the traditional view of modals, says: 
 All theories of modal verbs must account for the synchronic fact that virtually every modal has 
 two basic senses – a root sense and an epistemic sense. Within traditional or formal linguistic 
 theory, the root and epistemic meanings of modals have often been represented as 
 homophones (Frank, 1972; Lyons, 1977; Palmer, 1986). More recently, several attempts have 
 been made to apply some version of truth-conditional semantics (e.g., Papafragou, 2000) to 
 account for the multiple senses associated with each modal. (463) 
Now we saw above what Tyler has to say about the root and epistemic uses of modals. What is relevant 
here is that she refers to work in truth-conditional semantics as related to modals and thus 
acknowledges the relevance of formal semantics to her discipline. 
     Consider now the following passage from the conclusion of Enc’s article, taking into account that he 
has argued that ‘will’ is not a tense element but a modal, which implies that English has no future tense: 
 If, as is plausible, the present is treated as the absence of past tense (a view implemented in 
 different ways in Ogihara (1989) and Enc (1990)), then the past emerges as the only true tense 
 in English. This is not unusual. Comrie (1985) points out that many languages make only a binary 
 distinction. Some, like English, have a tense that distinguishes the past from the nonpast, and 
 futurity is expressed by a modal or some other form reserved for irrealis. Others like Hua spoken 
 in New Guinea, have a tense that distinguishes future from nonfuture. Comrie also notes that 
 there are no languages with a tense which distinguishes present and nonpresent. These facts 




 may also be true that each language is allowed only one tense and other temporal notions are 
 expressed through other syntactic categories. (356,7)  
Thus, I find it very interesting that Enc concludes his analytical study of a single morpheme of English 
with a claim of universal scope based, apparently, on a large number of empirical studies. And, needless 
to say, knowing which ‘tense’ a given language has is relevant to both SLA research and SLA pedagogy 
since a language cannot be characterized or taught unless its tense structure is specified.       
     Beyond this more or less marginal intersection, we have the central fact that both Tyler and Enc take 
‘will’ to be a modal, and both of them take it to indicate the future indirectly. Tyler says that it implies 
the future while Enc argues that the root use of ‘will’, to use Tyler’s term, is inherently future shifting. 
And, both authors make the distinction between root uses of modals and epistemic uses of them, 
although it was not convenient for me to bring this out in the discussion of Enc above. But, once we 
align the two authors in this way, we can see more clearly how they differ, and thus establish the field in 
which fruitful exchange between the two disciplines might take place. We will look for features that the 
one account has but the other does not, and then for features that the other account has but the one 
does not. However, the formula for the cooperation between the two enterprises should be as above, 
viz. that the SLA researcher or pedagogist provides data on novel linguistic phenomena that reflect 
actual use, and typically informal theory of these phenomena, while the formal semanticist provides the 
formal theory of the phenomena, or the formal counterpart of the informal theory. Of course the formal 
semanticist receives data on language use from the descriptive linguist but the data received from the 
SLA researcher is distinctive in that it comes from studies in which circumstances are contrived in such a 
way as to reveal more about the use of a feature than can be learned by the observation of its use under 
normal circumstances. An analogy can be made between an SLA study and a scientific experiment. 
     Here, from the SLA side, we get the general cognitive linguistics approach, the idea that the physical 
world and the social world and our general cognitive capacity condition our use of language. And, in 
more particular terms, we get the idea that force dynamics, expressed in terms of forces, paths and 
barriers, is the metaphoric basis for the system of modals in English. Relating the particular to the 
general, we might see force dynamics as fitting into the physical world component of the cognitive 
linguistic perspective. We might see the politeness formula called upon by                   
 Hi, are you busy? I was hoping you were free for lunch. 
as fitting into the social world component of the cognitive linguistics perspective. And, perhaps less 
obviously, we might see the epistemic use of modals reflected in  
 John may be at the party. 
as fitting into the cognitive capacity component of the cognitive linguistics perspective. Both Tyler and 
Enc make such sentences something like the conclusions of processes of reasoning, which might be 
regarded as inductive, or probabilistic and, of course, reasoning is our most distinctive, if not most 
important, cognitive capacity. Finally Tyler’s claim that at least some of the modals come in present-past 




to the physical world given its dimension of time, or as related to our cognitive experience given its 
dimension of time. But now, the question then becomes, how might these linguistic phenomena be 
formalized? If we focus on the main three types of modals considered here, exemplified by  
 Jane must pass the test. 
 That must/may be Jane at the door. 
 Jane, you may leave whenever you like. 
then we can use the terms, deontic modal, epistemic modal and permissive modal, respectively, where 
the term ‘permissive’ does not have its dictionary sense, ‘deficient in firmness or control’ but the 
blander sense ‘of or related to permission, or the granting thereof’. And Enc, emphasizing the futurity 
associated with deontic modals, offers the following formalization of this type 
MODAL [S] is true at < w , i > iff in every world w’ accessible to w there is an interval i’ such that i < i’ and 
S is true at < w’ , i’ >. 
where ‘S ‘= sentence, ‘w ’ = a possible world, ‘i ’ = an interval of time and ‘< ’ means ‘earlier than’,i.e. 
that the interval at its left occurs before the interval at its right.  
But now, if we take epistemic modals to involve reasoning, and thus argument, in the manner suggested 
above, then we might say that we need to have a given world in which the premises of the argument are 
true and then, taking into account the inductive or probabilistic character of the reasoning, have as well 
that the conclusion of the argument is true in some or most or some high percentage of worlds 
accessible to the given world: and thus the formalization 
MODAL [S] is possibly true in w iff P1, P2, … , Pn are true in w and S is true in some world w’ accessible to 
w. 
where ‘w ’ = a possible world, and P1, P2, … , Pn are the premises and ‘S ‘ the conclusion of an argument 
of the speaker of MODAL [S]. The formalization here is based as conservatively as possible on Enc’s as 
given above.     
     Finally if we take permissive modals to involve agents in relationships of power then we might say 
that we need to have a given world in which one agent has some kind of control over another agent in 
some respect, and have as well that the latter agent is free in that respect in at least some world or 
worlds accessible to the given world: and thus the formalization 
MODAL [S] is true in w iff C3abc is true in w and F2bc is true in some world w’ accessible to w. 
where ‘C3abc’ says ‘a controls b in respect c’ and ‘F2bc’ says ‘a is free in respect c’. 
§ 8 A Consideration of SLA Pedagogy from the Perspective of the Philosophy of Language 
     The general character of the discussion so far has been primarily theoretical. We have considered the 




sentences in which these elements appear. The consideration has come from two quite distinct 
perspectives, the formal semantics perspective, on the one hand, and the SLA research perspective, on 
the other, and this brings in a significant difference in terms of the degree of formality of the theory 
involved, but it does not challenge the fact that the character of the discussion has been theoretical. 
Still, the practical has been implicitly present all along. The ultimate purpose of Ekiert’s study of the use 
of English articles by speakers of an article-less L1 is to create the understanding of the process of article 
acquisition that will allow learners of L2s with articles to proceed more easily and more rapidly. And 
while, as I acknowledged, I purposefully emphasized the theoretical and deemphasized the practical in 
Tyler’s case, we knew from the reception of her title that her intent was in large part practical in that 
she included in her work an actual set of instructional materials designed to teach the use of the English 
modals. Now as we move towards the conclusion of this presentation of rationale, both the theoretical 
and the practical will remain in the picture, but the emphasis will shift to the practical. And, as the 
emphasis shifts to the practical, we find ourselves more concerned with SLA than with the philosophy of 
language and, in turn, more concerned with SLA pedagogy than with SLA research. However, it should 
be recalled that the main theme of this introduction is cross-fertilization, and given the focus on the 
practical, a good way to demonstrate the benefit of cross-fertilization might be to devise a project that 
draws its inspiration from the philosophy of language while having as its objective the enhancement of 
the acquisition process of the L2 learner. Let us then take a look at this learner. 
    The second language learner is not like the first language learner. There is no LAD, or language 
acquisition device, as in generative grammar, that delivers the language to them with minimal effort on 
their part. But then the second language learner does not fit the ‘inductivist’ model of first language 
acquisition either in that they do not have to generate an understanding of the whole of the second 
language on the basis of nothing more than the data available to them in the form of the use of the 
language by those around them, and their ability to sift through and sort out this data. Rather, the 
second language learner already has a full understanding of structure and meaning in language in view 
of their competence in their first language. And, they have as well the same general systems of learning, 
the same suite of cognitive capacities, that they appeal to when they take on ordinary subject matter – 
history, biology, chess. We might thus see the second language learner as using the considerable 
resources available to them either to develop an analogical relationship between their first language 
and the second language, or to figure out the second language on its own terms, using the structure of 
their first language as a model. Probably both strategies are employed, the former one being more 
useful where the first and the second languages are specifically similar, the latter one where the two are 
only generally similar. In more particular terms, the second language learner must master the 
vocabulary and the set of grammatical structures of the second language. They have to learn how to put 
these elements together to form sentences that express the meanings they intend (production) and 
they have to learn how to take these elements apart as they appear in sentences that express the 
meanings intended by others (reception). But then, the second language learner’s real problem has to 
be faced. If relationships among words and grammatical structures are nicely coded into rules then, the 
nature of a natural language being what it is in view of the way it develops, there are exceptions to the 
rules, so many exceptions that, at some point, it appears to the learner that the exceptions simply 




includes, especially verb inflection in English and languages similar to it. Where the verb is regular, this is 
not so difficult but, where the verb is irregular, the learner encounters a nightmare of specificity. And 
consider the very large set of idioms the language contains, and the deep dependence we have on 
metaphor for understanding, and the too often under-considered role of usage. This is not a very 
pleasant reference in America today but we can say ‘I was fired.’, ‘I was terminated.’, ‘I was let go.’, ‘I 
was given the pink slip.’, but we cannot say, for example, ‘My work was taken away from me.’, or ‘I was 
required to give up my work.’, or ‘I have been denied continuation at my job.’, or ‘My work and I were 
divorced.’, even though the same basic meaning runs through all of these sentences. Finally, there is the 
ontologically deeper issue of linguistic relativity. Recall Slobin’s thinking-for-speaking hypothesis. 
Different languages segment reality in different ways, and call upon the native speaker to focus on 
different things. So, in reflection of one of the generalizations made above, the second language learner 
must either map the conceptual structure of the second language onto that of their first, or negotiate 
the conceptual structure of the second language on its own terms, depending upon that of their first to 
facilitate understanding.    
     Now, since the SLA student already has an understanding of linguistic structure and meaning, and 
depends on general systems of learning in their effort to master the second language, the best way to 
help them may be to provide them with a maximally perspicuous representation of the grammar, and 
the vocabulary, of the second language. And yet, part two of this dissertation takes the form of an ESL 
textbook that presents English as a system that is simple, orderly and intuitive such that it might be 
claimed that the text is in fact a maximally perspicuous representation of the grammar of English. But, 
the system is based on the syntactic component of a semiotic system for English that I developed over a 
number of years and thus it might also be claimed that the text draws its inspiration from the philosophy 
of language. Given all of this, I believe that the ESL textbook that constitutes the second part of this 
dissertation has the potential to demonstrate the benefit of cross-fertilization between the philosophy 
of language and SLA pedagogy. The scope of this dissertation project does not allow the text to be field 
tested, but it can of course be evaluated in terms of the extent to which it presents English in a way that 
will facilitate the ESL student’s mastery of the language. The way in which the text’s chapters segment 
the subject, and the style in which these chapters are written help the student to grasp the structure 
and function of English more easily and more rapidly. Particularly important is the fact that the text 
presents the language as a single coherent whole whose parts are organized so naturally that student’s 
challenge is only that posed by the language itself. But now the system on which the text is based is the 
heart of the matter and thus the next few sections of this introduction will (1) outline the development 
of the system, (2) describe it briefly but in sufficient detail to make its character clear, and (3) account 
for the way in which it has been put to use through a long stretch of my teaching career.         
     The view of English upon which the ESL textbook is based developed in what I think is an interesting 
way. I started my teaching career at Rutgers in Newark in 1969. My second teaching position came at 
Brooklyn College in 1972, shortly after the open admissions policy had been implemented in C.U.N.Y. I 
worked in the SEEK Program, whose purpose was to support academically the new students coming into 
the university. Our role was vital because we had to insure that the social equity effected by making it 




with the maintenance of high academic standards that is critical to the character of the university. I had 
come to the city in 1968 to join the doctoral program in philosophy at N.Y.U. and thus, in SEEK, I worked 
with students taking philosophy courses and humanities courses generally. My work soon came to the 
attention of the philosophy department and I was assigned sections of introduction to logic. The part of 
the teaching I liked best was helping students learn how to translate from English into predicate logic. I 
developed early on a distaste for translating 
 All men are mortal. 
and 
 Some men are mortal. 
as 
 Vx M1x → M2x 
and  
 Ǝx M1x & M2x 
respectively, because the logic sentences did not seem to be structurally analogous to their English 
counterparts, and in particular the relationship between ‘→’ and ‘&’ did not seem to be analogous to 
that between ‘all’ and ‘some’. So, many years before I encountered them in the literature, I began to use 
restricted quantifiers such that the translations became 
 VM1x M2x 
for every man x, x is mortal, and 
 ƎM1x M2x 
for some man x, x is mortal 
‘VM1x’ and ‘ƎM1x’ could then be seen as correspondent to ‘all men’ and ‘some men’, respectively, and 
‘M2’ as correspondent to ‘are mortal’, with the match between the two occurrences of the one 
individual variable serving the function of concatenation in the English, in effect. And, of course, the 
difference between ‘V’ and ‘Ǝ’ is perfectly analogous to the difference between ‘all’ and ‘some’. The 
scope of the relationship is better shown with a sentence like 
 John invited her to every party of the season according to some of his friends. 
which, where the antecedent of ‘her’ is ‘Mary’, becomes 
 VPx ƎFy I4jmxy 
 For every party of the season x and for some friends of John y, John invited Mary to x according 




Now individual constants are called terms. Individual variables are called terms. The translation 
procedure here associates restricted quantifiers with the individual variables in the matrix of the logic 
sentence, such that in the examples above we get the associations 
 ‘VPx’ – ‘ x’ 
and  
 ‘ƎFy’ – ‘y’ 
and it then becomes appropriate to call these ‘associations’ terms, especially in view of their relations to 
the noun phrases  
 every party of the season 
and 
 some of his friends 
respectively, and what remains of the sentence is the predicate  
 I4  
Thus, the logic sentence can be seen to be an assembly of one predicate and four terms, and 
correspondingly the English sentence 
 John invited her to every party of the season according to some of his friends. 
can be seen as an assembly of one predicate and four terms as follows 
 




 every party of the season 
 some of his friends 
Therefore, I came to see English as having a term and predicate grammar. Then, in the summer of 1976, 
the Linguistic Society of America held its Summer Institute at the University of Massachusetts at 
Amherst. It is a critical fact of my development in the discipline that the theme of the institute was the 
formal semantics of natural language. I had taken courses in philosophy with Richard Martin, in 




was probably my participation in the 76 LSA summer institute which determined that my main interest 
would fall within the philosophy of language. But, without intention, or awareness, I regarded the 
theories of natural language I was exposed to from the perspective set by the simple translation model I 
had developed in my teaching in logic at Brooklyn College.   
     The term and predicate grammar of English can be specified at three levels, the level of the word (or 
‘word unit’ to accommodate basic expressions of more than one word like the preposition ‘because of’), 
the level of the phrase and the level of the sentence. At the word level, the 8 traditional parts of speech, 
which constitute in my view a remarkable system that has served us very well both educationally and 
intellectually, are augmented by 7 additional categories of words to produce the following 15 unit 
scheme: 
 1 Name    6 Determiner   11 Adverb 
 2 Relative Pronoun  7 Pronoun   12 Noun 
 3 W/TH Word   8 Conjunction   13 Adjective 
 4 Modal   9 Preposition   14 Interjection 
 5 Copula               10 Verb    15 Particle 
Name goes first because of its special character and Particle goes last because I added it only recently. 2 
Relative Pronoun through 9 Preposition are the categories that contain very small numbers of words, 5 
to 70 approximately, such that they can be specified precisely by lists. And 10 Verb through 13 Adjective 
are very large categories put in an order of explanation. 14 Interjection was last before Particle was 
added because, somewhat like Name, it is special. The phases of the grammar divide into the nominal 
and the verbal. There are 4 types of verbal phrase, which are called predicate bases because they serve 
as bases of predicates as described above. Thus, for example, the base of the predicate 
 _____ invited _____ to _____ according to _____ . 
is  
 invited   
and the prepositions 
  to 
and  
 according to 
are called predicate extenders. Predicate bases, term position blanks and predicate extenders are the 






 The Action Type / Essential Component = Verb 
      Examples: invited     was invited     was probably invited     must actually have been invited 
 The Quality Type / Essential Component = Adjective 
      Examples: is good     is very good     could be very good 
 The Relation Type / Essential Component = Preposition 
      Examples: are in     are certainly in     will certainly be in 
 The Identity Type / Essential Component = Copula 
      Examples: is     clearly is     may clearly be 
The components of predicate bases other than the essential ones are copulas, adverbs and modals, 
although a copula is required in the Quality Type and in the Relation Type and, as we have seen, a 
copula is the essential component in the Identity Type. There are 6 types of nominal phrase, which are 
called terms, as follows: 
 Names, e.g. ‘Jane’ 
 Pronouns, e.g. ‘he’ 
 Infinitive Phrases, e.g. ‘to bake a cake’ 
 Gerund Phrases, e.g. ‘baking a cake’ 
 W/TH Phrases, e.g. ‘what they want’ 
 Noun Phrases, e.g. ‘the huge pot of gold that she found’ 
Sentences are formed simply by filling terms of the right types into the blanks of predicates. Thus, we 
get the sentence     
 John invited her to every party of the season according to some of his friends. 
by filling the terms 
 John 
 her 
 every party of the season 




into the blanks of the predicate 
 _____ invited _____ to _____ according to _____ . 
in the order given. There are a couple of term types well established in the language that go beyond the 
6 types presented here. Thus, for example, in the sentence 
 The sour cream made John sick. 
The adjective ‘sick’ is a term. And in the sentence 
 The country has felt itself to be vulnerable since the twin towers were brought down. 
The sentence ‘the twin towers were brought down’ is a term. But, the frequency of occurrence of these 
term types is too low to motivate giving up the economy of the 6 member set vis-à-vis either pedagogy 
or theory.  The grammar covers only declarative sentences. Interrogative, imperative and exclamatory 
sentences are left out. All of the sentences covered by the grammar are simple. Complex sentences of 
the first order, like 
 The man, who is from Texas, came to the meeting late. 
 She recruited the rebels into the national army, thereby avoiding a civil war. 
are simple sentences that have what amount to simple sentences as components. Complex sentences of 
any order can be achieved by nesting, or embedding or recursion. Compound sentences of the first 
order are sequences of simple sentences such that a comma occurs between all adjacent sentences in 
the sequence except the last two, between which an appropriate conjunction occurs. Compound 
sentences of any order can be achieved by including sentences of the given order in the sequence. 
Compound sentences can be nested but this is extremely rare because it challenges our receptive 
capacity. All of the simple sentences covered by the grammar are in ‘standard form’. Sentences not in 
standard form like the existential sentence 
 There is a god. 
and the proportion sentence 
 The harder you study, the higher your grade. 
are produced by applying transformations to standard form sentences. A great deal of economy and 
clarity are achieved by having this arrangement.      
     This view of English has served as the pedagogical underpinning of a great deal of my work. I have 
taught logic more or less in the critical thinking mode at Marymount Manhattan College and at the 
College of New Rochelle, but I also taught straight logic, introduction to logic, for many years at Medgar 
Evers College. I taught the students the term and predicate grammar early on in the semester. There 
were always questions. ‘Why are we studying English grammar in a logic course?’ But, a large 




native countries so that they were able to respond positively to the sincerity of the teacher. Thus, when 
I explained that the grammar would serve as the basis for translation, and that translation was their 
route into the logic as a meaningful subject, they were accepting. I received more general appreciation 
in these classes than I have in any others over the now considerable number of years I have taught.  I 
have also used the full term and predicate grammar in the English composition courses I have taught at 
Medgar Evers, College at Old Westbury, Touro College and Pace University. I advise the students that 
knowing the structure of their native language, or in any case the de facto international language, is of 
great value in and of itself but that they will also need the know the grammar so that they can 
understand the explanations of the grammatical errors they make in their writing: you can’t understand 
the explanation of a subject-verb agreement error if you don’t know what a subject is, what a verb is 
and what it means for grammatical elements to agree. But since the course is a course in English, there 
is also enough time for me to train the students in the technique of sentence diagramming I have 
developed, one which is based directly on the grammar and is thus very different in nature from the 
traditional technique. And, it is a source of gratification for me each semester to discover, upon grading 
the final exams, that two or three of the students have mastered the technique perfectly. I have also 
used the grammar in ESL writing courses I have taught at Hostos Community College, the predominantly 
Hispanic institution in C.U.N.Y., and in the English Language Institute of Pace University. However, I 
don’t think that courses like this, as standardly taught, have much power to advance the students’ 
development of proficiency. They are taught too much like regular English composition courses and yet, 
as we will see shortly, something much different is called for. I have taught two workshop series for the 
Writing Center at Pace University. The first was a short series called ‘The Great Grammar Guru 
Workshop Series’. The humor of the title was related to my being regarded as the sharpest on grammar 
among the student and faculty tutors in the center. There were about ten students in attendance at the 
first meeting of the workshop. I had them go downstairs to the computer lab and write and then email 
to me a paragraph on the first of a series of open subjects like travel, fashion, sports, etc. and, in the 
subsequent session I made a PowerPoint presentation of my analyses of the sentences in the 
paragraphs produced. This pattern was repeated. In the PowerPoint presentations, I used the formal 
editing system I have developed, according to which there are four ‘edits’: 
 Change  [ … / … ] 
 Add   [ + … ] 
 Drop  [ - … ] 
 Move  [ * n < … ] , [ …  > * n ] where n = 1,2, … and the left or right ‘move to’ location is  
   indicated by a second *n 
I also projected a lot of enthusiasm. But, voluntary, Friday afternoon workshops are a tough sell, and the 
student participation level dropped precipitously. The second Writing Center sponsored workshop series 
I taught was quite different. It was set up like a course in that it ran for 14 weeks, and I called it 
Analytical English. I started with 13 or 14 students, had about 6 or 7 midway, and wound up with a 




meeting at my own expense, but this did not have the retention power I thought it would. The writing 
track of the workshop was basically the same as that of the other workshop, short compositions written 
on the spot with PowerPoint analyses of the sentences in them presented in the subsequent session. 
The difference was that I had four hours each week, and this allowed me to teach the term and 
predicate grammar, and the grammar of errors I have developed called the Big 10. It is based on ten 
commonly occurring error types, Tense, Fragment, Subject-Verb Agreement, etc., precise descriptions of 
the types, and exercises, each of which consists of ten sentences, with each sentence exhibiting one 
error of a distinctive type among the ten. But, I have to score Analytical English a failure (except for the 
strong relationships I was able to forge with the students who stuck it out). Like the typical ESL writing 
course, it lacked several elements that are necessary if the students are to have a real chance at 
advancing their proficiency. We will see what these elements are below. The term and predicate 
grammar served as the basis for a presentation I made in a recent Pace University Writing Center 
conference. The presentation had the too long title, The Potential Role of The Formal Semantics of 
Natural Language in Second Language Acquisition Theory, Pedagogy, Teaching and Tutoring. There is 
another use of the grammar that should be mentioned. I also work as an English and philosophy tutor in 
the Center for Academic Advancement at Marymount Manhattan College and, because there too I am 
regarded as the sharpest on grammar among the student and faculty tutors, I was asked last year to 
make a presentation at a meeting of the staff of writing tutors that might help them to be more 
effective in dealing with the grammatical aspect of the students’ compositions, and I dutifully prepared a 
nice PowerPoint presentation but, on the day of the meeting, the weather was so bad that the city 
virtually shut down, and the meeting was cancelled. But now, the main use of the grammar I want to 
discuss briefly here is in relation to my work in writing centers, as a ‘professional coach’ (Marymount) or 
as a ‘master consultant’ (Pace), i.e. as a faculty level tutor. My students are native speakers of English 
and ESL students from all points across the globe. The thing I enjoy most in working with the native 
speakers is what I call interpreting the assignment and planning the essay. The first thing is to determine 
the rhetorical type of the essay. Is it to be a narrative, a comparison, an argument? The next thing is to 
work out the organization of the essay under the rhetorical type that has been settled upon, i.e. the 
segmentation of the essay into parts under that type. The principle I follow is that the assignment has 
parts, and the parts of the assignment determine the parts of the essay. And, once the parts of the 
assignment have been identified, it’s time to bring in the length of the essay as specified by the teacher 
so as to set up what I call the ‘arithmetic’. Let us take a very simple example. If the essay has to be three 
pages long and the assignment has been found to have four parts then, on the stipulation that a good 
paragraph might well run for half a page, the arithmetic says that there will be six paragraphs in the 
essay overall and, since one of them has to be the introduction and one of them has to be the 
conclusion, that leaves four body paragraphs, each of which will be devoted to one of the four parts of 
the assignment. All of these steps in the process are accompanied by notes and diagrams produced on 
the computer or on a legal pad. The student comes out of the session feeling relief from the anxiety they 
came into the center with, and feeling confident that they can negotiate the assignment successfully. All 
of this procedure is of my own devising and it is systematic to such an extent, and produces clarity to 
such an extent that it represents a superior way of handling contact with the student who is wise 
enough, or fearful enough, to come into the writing center before they begin writing their composition. 




and most typically first and second semester English composition students, whose tuition pays for the 
writing center at Pace. I don’t have ESL students at Marymount, and at Pace the typical ESL student is 
not in Dyson College but rather in the English Language Institute (ELI), an adjunct, or ‘feeder’ school in 
relation to the university. I love working with these students most because their assignments are usually 
structurally simple so that the issue is straight grammar. I go through the essay with the student, 
identifying, explaining and correcting the determinate errors, i.e. the ones that can for the most part be 
fixed in only one way. I call this approach ‘explanatory editing’. I do edit the student’s essay, with their 
assistance, but this just provides the opportunity for me to teach the student the features of grammar 
that they do not know or have misunderstood. What is distinctive about my tutoring is that it is 
teaching, the teaching of grammar. The standard approach is to have the student read the essay aloud 
with the idea that they will catch their own errors, that they will hear them. On this approach, very little 
is expected of the session. If some of the surface errors are brought to the student’s attention and 
removed then enough has been done. At Pace now, it even seems to be the policy that we are supposed 
to do less for the ELI students, because they are ‘courtesy’ students who contribute nothing to the 
funding of the Writing Center. I can’t say this I really understand this. Each student, Dyson or ELI, gets 50 
minutes. Why would the tutor not help the student, of whatever financial/cultural stripe, as much as 
they can in the time allotted? But now, what is most satisfying about working with ESL students is that 
they don’t just make determinate errors, which are ‘conservative’ in that they respect the structure of 
English by involving only the ‘true parts’ of English, a word ending say, which is missing, or mistaken or 
present where it is neither required or allowed. No, ESL students also make ‘radical’ errors, ones that 
don’t respect the structure of English but instead rend its fabric in some way, and in relation to errors of 
this type, I am called upon to provide a more or less instant analysis of a complex linguistic 
phenomenon. When I am able to do so, I experience exhilaration, and when I am not, I have the 
pleasure of taking away from the session a problem that is of great interest to me. The big point here, 
however, is that the reception of radical errors provides an opportunity for the native speaker- 
grammarian to develop insight into the structure of the language. Such errors draw back the language’s 
curtain of familiarity, exposing its unfamiliar mechanism, its works. And of course we have in this yet 
another case of the intersection of formal semantics and SLA research and pedagogy creating a space in 
which a highly beneficial form of intellectual cross-fertilization can take place. 
     The last thing to be covered in this introduction is in a way one of the most important things and yet 
it can be presented very briefly. There are at least seven conditions that must be met if ESL instruction is 
to be effective: 
1. The model of the language on which the instruction is based must be as simple and intuitive as 
possible, and yet have broad explanatory power 
2. The student’s learning in relation to the model must be multi-faceted: (1) it should involve (a) 
listening and speaking, as well as (b) reading and writing: and, (2) attention must be paid to (a) the 
student’s language input, (b) the manner of the student’s mental processing of, or thinking about, the 
structure and function of the language and (c) the student’s language output; the tendency to elect one 




3. The instruction of the student must be bi-modal. In the one modality, the initial focus at least is on the 
student’s work, mainly the compositions that they write. These compositions must be subjected to 
grammatical criticism, i.e. they must be edited, and in a formal way. But, after a certain number of 
critiques have been produced, an analysis of the student’s writing should emerge, although each 
subsequent critique will refine that analysis. Then, the focus shifts from the student’s work to the 
student themselves as the effort is made to have them understand, understand thoroughly and deeply, 
what their grammatical problems are. The hope is that this will lead to grammatical mastery. However, 
it is very likely that there will be a residue of the un-mastered, despite the best effort, and it is here that 
the second modality comes into play. In this modality, the focus is on the student throughout. The 
student must be trained to edit their own work by using what I call SMEPS, or specific mechanical 
editing procedures. For each common error type, there will be a SMEP already available. Thus, for 
example, there will be a SMEP for article use, and one for Subject-Verb Agreement, and so on. But, for 
each student-idiosyncratic error type, a new SMEP must be devised. Now, if the goal with respect to the 
first modality is ‘automatic’ mastery then the goal with respect to the second modality is mastery ‘with 
contrivance’. Finally, if the means cum theme in the former case is understanding then the means cum 
theme in the latter case is empowerment. 
4. The student’s term of learning must be long. The ideal scenario for a student at Pace is that they 
would spend two years in the English Language Institute, four years in Dyson College and two or more 
years in The Lubin School of Business or some other graduate program of the university, and during all 
of this time they would have an absolutely dual objective – to learn the general and professional subject 
matter of their academic programs, and to develop their proficiency in English at least to the near-native 
level. 
5. The instruction of the student must be consistent. The biggest problem for the ESL student is that all 
of their learning is in a sense episodic. No single learning structure is constant through all of their 
experience. They take a series of courses, each under a different title and, typically, with a different 
teacher, although the titles are supposed to form a logical sequence and the teachers are almost always 
highly competent. And, the student uses the writing center but, except in special cases in which a 
relationship has been formed, which tutor the student works with in a given session is randomly 
determined. The student may work with a faculty tutor or a student tutor. The tutor will be more or less 
able to analyze the student’s grammar, and more or less interested in doing so. In any case, while there 
is a common understanding of English grammar, and a common recognition of the main types of error 
that occur in English, each tutor’s approach to grammatical evaluation is unique. Further, almost always, 
the goal of the tutorial session is to improve the student’s essay so that it will earn a higher grade and 
the student more or less expects the tutor to ‘fix’ the essay’s grammar. Thus, effectively, there is little or 
no thought of advancing the student’s proficiency. The situation that needs to prevail has 5 main 
characteristics: 
a. all of the teachers and tutors must subscribe to the same grammar and to a certain general approach 
to teaching it 




c. the teachers will also work as tutors, as faculty (or master or professional) tutors, of their own 
students: ideally they would meet with each of them once a week, or every other week, for 30 to 60 
minutes 
d. the teachers and the tutors would work together, as members of one team, (1) to implement the bi-
modal approach described above, (2) to cover all of the facets of the student’s learning enumerated 
above and (3) to administer the  accounting system described below  
e. beyond these constraints with regard to grammar, teachers would design and teach their courses in 
the manner that is common in collegiate education, i.e., they would conform to the course descriptions 
upon which the school curriculum is based while at the same time exploiting the limitation of these 
descriptions to the specification of goals, subjects/skills to be mastered and genres to be explored in 
order to bring to bear the ideas about teaching that they find to be valid and to employ the strategies of 
teaching  that they think are the most effective: and, they would be expected to teach with their 
personalities in order to make their courses as lively and as engaging for the students as possible. 
6. The student must be accountable for everything they are taught. But, there is no limit on the design 
of the accounting mechanisms that might be used to enforce this. I will cite one, possibly perverse 
seeming, example. After the student’s composition has been edited in a tutorial session, or as a part of 
the grading of the composition by the teacher of a course, in either case with the use of the system of 
edits described above so that each error-correction pairing becomes a discrete enumerable item, and 
after the student has had ample time to study the edited composition, they will be administered a test 
which requires them to take the corrected copy of their composition provided and put back in all of the 
errors that were originally there. Their grade on the test will be determined precisely by the percentage 
of the errors they are in fact able to put back and, yet, the average of their scores on all such tests will 
figure prominently in their grade for the course. Further, the ESL enterprise must have access to a 
powerful computer system that will be used to record all of the compositions all of the students 
produce, with their systematized evaluations. This will facilitate the precise tracking of the student’s 
progress in relation to a ‘map’ of English, i.e. an organized set of its features, whose members could be 
taken to be all, or virtually all, of the features of the language, or more modestly, all of the features 
involved in any mistake that has been identified in the general corpus of ESL writing. And, a necessary 
condition on the language track of the student’s academic program should be that they must achieve 
mastery of 95% of the terrain of the feature map by the time of their graduation, said percentage being 
perhaps a reasonable gauge of near-native proficiency. The understanding on which this condition 
would be based is that foreign students studying in America universities or language institutes 
associated with them are perfectly capable of meeting this standard, if they make the required effort, 
and yet they almost certainly will not meet the standard unless the condition that they do so be a 
necessary one. 
7. Finally, in order to handle all of this, the students must come to the institution with a very high level 
of motivation, although the detail of the design of the program, and the manner of the teachers and 




maintenance of motivation among the students since of course it is unrealistic to think that motivation 
will exist simply because it is demanded. 
     Now, I think it goes without saying that when I gave characteristic a. under condition 5., again: 
 all of the teachers and tutors must subscribe to the same grammar and to a certain general 
 approach to teaching it 
I intended that the grammar be the term and predicate grammar on which the textbook is based, and 
that the general approach be the one embodied in the textbook itself. 
     All that remains is for us to take a glimpse into the future. Appendices to the dissertation B. and C. 
are, respectively, (1) a technique of sentence diagramming called Sentence Analysis and an associated 
game called Pick ‘n Match: The Game of Sentence Structure, which is executed in PowerPoint, and (2) a 
more complicated and correspondingly less algorithmic technique of sentence diagramming called TNYT 
Break Down because the sentences it addresses come from The New York Times such that they first 
have to be ‘broken down’ into the standard forms that Sentence Analysis can handle. But, I have already 
begun to study Visual Basic with a view to developing a full-fledged video game version of Pick ‘n Match. 
The color, the sound and the action of this game, constrained by the staid forms of English, should make 
for genuine excitement, at least for those who are inclined to regard language as an entity worthy of 
independent recognition. Beyond this, I will develop a web site that will feature a variety of language 
video games and activities that happen on-line with posted results, but also an ‘academic network’ in 
which students will appear with their pictures, the computerized analyses of their compositions, as 
narrated by an animated avatar of their choosing – a 16 year old boy might for example choose a 24 
year old starlet, and all the back and forth chat that the students want, provided that they maintain a 
focus on the development of their proficiency. Further, I called above for the production of simple and 
intuitive theories in the intersection of formal semantics and SLA research but there is also the related 
business of developing comprehensible explanations of the theories of linguistic features in the formal 
semantics and SLA research literature. Good students in ESL will relish the experience of having these 
explanations presented to them by an enthusiastic teacher, and I feel particularly capable of  providing 
such explanations given  my years as a teacher of technical subjects like logic, grammar, compositional 
rhetoric and, in test prep workshops,  simple mathematics (the application of the four basic arithmetic 
operations to whole numbers, fractions, decimals and percentages, plus word problems), all in 
introductory courses at the undergraduate level. And, the mix of the insights that the students will 
develop in being presented with the explanations, the insights I will develop in presenting them, and the 
sharing of all of these insights has potential as itself a source of theory of some kind. Further still, if the 
textbook meets with the kind of success that I think it will then there will be a natural impetus to use the 
term and predicate grammar on which it is based to look in depth at specific linguistic phenomena. I 
believe that the simplicity and the intuitiveness of this grammar can set a perspective on natural 
language, English in particular of course but generally all related languages like Spanish and French, at 
the very least, which will foster the development of insight into the structure and function of the 
language, even if the theory that eventually emerges is of a quite different form, although there may be 




or less of the same form. Finally, there are two smaller considerations that don’t seem to have any 
natural place in the general scheme of this introduction, so I am putting them here. In the direction of 
the theoretical, I want to study the research methodology of SLA and, in the direction of the practical, I 
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Introduction 
      
     This essay will consider the way in which implicit knowledge of language and explicit knowledge of 
language relate to each other in the process of second language acquisition. This consideration raises 
several questions. First, what in fact are implicit and explicit knowledge of language? In order to answer 
this question we might want to ask the question about the difference between explicit and implicit 
knowledge in general. The answer here might be arrived at by considering our basic situation. We are 
agents seeking to survive and prosper in a large and complex world. Our intelligent capability is great. 
But we have many things to take care of and yet the concentration we can muster at a given point in 
time is decidedly limited. Thus a kind of division of labor has evolved. Implicit knowledge is what we 
depend on to help us take care of routine tasks. We take action under the guidance of implicit 
knowledge in order to accomplish routine tasks without having any awareness of this knowledge or the 
way in which it thus helps us. Explicit knowledge by contrast is what we depend on when we are faced 
with a problem and we must marshal the relevant knowledge and apply our reason to it in order to 
devise a solution. Necessarily then we are aware of this knowledge and of the way in which it helps us to 
accomplish tasks of this more difficult type. The difference between the roles that the two kinds of 
knowledge play in our lives can perhaps be made clearer by an example. The individuals living in early 
human society depended on implicit knowledge to provide themselves with bread. Someone had to 
discover the process of grinding dried grains to produce a meal, mixing this meal with water to make a 
dough and then baking the dough to make bread. And in each generation the youth of the society had to 
be trained in this process, either by observation or instruction or some combination of the two. But once 
trained, the individual was able to execute the process automatically and thus without any conscious 
thought.  By contrast, the individuals living in early human society depended upon explicit knowledge to 
figure out what to do when changes in the weather altered the seasonal patterns of plants whose 
produce constituted a significant part of their food supply. Can similar considerations be also applied   to 
the case of second language acquisition? The answer here in general terms is obvious. Second language 
acquisition is the learning of a language other than one’s native language. One can acquire a second 
language on one’s own by ‘picking it up’ while living in a country where it is the language spoken or one 
can acquire a second language through instruction provided by a teacher in a school or a tutor in a 
setting of one kind or another. But in more particular terms second language acquisition is a very 
complex educational process which is not fully understood. However a fair amount of this complexity 
will at least be negotiated in the discussion this essay will provide. Finally the consideration above raises 
the question of the way in which implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge relate to each other in 
second language acquisition. In the discipline of SLA (second language acquisition), theorists and 




formulate theories and conduct studies in order to advance the positions they take on these issues. The 
issue that addresses the way in which implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge relate to each other in 
second language acquisition is called the interface issue. This essay will consist largely in an exploration 
of this issue. 
     To understand the interface issue it is necessary to recognize that almost everyone in SLA accepts 
that both explicit and implicit knowledge of the second language are of value in acquisition. But 
absolutely everyone understands that the proficient use of a second language is based almost wholly on 
implicit knowledge. To see this we need to consider the phenomenon of ordinary language use. When 
we are speaking, writing, listening or reading in a second language at any level of proficiency, the 
operation of the mental processes that make our communication possible is guided by our knowledge of 
the language, but these processes remain largely hidden; we are aware of the ideas we are hearing, 
reading or communicating, but not of the linguistic rules that underlie the uses of the language. The 
knowledge involved is then implicit knowledge given the characterizations of the two forms of 
knowledge presented above. To be sure, in the early stages of using the language, one consciously 
appeals to one’s explicit knowledge of the translation of words and of the grammatical rules. This is 
occasionally true also of native speakers, when they search for the right synonym or for the right 
grammatical form to express a complex idea. For the purpose of our discussion, however, we can ignore 
these finer points and consider a successful case of SLA, where the student has arrived at a stage in 
which he or she can use the acquired language proficiently.    
     Now if the implicit knowledge of the second language is the basis of the use of that language then 
clearly the second language learner must acquire that knowledge if they are to become proficient to any 
meaningful extent. And of course a very great deal has to be said about this. Indeed it could be said that 
the whole SLA enterprise is the attempt to specify how the implicit knowledge of a second language is 
acquired. But the question of focus then becomes, what role does the explicit knowledge of the second 
language play? We can assume that it plays no role in the use of the second language. What then about 
the acquisition of the second language? Does explicit knowledge play any role in this?  Here we 
encounter three scenarios. Each one of these scenarios determines a position on the interface issue. The 
three scenarios are: 
(1) The learner acquires implicit knowledge of the second language by means of exposure and then 
uses the second language on the basis of that implicit knowledge. 
(2) The learner acquires explicit knowledge of the second language by means of instruction, this 
explicit knowledge converts through practice into implicit knowledge and the learner then uses the 
second language on the basis of that implicit knowledge. 
(3) The learner acquires explicit knowledge of the second language by means of instruction, this 
explicit knowledge facilitates the acquisition of implicit knowledge by means of exposure and the 
learner then uses the second language on the basis of that implicit knowledge. 





If the SLA theorist or researcher thinks that scenario (1) is true then they believe that explicit 
knowledge plays no role in second language acquisition and thus they take the ‘no’ position on the 
interface issue.  
If the SLA theorist or researcher thinks that scenario (2) is true then they believe that explicit 
knowledge plays the critical role in second language acquisition and thus they take the ‘strong’ 
position on the interface issue. 
If the SLA theorist or researcher thinks that scenario (3) is true then they believe that explicit 
knowledge plays a supportive role in second language acquisition and thus they take the ‘weak’ 
position on the interface issue. 
So the interface issue reflects differences of opinion about the role of explicit knowledge in second 
language acquisition among members of the SLA community who largely agree about the role of implicit 
knowledge. 
     This essay has two main objectives. The first objective is to establish a connection between SLA 
research and the philosophy of language by showing that the interface issue has an antecedent in the 
philosophy of language. And the second objective is to attempt to effect a resolution of the dilemma 
posed by the fact that (1) there is currently a consensus in the community of SLA scholars that the 
strong position on the interface issue is to be rejected in favor of either the no position or the weak 
position and yet (2) the strong position is the one that seems to accord most with (a) traditional 
pedagogy in second language teaching and in education generally, (b) the relevant philosophy of 
language theory and (c) thoughtful common sense. The essay has six main sections beyond this 
introduction. The next three sections present the interface issue in some detail by examining the work 
of a major representative of each of the three positions on the issue. § 2 examines the work of Robert 
DeKeyser as a representative of the strong position, § 3 examines the work of Stephen Krashen as a 
representative of the no position and § 4 examines the work of Rod Ellis as a representative of the weak 
position. In each case parts of the theorist’s work will be examined and then some critical commentary 
will be offered. In § 5 the essay turns its focus from SLA theory to the philosophy of language in that it 
presents the work of Gilbert Ryle as it relates to the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-
that. It will be shown that the distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge aligns 
closely with the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. This will demonstrate that the 
interface issue has a philosophical antecedent and thus achieve the first objective of the essay. At this 
point there is also a brief discussion of the ways in which Ryle’s work can be of service to SLA given the 
alignment. However Ryle has had his critics and in § 5 I shall also discuss the points made by Jason 
Stanley and Timothy Williamson, who offer what they take to be a complete refutation of Ryle’s 
argument. I shall argue however that the points they makes in their putative refutation don’t hold up to 
critical scrutiny. Section § 6 addresses the second objective of the essay. It examines the work of Jan 
Hulstijn. Hulstijn takes the no position on the interface issue but his approach to that issue is more 
accommodating than Krachen’s of considerations that favor the other two positions. I believe that in his 
work there are the resources necessary for the formulation of a resolution of the apparent dilemma 




complete. The proposed resolution of the dilemma depends upon the adoption of a variant of the strong 
position on the interface issue. I believe that this variant will accord well both with the interface issue 
related studies in SLA and the intuitions of teachers, philosophers and others who hold the traditional 
view of education. In § 7, the final section of the essay, I describe an approach to the design and conduct 
of studies in what can be called either teacher research or classroom based research and describe as 
well a model of ESL instruction. The idea is that the findings of studies of the type described and the 
outcomes of courses that present instruction of the type described will support the claim that the 
argument for the variant of the strong position advocated is valid. I hope to conduct such studies and to 
teach such courses myself and I hope that in doing so I might set an example for others. Both SLA theory 
and the philosophy of language focus on natural language. At minimum each discipline can serve as a 
resource for the other. Thus SLA can benefit from the study of the theory provided by the philosophy of 
language generally and by the formal semantics of natural language more specifically. And the 
philosophy of language can benefit from the study of the rich data on actual language use provided by 
SLA and from the study of the theory provided by SLA as well.          
§ 2   The Strong Interface Position 
Theory 
     DeKeyser (1998) is a broadly based but sharply focused presentation of at least one influential version 
of the strong interface position. Ellis (2009) credits Sharwood Smith (1981) as having advanced the 
position formally for the first time but DeKeyser’s work has many advantages when taken as a base for 
the exposition to be provided here. In the typical manner of an SLA theorist and researcher, DeKeyser 
addresses a more or less specific question. “The crucial question … is whether the explicit knowledge 
that results from sequential models of FonF [Focus on Form] instruction … can eventually be fully 
automatized (47).”  Ellis (2009) sets three questions that work well together to bring out what the 
interface issue amounts to. They are as follows: 
(1) To what extent and in what ways are implicit and explicit learning related? 
(2) Does explicit knowledge convert into or facilitate the acquisition of implicit knowledge?  
(3) Does explicit instruction result in the acquisition of implicit as well as explicit knowledge? 
DeKeyser’s question is effectively Ellis’s question (3) in a somewhat different vocabulary. All SLA 
theorists and researchers acknowledge that the basis of the competent use of any natural language is 
the user’s implicit knowledge of that language and thus one’s answer to question (3) determines 
whether one regards instruction in a second language to be a valid educational enterprise. 
      DeKeyser is an SLA theorist and researcher but he apparently discovered at some point that parts of 
cognitive psychology can serve as a valuable resource in relation to various types of investigation in his 
discipline. In all three of his works that we consider here, he conducts his investigation from a cognitive 
psychology perspective. And within cognitive psychology, what he finds to be most relevant is ‘skill 




computer programming, text editing and even cigar making. Among the models of skill acquisition to be 
found in the cognitive psychology literature, DeKeyser chose Anderson’s Adaptive Control Theory 
(ACT)(1982,1983,1990,1995) because it was at the time the most widely accepted model of its kind. 
According to the ACT model, there are three stages in the process of skill acquisition. 
(1) The declarative stage: the individual as learner acquires declarative knowledge: declarative 
knowledge is factual knowledge: for example that Napoleon was defeated in 1815 is factual and thus 
declarative knowledge: in the case of skill learning, it is obvious that the factual knowledge must 
pertain to the skill: in the typical case the knowledge comes from instruction. 
(2) The procedural stage: procedural knowledge directs behavior: it consists in ‘condition-action’ 
parings: when a certain condition comes into being, the individual is to perform a certain action: 
declarative knowledge that derives from instruction determines the pairings: each instance of the 
occurrence of one of the conditions involved followed by the performance of the associated action 
works to proceduralize the relevant declarative knowledge.  
(3) The automatized stage: as declarative knowledge becomes proceduralized, so procedural 
knowledge becomes automatized: automatized knowledge directs behavior without the conscious 
cooperation of the now skilled individual: when the condition comes into being, the action is 
performed without the individual’s having to think about it: it is performed automatically.    
It might be noted that whether a declarative stage is even possible depends on the skill. It is highly 
doubtful that a declarative stage is possible in the teaching of bicycle riding, or how to sing (training of 
opera singers). But the case of language is different because, in principle, there are rules that determine 
correct linguistic usage, and they can be expressed in propositional form. In any case these are the 
stages of the general skill acquisition process according to DeKeyser, following Anderson, but how does 
this process actually play out in the case of second language acquisition? DeKeyser’s text is both 
instructive and engaging but in order to present its essential content, I found it necessary to patch 
together passages from three disparate parts of it. 
     In the first of the three passages, we get a fairly complete characterization of the strong interface 
position in general terms. In order to develop the student’s ability to use the L2 (the second language), 
you first teach them its grammar and then have them complete exercises in which the grammar taught 
is used in one way or another.  
A formS-focused lesson [lesson focused on particular grammar forms] often takes the shape of 
reading a short text, and then explaining one or more grammar points, doing some structural 
exercises and some communicative exercises, and finally, in the case of a foreign as opposed to 
a second language class, translating a few sentences. But what does skill theory have to say that 
is relevant to planning a teaching unit? It says that declarative knowledge should be developed 
first, before it can be proceduralized. This means that if grammar is taught, it should be taught 
explicitly, to achieve a maximum of understanding, and then should be followed by some 
exercises to anchor it solidly in the student’s consciousness, in declarative form, so that it is easy 




Here the emphasis is on explicit instruction in relation to a feature of the L2 in order to develop the 
student’s declarative knowledge of that feature. Incidentally we see here that DeKeyser is concerned to 
a great extent with SLA pedagogy as opposed to SLA theory per se.  
          The background that is relevant to the next pasage is the classification of language drills that is 
given in Paulston (1970). According to Paulston, there are three types of language drills:  
 (1) Mechanical drills 
These drills do not require the student to understand the L2 language that the drill addresses. They 
permit just one acceptable response on the part of the student.  
Mechanical drills as described here would not be thought of as very useful by most language 
teachers but they could play a role in preparing students for meaningful or communicative activities. 
Thus for example a teacher who believes that the association of prepositions with verbs is essentially 
arbitrary might give their students a lesson that focuses on an article about U.S. elections. The 
students will learn the vocabulary and the grammar of the article as a part of the lesson but, prior to 
the lesson, they could be required to memorize the verb-preposition associations that occur in the 
article. They could then be tested by giving them:  
(a) a list of the ‘big 10’ prepositions of English, viz. 
of  to  at  by  in  on  for  with  from about 
      and 
(b) a sequence of fill-ins like the following:   
vote _____ 
supported _____ 
take a position _____ 
The only acceptable answers are ‘for’, ‘by’ and ‘on’, respectively, but the students the students will 
learn the verbs ‘to vote’, ‘to support’ and the verb based locution ‘to take a position’ as well as the 
big 10 prepositions only when they are given the lesson. The teacher wants to get out ahead of the 
problem of students’ being confused about verb-preposition associations by using an exercise in the 
form of a drill to make the point that the associations are arbitrary.    
(2) Meaningful drills 
These drills do require the student to understand the L2 language that the drill addresses. And they 
allow a range of acceptable responses. But each response is ‘canned’ in the sense that the student 




A lesson designed to teach the three basic tenses of English serves as an example here. The teacher 
says to one of her students, 
John, I understand that taking calculus is a part of your undergraduate program. 
The student must then respond by saying something like: 
Yes, I took calculus last semester. 
or 
Yes, I am taking calculus now. 
or 
Yes, I will take calculus next semester. 
Then the teacher says to another one of her students, 
Jane, I understand that your parents are concerned about your housing here. 
The student must respond by saying something like: 
Yes, they visited me last week. 
or 
Yes, they are visiting me now. 
or 
Yes, they will visit me next week. 
The students understand what the teacher says and what they themselves say. Further the students 
can form a past tense, a present tense or a future tense sentence so there is a range of choices. But 
each sentence a student offers as their response is improvised to fit the teacher’s prompt so that no 
real information is conveyed. Indeed it is obvious that the teacher and the students engage in a 
contrived discourse purely for the purpose of teaching the students the three basic tenses of English. 
 
(3) Communicative drills 
These drills differ from meaningful drills in that the range of acceptable responses is unrestricted. The 
range of acceptable responses is unrestricted because each response that the student makes is an 
intelligent one conditioned by the preceding discourse. Thus the student does contribute information to 




A very simple example will suffice here. The teacher selects a topic and they and their students 
engage in a discussion of that topic. The students take turns speaking in the discussion and, at their 
turn, each student must either say something about the topic that follows appropriately upon what 
has been said thus far or ‘take a pass’ by saying something like ‘I have nothing to add to that.’ or ‘I 
agree basically.’. The option to take a pass helps to make the discussion a relaxed one in which all of 
the students feel comfortable. The discussion is audio recorded and the teacher arranges an 
individual conference with each student during which they provide them with corrective feedback on 
the speech that they produced. 
     Now DeKeyser uses mechanical drills as a point of reference to further his characterization of the 
strong interface position by saying that:       
They [mechanical drills] are not what is needed to proceduralize this knowledge [declarative 
knowledge] … because they do not engage the learner in the target behavior of conveying 
meaning through language. Instead they provide practice in a very peculiar behavior, a 
“language-like behavior,” which consists of linking forms with other forms, of shuffling forms 
around, according to a pattern held in working memory, without ever linking those forms with 
meaning, that is, without the student ever engaging in the target behavior of using language 
(53). 
So for the student’s declarative knowledge of the L2 to become procedural knowledge, they must 
recognize that the condition specified by the declarative knowledge has come into being and then 
perform the action that it pairs with that condition during meaningful discourse. The declarative 
knowledge will typically take the form of a rule that governs a feature of the L2. The student must 
practice (1) receiving L2 language with that feature in order to apprehend meaning and (2) producing L2 
language with that feature in order to convey meaning. Here then the emphasis is on the need to have 
the student engage language as a repository of meaning at the same time that they develop their ability 
to process it mechanically.   
         The final passage from DeKeyser clarifies how, on his conception, the pedagogical enterprise 
proceeds: 
The essential notion to bear in mind here is that proceduralization is achieved by engaging in the 
target behavior – or procedure – while temporarily leaning on declarative crutches … in other 
words …conveying a message in the second language while thinking of the rules (49).   
We saw above that, for each feature of the L2,  the student must first receive instruction that secures 
for them declarative knowledge in the form of a rule that specifies a condition-action pairing and then 
they must employ that rule repeatedly in both reception and production as they participate in 
meaningful discourse. Here we see that the student must have the rule before their attention while they 
are participating in the discourse. That is to say, the student must think of the rule as they are 
participating in the discourse. The rule thus serves as a kind of template. But of course the template will 
be needed only until the declarative knowledge in the form of the rule has been proceduralized. A very 




which the recipe for a dish is given as they prepare that dish for the first several times. But after that 
they can prepare the dish without the aid of the cookbook, and with little or no attention paid to the 
preparation process itself.    
     So on Dekeyser’s view, a learner acquires a feature of the second language by (1) receiving explicit 
instruction on the rule that governs that feature and then (2) applying that rule as they participate in 
meaningful discourse while (3) keeping the rule consciously in mind as they do so. But note that (1) – (3) 
are not themselves stages in any process. Rather they are best thought of as the essential parts of a type 
of educational experience whose purpose it is to propel the learner through the three stages of skill 
acquisition outlined by Anderson as a means of increasing their proficiency in the second language.   
Practice 
   It is somewhat surprising that DeKeyser says so little about practice in his presentation of the strong 
interface position since the view on which that position is based focuses on instruction in grammar and 
vocabulary followed by practice as the means to the acquisition of a second language. He does however 
make critical reference to exercises at several points and these exercises have to be understood as 
forms of practice. He is also the editor of and a contributor to a book on the subject of practice as it 
relates to second language acquisition. The book, Practice in a Second Language: Perspectives from 
Applied Linguistics and Cognitive Psychology, is an anthology in which DeKeyser wrote the first and last 
chapters. In the first he attempts to situate the concept of practice in SLA , and in the last  he speculates 
about the future of that practice. The number of particular topics covered in these two chapters is quite 
large but brief consideration of about  half dozen will suffice for our purposes. 
     Definitions of the term ‘practice’ produced by several other SLA theorists and researchers are cited 
but according to the definition adopted by the contributors to the anthology, practice consists in “…  
specific activities in the second language, engaged in systematically, deliberately, with the goal of 
developing knowledge of and skills in the second language (DeKeyser 2007a 1).” Still one tends to miss 
here the element of repetition that seems to be so central to the nature of practice. Later on however 
DeKeyser says that the contributors to the anthology are not opposed to the idea of multiple repetition 
even though they did not include it in their definition.  
     DeKeyser sees practice as having many specific goals corresponding to the terms of a number of 
distinctions that are central in SLA theory. These include:  
- listening /speaking /reading /writing  
- accuracy /fluency /complexity  
- rule use /formulaic use  
- implicit /explicit  




The nature of practice must be determined by the specific goal that is being pursued. Thus for example 
practice aimed at the development of accuracy might take the form of self-conscious production with 
extensive, direct feedback from the instructor. Practice aimed at the development of fluency might take 
the form of freewheeling conversation with minimal, indirect feedback from the instructor. And practice 
aimed at the development of complexity might take the form of essay writing with a directive to use one 
or more complex grammatical structures in the composition.  
     Two fundamental aspects of practice are segmentation and transfer. Complex skills can be broken 
down into their component parts for purposes not only of practice but also of teaching and providing 
feedback. The newer methods of teaching that emphasize fluency are not inclined to segment complex 
skills but the older methods that emphasized accuracy were inclined to do so. “… what exactly the ideal 
point is on the analytic/synthetic dimension of curriculum design, and what this implies for practice 
activities, is still far from resolved … (DeKeyser 2007a 9).” I do not find DeKeyser to be so clear on the 
concept of transfer but it is nonetheless an important one. Transfer of skill from one kind of task to 
another seems to depend on the extent to which the two kinds of tasks are similar and on the form 
which the knowledge involved takes. Transfer is more likely where the two kinds of tasks are similar and 
where the knowledge involved is abstract. Thus for example there is little transfer of skill from the task 
of reading computer programs to the task of writing computer programs because the two tasks are 
quite different in specific terms even though they are obviously related. And if the knowledge related to 
a skill takes the simple form of familiarity with several examples then it is less likely to transfer but if it 
takes the form of a rule or a principle then it is more likely to transfer. “Knowledge that is overly 
contextualized can reduce transfer; abstract representations of knowledge can help promote transfer 
(Bransford et al. 1999 41 quoted in DeKeyser 2007a 6).” Where transfer from reading computer 
programs to writing computer programs does occur, it is a function of the learner’s possession of 
declarative knowledge  of a rule or a principle that underlies both task types.       
     Instruction and practice are the key components of the pedagogical model implied by the strong 
interface position. Factors like (1) the amount of time that has been allotted to a course, (2) the level of 
motivation of the students in the course and (3) the quality of the technology available to the teacher of 
the course are all quite important. But effective instruction and effective practice are necessary 
conditions of the success of the course.       
     It is very difficult to know what to say in reaction to DeKeyser’s theory of second language acquisition 
and the strong interface position it has him take. The views he expresses regarding learning are 
intuitively valid for virtually everyone living in advanced society. And in the schools, colleges and 
universities that are responsible for the education of the populace, it is simply presupposed that (1) 
instruction followed by study is the means to the acquisition of knowledge and (2) instruction followed 
by practice is the means to the acquisition of skill. Beyond school we have professional life and leisure. 
At work we have to become knowledgeable of and skilled at accounts payable, or computer assisted 
design, or customer relations. And away from work we take up bridge or become intrigued with crochet 
or fall in love with building model airplanes. DeKeyser’s theory accords very well with our experience in 
these various realms and if we asked anyone outside of linguistic scholarship to account for the way in 




to a lay version of that theory. Thus it seems fair to say that what DeKeyser offers has ha high degree of 
credibility in the everyday walks of life. But from the perspective of SLA scholarship, things are 
completely different. The thesis reflected in DeKeyser that the explicit knowledge produced by 
instruction converts somehow into the implicit knowledge that is the basis of both L1 and L2 language 
use is now taken to be refuted. The strong position on the interface issue has been supplanted by the no 
position and the weak position. Only these latter positions figure meaningfully in the ongoing debate. 
The opposition between the intuitive appeal of the strong position and the rejection of that position in 
SLA scholarship constitutes what I will call the dilemma of second language acquisition theory. Initially I 
had planned simply to register the dilemma but having read the work of Jan Hulstijn I saw new 
possibilities for resolving it. So I will say no more about DeKeyser until we reach the point at which the 
resolution can be attempted. For the moment I shall focus on the no position as it is represented by 
Stephen Krashen and on the weak position as it is represented by Rod Ellis. In both discussions there will 
be ample of criticism of the strong position.      
§ 3 The No Interface Position 
Theory 
      While Krashen cites authors whose work antedates his own, especially Wagner-Gough and Hatch 
(1975), he himself is the dominant figure associated with the no position on the interface issue. In 
Krashen (1985) he presents what he labels a theory of second language acquisition. This theory is based 
on five hypotheses which he calls ‘the acquisition-learning hypothesis’, ‘the natural order hypothesis’, 
‘the monitor hypothesis’, ‘the input hypothesis’ and ‘the affective filter hypothesis’, respectively. He 
introduces them in the introductory chapter of his text by providing a brief description of each one. The 
input hypothesis is regarded as the most important member of the set. Krashen does not specify any 
structure for the set but I think that a certain structure is implicit in it and I will try to bring this out later. 
         In addition to the hypotheses of his theory, Krashen also presents two other components of his 
overall case: eight ‘… very plausible predictions about a variety of interesting and yet poorly investigated 
phenomena in second-language acquisition …’ as well as responses to five challenges that have been 
made to the input hypothesis by other SLA researchers.  The order of my discussion will be the 
following:      
(1) brief sketches of the five hypotheses 
(2) an attempt to justify the ordering scheme I have suggested for these hypotheses 
(3)  a brief discussion of  Krashen’s eight predictions 
(4) a critical evaluation of Krashen’s response to the most basic and most important of the five 






The Five Hypotheses 
The Acquisition-Learning Hypothesis: 
      We can form a relationship with a second language in two distinct ways. Either we acquire the ability 
to use the language automatically by a subconscious process under certain circumstances or we learn 
about the nature of the language by a conscious process. In the latter case we either observe the use of 
the language so as to deduce what its form and function are or we are instructed so as to apprehend 
directly what its form and function are. The acquisition of a second language is very much like the 
acquisition of a first language and all SLA theorists and researchers agree that it is acquisition rather 
than learning (in Krashen’s sense) that is the basis of our actual use of a second language. 
The Natural Order Hypothesis: 
     Krashen attributes this hypothesis to Corder (1967). It is the claim that the features of a second 
language are acquired in a certain fixed order. For example the rule governing the plural meaning of ‘s’ 
might be acquired before the rule concerning the use of ‘s’ for the third person possessive.  But the 
order is not determined by a progression from simplicity to complexity. Thus in the case of English as the 
second language, the placement of the adjective at the left of the noun might not appear in the fixed 
order before the placement of a relative clause at the right of the noun even though an adjective is a 
simple modifier while a relative clause is a complex one. Moreover instruction is not supposed to be 
able to alter the sequence.    However, in the recent literature I have seen only two attempts to specify 
in the case of a second language, what the order actually is, and then only for a rather limited number of 
cases. Moreover I have seen no attempt to explain why, in the case of a second language, the order is 
fixed in this way rather than another.   
The Monitor Hypothesis: 
     As noted above Krashen makes a fundamental distinction between acquisition and learning. Of these 
two phenomena acquisition is far and away the more important one because it provides the basis for 
the actual use of the second language by individuals who have reached any level of proficiency. But 
learning does have a role to play. We can use what we have learned about the second language to 
monitor, i.e. to edit, the language that we produce when we speak or write. That is, we can hold up a 
rule that we have learned against what we have said or written to see if there is a match or a mismatch 
and then revise what we have produced where there is a mismatch. Thus monitored production is at 
least somewhat more accurate grammatically than unmonitored production. However only individuals 
who are highly motivated to speak and write correctly and who in fact know the rules can monitor their 
production. But such individuals are rare according to Krashen. Further when someone does monitor, it 
makes their production less efficient. Krashen does not actually describe the monitoring process but it 
seems quite natural to think that the second language user who engages in it must (1) formulate a 
sentence that conveys at least roughly the meaning that they intend and then (2) check that sentence 
against any number of rules in order to determine whether it is in conformity with them. By contrast the 
second language user who does not engage in the monitoring process has only to perform task (1). And 




production takes longer than unmonitored language production to output a sentence that conveys a 
certain meaning. It is true that a sentence produced without monitoring will quite likely contain more 
errors than one produced with monitoring but I share with most of the language teachers I have known 
the idea that there are two kinds of errors in a certain respect, viz. those that do not affect the clarity of 
the sentence and those that do. Errors that do not affect clarity are for the most part what I call 
‘discrete’ errors. Examples are failure to use the plural ‘s’ on a noun, failure to use the past tense ‘-ed’ 
on a verb and confusing expressions that look and/or sound alike – confusing ‘their’ with ‘they’re’. Errors 
that do affect clarity are for the most part structural errors. The sentence consists of a number of 
phrases and/or clauses that aren’t in the proper order – they are ‘scrambled’ in relation to the proper 
order – and invariably there are problems with respect to at least some of the phrases and clauses 
themselves. I try to bring out the difference between the two kinds of errors by using a car accident 
analogy. A discrete error is like a ‘fender bender’. The car’s fender was bent in the accident and the 
repair shop just takes it off and puts on a new one. A structural error is like a ‘total wreck’. The car is 
badly damaged in general and the chassis is bent in particular. The car must be sold as nothing more 
than a source of parts and scrap metal and thus must be replaced. By the way I try to cancel any grim 
implication of this second part of the analogy by making the joke that the car involved was a Volvo so 
that no one was hurt in the accident. Now to return to the issue at hand, the vast majority of the errors 
produced by both native and nonnative speakers of English are of the discrete kind, and thus the errors 
produced by the individual who does not monitor might be exclusively of the discrete kind such that the 
meaning of their sentence is clear despite the errors. Thus there can be a strict tradeoff between the 
accuracy achieved by the individual who monitors and the greater efficiency preserved by the individual 
who does not.            
The Input Hypothesis: 
     The only way in which we acquire a second language is by means of ‘comprehensible input’. When we 
hear or read language that contains a certain feature and we understand that language, we acquire the 
feature. However this process is subject to the natural order of acquisition reflected in the natural order 
hypothesis. We can learn a feature at point i + 1 in the natural order only when (a) we have already 
arrived at point i and (b) we receive linguistic input containing that feature, which we understand, by  
virtue of various contextual extra-linguistic items and/or our general knowledge of the world. These 
factors thus serve as a kind of ‘scaffolding’ for the construction of our understanding of language 
containing the i + 1 feature. Acquisition of the new feature is automatic under the circumstances 
specified although factors related to the affective filter hypothesis can thwart the acquisition, as we will 
shortly see. But what guarantees the acquisition when the affective filter does not thwart it is our 
‘internal language processor’. Krashen identifies this internal language processor with Chomsky’s 
Language Acquisition Device, or LAD. 
The Affective Filter Hypothesis: 
     Whether comprehensible input automatically results in acquisition depends on whether the 
individual’s affective filter is ‘up’ or ‘down’. Their affective filter is ‘up’ where they lack motivation or 




revealed or that they will fail. But their affective filter is down where they consider themselves to be 
potential members of the community that uses the second language, and are so focused on the meaning 
that is being communicated that they temporarily forget that they using a new language. Where the 
filter is up comprehensible input will not reach the LAD in order to connect with it and acquisition will 
not occur. But where the filter is down the connection will be made and acquisition will take place 
automatically. 
     The acquisition-learning hypothesis is obviously the basic one because it claims that there are two 
distinct ways of getting to know a language– the unconscious “automatic” one and the conscious 
learning of rules, and it does not make any place for a way that combines the two elements, even in the 
case of a second language. The two terms in its name, ‘acquisition’ and ‘learning’, correspond to these 
two ways, which form a simple classificatory scheme, which can be applied to the other rules.  
Monitoring is the process that allows learned knowledge of language to play a role in an individual’s use 
of a second language. They can use the knowledge that they have learned through instruction to control 
the grammatical quality of the language that they produce. But this according to Krashen is an inefficient 
way and it applies only to a small minority. Krashen presents the following as his ‘fundamental 
principle’: “ … people acquire second languages only if they obtain comprehensible input and if their 
affective filters are low enough to allow the input ‘in’(4).” We see then that the input hypothesis and the 
affective filter hypothesis form a pair that gives us necessary and sufficient conditions for second 
language acquisition. What then of the remaining hypothesis, the natural order hypothesis? It plays a 
regulative role in relation to second language experience. If the learner is at point i in the natural order 
then they can neither acquire a feature nor monitor language containing it unless it is at point i + 1. Thus 
the natural order hypothesis cannot be seen as falling under either the concept acquisition or the 
concept learning of the classificatory scheme. Instead it must be seen as standing outside the complex 
of the other four hypotheses in the role of a broad ‘regulator’ of the complex set of processes that they 
generate collectively. I think that uncovering this structure in Krashen’s set of five hypotheses provides 
at least a modicum of insight into the general nature of his theory of second language acquisition.   
Evidence 
     As we turn our attention now to evidence for the Input Hypothesis, it is very important to point out 
that Krashen considers both L1 and L2 studies and it is important to be mindful of when he is discussing 
which. Further the studies vary broadly in terms of the phenomena addressed, the methodologies 
employed and the findings arrived at. So there is a good deal of complexity overall. Krashen introduces 
the section on evidence as follows: 
In this section, we very briefly review previously published evidence supporting the Input 
Hypothesis and fundamental principle. While alternative explanations are not excluded in 






Krashen presents his evidence  for the input hypothesis under ten headings, which are as follows: 
- caretaker speech    - lack of access to comprehensible input 
- the silent period    - method comparison research 
- age differences    - immersion and sheltered language teaching 
- the effect of instruction   - the success of bilingual programmes 
- the effect of exposure    - the reading hypothesis 
The selection of these headings is to be accounted for only by noting that each one of them refers to 
something that Krashen takes to provide evidence for the input hypothesis. The space he devotes to the 
referents of the headings varies from five pages for ‘caretaker speech’ to eight lines for ‘lack of 
comprehensible input’. Some of the discussions of the referents include considerable citation of studies, 
others include minimal citation of studies and still others include no citation of studies. Work specifically 
by Krashen is cited in just a few discussions. It might be said in a general way that what Krashen provides 
is a survey of studies. Surveys of studies are common in SLA research but the typical such survey is 
sharply focused on a specific research question and tightly organized. Krashen’s survey addresses 
whatever seems relevant to the input hypothesis and the studies cited in the various discussions of the 
heading referents are not brought into relation to each other. Let us now consider the discussions in 
turn. The objective in each case will be to determine to what extent the input hypothesis is supported by 
what the discussion reveals. 
Caretaker Speech: 
     In the discussion related to this heading, Krashen is concerned with four factors of acquisition, viz. 
(1) whether the child is directly engaged in conversation by the caregiver, most typically the 
mother 
(2) to what extent the caregiver simplifies their language in conversation with the child 
(3) the role of caregivers beyond the mother 
(4) the way in which context helps to make the caregiver’s speech comprehensible to the child 
     It should be noted that, while it took me some time to realize it, in this discussion Krashen addresses 
first language acquisition for the most part. The larger part of the discussion focuses on (2) so let us 
begin with it. Cross (1977) reports that “… the syntax of mothers … is not uniformly pitched just a step 
ahead of the child in either linguistic or psycholinguistic complexity. Some utterances are pitched at the 
child’s level, some below this, and others are considerably in advance of what the children themselves 
can say (180).” Ochs (1982) reports that Samoan caregivers “… do not use baby talk lexicon, special 
morphological modifications (diminutives, etc.), simpler syntactic constructions or constructions of 




caretakers in an African American community “… do not simplify their language, focus on single-word 
utterances by young children, label items or features of objects in either books or the environment at 
large (68).” 
     These reports might seem to be at least contrary to the input hypothesis since it is natural to think 
that language becomes comprehensible to the child by virtue of their mother’s adjustment of the 
complexity of her language to the level the child has reached in their progression towards proficiency. 
But Krashen sees the evidence in the reports by Cross, Ochs and Heath as helpful to him. He says the 
following about this evidence: 
It is, in fact, valuable data in that it focuses attention on what is essential for language 
acquisition: not simplified input but comprehensible input containing i + 1, structures ‘slightly 
beyond’ the acquirer’s current state of competence. It should be emphasized that the Input 
Hypothesis does not claim that all acquirers will receive simplified input, expansions, or middle-
class caretaker speech. It does claim that all acquirers will obtain comprehensible input, and 
there is good reason to posit that such input is available to acquirers in each of the situations 
described above. (6) 
     Regarding factor (1) above Krashen cites Harkness (1971) and again Heath (1982). Harkness says, 
“One [Guatemalan] mother told me, ‘I never talk with my child. I just tell him to do something and he 
does it. When he talks, it’s with other children.’ (498).” And Heath says that the working-class caretakers 
in the African American community referred to above “… while very responsive to young children’s non-
verbal behavior, make no special attempt to involve children in conversation until the child can make 
himself understood (68).” 
     The situation here is very similar to the one above. If the mother or other caregiver does not even 
engage the child in conversation then how does the child receive what is presumably their first and most 
valuable comprehensible input, viz. the level adjusted language of the individual who is with them all 
but constantly when they are very young? Krashen does not say that the data here is valuable but he 
does not see it as posing a problem for the input hypothesis either. In the situations cited, the child has 
an alternative. Krashen says: 
… in each case there is a large amount of exposure to language; language is used around the 
child a great deal. Heath notes that the Black working-class children she studied ‘are in the midst 
of constant human communication, verbal and non-verbal … they are held, their faces fondled, 
their cheeks pinched, and they eat and sleep in the midst of human talk … they are talked about 
and kept in the midst of talk about topics that range over any subject …’. They are exposed to 
‘almost continuous communication’ …  (7) 
Presumably similar considerations apply in the case of Guatemalan children.  
     We turn now to factor (4) above, which is quite different from the other three in that it represents 
Krashen’s best effort to explain how input becomes comprehensible for the child. Two passages need to 




now’ aids comprehension, supplying the extra-linguistic context that helps the child in decoding the 
message (4,5).” And, relying on Ochs, he says: 
‘Exposure’ does not necessarily entail comprehensible input. In these cases [ones in which the 
child is not talked to directly], however, extra-linguistic context is present to make the available 
speech the child hears more comprehensible. Ochs points out, for example, that ‘the topics 
entertained between caregiver and child tend to focus on the immediate past (e.g. accusations 
and reports of misdeeds), immediate present, and immediate future (e.g. directives to carry out 
acts) …’, topics that ‘characterize household talk in general and are part of a register used by 
familiars and intimates’. Samoan caretaker speech thus focuses on the ‘here and now’ … (7) 
The idea that context can help a child to understand language is a highly intuitive one. Let us employ 
some simple semantics here. A sentence denotes a state of affairs and a state of affairs is a structure of 
some kind. Now to the extent that at least the parts of the structure can be indicated demonstratively 
because they are in the context of the conversation, the child should find it easier to figure out from the 
sentence what state of affairs cum structure it in fact denotes. However Krashen says nothing about 
how context helps to make input comprehensible. 
     The final factor of the four above, (3), can be dispensed with quickly. Krashen discusses briefly four 
kinds of caregivers beyond mothers, viz. other children and, in the case of second language acquisition, 
teachers, foreigners and other learners. This is a relatively minor point but in a society like that of 
America today, I think that it is also important to mention nannies and babysitters in case of first 
language acquisition.     
     The thing I find most interesting about this, the longest of the discussions in Krashen’s section on 
evidence, is that he takes the input hypothesis to apply to first language acquisition as well as to second 
language acquisition. This strongly implies that he thinks that the two language acquisition forms are 
alike. And it seems that, on Krashen’s view of second language acquisition, they are alike with respect to 
the role played by exposure. But aren’t they quite different in that first language acquisition is 
unconscious and automatic whereas second language acquisition is conscious and typically difficult? Not 
so for Krashen. In the sub-section of the section on the five hypotheses entitled ‘The Fundamental 
Principle in Second Language Acquisition’, he says: 
We can summarize the five hypotheses with a single claim: people acquire second languages 
only if they obtain comprehensible input and if their affective filters are low enough to allow 
input ‘in’. When the filter is ‘down’ and appropriate comprehensible input is presented (and 
comprehended) acquisition is inevitable. It is, in fact, unavoidable and cannot be prevented – 
the language ‘mental organ’ will function just as automatically as any other organ … (4) 
Following his own statement, Krashen quotes Chomsky (1975) as follows: 
The learner (acquirer) has no ‘reason’ for acquiring the language; he does not choose to learn 
(acquire) under normal conditions, any more than he chooses (or can fail) to organize visual 




can fail) to become an arm or the visual centers of the brain under appropriate environmental 
conditions. (71) 
Clearly, Chomsky is talking about first language acquisition here. So the individual does not choose to 
acquire the first language according to Chomsky and the individual’s acquisition of the second language 
is inevitable and unavoidable according to Krashen, under the circumstances he cites. Hence for Krashen 
both first and second language acquisition are automatic simply speaking.  And note that Krashen refers 
to ‘the language mental organ’, which we must take to be the same thing as the LAD, or language 
acquisition device. Thus it appears that for Krashen the LAD is the basic mechanism responsible for both 
first and second language acquisition. 
     I must admit that I am simply puzzled by this. I don’t think that any of my ESL students have found the 
acquisition of English to be automatic. Given what Krashen says, this must mean that their affective 
filters have not been down or that they have not received sufficient comprehensible input. But how is 
this to be understood in practical terms? 
The Silent Period 
     A child who has moved to a new country whose dominant language is different from his own typically 
goes through a silent period which usually lasts for about six months. Krashen says: 
The child’s reluctance to speak for the first few months of his residence in a new country is not 
pathological, but normal. The child, during this time, is simply building up competence by 
listening, via comprehensible input. His first words in the second language are not the beginning 
of his second-language acquisition; rather, they are the result of the comprehensible input he 
has received over the previous months. (9) 
     In his discussion of caretaker speech, Krashen cites a number of scholarly sources beyond Cross, 
Harkness, Ochs, Heath and Chomsky for a total of sixteen, but here he relies on partial biographies of 
two individuals, Richard Rodriguez, a well-known author, and Richard Boydell, who can barely speak and 
has no use of his hands and arms due to cerebral palsy. Rodriguez knew only Spanish when he entered 
an all English school in Sacramento as a boy. Krashen says that he did not speak in class until he had 
received sufficient comprehensible input from a teacher who talked with him and read with him after 
the school day was over. As a child, Boydell listened to the conversations that took place in his home 
and later his mother helped him to learn how to read. These were his sources of comprehensible input 
according to Krashen, and at age thirty Boydell was able to write an elegant letter using a foot-
controlled electric typewriter.  
     Both of the stories here are interesting and inspiring but I am not so sure what to make of them as 
evidence for the input hypothesis, or of the notion of a silent period itself. There are just the two cases 
and they differ in fundamental ways. Rodriguez’s silent period must have run from some months to a 
year or so while Boydell’s ran for 30 years, his very difficult oral communication with his mother aside. 





     Krashen believes that the input hypothesis and the affective filter hypothesis can account for age 
related differences in second language acquisition. “The data indicates that while children are generally 
superior in second-language attainment in the long run, adults, at least initially, acquire at a faster rate 
… older acquirers progress more quick in early stages because they obtain more comprehensible input, 
while younger acquirers do better in the long run because of their lower affective filters (12).” Adults 
obtain more comprehensible input for three reasons. They have considerable experience and 
knowledge of the world and this helps them to make input more comprehensible. They can begin to 
participate in conversations in the second language earlier on as a result of their ability to use the 
grammar of their first language in combination with the vocabulary of the second language and then 
apply monitoring to improve the product. And they have greater conversation management skill in that 
they are better at indicating to their partner that they have not understood something, and at 
encouraging their partner to keep the exchange going. Krashen says the following about the role of the 
affective filter: 
Child-adult differences in ultimate attainment may be due to differences in the strength of the 
affective filter. I have hypothesized (Krashen 1981a) that the affective filter gains dramatically in 
strength at around puberty, a time considered to be a turning point for language acquisition 
(e.g. Seliger, Krashen and Ladefoged 1982), and may never go ‘all the way down’ again. While 
the filter may exist for the child second-language acquirer, it is rarely, in natural informal 
language acquisition situations, high enough to prevent native-like levels of attainment. For the 
adult, it rarely goes low enough to allow native-like attainment. (13) 
But the language acquisition device remains with us throughout life, and it does not degenerate in 
effectiveness. Thus ‘perfect post-puberty acquisition’ is at least possible.      
The Effect of Instruction 
     Formal instruction in classrooms is helpful when the language generated there is the student’s 
primary source of comprehensible input. This is especially true for the beginner because they find real 
world use of the L2 much too complex to be a good source of comprehensible input. Formal instruction 
is less helpful, however, when the student lives in a society where the second language is dominant and 
they find at least some of the language they are exposed to comprehensible because of their level of 
proficiency. Krashen says that this explains “… why advanced ESL courses for international students in 
North American universities are not effective (Upshur 1968; Mason 1971). The students are competent 
enough in English to get their comprehensible input elsewhere, i.e. certain subject matter classes and in 
social situations (14).” Krashen’s unqualified claim that such courses are ineffective seems to beg the 
question that is central to the interface issue. Clearly students can gain advanced explicit knowledge of 
English in such courses, and the question that is central to the interface issue is - does this explicit 
knowledge convert with practice to the implicit knowledge that all agree is the basis of the proficient 





The Effect of Exposure 
     Krashen (1982a) reviews a range of studies of the relationship between exposure and proficiency and 
argues that the effect of exposure to the L2 depends on the situation of the individual. If the individual is 
in school then exposure probably provides comprehensible input. But if the individual is an immigrant 
who can perform their work with minimal use of the L2 then exposure may not provide comprehensible 
input. 
Lack of Comprehensible Input 
     Long (1983a) presents a review of cases in which individuals did not receive sufficient comprehensible 
input. In one such case hearing children of deaf parents had adult-to-adult speech on television as their 
only source of comprehensible input. As a result acquisition was delayed to a great extent. By contrast 
hearing children of deaf parents who had a great deal of interaction with hearing adults experienced no 
delay in acquisition. Krashen says that this is exactly what the input hypothesis predicts. It should be 
noted however that the children who did experience a delay were nonetheless able to catch up. 
Method Comparison Research 
     A number of studies, including Krashen (1982a) and Krashen and Terrell (1983), that compare 
grammar-based and drill-based methods of instruction show no significant difference in effectiveness. 
This is due to the fact that neither method provides a high enough level of comprehensible input. 
However courses that do provide a high enough level of comprehensible input and maintain a low-
anxiety environment do work. Book flood classes are those in which students read broadly out of 
interest or for pleasure and such classes are more effective than classes based on the audio-lingual 
method. But Krashen does concede that grammar instruction helps with ‘discrete point tests focused on 
late-acquired items’. Tests of this type feature complex rules that are encountered only late in the 
natural order of feature acquisition. 
Immersion and Sheltered Language Teaching 
     Immersion and sheltered language programs are effective. In immersion language programs students 
take all of their classes in an L2. In sheltered language programs students take one or more of their 
classes in an L2. These programs are effective because they provide a very high level of comprehensible 
input. Native speakers of the L2 are excluded from the classes and the teachers are thus encouraged to 
speak at a level of the language that allows the students to understand. Textbooks and associated 
materials are also level adjusted and supplemented where necessary. Lambert and Tucker (1972) claim 
that if immersion students of French are provided with the opportunity to use the language in a variety 
of social situations, they may achieve native-like proficiency in their speech. And students at the 
University of Ottawa who took their second semester of psychology in the second language rather than 
taking a course in the second language itself increased their proficiency as much as students who did 
take a course in the second language itself (see Wesche (1984) for details). Krashen concludes 




teaching is language teaching … (16).” And he adds the point that immersion and sheltered language 
programs may serve as a bridge from academia to the larger world. 
The Success of Bilingual Programs 
     Properly designed bilingual education programs can be effective. Immigrant students who are given 
solid subject-matter classes in their L1 plus classes in which they study the language of their new society, 
i.e. their L2, perform well. The subject-matter classes develop the students’ cognitive academic language 
proficiency, or CALP. In plain language CALP is ‘the ability to utilize language to learn and discuss 
abstract ideas’. This ability is transferable to any other language. Thus when the students are strong 
enough in the L2, they experience the transfer to that L2 of the CALP that they developed in in their L1. 
Legarreta (1979) suggests that bilingual education programs are ineffective when they use the method 
of concurrent translation. If a translation of the material in the L2 being studied is always provided then 
the students have no motivation to try to comprehend the L2 and the teacher has no motivation to 
make the L2 comprehensible to them.     
The Reading Hypothesis 
     Krashen (1978a, 1984) and Smith (1983) claim that good writing comes from reading broadly for 
interest and/or pleasure. Moreover the structure of natural language is very complex and the fact that 
so little of this structure has been described makes it extremely unlikely that it can be taught 
deliberately. Through reading however the individual is provided with the whole of the language as 
comprehensible input. It is nonetheless important to take into account that the student must move 
through the natural order of acquisition and thus not every book is suitable for a given student at a 
given point in in their development. A note on terminology may be of value here. It would perhaps have 
been better if Krashen had not chosen to use the term ‘the reading hypothesis’ as the heading for a 
discussion of evidence in support of the input hypothesis. 
     Collectively we have here a massive amount of material of a wide variety of types. It is difficult to 
know exactly what to say about it. Krashen uses a number of locutions in presenting what he takes to be 
evidence for the input hypothesis. These locutions include: ‘predicts’, ‘accounts for’, ‘could easily be 
interpreted in terms of’, ‘helps to settle’, ‘conclude’, ‘would predict’, ‘has revealed’, ‘provides additional 
evidence for’, ‘provides an explanation for’ and ‘show’.  Perhaps the verb and noun pair ‘explain’ and 
‘explanation’ is the most apt choice. Explanation addresses a fact that we do not understand. We have 
all of these cases of successful second language learning but there was no one factor or set of factors 
that allowed us to understand why all of them are in fact successful. But Krashen claims that the factor 
that explains all of the cases of success is the receipt of comprehensible input. It is not so clear what this 
amounts to, however. What causes a unit of L2 language that was not comprehensible to an individual 
to become comprehensible to them, and once that unit becomes comprehensible, how does it help the 
individual to find the whole of the L2 to be comprehensible? Without something on the order of a 
projection mechanism that takes us from incomprehensibility to comprehensibility and perhaps another 
projection mechanism that takes us from the comprehensibility of parts of the L2 to the 




understand L2 acquisition. I know that this is quite vague but the question at hand is a very basic one, 
and Krashen’s notion of comprehensible input is completely unelaborated. It may be that what Krashen 
does is to identify something that is common to all cases of successful L2 learning, but has no power to 
explain them.         
Krashen’s Criticism of the Other Positions 
     We turn now to the third and final part of Krashen’s position: his criticism of other positions, and in 
particular the strong interface position.  While, for reasons indicated above, I chose DeKeyser as the 
representative of that view, it was Sharwood Smith (1981) who took the position first; in fact, Krashen’s 
criticism of that work, followed by his exchanges with Sharwood Smith gave rise to more precise 
statements of both the strong and the weak interface positions.  Smith argues that “ there is every 
reason to accept the older, intuitively attractive version [account of second language acquisition] which 
says that explicit knowledge may aid acquisition via practice (167).” But the terms ‘may’ and ‘aid’ make 
this a rather mild expression of the strong position. Krashen characterizes it as follows: 
The strong interface position holds that there is only one way to develop automatic-type skills in 
a second language, that being via conscious learning and practice and drill: learning must 
precede acquisition. If this is true, it implies that language teaching is truly ‘applied linguistics’, 
completely dependent on research in formal linguistics; linguists discover a rule, applied 
linguists include it in texts and write exercises using the new rule, teachers teach it, and 
students learn it. If true it also implies that the Input Hypotheses is wrong. Many classroom 
methods assume the correctness of the strong interface position. (39) 
I think it fair to say that there is a bit of caricature here but the position is made clear.  
     Besides the criticism that is implied in the very phrasing of that passage, Krashen proposes the 
following two points:  (1) there are cases in which an individual knows a rule but has not acquired the 
corresponding feature and (2) there are cases in which an individual has acquired a feature but does not 
know the corresponding rule.   
    Let us take (1) and (2) in turn. We rely here on arguments against the strong position presented in 
Krashen (1981a, 1982a) and counterarguments presented in Sharwood Smith (1981). Regarding (1) 
Krashen argues that there are individuals who know the rule but don’t have the feature. Smith responds 
by saying that such individuals are simply not “ … prepared to invest the extra time and energy to 
automatize what is currently exclusively explicit knowledge (165).”  To this Krashen replies by citing the 
case of ‘P’. P is an intelligent, hard-working and highly motivated speaker of English as a second 
language who has a B.A. in linguistics.  In her writing she uses the third person singular ‘s’ for regular 
verbs, e.g., ‘walks’, ‘thinks’. But after a number of years, she still has not acquired it in her speech. (see 
Krashen and Pon (1975)) Regarding (2) Krashen points out that Seliger (1979) reports that there are 
performers who have acquired the correct use of ‘a’ vs. ‘an’ but don’t have explicit knowledge of the 





1. A rule may have been learned at some time before it was acquired but was then forgotten. 
2. The rule may be known to the speaker but they may nonetheless be unable to articulate it. 
Krashen replies by claiming that self-report data contradicts this. Citing Cook (1973) and d’Anglejan and 
Tucker (1975), he says:  
… performers who report that they operate largely on the basis of ‘feel’ do not say that they 
knew the rule once but have forgotten it, or that they have a version of it in their heads but 
cannot communicate it. Moreover, second-language performers have been shown to acquire 
rules that are probably never taught. (40,1) 
     Needless to say this is a very difficult question. Krashen writes in a persuasive manner but there seem 
to be several concerns with respect to his argument.  
     First the no interface position is prima facie counterintuitive because everyone living in any kind of 
society has had many experiences in which they developed a skill after receiving explicit instruction 
related to it and then practicing it, and it is difficult to believe that the instruction had no role in 
developing the skill.  Obviously what I am saying here does not constitute a disproof of the no interface 
position because we realize that we don’t in fact know the exact role that the instruction plays. 
Nevertheless counter-intuitiveness is a hurdle for any theory marked by it and this hurdle is not such an 
easy one to surmount.  
     Second Krashen doesn’t say in any detailed way how acquisition results from the receipt of 
comprehensible input. In his presentation of the input hypothesis, he mentions context, extra-linguistic 
information and our general knowledge of the world as factors that provide a kind of scaffolding which 
helps us to understand language containing a new feature. But this is sketchy at best. It is not even clear 
that we actually have three separate factors here. For example are not both context and general 
knowledge of the world extra-linguistic information with respect to a particular discourse situation? But 
let us say that we do have three separate factors. How do they act individually or in concert to convert 
incomprehensible language to comprehensible language for the second language learner?  We are 
concerned with the acquisition of new features. Let us consider a case in which the new feature is a 
word, a metaphor or a grammar rule that the learner does not understand. If that feature is somehow 
the only element that they don’t understand in a sentence that someone has spoken to them then 
perhaps Krashen’s scaffolding will allow them to figure out the feature. But how could a learner’s 
discourse history in the L2 present them time and time again with a complex expression in which the 
only item that they don’t understand is a new feature for them? And we must remember that second 
language acquisition is for Krashen an entirely unconscious process and thus no part of the figuring out 
can be activity of the kind involved when we are trying to understand a step in a logic proof or plot our 
next move in a chess game. 
     There may however be a broader range of possibilities for the discovery of the meanings of new 
expressions in the L2 than is suggested here. The mechanisms for the discovery of new meanings seem 




says the word for apple in the L2. Implication is more complex. It may be possible to say that an 
implication goes either from (a) the learner’s knowledge of some semantic structure common to the L1 
and the L2, or from (b) the learner’s knowledge of some of the syntax of the L2, to the discovery of new 
meanings. Let us consider two examples. The first illustrates the semantic case. The learner knows that 
the L1 and the L2 both reflect the cause-effect relation. They hear an L2 expression that they know from 
context refers to a particular cause-effect phenomenon. They already know the meaning of one of two 
key terms in the expression and, given this and their knowledge of the phenomenon, they are able to 
figure out the meaning of the other key term in the expression. If the semantic structure has more than 
two parts then there is the opportunity to discover the meanings of more than one new expression. The 
second example illustrates the syntactic case. It also shows how the meaning of an expression larger 
than a word can be discovered. Your friends in the foreign country you are visiting are having fun 
discussing something that happened in a restaurant. One of the women in the group saw a man at 
another table whom she found attractive and, when he turned his attention to her, she blew him a kiss. 
Well one of the other women in the group says in the L2 ‘She blew him a kiss.’ and then acts this out 
using one of the men in the group as her prop. Everyone laughs reflecting the humor they find in the 
boldness of the original gesture. Now you know that SVO, with an option to add objects, is a syntactic 




structure of the L2 sentence. But 
with this you are able to figure out the meanings of all of the words in the sentence. 
     Third, Krashen claims that his theory predicts the various items of evidence he adduces, of which 
there are many more than the ones listed and discussed above. Let us represent Krashen’s theory of 
second language acquisition as ‘T(NP)’ (i.e., the theory of the ‘no position’) and let us represent his 
evidence as ‘E’. Then Krashen claims that there is some sort of implication:         
T(NP) → E 
But what kind of implication is this?  In the natural sciences, say physics or chemistry, there is sufficient 
rigor and precision that make such claims meaningful. But here we are in an area that is too loose and 
indefinite for justifying such a claim.  What we need is a situation in which the evidence is not 
compatible with alternative theories, but this does not seem to be the case. Moreover, Krashen makes 
the claim post factum. There is no prediction of results of new experiments or new measurements, nor 
postdiction of patterns in existing data.  The prediction claim is better understood as the claim that the 
evidence E fits well with T(NP), or fits it better than it fits other theories – which is of course what the 
debate is about. 
      Fourth, Krashen depends on the natural order hypothesis to a great extent in his theory of second 
language acquisition. I have remarked already on the difficulty of substantiating this hypothesis on the 
basis of empirical data. I should also add here that it does not accord with my experience working with 
ESL students.  I have worked in writing centers for many years and many of my tutees are ESL students 
and in the course of my work I have taught students of different backgrounds and of diverse 
nationalities.  The following details are relevant to the point at issue. In each grammar oriented session I 
employ what I call ‘explanatory editing’: the students are supposed to revise under my guidance, their 




accurately the student’s intended meaning. There are typically many errors in the student’s 
composition. I have not performed exact counts, but I could say that there might be as many as 100 
errors that are discovered, corrected and explained during the typical 40 to 60 minute session. The 
errors come in two broad varieties. There are: 
(1) ‘discrete’ errors of  various kinds: mostly  they have to do with 
a. the parts of nouns that change under inflection – ‘s’, ‘’s’ and ‘s’’ 
b. the parts of verbs that change under inflection – ‘s’ and ‘-ed’ 
c. the  auxiliaries of nouns in the form of determiners – the articles ‘a/an’ and ‘the’ 
d. the auxiliaries of verbs in the form of copulas – forms of the verbs ‘to be’ and ‘to have’ 
e. misspelled words  
f. homonyms – ‘their’ vs. ‘they’re’ 
g. disagreement cases related to subjects and verbs – ‘She assist the manager of the Computer      
    Lab.’ 
h. disagreement cases related to pronouns and their antecedents – ‘General Motors is a   
    major American corporation. They produce so many of the products we depend upon. 
(2) structural errors  - whose scope is either one sentence or a short sequence of sentences 
Typically discrete errors can be corrected in only one way whereas structural errors can be corrected in 
any number of ways. 
     Now there are two points to be made in relation to error types and the natural order. The first point 
is that I have never encountered an error that I could not explain to a cooperative student well enough 
for them to understand it basically, or to understand it thoroughly if multiple sessions are devoted to 
the project. Now each error amounts to a failure of mastering a certain feature of L2, but the order in 
which they are treated in class is independent of the order of the corresponding feature recommended 
by the natural order hypothesis; it would be miracle of pure chance if they happened to be the same. 
The difficulty of a student in understanding the feature does not seem to have any connection to the 
natural order. Some types of errors are much more difficult to explain to the students than other. But, 
again, the reasons for this have to do with complexity and lack of an analogous feature in the student’s 
native language, not with the natural order. Good examples of errors that are difficult to explain are 
those relating to the perfect tenses, those involving the ‘who’ vs. ‘whom’ distinction, and those involving 
use of an infinitive phrase vs. use of a preposition - gerund phrase sequence. Now if a student can 
understand an error type thoroughly then they also understand the related feature thoroughly. And 
with this kind of understanding of the feature, they are well equipped to use it in their writing. The most 




employs what I call strategic pausing which gives them time to plan the use of the feature ‘online’. And 
after a certain amount of use in writing and perhaps in speech as well, the student will develop some 
kind of command of the feature. Ellis would say that their explicit knowledge of the feature had been 
‘automatized’. Of course truly acquired features are known implicitly but consider how odd a situation 
could develop given the natural order hypothesis. Imagine a situation in which the student can use the 
feature somewhat fluently in their writing and in their speech but it is as yet impossible for them to 
acquire it because it is still down the line on the natural order. Consider how awkward such an explicit 
knowledge- implicit knowledge gap is.   
     The second point to be made in relation to error types and the natural order is that acquiring a 
feature of a language amounts to being able to use it correctly and spontaneously without any reflection 
but this means that if the natural order hypothesis is correct then, in the writing of the ESL students I 
work with, some features should be present and well controlled while other features should be absent. 
In fact however there is almost always a mixture of correct uses and incorrect uses of the features 
related to the discrete error types. Thus for example the student uses articles correctly in some cases 
and incorrectly in others. It does not matter whether the article is ‘a/an’ or ‘the’. But I can see how the 
advocate of the natural order hypothesis might reply to this objection. They might say that the hit or 
miss use of a feature shows that the student has only explicit knowledge of the feature and thus they 
have not acquired it. By contrast they have implicit knowledge of the features that they have acquired 
and this knowledge is the basis of their being able to use the features correctly and spontaneously 
without any reflection. But I am not sure that in the writing of my ESL students there are any features 
related to discrete error types that stand out as particularly well controlled. There does not seem to be 
any possibility of setting up column A and column B with well controlled features in A and hit or miss, 
and absent, features in B. These considerations suggest a prima facie conflict between my experience as 
a tutor and the natural order hypothesis.   
     Finally, my main concern with Krashen’s theory has to do with his central thesis, which claims that 
acquisition results only from the receipt of comprehensible input. Taken in the right way this is certainly 
true but not so much to the point. I think that the receipt of comprehensible input must be posited as a 
critical stage in the second language acquisition process on any theory. The thing that characterizes a 
theory is the way in which it explains how input becomes comprehensible. Being in receipt of 
comprehensible input is something like a state of the learner whereas what we need is something on 
the order of action, something that causes the learner to be in that state. There are only four 
possibilities for the kind of action needed that I know of from the study of the SLA literature. First there 
is the action of instructing the learner and the associated action of the learner’s practice. Second there is 
the relatively complex and variable set of actions involved in ‘picking up’ a second language that results 
from the learner’s living in a country whose language is different from their native one. Third there is the 
process   proposed by Krashen, in which the student is repeatedly exposed to texts from which, on the 
basis of contextual and semantic clues, the student can interpret correctly various linguistic features, 
according to the natural order hypothesis. And fourth there is a type of action to be described later in 




     All four of these types of action can be seen as making the learner’s input comprehensible to them. 
Thus these four types of action have the explanatory power associated with theories. They explain how 
input becomes comprehensible and this amounts to explaining how acquisition takes place. By contrast 
Krashen’s thesis that acquisition takes place when the learner receives comprehensible input seems to 
lack explanatory power. It is then possible that he does not offer a theory of acquisition so much as he 
identifies the critical process in acquisition as it is caused by all of the four types of action enumerated 
above. Now it may seem to the reader that I am being unfair to Krashen here because of course the 
third of the four types of action, viz. the process of using factors of context and the like to interpret 
language, is due to him. But two points have to be made here. First, Krashen does not use this process 
throughout his theory of second language acquisition and he certainly does not give it the central role in 
his theory that, say, DeKeyser gives to instruction + practice in his theory. Krashen uses this process only 
in his discussion of caretaker speech and at one or two other points in his discussion. He gives the 
central role to his ‘fundamental principle’, viz. the principle that “… people acquire second languages 
only if they obtain comprehensible input and if their affective filters are low enough to allow input ‘in’ 
(4).” And second it seems that the process of using factors of context and the like to interpret language 
works only for a relatively narrow range of sentences. This is the range of sentences that denote states 
of affairs whose components are represented in the context in which the sentence is used. Thus for 
example, the mother says to the child, ‘Apples are delicious.’ as she first holds up an apple and then 
bites into it with an expression of delight on her face. The class of apples denoted by ‘apples’ is 
represented in the context by the apple and the quality ‘being delicious’ is represented in the context by 
the mother’s biting the apple while having a look of delight on her face. It is not at all clear how the 
process of using factors of context and the like to interpret language works for sentences that denote 
states of affairs none of whose components are represented in the contexts in which the sentence is 
used, especially where one or more of these components is abstract. Consider for example the 
sentence, ‘The decision of the court was just.’ used as a part of the conversation at the dinner table in a 
private home. None of the components of the state of affairs denoted by the sentence is represented in 
the context in which the sentence is used, and the quality ‘being just’ is of course a very abstract one. 
     So far we have discussed Krashen’s criticism of the strong position. Concerning the weak position he 
says the following:  
A weak interface position is that learning can become acquisition, but that it is not the only way. 
Learning becoming acquisition is an ‘alternative route’. … If this position is true, it means that 
there are two paths to acquisition, one via comprehensible input, and another via conscious 
rules; there are two ‘language acquisition devices’ or the language acquisition device works in 
two different ways. (41) 
Krashen sees two serious problems with the position as stated. First it violates Occam’s Razor in that 
comprehensible input on its own accounts for phenomena like 1 – 8 discussed briefly above under the 
concept of evidence. Thus there is no need to appeal to explicit instruction + practice in the account. 
“The alternative route does not help to explain the efficacy of caretaker speech … the success of 
methods utilizing comprehensible input and subject-matter ‘sheltered’ language classes, the success of 




Krashen’s logic here or I misunderstand him badly. He does not seem to understand that the alternative 
route interpretation of the weak position implies that there are two sufficient conditions for acquisition. 
These conditions are comprehensible input and explicit instruction + practice. The two conditions are 
then independent of each other and it makes no sense to consider either one helping the other. 
   The second problem Krashen sees with the weak position is that it implies that the natural order of 
acquisition can be defeated. “If learning should become acquisition, any rule can be acquired at any time 
via the alternative route. Thus, evidence for the natural order, and evidence that the natural order is 
independent of the teaching order … is evidence against the [weak] interface position (41).” But the 
advocate of the weak position has two options here. One is to accept the natural order but say that 
explicit instruction + practice can serve as the means to acquisition when an individual reaches the point 
in that order at which a given feature becomes acquirable. The other option is the more radical option 
that Krashen considers exclusively. This is the option of directly challenging the natural order hypothesis 
by claiming that any feature can be acquired at any time via explicit instruction + practice. Of course this 
option comes up directly against the research Krashen refers to that concludes that the natural order is 
independent of the teaching order. But it is still difficult for me to imagine any feature that a bright, 
well-motivated student who has reached the point in their development that is typical of international 
students enrolled in American universities and the feeder schools attached to them could not master 
through the receipt of highly effective explicit instruction followed by diligent, long term practice with 
explicit critical feedback. Of course the question might be what is this mastery: is it implicit knowledge 
or is it just explicit knowledge? 
     All of this having been said, it must be noted that Krashen’s interpretation of the weak position as 
represented in the quote above is quite different from the standard interpretation as we saw it above in 
the introduction and will see it again below in § 4 where we will discuss Ellis as the representative of the 
weak position. 
     Krashen considers one additional position on the interface issue. He labels it the ‘weaker’ interface 
position and explains it as follows. If an individual has learned the rule corresponding to a feature and 
they produce language in which that feature is employed correctly then they thereby provide 
themselves with comprehensible input. And receiving this input can then foster that feature’s 
acquisition. But this weaker position is perfectly compatible with the input hypothesis since it is the 
comprehensible input and not the learning that fosters the acquisition. Thus the weaker position does 
not amount to much in the consideration here of challenges to the input hypothesis. 
     The argumentation here relating to Krashen’s theory of second language acquisition has been 
extensive and complex but I conclude from it that the theory should not be accepted. 
§ 4 The Weak Interface Position 
Theory 
    The weak interface position is, as its name indicates, one that stands ‘between’ the strong and the no 




causal connection between explicit knowledge of the L2 as imparted by instruction + practice and 
implicit knowledge of the L2 as the basis for the use of that L2 but the connection is partial and indirect. 
Ellis says: 
While both a non-interface and a strong interface position are doubtful, a weak interface 
position is tenable. If it is assumed that most communication calls for the use of implicit 
knowledge, a test of whether explicit knowledge can become implicit is whether form-focused 
[i.e., grammar focused] instruction directed at a specific linguistic feature results in the use of 
that feature in spontaneous communication. (1997:114) 
Ellis’s answer to this question is a qualified ‘yes’ and, invoking the natural order hypothesis, he describes 
the circumstances under which the explicit knowledge of language developed by grammar focused 
instruction can in fact convert to implicit knowledge of language as follows:                                                                                                                             
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     
Explicit knowledge derived from instruction may convert into implicit knowledge, but only if 
learners have reached a level of development that enables them to accommodate the new 
linguistic material. In such cases the learners’ existing implicit knowledge constitutes a kind of 
filter that sifts explicit knowledge and lets through only that which they are ready to incorporate 
into the interlanguage (IL) system. However, in other cases – when the focus of the instruction is 
a grammatical property that is not subject to developmental constraints – the filter does not 
operate, permitting learners to integrate the feature directly into implicit knowledge. (1997:115) 
 
An example might help to make what Ellis presents here clearer. Let us say that on the natural order 
hypothesis, feature x [(fx)] must be learned before feature y [(fy)]. Now if a given student is at a point in 
the natural order at which they have learned (fx) but have not learned (fy) and they receive instruction 
on (fy) then they can learn (fy). But if the student is at a point in the natural order at which they have 
learned neither (fx) nor (fy) and they receive instruction on (fy) then they cannot learn (fy). When we say 
here that a student has learned a feature we mean that they have acquired that feature by developing 
implicit knowledge of it. Thus on the first scenario here the student’s implicit knowledge (+ fx) , (- fy) 
allows them to learn (fy) as a result of having received instruction on it. But on the second scenario the 
student’s implicit knowledge (- fx) , (- fy) does not allow them to learn (fy) as a result of having received 
instruction on it. So the student’s existing implicit knowledge serves as a kind of ‘filter’ on the stream of 
feature instruction that they receive. However there are features that are not in the natural order. If (fz) 
is such a feature then it can be learned as a result of having received instruction on it at any time.  
     The two quotes above represent about as much as Ellis says in this chapter about the weak 
hypothesis per se. But he goes on to present two sections entitled ‘Learning explicit knowledge’ and 
‘Learning implicit knowledge’ and it seems that some of the material contained in the latter section can 




instruction develops is converted into implicit knowledge. I will present Ellis’s view of the explicit-
implicit knowledge conversion as a process that has three stages; 
1. Noticing:  
     Instruction must bring the learner to notice a feature of the L2 that they have not yet acquired. 
Following Schmidt (1990,1994), Ellis distinguishes noticing from perceiving. The criterion is that what 
has been noticed is ‘available for verbal report’ whereas what has been perceived may not be. Ellis 
then goes on to cite six factors that can induce the learner to notice a feature: 
(a) the task that the learner has been assigned: the learner’s task can be to understand a feature 
having been given a lesson on it or to engage in communication which somehow involves the use of 
the feature 
(b) the frequent appearance of a feature as a result of its occurrence in ‘teacher talk’ or in lessons 
about it provided by the teacher  
(c) the unusualness of a feature results from its being different from what is expected in view of the 
course of instruction up to that point         
(d) the salience of a feature which is due to its phonological form or its position in utterances 
 (e)the modification of the interaction between the learner and the teacher or other students which 
results from the need to ‘negotiate for meaning’: negotiation is needed where one party to the 
interaction has to clarify the meaning of something they have said after the other party has 
indicated that they do not understand it 
(f) the ability of the learner to notice a feature as a function of their existing linguistic knowledge 
Ellis is careful not to claim more than what the available evidence confirms. Thus he says that none of 
the factors above or any combination of them guarantees that noticing will occur. They only make it 
more likely that it will occur.  
2. Comparing: 
     The second stage of the acquisition process being described here is comparing. If a feature is to be 
acquired then instruction must not only bring the learner to notice the feature. It must also bring the 
learner to compare that feature with whatever there is in their interlanguage system that is 
analogous to it or functionally equivalent to it. Ellis provides an example in which the teacher used a 
technique called ‘recasting’ in order to get the learner to compare. The Learner-Teacher dialogue is 
as follows: 
Learner: No go disco this Saturday. 




Here the teacher ‘recasts’ the learner’s sentence in order to get them to compare their form of 
expression with the correct form. Of course logically and psychologically the learner must notice the 
correct form before they can compare it to their form.  
3. Integrating 
     The third and final stage in the acquisition process is integrating. Once instruction has brought the 
learner to notice a feature and then compare it with the correspondent feature in their existing 
interlanguage, they may be able to revise their hypothesis about the relevant part of the L2. Ellis 
credits Gass (1988) for this idea but does not develop it. However the point seems to be that the 
learner is exploring the L2 and they formulate a hypothesis about one of its parts that they have no 
actual knowledge of. But the learner may develop a new hypothesis about that part of the L2 as new 
information about it comes in as a result of noticing and comparing. Presumably the new hypothesis 
is a better hypothesis, being based on more information.  The part of the L2 being hypothesized 
about may be simple or complex. Simple parts like words and ‘formulaic chunks’ (e.g. ‘Have a nice 
day.’) are actually or effectively lexical items and they are integrated into the learner’s interlanguage 
simply by adding them to it. But complex parts like rules and broad patterns can perhaps be 
integrated into the learner’s interlanguage only by restructuring it. Whether restructuring occurs 
with or without the conscious awareness of the learner is a matter of some controversy.  Ellis cites 
skeptical views found in DeKeyser (1995) and several other sources. Finally the learner can integrate 
a feature of the L2 into their interlanguage only when they have reached the point in the natural 
order of acquisition at which that feature is located. Citing Gass (1988) again, Ellis says that when 
instruction leads the learner to notice and compare a feature that is beyond the point they have 
reached in the natural order, they may lose their acquaintance with that feature or store it as explicit 
knowledge which can help them to acquire it when they are ready for it.     
          Ellis concludes his argument for explicit instruction in the grammar of the L2 as follows: 
An implication in the position being advanced here is that acquisition will proceed more rapidly 
if learners have well-developed explicit knowledge and access to communicative input. … The 
synergistic … effect created by implicit and explicit learning working together outweighs the 
effect of either kind of learning working separately. (1997:124)  
      We chose Ellis to be the representative of the weak interface position and we have now considered 
his theory in support of that position. Those who believe in what can be called the traditional approach 
to teaching English to first speakers of other languages face a dilemma. The two horns of the dilemma 
are (1) the preponderance of negative critical opinion of the strong interface position in the SLA 
community and (2) the counter-intuitive character of the no interface position. Given this dilemma, the 
weak interface position takes on a special status since it stands somewhere in between the strong 
position and the no position. At this point it might be useful to supplement our consideration of Ellis’s 






  The article presenting the study is quite long and some of its technical content is quite complex. For our 
purposes we need not go into the details and a short overview will suffice. The point will be to show 
how the design and the findings of the study dovetail with Ellis’s theory. The study also illustrates the 
methodology of SLA research.  
     The study addresses the practice of providing students who are first speakers of other languages with 
‘corrective feedback’ when they make a mistake in their production of spoken English. Ellis uses a two-
fold classification of the forms of response that constitute corrective feedback: 
(1) The provision of an alternative phrasing that expresses what the student intended to say in a 
correct form that avoids the error.  
(2)  The provision of a ‘metalinguistic’ explanation of the nature of the mistake, i.e. an explanation of 
the error that is based on a statement of the grammatical rule which has been violated by the 
student’s phrasing. 
     As is typical, the study was driven by a specific research question: 
Do learners learn more from implicit or explicit corrective feedback directed at their 
grammatical errors? 
We can see the connection in interest between Ellis’s theory and this study right away. His theory claims 
that explicit teaching of grammar is effective, and the explicit corrective feedback that is one of the two 
approaches the study addresses amounts to explicit teaching of grammar. 
     For the purpose of the study, the concepts of explicit and implicit corrective feedback were 
‘operationalized’ as responses of type (1) and type (2), respectively.  A response of type (1) is a ‘recast’. 
For example, if the student says, ‘I no go to school today’ then the teacher recasts this as ‘I won’t go to 
school today’. Note that a response of type (2) does not include a correction of the error.   
    The participants in the study were the members of a class of 34 students in a private language school 
in New Zealand. They were divided into three groups: groups 1 and 2 had 12 students each, and group 3 
had 10 students. Groups 1 and 2 had to perform two tasks separately. In the first task, the group was 
divided into four groups of three students and each triad was given a sequence of pictures, which told a 
story along with a written version of that story. The written versions the triads were given were all 
different from each other. The triads were then given a short amount of time to read their written 
version and they were told that they should read it carefully because they would have to retell the story 
in detail (orally) without having the written version or any notes to help them. When the written 
versions were taken away, the triads were given a list of verbs they would need in the retelling of the 
story. So they had just the picture sequence and the verb list as they performed the retelling. The words  




were written on the board and the triads were told that they would have to begin their stories with this 
word sequence . As the student in a given triad performed the retelling of their triad’s story, the other 
three triads listened. The listening groups were told that they had to listen carefully because they would 
have to say what was different about the stories they were listening to. The second task was a variant of 
the first, the main difference being that the sequence of pictures that told the story contained a picture 
that did not fit in and the triads were informed that they would have to identify that picture. The two 
tasks were completed on two successive days. Group 3 was the control group and did not perform 
either of the tasks but simply continued with their normal school routine.  
     The target grammar structure chosen for the study was past tense ‘-ed’. It was chosen for two 
reasons. First the researchers were interested in seeing how instruction in the form of corrective 
feedback would affect a learner’s proficiency in the use of a structure that they had already mastered to 
some extent. And second the researchers wanted to test a structure that ESL students find difficult.  The 
tendency is for the learner to use the simple present form of the verb even where the need for the past 
form is evident. Thus the learner might say: 
Yesterday, I visit my sister.  
The researchers offered no hypothesis regarding the reason for this difficulty. However my own 
experience suggests that beginning and intermediate ESL students simply cannot handle both (1) 
producing the sentence that expresses the often complex meaning that they intend and (2) handling 
noun auxiliaries like articles, plural endings, and possessive endings as well as verb auxiliaries like 
copulas, singular ‘s’, progressive ‘-ing’, and past tense ‘-ed’ at the same time as they speak or even as 
they write. 
     The instruction which was at the heart of the study came in the form of corrective feedback that the 
members of the two non-control groups received as they retold the story involved in each task. 
Presumably one member of each triad performed the retelling as the entire membership of the group 
listened closely. The dynamic of the study was set up by the fact that the corrective feedback Group 1 
received was of the metalinguistic explanation type while the corrective feedback that Group 2 received 
was of the recast type. As noted above, the use of recasts is thought of as implicit instruction while the 
use of metalinguistic explanation is thought of as explicit instruction.  
     The students in all three groups were then subjected to a battery of three tests on three separate 
occasions.  The three tests in the battery can be described briefly as follows: 
(1) The Elicited Oral Imitation Test (EIT) 
This test consists of 36 belief statements. 18 of the statements are grammatically correct and 18 of 
them are grammatically incorrect. 12 of the statements target past tense ‘-ed’, 12 target comparative 
adjectives (for the purpose of another study) and 12 target ‘distractor items’. The student is 
presented with the statements one by one via audiotape. Upon each presentation of a statement, 
the student has to do two things. First they have to indicate whether they agree with, disagree with 




statement orally in correct English. The student receives a score of 1 if the statement contains no 
error and they repeat it as given or the statement contains an error and the student repeats the 
statement with the error corrected. The student receives a 0 otherwise. This test is designed to test 
implicit knowledge of grammar (presumably, because the student will avoid the error 
‘automatically’). 
(2) The Untimed Grammaticality Judgment Test (UGJT) 
This test was given in a pen and paper format (it can also be given in a computer format) and it 
consists of 45 sentences. 15 of the sentences target past tense ‘-ed’ and the other 30 sentences 
target other structures. Of the 15 sentences that target past tense ‘-ed’, 7 are grammatically correct 
and 8 are grammatically incorrect. In relation to each sentence, the student has to do three things. 
First they have to indicate whether the sentence is correct or incorrect. Second they have to indicate 
on a scale of 0 – 100 how confident they feel about their judgment. And third they have to indicate 
whether they made their judgment on the basis of ‘rule or feel’. The scoring here is simpler. If the 
student indicates that a correct sentence is correct or that an incorrect sentence is incorrect then 
they receive a score of 1. The student receives a score of 0 otherwise. Having the test taker register 
the degree of confidence they feel in making a judgment may help to some extent to assess their 
knowledge of grammar. Because they can make the right judgment purely on the basis of luck, a 
correct judgment with a high register of confidence might be more impressive than a correct 
judgment with a low register of confidence. And having the test taker indicate whether they made 
their judgment on the basis of rule or feel helps to determine whether they relied more on explicit 
knowledge or implicit knowledge in making the judgment.     
    
(3) The Metalinguistic Knowledge Test (MKT) 
This is a pen and paper test that consists of 5 ungrammatical sentences. 2 of the 5 sentences contain 
a past tense ‘-ed’ error. In relation to each sentence, the student has first to correct the error and 
then to explain the error in their own words in English. The student receives a score of 1 for 
correcting the error in a sentence and another score of 1 for explaining the error correctly. 
Before each test, the students participated in a preparatory session in which they were given a sample 
test. With respect to the EIT and the UGJT, some of the items on the sample test appeared on the test 
itself. Thus there was some transfer of material. This was especially important in the case of the EIT 
because if the student could perform about as well on the new material as on the transferred material 
then it could be claimed that they were able to generalize from particular grammar structures they had 
learned to structures of that type in general. 
     The battery of the three tests was administered first as a pre-test five days before the first task day, 
then again as an immediate post-test the day after the second task day and finally as a delayed post-test 
twelve days after the day of the immediate post-test. The test items were scrambled from test occasion 




      In its Analysis, Results and Discussion sections, the study presents several complex statistical arrays 
with respect to the outcomes of the testing. However the authors of the study also present these 
outcomes in a summary and non-technical way. The following points convey the content of this non-
technical summary: 
(1) the pretests show that all groups had strong explicit knowledge of past tense ‘-ed’ but weak 
implicit knowledge of it 
(2) there were no significant differences of any kind among the three groups in the immediate post-
tests 
(3) in the delayed post-tests, both Group 1[explicit feedback] and group 2 [implicit feedback] made 
significant gains on the EIT and to a lesser extent on the UGJT but the gains for Group 1 were greater 
Now since the EIT registers implicit knowledge, the conclusion to be drawn is that explicit feedback is 
more effective than implicit feedback in advancing the learner’s implicit knowledge of grammar. The 
authors of the study offer explanations of both (3) above and the general conclusion here. Regarding (3) 
they cite Mackey (1999) who has shown that the effects of instruction on implicit knowledge are more 
apparent on delayed tests of such knowledge. In the time between the instruction and the delayed test, 
learners are able to incorporate the structure targeted by the instruction into their interlanguage 
systems. And regarding the general conclusion, the authors of the study claim that:  
(a) the learner finds explicit feedback to be more overtly corrective than implicit feedback 
(b) perhaps because of (a), the learner is more aware of the need to correct a mistake when they 
receive explicit feedback with respect to it  
(c) with greater awareness of the need to correct a mistake, the learner is more likely to have greater 
awareness of the ‘gap’ between the mistaken structure they have produced and the correct structure 
corresponding to it. This in turn facilitates the acquisition of the implicit knowledge of the correct 
structure. 
It should also be noted that the corrective feedback was provided as the students participated in a 
communicative activity. The learner was distracted from participation in the activity when they were 
provided with the corrective feedback but the distraction was brief and partial, and the feedback 
allowed them to focus on grammatical form. Combining communicative activity with focus on 
grammatical form is thought to be a highly effective means of developing implicit knowledge of a second 
language. 
     The authors of the study conclude as follows: 
[These findings support the claim] … that L2 knowledge can enhance the processes involved in 
the development of implicit knowledge (e.g. noticing and cognitive comparison). That is, the 
awareness generated by metalinguistic feedback promotes the kind of synergy between explicit 




     The study was small. It involved only 34 participants. Further there were only two days of instruction 
and the instruction actually ran for just 30 minutes on each of these two days. But small studies are 
common in SLA research and this one was well designed and well conducted. Indeed the report of the 
study analyzed here is a chapter in the book Implicit and Explicit Knowledge in Second Language 
Learning, Testing and Teaching. It contains twelve studies that cover (a) the measurement of implicit 
and explicit knowledge, (b) the application of the measures of these two forms of knowledge and (c) the 
acquisition of these two forms of knowledge as driven by form-focused instruction, along with an 
introduction and a conclusion by Ellis. The book originated in a project which was funded by the 
Marsden Fund. The fund supports ‘ideas-driven’ research and is administered by the Royal Society of 
New Zealand.  
     More to the point, if we compare the conclusion of the study with the conclusion of Ellis’s chapter on 
the theory of instructed second language acquisition discussed above then we can see how the two 
dovetail and how together they form a strong case in support of the weak interface position. The critical 
line in the conclusion of the theory chapter is: 
The synergistic … effect created by implicit and explicit learning working together outweighs the 
effect of either kind of learning working separately. 
and the critical line in the conclusion of the study chapter is: 
… the awareness generated by metalinguistic feedback promotes the kind of synergy between 
explicit and implicit knowledge that is hypothesized to underlie L2 learning. 
     But now what of the weak position itself? I do not think that it is possible to make a meaningful 
comment here without bringing in motivation and interest. The weak interface position does have the 
appearance of being a residue. That is to say, it has the appearance of being what is left of the strong 
interface position as represented by DeKeyser after it has absorbed the critical blow administered by the 
emergence of the no interface position as represented by Krashen. Given the SLA consensus that the 
strong position is untenable, Ellis has to concede that explicit knowledge of the L2 does not convert into 
implicit knowledge of the L2 with practice except under the special circumstances specified earlier. In 
general, explicit knowledge of the L2 + practice merely facilitates the development of implicit knowledge 
of the L2 by other means. 
         The disciplined researcher may be able to accept this residue without regret but the pedagogist 
who adheres to the traditional idea that instruction followed by practice is the means to the 
development of competence may not be able to do so. However we will see that there may be a way 
out of this difficulty when we come to the work of Jan Hulstijn. 
§ 5 Knowing-How vs. Knowing-That 
     While Ryle’s 1949 book Concept of Mind is a classic, the overall position he endorses is not, in 
general, acceptable nowadays and is not a living subject of discussion. But the knowing-how versus 




analytic philosophy. It came to the fore in a relatively recent attempt to undermine it, which I shall 
argue, did not succeed. I shall do two things in this section. First, I shall describe very briefly Ryle’s 
introduction of the distinction and his goal of upsetting the Cartesian picture and replacing it by a 
different ontology of the mind. Second, I shall evaluate the distinction and some recent attempts to 
undermine it, from my own perspective. Without going into the details of the historical Ryle, I shall 
argue that the distinction is essentially correct and important.  
       Ryle attempts to locate the emergence of Cartesian dualism in Western intellectual history. He says 
that Galileo’s general mechanical theory posed a dilemma for Descartes. Descartes accepted Galileo’s 
theory because he was a scientist. But he was reluctant to do so because he was also a religious 
philosopher and Galileo’s theory implied that man differs from the other entities in the world only in 
degree of complexity. Descartes thus established a basic division between mind and body. Bodies exist 
in space and time. They interact with each other according to the law of cause and effect. By contrast 
minds exist in time but not in space and they form a different substance. Cartesian dualism is a two-
substance theory, in which minds and bodies are manifestations of different substances, and it gives rise 
to the basic problem of interaction: how to reconcile this view with the widely accepted commonsense 
picture of a continuous causal interaction between the two that appears to go in both directions.    
Furthermore, each person has direct knowledge of the operation of their own mind but there is no way 
for one mind to know directly the operation of another. It is not even possible for one mind to know 
whether other minds exist. Ryle labels this view ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’. Each person’s 
body is a machine, and their mind is a ghost that somehow resides in that machine. Still body and mind 
are represented in a common framework of substance and attribute. But to represent them in this way 
is to commit a basic mistake because “… ‘there occur mental processes’ does not mean the same sort of 
thing as ‘there occur physical processes’ …” (italics mine) (22). The mental and the physical are not of 
the same logical type but the Cartesian view treats them as if they were. The mistake committed by this 
view is then of a fundamental kind that Ryle famously called a category mistake. 
      Ryle introduces the distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that as a means towards the 
undermining of the basic picture that underlies Cartesian dualism. This goal, as well as the historical Ryle 
does not concern me here. Instead an effort will be made to align the philosophical distinction between 
knowing-how and knowing-that with the SLA theory distinction between implicit knowledge of language 
and explicit knowledge of language. A major debate in SLA research concerns the way in which the 
implicit and explicit forms of knowledge relate to each other in the process of second language 
acquisition. If an alignment can be established between the two distinctions then it follows that there is 
a philosophical antecedent for the SLA debate.             
        Ryle follows his harsh criticism of ‘the Ghost in the Machine’ with a criticism of what he calls an 
‘intellectualist legend’, which, he claims, is at the core of the Western way of viewing ‘mental conduct’. 
On this view the primary form of mental conduct is intellectual activity, which is mainly manifested as 
theorizing.  All other forms of mental conduct derive their real value from their connection to theorizing.  
According to the legend an intelligent performance is a performance that follows what Ryle calls a 
‘regulative proposition’. This proposition states various criteria for performing the act in question. Once 




criteria, in which case the performance can be classified as intelligent. Thus the mind (the ‘ghost’) knows 
that the performance is to be regulated according to such and such a proposition and it is this 
knowledge that enables the agent to produce the required performance. The agent’s ability to produce 
the performance intelligently is therefore assimilated into the agent’s knowledge that such and such 
propositions hold. Now the ability to perform correctly, in purposeful mind-directed activities is referred 
to by using the expression know how to …, e.g., one knows how to play the piano, how to ride a bicycle, 
how to express oneself in English, and so on and so forth. On the other hand knowing the truths of 
certain propositions is expressed by knowing that …, e.g., one knows that the earth turns around the 
sun, that gold is heavier than lead, that the allies won the second world war, and so on. In his book Ryle 
introduces this distinction as a basic distinction between two types of knowledge, claiming that the 
‘intellectualist legend’ assimilates knowing how to knowing that, and arguing for the impossibility of 
such an assimilation. The relevance of the distinction to SLA is obvious: what in the SLA literature 
discussed in the previous sections is called implicit knowledge is knowing how. This is the knowledge 
manifested by using the language ‘automatically’, or spontaneously, in a non-reflective way. On the 
other hand explicit knowledge is knowledge that is based on the agent’s awareness of the grammatical 
rules. While my position is that teaching the grammar can lead to implicit knowledge, I accept the basic 
distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. While this distinction is, I think, the distinction 
introduced by Ryle, the latter is part of an ambitious project in the philosophy of mind, which deals with 
the mind-body problem and does not belong to the subjects of this work, or to the debates with regard 
to the SLA framework. I have included some material concerning Ryle for the sake of completeness only. 
On the other hand some recent attempts to undermine the knowing-how/knowing-that distinction do 
have some relevance to the SLA framework and I shall discuss them later.  
          Ryle presents three arguments against the ‘intellectualist’ thesis that knowing-how is knowing-
that. First, he argues that the thesis has an unacceptable consequence because it implies an infinite 
regress. Second, he points out the basic differences between the two types of knowledge and third, he 
proposes that the ‘intelligence’ of the performance is to be identified with the performance itself.   For 
my purposes, I can ignore the first argument and I will focus on the other two. 
The Critical Differences 
    Ryle’s second argument aims to show that knowing-how cannot be knowing-that because the two 
phenomena are so basically different. He lists at least four differences. First it is altogether appropriate 
to ask, in cases of knowing that, what are the grounds of the agent’s belief in the truth of the 
proposition in question. For example if someone believes that the Romans had a camp at a certain 
place, it is perfectly natural to ask them what the grounds are for this belief. But it makes no sense to 
ask of someone’s skill at something what the grounds are for that skill. For example if someone is skilled 
at playing cards, it makes no sense to ask the person for the grounds of that skill. One’s first take on this 
argument is that it seems to be rather obviously sound. But as is so often the case where there seems to 
be obvious soundness, one must be careful that the argument does not beg the question. If we take it 
that X is a belief in a proposition and that Y is a skill then of course they are different. However the 
position of those who claim that knowing-how is a species of knowing-that must be that although Y is 




a type of action that is regulated by a proposition that specifies the criteria for actions of that type. So it 
is the proposition that is of critical importance and yet propositions fall under knowing-that, not under 
knowing-how. This argument for the position that knowing-how is a species of knowing that may be fine 
in the abstract but it may not be so fine when the attempt is made to apply it to particular cases. What if 
there is a children’s show in which one child recites the capital cities of all the 50 U.S. states and another 
child does all kinds of fabulous tricks with a yoyo? Imagine the difficulty involved in introducing the 
audience to the two terms ‘knowing-that’ and ‘knowing-how’ and then trying to use an argumentative 
strategy like the one outlined above to convince them that both performances are instances of knowing-
that.     
     Second, some of the actions that are performed as expressions of skill or ability are determined to be 
intelligent or unintelligent on the basis of criteria that remain unformulated. The example that Ryle 
offers is that of the wit. The wit “… knows how to make good jokes and how to detect bad ones, but he 
cannot tell us or himself any recipes for them (30).” Ryle’s point might be criticized by saying that the 
wit’s skill may not have explicitly formulated criteria but this does not mean it does not have implicitly 
formulated criteria. And there are many theories of humor in its various forms. I was a great admirer of 
Johnny Carson, the host of The Tonight Show. Watching Carson run the series of jokes in his monologue 
often tempted me to try to come up with some kind of formula of my own. A joke typically has a butt. 
Something negative is said about some person, group or institution. Thus there is something on the 
order of cruelty at the heart of humor. However in most cases the negative attribution is either mild or 
relates to some ‘other’ in relation to the one who makes the joke and their audience. Jokes almost 
always seem to involve a surprise that is effected by a departure from what is expected. And very often 
jokes employ some clever linguistic construction. A simple example illustrates all three of these 
elements. The comedian says something like 
Women deserve special consideration. Take my wife. No, really, take my wife. 
This joke comes from the pre-feminist era of vaudeville but I use it because I know of no other joke that 
reflects the set of elements enumerated above so simply. The joke has a butt. It may seem that the butt 
is the comedian’s wife but I think that it is the comedian himself. Thus the joke is self-deprecating. There 
is a surprise resulting from the violation of expectation because husbands are supposed to be protective 
of their wives and thus the last thing they could abide is giving her away to a stranger. And linguistically 
there is the double entendre of ‘Take my wife.’ Of course it means ‘consider my wife as an example’ in 
the audience’s first understanding but it means ‘take possession of my wife’ in their developed 
understanding. But now try to imagine someone becoming a wit as a result of studying the formula that 
these three elements constitute. So Ryle’s point is I think well taken. What kind of proposition or set of 
interrelated propositions can we see someone as appealing to in any way in the process of doing 
something as complex as making a joke? And there is the wisdom of the author E.B. White, who said, 
"Humor can be dissected as a frog can, but the thing dies in the process and the innards are discouraging 




     The third difference is that while having a skill is obviously a matter of degree, knowledge-that is not. 
The fourth difference, which is related to the third, is that knowledge how is usually acquired gradually, 
but not so knowledge that.  While these differences are rather suggestive, they are far from decisive; 
adherers of the ‘intellectualist’ thesis can find ways around them.  
Identification vs. Causation 
      What I will treat here as Ryle’s third counterargument is actually a set of three closely related 
arguments. All of them are quite subtle but I think that they are more convincing than the arguments 
above, since they point to more  basic differences between knowing-how and knowing-that. In the first 
of the three arguments, Ryle tries to establish an identity between the intelligence of a typically 
outwardly performed action and the manner in which that action is performed. . On the alternative view 
the intelligence of an action is due to an internal process of the mind that precedes the action 
temporally. That is, the action is intelligent because it has been directed by an internal process of the 
mind. Of course this alternative view is the one promoted by Cartesian dualism according to Ryle. Thus 
Ryle’s argument not only works to clarify the nature of knowing-how but also serves his larger 
philosophical purpose of refuting Cartesian dualism. Ryle accepts the commonly held view that an agent 
performs intelligently if they are thinking of what they are doing as they are doing it. With this in mind 
he says: 
‘thinking what I am doing’ does not connote ‘both thinking what to do and doing it’. When I do 
something intelligently, i.e., thinking what I am doing, I am doing one thing and not two. My 
performance has a special procedure or manner, not special antecedents. (32) 
In a given case, the special antecedent is an internal process of the mind as discussed above. And we 
saw there that Ryle rejects the view that the intelligence of an action is due to any such process. But it is 
important to note that Ryle does not replace a special antecedent with a special procedure or manner as 
the factor that is responsible for the intelligence of an action. Let us put aside for the moment the term 
‘procedure’ and focus on the more apt term ‘manner’. An action is something on the order of an 
‘individual’ while the manner of that action is something more on the order of a ‘quality’. But the 
manner of an action is not something that is separate from that action. Thus it is not in a position to be 
responsible for the intelligence of that action. Rather the manner of the action is to be identified with its 
intelligence. This is what Ryle argues. It is not perfectly clear however that a manner’s being a part of an 
action precludes its being responsible for the intelligence of that action. 
     In a different passage Ryle makes his point by referring to efficiency rather than intelligence, yet  
these two qualities are on par in the general case that he makes. And what is important here is that he 
makes the identification of manner with efficiency more explicit than he made the identification of 
manner with intelligence. The passage gives us a hypothetical example in which the subject is an 
‘intelligent reasoner’ who knows the rules of Aristotle’s logic.  
He does not cite Aristotle’s formulae to himself or to the court. He applies in his practice what 




without considering the prescriptions of a methodology. The rules that he observes have 
become his way of thinking, when he is taking care; they are not external rubrics with which he 
has to square his thoughts. In a word he conducts his operations efficiently, and to operate 
efficiently is not to perform two operations. It is to perform one operation in a certain manner 
or with a certain style or procedure … (48)    
This passage is quite similar to the one above, but it adds to and reinforces the point. Further reinforcing 
is provided by the following example that involves four distinct professions.   
The boxer, the surgeon, the poet and the salesman apply their special criteria in the 
performance of their special tasks, for they are trying to get things right; and they are appraised 
as clever, skillful, inspired or shrewd not for the ways in which they consider, if they consider at 
all, prescriptions for conducting their special performances, but for the ways in which they 
conduct those performances themselves. (48)  
 Note that the term ‘way’ appears in the slot that is occupied by ‘manner’, ‘procedure’ and ‘style’ in the 
two passages above. 
     We will be able to dispense quickly with the second of the three arguments having to do with 
identification. This argument differs from the one above in terms of the elements that it identifies. It 
does not identify the intelligence of a performance with the manner of that performance but rather the 
typically outward intelligent performance of an agent with the workings of that agent’s mind. Note that 
the criteria that we apply in judging someone’s performance are, according to Ryle, external. Even when 
a great deal of a person’s thoughts remains hidden, it can, in principle, be revealed as any other external 
fact:   
Overt intelligent performances are not clues to the workings of minds; they are those workings. 
Boswell described Johnson’s mind when he described how he wrote, talked, ate, fidgeted and 
fumed. His description was of course incomplete, since there were notoriously some thoughts 
which Johnson kept carefully to himself and there must have been many dreams, daydreams 
and silent babblings which only Johnson could have recorded and only a James Joyce would wish 
him to have recorded. (58,9) 
In making sense of what you say, in appreciating your jokes, in unmasking your chess-
stratagems, in following your arguments and in hearing you pick holes in my arguments, I am 
not inferring to the workings of your mind, I am following them. (61) 
     While, the knowing-how/knowing-that distinction is largely accepted – except for some recent 
challenges to it, to be discussed in the sequel – Ryle’s metaphysical position on the mind-body problem 
is no longer at the focus of current attempts to address the problem. Here the focus of attention has 
shifted to physicalism, supervenience and brain studies, which are beyond the scope of this work and 




           More pertinent to the subject matter of this work is the following remarkable passage from Ryle’s 
book: 
Consider first a boy learning to play chess. Clearly before he has yet heard of the rules of the 
game he might by accident make a move with the knight which the rules permit. The fact that 
he makes a permitted move does not entail that he knows the rule which permits it. Nor need 
the spectator be able to discover in the way the boy makes this move any visible feature which 
shows whether the move is a random one, or one made in knowledge of the rules. However, the 
boy now begins to learn the game properly, and this generally involves his receiving explicit 
instruction in the rules. He probably gets them by heart and is then ready to cite them on 
demand. During his first few games he probably has to go over the rules aloud or in his head, 
and ask now and then how they should be applied to this or that particular situation. But very 
soon he comes to observe the rules without thinking of them. He makes the permitted moves 
and avoids the forbidden ones; he notices and protests when his opponent breaks the rules. But 
he no longer cites to himself or the room the formulae in which the bans and permissions are 
declared. It has become second nature to him to do what is allowed and to avoid what is 
forbidden. At this stage he might even have lost his former ability to cite the rules. If asked to 
instruct another beginner, he might have forgotten how to state the rules and would show the 
beginner how to play only by himself making the correct moves and cancelling the beginner’s 
false moves. (40,1)  
Note how nicely this example fits with our common sense.  My own view is that one will almost certainly 
think that Ryle is right when you see the example juxtaposed with what his critics have to say against 
what the example suggests. In any case what Ryle gives us here is a nice picture of how we develop a 
skill. And this development is clearly a matter of knowing-how, not one of knowing-that.  Two points are 
noteworthy here. It is not necessary that we receive instruction in order for us to acquire a skill. Close 
observation is a substitute for instruction. It is tempting to say that we can learn how to do something 
either deductively by instruction or inductively by observation. If the boy learning chess is taught a rule 
then he must figure out how to move the piece that the rule governs. But by watching how a piece in 
moved, he can figure out the rule that governs it. Of course whether we learn by instruction or 
observation or some combination of the two we must practice in order to become good at whatever it is 
that we are learning. All of this supports the view endorsed by common sense. The second point 
concerns the importance of instruction. In another passage Ryle says that “… the learning of all but the 
most unsophisticated knacks requires some intellectual capacity. The ability to do things in accordance 
with instructions necessitates understanding those instructions. So some propositional competence is a 
condition for acquiring any of these competences. … I could not have learned to swim the breast stroke, 
if I had not been able to understand the lessons given me in that stroke … (49).”   
       Ryle’s characterization of habits and skills is brief and fairly simple. Habits and skills are dispositions. 
And to ascribe a dispositional property to a thing or an agent is like subsuming it under a law. “To 
possess a dispositional property is not to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change; it is 
to be bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular 




terms of (1) the means by which they are inculcated, (2) the manner in which they are exercised and (3) 
the forms of behavior that their exercise produces.  
 (1) Habits are inculcated by drill. Ryle does not develop this point very much but the soldier learns to 
present arms by learning what amounts to a template for the action and then performing the action 
repeatedly with the intention of matching the template exactly every time. In the purest case criticism 
by the drill sergeant consists only in citing variation from the template. Skills however are inculcated by 
training. The soldier learns to shoot by receiving instruction in shooting and by practicing shooting but 
the training involves the attempt to stimulate the soldier’s judgment by means of example and criticism. 
Marksmanship is a complex skill and the exchange between the shooting instructor and the soldier is 
correspondingly complex. It involves not only direction but also the reasoning required to apply the 
relevant generalizations to a particular set of circumstances. (2) The exercise of a habit is automatic. The 
agent does not have to think about what they are doing when they are behaving according to habit. The 
exercise of a skill, by contrast, requires care and vigilance on the part of the agent. They must think 
about what they are doing as they are doing it so that they can do it well. The hallmark of a skill is that 
every exercise of it provides a lesson which should be learned in order to improve future performance. 
(3) A habit is based on a single-tract disposition and its actualizations are as uniform as is possible. But a 
skill is based on a higher-grade disposition and its actualizations form a potentially infinite variety. To 
return to the soldier, all of their presentations of arms should be the same, but their shooting 
performances will differ considerably given the variables of target, distance, terrain, wind and so on. 
     With this we conclude our discussion of Ryle’s analysis of the distinction between knowing-how and 
knowing-that and turn our attention to a consideration of the relationship between this distinction and 
the SLA distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge as a means of casting more light 
on the interface issue.  
The Implications of Ryle’s Work for SLA Theory 
    In the SLA sections above we discussed implicit knowledge of language and explicit knowledge of 
language, and in the Ryle section just completed we discussed knowing-how and knowing-that. The 
original intention for this part of the essay was to compare the respective terms of these two 
distinctions in order to determine to what extent the distinctions themselves align with each other. That 
is to say the original intention was to compare 
- implicit knowledge of language (or more generally implicit knowledge per se) with knowing-how 
  and 
- explicit knowledge of language (or more generally explicit knowledge per se) with knowing-that  
in order to determine to what extent the two distinctions that the four terms form align with each 
other. I think that the overall discussion up to this point makes it rather clear that the two distinctions 




order to produce a single account that works for both distinctions. Let us consider the following six 
points: 
(1) implicit knowledge and knowing-how help us with routine tasks whereas explicit knowledge and 
knowing-that help us with special tasks 
(2) implicit knowledge and knowing-how fuel automatic processing whereas explicit knowledge and 
knowing-that fuel deliberative processing 
(3) implicit knowledge and knowing-how are totally or mainly unconscious whereas explicit 
knowledge and knowing-that are totally or mainly conscious 
(4) implicit knowledge and knowing-how are inculcated whereas explicit knowledge and knowing-
that are imparted 
(5) implicit knowledge and knowing-how  aim at efficiency, value low resource use, and have as their 
objective to get the job done whereas explicit knowledge and knowing-that aim at accuracy, accept 
high resource use, and have as their objective to get the job done right 
(6) implicit knowledge and knowing-how promote sameness and seek to achieve stability whereas 
explicit knowledge and knowing-that promote difference and seek to achieve innovation. 
Full characterizations of the two distinctions could vary considerably in terms of the number of points 
involved, the nature of the points involved and the ways in which the points are expressed. So what is 
offered here is not claimed to be complete, non-redundant or final in any way. However I do believe 
that we can see in it faithfulness to the views of the authors studied above along with some projection 
from those views in the interest of developing the fullest and deepest possible understanding of the 
nature of the target phenomena.  
    Before going on it is important for us to point out that even though the explicit knowledge vs. implicit 
knowledge distinction and the knowing-that vs. knowing-how distinction align in the manner established 
above, under no circumstances are the respective terms of these distinctions to be identified, and in 
particular implicit knowledge and knowing-how should not be identified. And when we try to figure out 
what the relationship between the two actually is, we encounter considerable complexity. Let us try to 
get a foothold here by considering three cases in turn: 
1. A meeting is to be held in New York and someone there says, ‘John won’t be able to come to 
the meeting. He’s in Madrid.’ Here the proposition that a person can’t be in two places at one 
time is implicit in that it is not laid out explicitly. What we have is something like the suppressed 
premise of an argument that we learn about in a logic class. But clearly our implicit knowledge 




2. Someone hears a noise. They know that something caused the noise but this knowledge is 
internal and deeply entrenched. Here the proposition that if there is a noise, something caused 
it is also implicit because it is not laid out explicitly. In physics we have explicitly stated laws that 
could be applied to the case in order to provide an explanation but this is not to the point. The 
person who hears the noise may not know physics, and even the physicist would not think about 
theory if they were the one who heard the noise. But clearly again our knowledge of the 
proposition is not an instance of knowing-how. 
3. Someone is riding a bicycle. Something which is not laid out explicitly undergirds this action, a 
set of dispositions and a set of sensory-motor connections perhaps. But no proposition or a set 
of propositions is involved. Riding a bicycle is an instance of knowing-how. 
     We might tend to run the three cases together because they are similar in two important ways. First 
as we have seen, in none of the cases is anything laid our explicitly. And second all of the cases are cases 
of reliance. We rely on the proposition in the first case to get our communication business done. We 
rely on the proposition in the second case to know what to do. And rely on the dispositions and the 
sensory-motor connections in the third case to be able to ride the bicycle. But the critical difference has 
already been seen. In the first and second cases there is a proposition that could be made explicit, 
although with much greater difficulty in the second case, whereas there is no proposition or set of same 
in the third case. 
     It is very interesting to consider the case of language here. A bit later we will appeal to Chomsky’s 
distinction between competence and performance in the discussion of Ryle’s critics. Here we might use 
the distinction in the following way. Language represents a kind of split case. Our competence with 
respect to language is our knowledge of the language and it seems natural to think that this consists in a 
set of propositions that could be made explicit. Indeed it is the business of theoretical linguists to do just 
this. But our performance with respect to language is a completely different affair. Hearing and speaking 
and reading and writing can perhaps be seen as like riding a bicycle in that what undergirds them is a set 
of dispositions and a set of sensory motor connections. And note that putting the matter in this way 
raises the very interesting question of how the competence and the performance are related.           
     One of the major goals of this work has now been achieved. In establishing the alignment between 
the SLA distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge and Ryle’s distinction between 
knowing-how and knowing-that, it has been shown that the SLA distinction has an antecedent in the 
philosophy of language. And since the interface issue is based on the SLA distinction, by extension it too 
has an antecedent in the philosophy of language. This means of course that Ryle’s analysis is a resource 
for SLA theorists and researchers who use the implicit knowledge - explicit knowledge distinction in their 
work. Ryle’s use of dispositions in the explanation of knowing-how may be what is most helpful. And 
there is already an easy connection to be made between DeKeyser’s condition-action pairings and Ryle’s 
‘[being] bound or liable to be in a particular state, or to undergo a particular change, when a particular 
condition is realized’. For the future Ryle’s identification of the intelligence of a performance with the 
manner of that performance may prove useful when brain research has reached an advanced state and 




well and the qualities of the performance and behavior generally that we observe in others and in 
ourselves. Ryle’s model may or may not fit the factor set that will have evolved but I think that his 
implied thesis that identification rather than causation has to be the lead concept in the construction of 
explanations of the relationship between mind/brain and experience could prove to be true. 
     DeKeyser, Krashen and Ellis hold the positions they do on the interface issue as a consequence of the 
way in which they see the relationship between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge in second 
language acquisition. And second language acquisition is a form of learning. But Ryle has the equivalent 
distinction between knowing-how and knowing-that. And the main part of the case he makes has to do 
with the way in which the two forms of knowing figure in learning. So perhaps it can be said that Ryle’s 
work implies a position on the interface issue. But if his work does imply a position on the interface issue 
then the question is of course, which position does it imply? Consider again the story of the boy learning 
to play chess as presented in the long quote above. And look now again at what Ryle had to say more 
pointedly about instructions and lessons as they relate to skill acquisition:        
The ability to do things in accordance with instructions necessitates understanding those 
instructions. So some propositional competence is a condition of acquiring any of these 
competencies. … I could not have learned to swim the breast stroke, if I had not been able to 
understand the lesson given me in that stroke; (49) 
It seems most likely then that if Ryle had somehow been presented with a choice among the three 
positions, he would have taken the strong one. The no position might not have made sense to him, and 
the weak position would probably have seemed too weak. So perhaps Ryle’s work offers support for the 
strong position. If so then it is distinguished support because it comes from philosophy. But I do not 
think that the resources in Ryle can reinforce the strong position enough for it to overcome the research 
findings and argumentation that have effectively driven it from the field of competition with the result 
that the only the no position and the weak position are now recognized as viable. 
 Knowing-how/Knowing-that and Chomsky’s Competence/Performance Distinction 
     The most important challenge to Ryle’s account of knowing-how vs. knowing-that which I am aware 
of is Stanley and Williamson (2001). These authors attempt to show that both Ryle’s argument that the 
intellectualistic legend implies an infinite regress and his positive account of knowing-how in terms of 
dispositions are to be rejected. And they go on to offer a positive account of knowing-how of their own, 
which claims that knowing-how is a species of knowing-that.  Ryle’s infinite regress argument is an issue 
that concerns the historical Ryle, which can be bypassed – as far as this work is concerned. When it 
comes to Ryle’s positive account of the distinction, S&W take Ryle to be wrong in a fairly obvious way. 
They think that considerations pertaining to some simple cases are sufficient to dismiss his positive 
account of knowing-how:   
According to Ryle, an ascription of the form ‘x knows how to F’ merely ascribes to x the ability to 
F. It is simply false, however, that ascriptions of knowledge ascribe abilities. … For example, a ski 




herself. Similarly, a master pianist who loses both of her arms in a tragic car accident still knows 
how to play the piano. But she has lost the ability to do so. It follows that Ryle’s own positive 
account of knowledge-how is demonstrably false. (416) 
Thus we might say that S&W accuse Ryle of identifying knowing-how with the ability to perform while 
they sharply separate the two. But there is considerable terminological and conceptual ambiguity in this. 
Ryle classifies ‘knowing how’ among dispositional properties, and it is unfair to construe him as 
identifying knowing-how with abilities simpliciter. A pianist whose hands are handcuffed behind her 
back is unable to perform.  But surely Ryle does not imply that she has lost her ability to perform, let 
alone her knowledge how to perform. ‘Ability’ is an ambiguous term, which by itself implies a 
dispositional property. We might say that the handcuffed pianist is unable to perform without, however, 
losing her ability. So it all depends where the line that determines loss of ability is drawn. Ten years ago 
a person who lost both his legs lost the ability to run, but nowadays we have amputees, who, using 
prosthetic legs, compete along with other runners in the Olympics. Possibly, the retention of ‘ability’ can 
be traced to the preservation of certain neural organizations in the brain–and this is a resource that 
Ryle’s externalistic approach cannot appeal to. This case is different from the case of the ski master, 
which requires a different analysis and into which I shall not go. But it should be obvious that the S&W 
conclusion that Ryle’s account “is demonstrably false” is based on a gross simplification.  
     We can perhaps achieve better clarity by invoking a distinction proposed by Chomsky in (1965), 
between competence and performance:          
We thus make a fundamental distinction between competence (the speaker-hearer’s knowledge of 
his language) and performance (the actual use of language in concrete situations). (4)  
 Furthermore, competence has to do with internalizing the grammar: 
Obviously, every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that 
expresses his knowledge of his language. (8) 
Chomsky combines here two ideas, the idea of a generative grammar and the idea of having this 
grammar internalized. Concerning the grammar, we have the well-known conception of grammar as a 
mechanism that enables the expression and the understanding of an indefinite number of thoughts:       
age 
Within traditional linguistic theory … it was clearly understood that one of the qualities that all 
languages have in common is their “creative” aspect. Thus an essential property of language is that 
it provides the means for expressing indefinitely many thoughts and for reacting appropriately in an 
indefinite range of new situations … The grammar of a particular language, then, is to be 
supplemented by a universal grammar that accommodates the creative aspect of language use and 





Chomsky appeals to the work of Wilhelm von Humboldt, and in particular, to the notion of generating 
an infinite number of sentences according to a finite set of rules. The Chomskian term ‘generate’ 
matches the term ‘erzeugen’ used frequently by Humboldt, and he quotes Humboldt’s expression 
‘make infinite use of finite means’.  Mastery of the grammar is thus having the ability to use this 
system of rules. All of this is a well-known story, which has been developed by Chomsky and his 
followers in the last fifty years into the huge project of generative grammars, with all its ramifications. 
The performance/competence distinction does not depend however on the particular grammar one 
adopts, but on the difference between correct use of the grammar which is manifested in concrete 
situations and the state in which this grammar has been internalized by the speaker. In Chomsky’s 
system the two are brought together, since considerations of possible implementation of the grammar 
in brain modules are relevant to the choice of grammar. We might say that everything that has been 
considered here thus far is ‘formal’ in nature but we get some idea of what the ‘substance’ of the 
speaker’s competence is when Chomsky says: 
… in the technical sense, linguistic theory is mentalistic, since it is concerned with discovering a 
mental reality underlying actual behavior. Observed use of language or hypothesized 
dispositions to respond, habits, and so on, may provide evidence as to the nature of this mental 
reality, but surely cannot constitute the actual subject matter of linguistics, if this is to be a 
serious discipline.(4) 
So competence is mental, and it does not consist in dispositions, habits or the like – although in normal 
situations it will be manifested by the non-reflective free use of language There is no effort to say 
specifically what competence as a mental entity does consist in, but Chomsky can, and in later works 
does point to physical-neural organization, brain modules and other items that are subject to brain 
studies. It should be noted that Chomsky’s appeal to mental content amounts to an internalist position 
that contradicts the externalist behaviorial-oriented position of Ryle. Indeed Chomsky is openly 
sympathetic to certain aspects of Cartesianism, which he embraces, without embracing the 
metaphysical two-substance theory, and without being committed to a particular position on the mind-
body problem (in 1986 he published a book entitled Cartesian Linguistics).   
      In an idealized situation, performance would be a ‘direct reflection’ of competence. But under the 
actual conditions of the use of natural language, ‘memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention 
and interest, and errors (random or characteristic)’ have an effect. Chomsky refers to performance 
models. These models might be developed through the use of deviant sentences. And the deviant 
sentences would be rated in terms of the extent to which they are ‘acceptable’. The term ‘acceptable’ is 
distinct from the term ‘grammatical’. All of the example sentences Chomsky discusses are grammatical  









Two of the example sentences discussed are: 
 I called the man who wrote the book that you told me about up. 
 The man who the boy who the students recognized pointed out is a friend of mine.  
     Let us see how the grammatical/acceptable distinction works out in the cases of these two sentences. 
We will want to show both why they are grammatical and why they have a low level of acceptability. Let 
us take the two sentences in turn. The first thing to see about (1) is that it has undergone particle 
movement. The particle ‘up’ has moved from its verb phrase position to the position after of the object 
of the verb phrase, which is ‘the man who wrote the book that you told me about’. But if we move the 
particle back, we get 
I called up the man who wrote the book that you told me about. 
which we can see to be grammatical by means of the following labeled bracketing: 
[I SP] [called up VP] [the man who wrote the book that you told me about OP]. 
where SP = subject phrase, VP = verb phrase and OP = object phrase. So the sentence has SVO form, its 
subject phrase is the pronoun ‘I’, its verb phrase is the phrasal verb ‘called up’ and its object phrase is a 
noun phrase based on the noun ‘man’, which is modified by the article ‘the’ and the relative clause ‘who 
wrote the book that you told me about’. The sentence is perfectly grammatical. But it has a low level of 
acceptability for two reasons. First the object phrase that the particle moves to the position after, ‘the 
man who wrote the book that you told me about’, is long and complex. Compare the sentence 
The mother picked her daughter up. 
It has undergone the same particle movement but the object term involved, ‘her daughter’, is short and 
simple. And second, the relative clause of (1) exhibits nesting. The simplest way to see this is to imagine 
the relative clause as having been formed in two stages. First we had  
who wrote the book 
and then the relative clause 
that you told me about 
came along to attach to the noun ‘book’ of the first stage relative clause to produce 
who wrote the book that you told me about 




     Now sentence (2) can be shown to be grammatical as it stands by labeled bracketing as follows: 
[The man who the boy who the students recognized pointed out SP] [is VP] [a friend of mine OP].  
The sentence’s subject phrase is the noun phrase ‘the man who the boy who the students recognized 
pointed out’, which is based on the noun ‘man’ which is modified by the article ‘the’ and the relative 
clause ‘who the boy who the students recognized pointed out’ (which is itself grammatical despite 
appearances to the contrary as we will see), its verb phrase is the identity copula ‘is’ and its object 
phrase is the noun phrase ‘a friend of mine, which is based on the noun ‘friend’ which is modified by the 
article ‘a’ and the prepositional phrase ‘of mine’. This sentence too is perfectly grammatical. But it has a 
very low level of acceptability because of the nesting that its relative clause exhibits. The simplest way to 
see this is again to imagine the relative clause as having been formed in two stages. First we had 
who the boy pointed out 
and then the relative clause 
who the students recognized 
came along to attach to the noun ‘boy’ of the first stage relative clause to produce 
who the boy who the students recognized pointed out  
Now the thing to see here is that, whereas the second relative clause in (1) came along and attached to 
‘book’, which is at the end of the first relative clause, the second relative clause here comes along to 
attach to ‘boy’, which is inside of the first relative clause. This makes for a tremendous processing 
difference. In the case of (1) the reader gets to process the whole of the first relative clause before they 
have to take on the second relative clause but in the case of (2), the reader has, in effect, to try to 
process the second relative clause after having processed only a part of the first relative clause. I have 
read (2) innumerable times and I still have to struggle with it.  
     In any case the idea of using sentences of low levels of acceptability seems to be that correlations 
might be established between constructions of various types and factors of performance like (1) the 
amount of memory required and (2) the amount of computation required in the processing of a 
sentence.  
     With this background we are now in a position to apply Chomsky’s competence-performance 
distinction to the cases presented by S&W. However it is very important to take into account the fact 
that Chomsky’s distinction is intended to apply only to the skill of using natural language whereas the 
cases presented by S&W in their criticism of Ryle cover a very broad range of skills. Given this there is 
one major difference between the case of language and the cases of skiing and piano playing on 
Chomsky’s view. This difference has to do with the acquisition of the relevant skill. Chomsky claims that 
we have an innate faculty of language which houses the universal principles of language. This greatly 
reduces the problem the child faces in learning their native language. The child has only to use the data 




clearly no one thinks that we have such a faculty for all other skills.  And there is a sense in which it may 
be inappropriate to use the one term ‘skill’ to cover using language, skiing and playing the piano. Every 
human being whose development is not impaired in some way uses language ‘perfectly’ but not 
everyone can be an expert skier or a master pianist. Still everyone has to use language ‘skillfully’ and if 
everyone also had to ski or play the piano ‘skillfully’ then probably people in general would do so. I don’t 
think that anyone can claim to have perfect clarity in these matters yet. 
      Further let us note that there is at least a possible basic difference between the two cases that S&W 
present. I don’t know whether they intended it or not. To see the difference we have to compare not 
the ski instructor and the injured pianist but an able master skier and an able master pianist. If the 
pianist is a classical pianist then her skill and that of the skier are rather different. Despite the great 
difficulty involved in producing the composition at the concert, the pianist does not have to make any 
real decisions as she is playing unless something goes wrong. And her objective is that what she will 
produce will be more or less the same as what she produced in her last successful performance of the 
same composition. But things are quite different for the skier. She must make any number of decisions 
as she descends the slope. These decisions are forced by the particulars of the configuration of the snow 
she encounters. She no doubt has a strategy for negotiating the slope as efficiently as possible but she 
knows that even if she skies very well, there is a wide range of possible outcomes for her overall 
performance.  
     The case of language use seems to be more like the case of the skier than the case of the pianist. 
What Chomsky calls the creative aspect of language requires the language user to make many decisions 
as they negotiate the discourse they are engaged in. An idea occurs to them and instantly they have to 
produce a sentence that expresses it. Or someone else produces a sentence and they have to react to it 
instantly in some way. They react by producing a sentence of their own, or a gesture or just a look. Thus 
it would seem that we must attribute to the skier something like the generative capacity that Chomsky 
attributes to the language user. It is not so clear that we need the same kind of mechanism to account 
for the performance of the pianist.  
    Given all of this, I think that we can apply Chomsky’s competence-performance distinction to the 
cases that S&W present quite efficiently. At base, knowing-how is competence. Thus it is true to say that 
the injured pianist knows how to play the piano. She has lost her arms but she retains the sensory-
motor couplings developed by years of diligent practice. She also retains the knowledge of music and 
the ideas about music developed by years of diligent study, along with the feelings for music spawned 
by the practice, the study and of course the experience of actually playing. The consideration here 
supports S&W’s claim that knowing-how is competence.   
     But while knowing-how is at base competence, it is also performance. Consider the case in which the 
master pianist is injured on her way to a concert of very great importance in which she will accompany 
the orchestra in one of its performances. The show must go on, but there is no ‘understudy’. The 
directors of the concert rack their brains trying to come up with a solution to the problem but they are 
simply stumped – until one of them realizes that he saw Jones in the audience earlier and she is an 




‘Jones knows how to play the composition, and she’s in the audience!’, to the relief and the delight of 
his co-directors. It is clear here that the director’s report includes a reference to Jones’s ability to 
perform. The consideration here supports Ryle’s claim that knowing-how is both performance and 
competence.     
     Thus neither Ryle nor S&W get things exactly right. Both are perhaps guilty of confusion in their 
understandings of the terms ‘knowing-how’ and ‘the ability to perform’. But when we realize that both 
competence and performance are factors in knowing-how then we can see that S&W are right in 
claiming that the ski instructor knows how to ski and that the injured pianist knows how to play the 
piano because both have competence, but Ryle is also right in claiming that the boy knows how to play 
chess both because he has the competence and because he has the ability to perform. 
     I think that what Chomsky’s competence-performance distinction allows us to see when it is applied 
to the Ryle vs. S&W debate is that sentences like 
X knows how to play the piano. 
and 
X knows how to ride a bicycle. 
are two way ambiguous. Thus they have two senses. On one sense they mean simply that X has 
competence. The question of whether X also has the ability to perform is left open. On the other sense 
they mean that X has competence and the ability to perform.  Note that it is in this latter sense that such 
sentences are used in the vast majority of cases. 
     Perhaps it might be useful to formalize this a bit and distinguish ‘knowing-howC’ from ‘knowing-
howC&A’. The former is knowing-how as it is related to competence. The latter is knowing-how as it is 
related to both competence and actual ability, as manifested in concrete cases. However since there can 
be no actual ability to perform without competence, ‘knowing-howC&A’ might be better rendered simply 
as ‘knowing-howA’. Given this, we can say that 
The ski instructor knows howC to perform the complex stunt. 
The pianist knows howC to play the piano. 
are both true but that 
The ski instructor knows howA to perform the complex stunt. 
The pianist knows howA to play the piano. 
are both false. So Ryle’s positive account of knowing-how has to be relabeled as a positive account of 





§ 6 A Possible Resolution of the Dilemma Concerning the Strong Interface Position 
     Recall that by the ‘dilemma’ I mean the conflict between (1) the traditional idea that instruction and 
practice constitute the main way of acquiring a second language, and (2) the emergence of a consensus 
in the SLA community that only the no position and the weak position on the interface issue are viable, a 
consensus which seems to give to explicit instruction a minimal role, at most (thus Ellis accords to 
instruction merely a facilitating role). In this section I shall outline a thesis, which derives from ideas 
proposed by Hulstijn (2002), which gives to explicit instruction a more significant role than what is 
implied by the no and the weak positions. Hulstijn proposes two kinds of systems that can underlie, or 
embody linguistic knowledge: symbolist and connectionist. Symbolist systems represent knowledge of 
language in terms of symbols and rules or other operations that specify possible relationships among 
symbols. Connectionist systems embody knowledge of language by means of neural networks with 
‘hidden units’, which can contain symbols or parts of symbols (in the second case they are referred to as 
‘sub-symbolic’).The analogues of the rules and operations of symbolist systems are patterns of 
activation in the neural network. Symbolist systems treat the representation and the processing of 
knowledge separately, but in connectionist systems usually there is no such principled distinction. 
      Each of the two types has its advantages and disadvantages. Symbolist systems are good at 
simulating abstraction and also productivity (i.e., the ability to generate an infinite number of structures 
using a finite number of rules) because their rule sets can lead to recursive processing and thus can 
represent an infinite number of structures. However symbolist systems are also rigid because exceptions 
to rules create the need for more rules. Connectionist systems are good at handling irregular and even 
conflicting input because the degradation of performance caused by the irregularity or the conflict 
occurs gradually – the system experiences ‘graceful degradation’. However, connectionist systems are 
relatively inefficient when it comes to symbol manipulation. Linguistic phenomena occur across a broad 
range from ‘high’ to ‘low’. There is general recognition of phonetics, phonology, morphology, lexis, 
syntax, semantics, pragmatics and discourse as separate domains in a hierarchy of complexity. For the 
most part connectionist systems are better at handling lower level phenomena whereas symbolist 
systems are better at handling higher level phenomena.   
     Despite all of these differences, Hulstijn subscribes to the claim made in Carpenter (1999) that “… the 
two architectures [symbolist and connectionist systems] are completely compatible abstractions, which 
suggest that a wise scientific strategy is to figure out their interrelation, rather than to choose between 
them (258)”. And indeed there are hybrid systems. Hulstjin himself favors a hybrid system of modular 
design. The modules exist in a network and some of them are sub-symbolic while others are symbolic. 
Linguistic knowledge can be represented via sub-symbolic modules in network activation patterns or via 
symbolic modules in sets of lexical items or rules. It all depends on the specific type of linguistic 
knowledge involved.  
     Although our main concern here is with second language acquisition, it is worth noting that Hulstijn 
also contrasts the symbolist and the connectionist approaches with respect to first language acquisition. 
He says that some symbolists believe that we are born with a language specific faculty which encodes 




general capacity to detect similarities in the acoustic and visual stimuli that we receive and to store 
these stimuli accordingly. In this latter case induction (that is, generalization from observed patterns to 
general regularities) provides the required principles of language. However the connectionists who 
espouse this view do not rule out the possibility that a language specific faculty develops at some early 
period.  
     Quite naturally, explicit knowledge of language is associated with the lexicons and rule sets of 
symbolist systems, and implicit knowledge of language with the networks and activation patterns of 
connectionist systems. In explicit learning we consciously engage lexical entries and rules of grammar in 
order to develop proficiency in assembling the words and short word-sequences, which serve as the 
lexical entries according to the patterns set by the rules, so as to form sentences that express our 
intended meaning. But in implicit learning, processes that start at the sub-symbolic level lead by 
induction to the development of the same kind of proficiency in the expression of meaning. This takes 
place in a network whose operation escapes conscious awareness. 
         Three critical ideas in Hulstijn’s text have the potential for resolving our dilemma. Each one of them 
is expressed in a fairly brief passage. The selection and enumeration of these passages are my own.  
(a) Implicit learning is an autonomous process, taking place whenever information is processed 
receptively (through hearing and seeing), be it intentionally and deliberately or unintentionally and 
incidentally. Implicit learning is not under conscious control. That is, once we have decided to listen, 
read, speak or write, we cannot choose not to encode and store information, or not to adjust the 
connection weights in our network. Implicit learning is unstoppable in the sense that it is not under 
conscious control and that its processing components cannot be verbalized. (206) 
 (b) Anderson’s model [his ACT model of skill acquisition discussed in connection with DeKeyser 
above] requires the processing of the required information over a great number of trials, during 
training. Thus, it may be the repeated processing of primary linguistic information that establishes 
implicit knowledge. The most likely conceptualization of the proceduralizing that takes place is the 
construction of a separate network of an implicit nature. (207) 
 (c) Since implicit learning takes place as an unstoppable information processing mechanism, it will 
automatically accompany explicit learning activities whenever L2 learners engage in practicing the 
pronunciation of a particular sound, or producing a grammatical structure. (207)  
Now what we want to do is pull together the points made in these three passages in order to form a 
single statement, or an argument, that represents what Hulstijn implies and which may help us here.  
According to the first passage, whenever we process language, either by  inputting  it through listening 
or reading, or by outputting it through speaking or writing, we automatically learn in an unconscious 
way, and what we learn takes the form of implicit knowledge. According to the second passage, 
whenever we attempt to develop a skill, we perform a great number of trials: in other words we 
practice. And if the skill we are trying to develop is the skill of using the language then the trials we 
perform are acts of language processing, i.e. listening and reading, and speaking and writing. But 




form of implicit knowledge of language. Further, in the case in which we are processing language by the 
performance of trials, or drills or exercises, the implicit knowledge we develop is procedural: it is 
knowledge of how to do something, and the physiological mechanism responsible for this is the 
construction of a new neural network. The last passage works here as a conclusion, so we do get an 
argument. According to this passage, whenever we practice using a language we develop implicit 
knowledge of that language of the procedural kind, that is to say we develop the skill of using the 
language.     
     For obvious reasons one tends to identify the claim about the centrality of traditional instruction, 
made in (1) above, with the strong interface position such that the two rise and fall together. But 
Hulstijn’s argument makes room for a more refined view of the issue.  At the heart of the matter is the 
question that defines the interface issue. This is the question  
Does the explicit knowledge of language that is produced by explicit instruction in vocabulary 
and grammar and the like convert into the implicit knowledge of language that all parties agree 
is the basis for the use of a second language with any level of proficiency?  
Those who answer ‘yes’ take the strong position, those who answer ‘no’ take the no position, and those 
who answer ‘no’ but with positive qualifications about the facilitating value of explicit instruction take 
the weak position.     
     But the notion of ‘conversion’ is rather vague and it covers more than one possibility. Hulstijn’s idea 
about neural networks that incorporate symbolic and sub-symbolic subunits suggests that explicit 
teaching of grammar and the lexicon, when it is accompanied by repetitive drills,  may result in a hybrid 
kind of network that  operates at a subconscious level, but in which the explicit teaching has left its 
traces. This will be a different network than the one produced by mere repetition of comprehensible 
input, when the subject is immersed in a linguistic community that speaks the second language, without 
an explicit teaching process. We have seen in § 3 that Krashen considers a similar possibility of 
‘alternative routes’, which he calls ‘a weak interface position’. Against this hypothesis he invokes 
Occam’s razor: If we agree that sufficient comprehensible input can by itself lead to implicit use of the 
new language, there is no need for an alternative route.  But this use of Occam’s razor is inappropriate, 
given all that we know already about the plasticity of the brain and the possibilities of using different 
modules to achieve the same goal. Also the ‘alternative route’, when it is conceived in terms of Hulstijn’s 
connectionist  models, has more explanatory power in that it clarifies the positive role of teaching and 
the evidence concerning the different efficacies of different  teaching methods. There is surely more to 
explicit teaching than the occasion it provides for repetitive use of the second language.  Elis speaks of 
teaching as having a ‘facilitating’ value, but Hulstijn’s suggestions give this vague term a more concrete 
meaning.  
While this proposal strengthens considerably the ‘facilitating value’ position, it is not clear whether it 
counts as a variant of ‘the strong position’. Given the broad way in which ‘strong’ and ‘weak’’ are 
distinguished from each other, and the fact that this, to a large extent is a matter of degree, I do not 




§ 7  Classroom Based Research 
     This section has three divisions. The first division addresses the design and implementation of a 
certain kind of practical research pertaining to ESL instruction and potentially to SLA instruction 
generally. This is the main division and it describes in some detail five particular ESL research projects. 
The second section is a critical comparison of practical research in ESL and theoretical research in SLA. 
The third division moves away from research to consider instruction proper. I do not provide any course 
designs but I do describe in some detail an important instructional technique, and I offer some thinking 
about what the proper goal of ESL instruction and SLA instruction generally should be.  
Research 
     Clearly, the studies most needed to evaluate the implications we drew from Hulstijn’s theory, are 
studies of the type produced by SLA researchers; the study of the effect of explicit feedback on the 
acquisition of past tense ‘-ed’ conducted by Ellis and associates, which we reported above, is a good 
example. However, there is also what is called ‘action research’. This type of research is conducted in 
SLA classrooms and it takes three distinct forms. 
1. Technical action research: an SLA researcher comes into a class to conduct a study, with the 
cooperation of the teacher and the students, in order to address a research question prompted by a 
certain theory, or to confirm or disconfirm the results of one or more studies that have already been 
done.  
2. Practical action research: here the teacher conducts the research with a view to the certification of 
new methods of teaching that they hope to employ in order to improve the students’ performance. 
3. Critical action research: the teacher conducts research not only for the purpose of certifying new 
methods but also for the purpose of determining the underlying social causes of the problem in the 
students’ performance which suggested the need for new methods in the first place.  
Practical action research can also be called teacher research and classroom based research. I will use 
this last term because I think that it is the more informative of the three. But typically I will use a related 
term, viz. classroom based studies, to facilitate individual reference.  
     I am interested in conducting classroom based studies that are inspired by the ideas about second 
language acquisition developed in the discussion of Hulstijn above. Each one of these studies will have a 
structure that is similar to studies conducted in SLA research, as exemplified by the study above by  Ellis 
and his associates. Thus it will have components of the following kind. 
- research question    - instructional procedures 
- design      - testing instruments 
- participants     - results 




- tasks      - conclusion  
Later we will see the specific form that these components might take in a certain study. It must be 
emphasized however that the purpose of the research will not be to support any SLA theory, no matter 
how narrowly framed it might be. Rather the purpose will be to validate an approach to teaching some 
feature of the second language by showing that the use of that approach results in better outcomes in 
terms of student learning. Note that a definite tradeoff is implied here. Studies intended to support SLA 
theories typically have a sharply focused research question. They aim at establishing something about 
the acquisition process itself while meeting formal and rigorous standards. But classroom based studies 
can have a greater immediate practical payoff, in that they are conducted in classrooms, by teachers, in 
order to achieve certain pedagogical objectives. 
     The main features of English that I am interested in presently are as follows. 
1. the articles of English: ‘a’, ‘an’ and ‘the’ 
2. the six basic tenses of English: the past, the present, the future, the past perfect, the present perfect 
and the future perfect 
3. the prepositions of English, with a concentration on the ‘big 10’’: ‘of’, ‘to’, ‘for’, ‘with’, ‘by’, ‘in’, ‘on’, 
‘at’, ‘from’, ‘about’ 
4. the pronouns of English: especially the ones that typically take antecedents: ‘he’, ’she’, ‘it’ (singular, 
subjective); ‘him’, ‘her’, ‘it’(singular, objective); ‘they’ (plural, subjective); ‘them’ (plural, objective); 
‘himself’, ‘herself’, ‘itself’ (singular, reflexive); ‘themselves’ (plural, reflexive); and ‘it’ vs. ‘this’ used as 
subjects  
5. clarity: sentences and short sequences of sentences that are unclear due to the disarrangement of the 
terms, i.e. the subject phrases, verb phrases, object phrases, occurring in them  
     Let us now consider these five features from the perspective of the ten component structure for 
second language acquisition studies given above. Clearly each of these features will be the target 
feature of a study. The participants will be students in my classes. The research question will always be 
of the simple form: 
Is a certain approach effective in increasing the students’ level of proficiency in the use of the 
given feature? 
     The design component of the study structure will be equally simple:   
(1) The students will be tested at the beginning of the course to determine their starting level of 
proficiency with respect to the use of the target feature. 
(2) They will be taught the use of the feature, using a particular approach, during the period through 




(3) They will be tested at the end of the course and at two intermediate points spaced evenly between 
the beginning and end points in order to plot their progress. The results, discussion and conclusion 
components of the structure cannot be realized until the study is completed of course, so the critical 
components in relation to each study are: 
- instructional procedures 
- tasks 
- testing instruments  
Let us now consider how these three components will be realized in relation to each of the five target 
features which we shall take one by one.  
1. the articles of English: ‘a’, ‘an’ and ‘the’ 
     The use of English articles is a very difficult problem for most ESL students. Some of the students’ first 
languages don’t have articles and the first languages of others have articles whose grammar is different 
from that of English articles. And of course the grammar of English articles, especially the definite article 
‘the’, is complex and challenging.  
     Over the years I have developed a number of ideas about the grammar of English articles and how 
best to teach it. Here I shall consider a set of three distinctions that I propose to employ as instructional 
procedures in relation to the definite article ‘the’ in this study. The distinctions are: 
- open class vs. closed class 
- class concept vs. class membership 
- characterization vs. identification   
     In the graphic representation I employ in class I use circles to represent classes and ‘x’s to represent 
individuals.  The instruction is set up by the presentation of two sentences like: 
Students have a hard life. 
Prof., the students are waiting for you. 
where the focus is on the plural count noun ‘students’. The three distinctions are in an obvious sense 
‘parallel’ and they are employed in order to give different perspective on the indefinite/definite 
distinction. These different perspectives can be helpful in leading the student to master the same 
grammatical distinction.  
Open Class vs. Closed Class: 
     With respect to the first sentence I draw a circle (representing the class of students) and then draw 




elementary school, and arrows taking individuals out of the circle, each representing twenty-two year 
old graduate who exits college and takes a job. The class is thus ‘open’ and the definite article is not 
needed. But with respect to the second sentence I draw another circle and draw 15 or so ‘x’s inside it 
explaining that these are the students in the professor’s class. All of the 15 ‘x’s have to be in the circle 
and no other ‘x’s can be there. The class is thus ‘closed’ and the definite article must be used. 
Class Concept vs. Class Membership: 
     With respect to the first sentence I draw a circle and point out that we are not concerned with any 
particular individuals. It is the concept ‘student’ that is important and the members of the class are 
whatever individuals happen to fit that concept. In this case the definite article does not have to be 
used. But with respect to the second sentence I draw a circle and then draw 15 or so ‘x’s inside it, 
pointing out that we are concerned with particular individuals. It is the membership of the class that is 
important and the concept ‘student’ serves only as a device that helps to deliver the 15 students in the 
professor’s class to us.     
Characterization vs. Identification: 
     Here it is better to use the second sentence: I point out that the sentence, along with contextual 
information, including the name of the professor, the name of the college and the course title, number 
and section, provide us with enough information to identify 15 or so individuals, to distinguish them 
from all other individuals in the world. But with respect to the first sentence, information sufficient for 
identification is not only not available as a matter of fact, but also as a matter of semantic principle: 
while it might be possible to identify all past and present students, it is certainly not possible to identify 
all  future students. Yet the noun ‘students’, unadorned as it is in the first sentence, has reference to the 
future as well as to the past and the present.  
     The articles ‘a’ and ‘an’ will be handled in a somewhat similar way, which I shall not elaborate on 
here. A sentence pair and the characterization vs. identification distinction serve as the basis of the 
approach. Consider: 
A student came by to see you. 
The student who needs a change of grade came by to see you. 
In the case of the first sentence the information provided is sufficient only for characterization while in 
the second case the information provided is sufficient for identification -  assuming that only one of the 
professor’s students needs a change of grade. Of course the use of ‘a’ before consonants and ‘an’ before 
vowels will be taught as well. 
     The tasks to be performed by the students in this study, and the ones to be performed in most of the 
other studies, are of the same basic type. The students will have to study input and output, i.e. they will 
have to study published texts of good quality, as well as their own writing with respect to the target 
feature. In the case of the study of articles, the students, with the help of the teacher, will have to 




three distinctions above, and more broadly in terms of their own intuition with respect to natural 
language. This is a challenging undertaking but the massive amount of processing that will take place 
over the course of the term and the collective analytical power of the students and the teacher should 
yield a deep understanding of article use by the end of the term. The texts will take the form of articles 
from publications like The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, Time Magazine, Newsweek, The 
New Yorker, Atlantic Monthly, Harper’s, The Nation, The Economist, and Forbes Magazine. The 
motivation for this selection is twofold. First, the students will probably find selected articles from these 
sources to be interesting and this will help with getting through the long series of analyses. Second, 
reading articles in publications like these can develop certain analytical skills, which, hopefully, will make 
the instruction more effective. 
     The students will write essays on a variety of subjects in a variety of rhetorical modes – narrative, 
classification, argument, etc. Each correct article use, incorrect article use, missing article and 
superfluous article produced by each student will be studied by the class as a whole. This task is the 
complement to the one above: it concerns the identification of errors and their correction. Since 
intellectual appreciation of article use is not a sufficient basis for advances in proficiency,  the instruction 
includes also the following elements:  (1) the students will be trained in the use of a SMEP, i.e. a specific 
mechanical editing procedure, for the use of articles (see the detailed description of SMEPs provided 
below) and (2) they will receive comprehensive and systematic feedback on the use of articles in their 
essays. It is then expected that the students’ command of the use of articles will increase significantly 
over the period during which the course runs.  
     The students will be tested four times, as was indicated above. Each test will have two parts. The first 
part will be the writing of an essay and the second part will be the completion of a four section exercise. 
Each section of the exercise will contain 10 sentences. In the first section the student will have to choose 
one of the three articles at various points in the 10 sentences where one of them must be used. In the 
second section the student will have to indicate at various points in the 10 sentences whether an article 
must be used and if so which one. In the third section all articles will have been removed and the 
student will have to put them in where they are needed. And in the fourth section the 10 sentences will 
contain cases of correct article use, incorrect article use, missing articles and superfluous articles and the 
student will have to identify the mistaken cases and correct them.  The four sections involve a 
progression in difficulty from the lowest level in the first section to the highest level in the fourth.  
     In order to make the scoring principle clear to the students all scores will be on a scale of 100. In 
order to achieve this I will use a modification of a formula I use in determining my final grades as 
follows: 
(100 ÷ the number of responses that have to be made) x the number of the student’s correct responses 
It should be noted that where I refer above to the scoring of tests I am including the essay the student 
will write, with respect to which the number of responses that have to be made = the number of uses of 




      Concerning the other four target features, I shall indicate here only the essential elements without 
going into all the details.  
2. the six basic tenses of English: the past, the present, the future, the past perfect, the present perfect 
and the future perfect 
The key concepts here are that (1) there are three time ‘zones’, the past zone, the present zone and the 
future zone, and (2) the basic difference between the simple tenses (the past, the present and the 
future), and the complex tenses (the past perfect, the present perfect and the future perfect) is that the 
former involve one main action in a specified time zone whereas the latter involve two main actions in a 




The Past Zone The Present Zone The Future Zone 
The Simple Tenses 
 
action action action 
The Complex Tenses 
 
action 1   →   acZon 2 action   →   exact now action 1   →  acZon 2 
 
A simple example related to the past tense and the past perfect tense will serve to bring out the 
structure of the six tenses: in a married couple the wife, who has been at her job for some time and is 
well established there, usually comes home at five. The husband however is fairly new at his job and 
typically has to work late. He likes nothing more than having dinner and a glass of wine with her in the 
evening. But she, being the more pragmatic one, will go ahead and eat dinner if she is hungry, without 
waiting for him.  The husband’s colleagues know this, and one of them, speaking of a certain day last 
week when the husband had to stay later than usual, says: 
Poor guy, by the time he arrived home, she had already eaten dinner. 
The tense of this sentence is the past perfect, as signified by the verb phrase ‘had eaten’ – the adverb 
‘already’ is optional.  We have two actions, the action of her eating dinner and the action of his arriving 
home. Both occurred in the past zone, but her eating dinner is the main action (referred to by the verb-
phrase of the sentence) and its time is described relative the other action: his arriving home. Thus in the 
box for the past perfect, her eating dinner is action 1, his arriving home is action 2 and the arrow shows 
that the action of her eating dinner took place before his arriving home. So the action of his arriving 
home ‘locates’ the action of her eating dinner at a more specific point. This example with the help of the 
diagram, makes the difference between the past perfect and past pretty obvious, when the latter is 
exemplified by the sentence: 
She ate diner. 




By the time he arrives home, she will already have eaten dinner. 
She will eat dinner.      
     The present perfect is a bit different in that an action’s time is stated not in relation to another action 
in the same zone but in relation to the present i.e. the exact ‘now’.  The action has occurred before the 
present, meaning that its completion took place in the time stretch from its starting point to the 
present:  
She has already eaten lunch.   
The action of her eating lunch is classified in present zone, but at a point prior to the exact now of that 
present zone. Moreover, what counts as ‘present’ is flexible and context dependent: it can be this 
second,  this minute, this hour, this afternoon, today, this week and so on.  
     The students’ tasks with respect to tense will be to analyze the tenses of the sentences in articles 
drawn from the sources listed above and from the essays that they write. And they will be tested by 
having them write essays and complete exercises on the four sections of 10 sentences model 
established above.  
3. the prepositions of English, with a concentration on the ‘big 10’: ‘of’, ‘to’, ‘for’, ‘with’, ‘by’, ‘in’, ‘on’, 
‘at’, ‘from’, ‘about’ 
     The situation here is quite different due to the following issue: should verb-preposition associations 
be taught as ‘formal’ arbitrary associations or as meaning based associations? Consider the sentence: 
I will vote for the most qualified candidate.  
How does the ESL student know to use the preposition ‘for’ with the verb ‘vote’ here? The students and 
the teacher will study the verb-preposition associations found in articles drawn from the sources listed 
above and from the essays the students write in order to try to determine what the most effective 
learning strategy is. The arbitrary association strategy will be advanced by (1) making a list of the 
associations encountered and (2) learning to use Longman’s Advanced Learner’s Dictionary, which, for 
example, gives ‘[ + for ]’ as one of the options in its definition of the verb ‘vote’. The meaning based 
association strategy will be advanced by (1’) using a good regular dictionary, which lists many specific 
uses for a given preposition (the tenth edition of Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary lists 24 
specific uses of ‘for’ as a function word) and (2’) trying to establish intuitive concepts for at least the 
main uses of prepositions – ‘on’ is related to surfaces, ‘in’ is related to containers, etc. The restriction to 
the ‘big 10’ prepositions should help greatly with this (there are about 70 prepositions in English). Here 
The students won’t be tested so much as they will be surveyed. Each student will write a short piece at 
the end of the course in which they describe the strategy for learning verb-preposition associations that 
they find to be most effective.   
4. the pronouns of English: especially the ones that typically take antecedents: ‘he’, ’she’, ‘it’ (singular, 




‘himself’, ‘herself’, ‘itself’ (singular, reflexive); ‘themselves’ (plural, reflexive); and ‘it’ vs. ‘this’ used as 
subjects 
     The learning goal I will set with respect to this feature is the simplest of the five. The students have to 
learn (1) to continue the use of a pronoun or pronoun cluster (e.g., ‘she’, ‘her’, ‘herself’) as long as the 
referent of its antecedent  appears in the preceding sentence, and (2) the necessity of distinguishing the 
use of ‘it’ from the use of ‘this’ in referring back to the preceding sentence. Consider the following 
passage: 
Mr. Obama is a pragmatist on defense strategy. He believes in the use of drones. Many have 
criticized him for this on grounds of ethics. But he regards himself as a man who is guided by his 
morals in the effort to formulate and implement the defense strategy that best protects the 
American people. The defense strategy of a nation is in many ways its most important strategy. 
Like every other American president, Mr. Obama understands this. 
Now consider the passage again where the key terms are underlined and the sentences numbered by 
superscripts:  
Mr. Obama is a pragmatist on defense strategy.
1
 He believes in the use of drones.
2
 Many have 
criticized him for this on grounds of ethics.
3
 But he regards himself as a man who is guided by his 
morals in the effort to formulate and implement the defense strategy that best protects the 
American people.
4
 The defense strategy of a nation is in many ways its most important 
strategy.
5
 Like every other American president, Mr. Obama understands this.
6
 
The sentence sequence begins with the term ‘Mr. Obama’ occurring in sentence 1, and in sentences 2 
through 4 a pronoun takes this term as antecedent because its referent, Mr. Obama, appears in the 
sentences that immediately precede sentences 2 through 4, respectively. The rule then is that if the 
referent of an established term, like ‘Mr. Obama’, appears in sentence n and in sentence n + 1, then the 
term used for that referent in sentence n + 1 must be a pronoun (or a proper name if special 
circumstances make this preferable). But in sentence 5, Mr. Obama does not appear as a referent and 
thus a pronoun cannot be used to refer to him in sentence 6. The chain of reference has been broken so 
to speak, and the term ‘Mr. Obama’ must be reestablished in sentence 6. 
     We can perhaps see better how this works by using the following schema in which a line represents a 
sentence and ‘X’ represents the appearance of a referent: 
 
1 _______________ X (Mr. Obama) _______________  
2 __________________ X (He) ___________________ 
3 __________________ X (him) __________________ 





6 _______________ X (Mr. Obama) _______________ 
 
     The other pronoun topic to be addressed in the study is rather simple. Students, ESL and native-
speaker alike, quite often try to refer back to the whole idea presented in the preceding sentence by 
using ‘it’ as the subject of the succeeding sentence while the pronoun that must be used for this 
purpose is ‘this’. The distinction can be brought out by means of the following pair of sentences and 
some auxiliary bracketing: 
I bought [a sports car]. It has a V8 engine. 
[I bought a sports car.] This made me very happy. 
In the first sentence ‘it’ is used properly to refer back to a part of the state of affairs given by the 
preceding sentence while in the second sentence ‘this’ is used properly to refer back to the whole of the 
state of affairs given by the preceding sentence. But the student will quite often write: 
I bought a sports car. It made me very happy. 
meaning 
[I bought a sports car.] It made me very happy. 
and this is a mistake. The ‘it/this’ mistake is one of the conceptually simpler ones. Bringing it to the 
student’s attention and following this with simple drills in the two uses should prove effective in 
eliminating the error. 
5. clarity: sentences and short sequences of sentences that are unclear due to  disarrangement of  terms 
(i.e. the subject phrases, verb phrases, object phrases occurring in them) 
     All too often ESL students produce unclear sentences, or short sentence sequences, by  ‘scrambling’ 
the order of the terms involved, which, in the case of single sentences,  are the subject phrase, the verb 
phrase and the object phrases. Note that sentences with no object phrases or with no more than one, 
are not subject to such scrambling. In addition to the scrambling there can also be missing terms, 
superfluous terms and improperly formed terms. I have found that the simplest way to deal with this 
problem is to (1) identify the agent of the sentence, i.e. the performer of the action, (2) produce a term, 
typically a name or a noun phrase, that refers to the agent and make that term the subject of the 
sentence, and (3) try to get the sentence to conform to the ‘standard’ pattern for sentences in English. 
That pattern is 




 … + OP
n
   
where ‘SP’ = Subject Phrase, ‘VP’ = Verb Phrase and ‘OP’ = Object Phrase.  Typically prepositions are 




The manager taught the new employees about the accounting system by showing them a video. 
the prepositions ‘about’ and ‘by’ connect the object phrases ‘the accounting system’ and ‘showing them 
a video’, respectively, back to the verb phrase ‘taught’.  
     In this study the source material must be the students’ own writing and their task must be to reform 
any unclear sentences that appear in that material using the approach described above. The product of 
the study will take the form of pairings of unclear sentences with the student’s proposed corrected 
versions, and it will include also a written explanation by the student and a commentary by the teacher. 
The point of the commentary will be to say how effective the reform appears to be and what problems 
remain where the reform is less effective than is desired.   
     The value of the five studies described above will be enhanced if a description of each study is written 
up as a report that is made available to other teachers. The format for the report should follow the ten 
component structure for SLA studies given above just as the studies themselves will.  It must be kept in 
mind that the audience for the report is, first and foremost,  the community of ESL teachers and other 
SLA teachers and not the community of SLA researchers and theorists (although the attention of the 
latter community to such reports would be certainly desirable). Having teachers as the primary audience 
means that the writing in the reports should be informal in the proper sense of the term: the statistics 
that are an essential part of the typical SLA study are very challenging, and some non-technical or semi-
technical method of delivering the basic information that they contain to the audience of language 
teachers must be devised.  
     Hopefully teachers will find the studies to be interesting because of the potential that the ideas they 
contain has for improving educational outcomes. None of the studies described incorporates any 
particular theory or approach in philosophy of language but the thinking that went into them was 
guided to a meaningful extent by concepts and distinctions that are characteristic of that  discipline. This 
is especially true in the case of the first study whose target features are the articles of English. The 
proper analysis definite article ‘the’ and quantifiers and determiners generally has been of particular 
interest to linguistically oriented philosophers for quite some time. We need only consider the three 
seminal papers ‘On Denoting’ by Bertrand Russell, ‘The Proper Treatment of Quantification in Ordinary 
English’ by Richard Montague and ‘Generalized Quantifiers and Natural Language’ by Jon Barwise and 
Robin Cooper to see that this is so. All of these papers are far too technical to be of direct relevance to 
ESL teachers or to SLA teachers generally but the concepts that undergird them could be brought out 
and made useful by someone with the proper preparation who has studied the works closely and has at 
the same time the ability to explain technical material in an effective way. My personal interest is in 
developing a treatment of ‘the’ and determiners generally that is much simpler and much more intuitive 
than the treatments that receive recognition currently. The three distinctions on which I base the 
teaching of the use of ‘the’ are byproducts of the pursuit of this interest. 
      There are resources in the philosophy of language, with possible relevance, direct or indirect, to the 
other target features as well. The second study will address the six basic tenses of English, but then 




prepositions set relations and there is the logic of relations. The fourth study will address the pronouns 
of English but then there is the theory of anaphora. Finally the fifth study addresses the problem of 
sentences that are unclear because their terms have in effect been scrambled and here the notion of 
logical form may perhaps provide guidance. If it is possible to mine these resources by first putting in the 
work that is necessary to understand them well, and then finding a way to present their essential results 
and claims in a form that allows the language teacher who is willing to work a bit themselves to grasp 
them, then any number of possibilities for the advancement of second language pedagogy might open 
up. 
     And if there are in fact second language teachers who might want to try to teach the target features  
using the recommended instructional procedures  and perhaps even conduct a study of their own, then 
they can of course use any variation or any additional devices that come to their minds. The aim of such 
studies is the local and humble goal of getting better results in ESL teaching.  
       Teachers display a great variety of teaching styles, which surely affects the efficacy of their teaching.  
One stands behind a lectern and speaks in a formal way guided by a prepared text. Another paces back 
and forth right in front of the students and, and while having a clear plan in mind, they improvise in 
response to the students’ questions and mood. Style of teaching will be a key variable in the 
determination of the outcome of any experiment with a new pedagogical approach. This does not mean 
however that no truth can emerge from classroom based studies. In particular if a number of teachers 
have tried a certain approach and all of them have had success with it then this will indicate that the 
advantages of the approach have dominated the differences in teaching style.  
     The final point to be made here is that technology could play a very large role in ESL and SLA teaching 
generally. The use of chalk and blackboard (or markers and white board) is in my experience quite 
efficient and, I think, should be continued. But I also use PowerPoint extensively and I am interested in 
using Prezi, which I saw a demonstration of at Marymount Manhattan College. Well beyond this, 
however, the use of sophisticated computer based programs, including simulation and animation 
systems, may open up an endless array of possibilities whose efficiency may be subject to testing.  
Some Critical Reflection on Research 
     While classroom based research is and should be thought of as supplementary to standard SLA 
research, and while it lacks the rigor of controlled well defined experiments, subject to statistical 
methods, I see it as having three distinct advantages. The first is that, while in standard SLA research a 
simulation of actual learning is studied, in classroom based research, the actual learning phenomenon 
itself is studied. Thus in Ellis’s study the tasks that the students were directed to perform, the ones 
involving stories and pictures, were not real assignments. Rather they were simulations of real 
assignments designed to highlight the object of the researchers’ interest, viz. the relative effectiveness 
of implicit and explicit instruction in the form of feedback. The problem with simulations is that an 
inference has to be made from the simulation to the actual phenomenon. I concede that the inference is 
often rather direct but it is still an inference and it is not always so direct – it depends on the study. By 




phenomenon itself that is studied. The second and the third advantages of classroom based research  
are much simpler. Standard SLA research attempts to isolate a single learning phenomenon whereas 
classroom based research takes each phenomenon in the context of the complex situation that exists in 
the classroom. The more the phenomenon is isolated, the more determinate the study results will be, 
but the more the phenomenon is taken in context the more practically useful the study results will be. 
As indicated,  I am here claiming an advantage for classroom based research with respect to standard 
SLA research but, clearly as regards isolation vs. context, it is fairer to say that there are offsetting 
advantages and disadvantages. Finally, standard SLA studies tend to focus on a point in the educational 
proceedings they select for study while classroom based research can take in the whole arc of such 
proceedings since the teacher and the students are together for a relatively long period of time. 
Practical action research thus provides a better basis for longitudinal studies. 
     Another point which needs to be made here is that, as regards purpose, there is a critical difference 
between standard SLA research and the classroom based research I want to conduct. SLA research 
studies often focus on a linguistic feature merely for its instrumental value. Typically the effectiveness of 
some pedagogical approach is being tested and any number of features would serve as the object of 
focus. Thus in the study by Ellis and associates past tense ‘-ed’ was chosen because students have some 
knowledge of it but still have problems using it, but they could just as well have used plural ‘s’ or passive 
voice ‘-ed’ or ‘a’ vs. ‘an’ and so on in their effort to determine whether explicit instruction or implicit 
instruction in the form of corrective feedback is more effective.  By contrast, the studies I am interested 
in conducting will focus on features whose syntactic and semantic analysis has not been settled and yet 
one can have ideas about how the analysis should go. More specifically one can have informal 
explanations of the features. The explanation of each feature would be intended to serve a double 
purpose. It would serve as the means of instructing the students in the use of the feature and it would 
also serve as a possible basis for the formal explication of the feature.  
Teaching 
     One of the most important techniques that I use to teach grammar is what I call a SMEP, a specific 
mechanical editing procedure. If a student applies the SMEP for a type of error to their writing then it 
should be possible for them to eliminate all errors of that type, provided that they proceed with 
sufficient care. The best example relates to the most pervasive error type among the ESL students I work 
with in the Writing Center at Pace University. The error type consists in the use of count nouns both 
without a plural ending and without a determiner. Thus one should not say: 
I like car.  
Instead, one must say any of: 
I like cars.  
I like this car. 




Most ESL students have considerable explicit knowledge of English grammar and they can use this 
knowledge to eliminate ‘naked’ count nouns from their writing by going through their essay, word by 
word, underlining or highlighting every count noun, and determining whether it is naked and, if it is, 
taking care to ‘dress’ it with a plural ending or a determiner or both (in this last case the noun is ‘all 
dressed up’). Of course the student cannot randomly add plural endings and determiners. A plural 
ending is to be added precisely where plurality is intended, and the use of determiners must be guided 
by the student’s knowledge of the 7 classes of determiners and the semantic considerations that dictate 
their use. Now a SMEP can be developed for every determinate error type, i.e. every type that allows for 
just one means of correction. Thus, theoretically at least, every student can be put in full command of 
the determinate aspect of the grammar of their writing, and yet determinate errors are the ones most 
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